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ABSTRACT 
Introduction: Speech and language therapy (SLT) is purported to be a scientifically-
based discipline. A commitment to scientific practice is currently best represented 
by practicing in an evidenced-based way, specifically by the use of research 
evidence, yet studies examining the use of research evidence both within the 
profession and across disciplines, consistently suggest that research is less than 
influential in guiding practice decisions. This suggests practice may not be scientific. 
Furthermore, unscientific practice may be represented by the use of pseudoscientific 
and / or non-scientific therapies.  
 
Aim: The aim of this research was to explore professional knowledge and decision-
making scaffolds in SLT clinical practice with special attention paid to scientific 
underpinnings. The intention was to gain an authentic understanding of the role of 
science in practice and thus, a deeper appreciation of the nature of SLT practice. 
 
Methodology and Methods: A mixed-methodology approach was undertaken 
targeting SLTs working in Ireland. The initial quantitative phase consisted of an 
electronic survey (n=271) focussing on therapy choices in disability and dysphagia, 
reasons for use and non-use of these therapies, and factors influencing decision-
making. The subsequent qualitative phase utilised three focus groups (n = 48). 
Group one consisted of SLTs working in a disability setting, group two of SLTs 
working in an acute hospital setting and group three of SLTs working in a 
community setting. Data were analysed using a variety of techniques including 
descriptive statistics and inferential statistics for the survey data, and thematic 
analysis for the focus group data.   
 
Results:  The therapies SLTs always-use in both areas of practice represent limited 
approaches to intervention. In disability, practice is effectively represented by seven 
high-use predominantly augmentative and alternative communication therapies; in 
dysphagia the three high-use therapies are mainly bolus modification techniques. A 
limited range of reasons explained use. Across all areas of practice and all therapies 
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and techniques, client suitability and clinical experience dominated as the main 
reasons interventions were always used. The principal reasons for not using 
therapies were lack of training, lack of knowledge and lack of suitability. A clinical 
lifespan is suggested with early-years clinicians being most dependent on external 
sources, specifically colleagues, to inform decision-making. Clinicians in the middle 
years of their careers appear more autonomous while those in the later years appear 
to branch out to external sources again, most specifically research evidence. 
Disability and dysphagia clinicians are significantly different in their use of all 
reasons for use and non-use with the exception of clinical experience. Scientific 
reasons are not well represented in either area of practice. Moreover, there is an 
apparent disconnect between attitudes and practice. For example, respondents 
demonstrate clear research values generally but not when therapy-specific 
reasoning is explicated.  
Three main themes were identified from focus group data: practice imperfect; 
practice as grounded and growing, and; critical practice. Practice as defined by 
clinicians is grey-zoned, eclectic, experimental, developmental and pragmatic, being 
primarily pivoted upon a clinician’s tool bag and experimental practice. This tool bag 
is composed predominantly of population-specific experience and facilitates the 
clinician to construct individualised interventions. Clinicians demonstrate scientific 
thinking but do not automatically reference scientific scaffolds unless explicated. 
 
Conclusion: Clinical practice is narrowly defined being predominantly scaffolded 
upon a limited range of therapies and case evidence and practical evidence. Practice 
is also constructed by SLTs as experimental and flexible. Scientific practice as 
characterised by research evidence is not evident in this study, however clinicians 
may operate scientifically through the use of scientific behaviours including 
experimentation, trial and error and on-going learning. This understanding of 
practice has implications for the dominant model of evidence-based practice. 
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Introduction 
‘Decision making is an essential part of health care….all…..decisions determine the 
quality of the health care that is provided’ (Chapman & Sonneberg, 2000, p.3).  
 
Clinical practice is an arena in which the clinician and patient engage in an interaction 
focused on providing best care and best outcomes. In the late twentieth and early 
twenty-first centuries, this arena has existed in the context of the dominant model of 
evidence-based practice (EBP). The growth of EBP has been partly driven by policy 
makers mainly to assist with the dilemma of allocating health resources (Rafferty, 
2010) and to ensure that clinical practice is based on high quality research (Reilly 
2004a). As Roddam and Skeat (2010) point out, third parties including governments 
and insurance providers ‘were beginning to demand factual evidence rather than 
clinical wisdom as the basis on which to make decisions’ (p.10).  In the UK this 
resulted in a range of policy documents (e.g. Department of Health, 2001 and 2006) 
and the establishment of institutions concerned with clinical excellence and 
governance such as the National Institute of Clinical Excellence (NICE). Indeed, the 
very phrase ‘evidence-based practice’ has come to define good practice, being 
synonymous with clinicians who value practice grounded in proven methods and who 
identify themselves as competent and considered practitioners. Thus, not practising 
in an evidence-based way opens the door to questioning the competency of such 
practice. However, while on the whole lauded by the literature, EBP has failed to 
engage the clinical communities to the degree envisioned, giving rise to repeated 
suggestions that clinicians need to change the way they do things.  
 
It is worth examining clinical practice to better understand the thinking and decision 
making processes underlying treatment decisions. What factors actually influence 
decisions? Are clinicians for example as Kahmi (1999) asks, more influenced by 
treatment efficacy studies or their own theoretical biases? And what roles do patients 
play in influencing decisions? It is currently less than clear what specific clinical 
reasoning scaffolds treatment decisions. Furthermore, this subject remains relatively 
under researched in speech and language therapy (SLT), particularly in comparison 
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to other health disciplines. It may be as Fish & Coles (1998a) originally inferred, that 
only by bringing decision making to the surface, can we begin to understand practice, 
and therefore both the use and relevance of models such as EBP.  
 
The question EBP has essentially posed is whether practice is grounded in science.  
This study aims to explore that question using therapies and techniques to examine 
the basis of decision making, with specific attention paid to scientific underpinnings. 
Perhaps it is the case as Doody (2011) argues, that ‘empirical evidence itself is not 
always sufficient for rational decision making’ (p.4). Moreover, if scientific constructs 
do not underlie clinical decisions, then the question to be answered is what does, and 
why might this be more meaningful to clinicians. Making explicit decision making 
scaffolds may lead to a better understanding of the compatibility issues between 
clinical practice and EBP, stimulate a broader debate about the nature of practice, 
suggest a better way to use EBP, or indeed postulate alternative models which may be 
more compatible with the nature of SLT clinical practice.  
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Chapter 1: Review of the literature 
 
 
1.1 INTRODUCTION  
‘Insights into the foundations on which our practice is based can help us respond to the 
glare of scrutiny in contemporary health care’ (Richardson, Higgs & Abrandt-Dalhgren, 
2004, p.13). 
  
Speech and language therapists (SLTs) along with their fellow health professionals, 
practice in the era of EBP. EBP can be said to effectively represent a commitment to 
incorporating science into practice but has been met with less than eagerness by 
clinicians. This lack of enthusiasm invokes questions of why such an apparently 
common sense model is struggling to find a place in clinical practice, and whether its 
scientific basis forms part of the explanation for its ostensible lack of allure. 
Discerning the scaffolds which underpin treatment decisions may facilitate our 
understanding of the role of science in the profession.  Within this study the notion of 
scaffolds is used to encompass the bases or sources of knowledge which support 
intervention decisions. 
A search of the literature was conducted using the following databases: Academic 
Search Complete; Biomed Reference Collection Expanded; CINAHL plus; Medline; 
Nursing & Allied Health Collection; Psycharticles, and; Psychinfo. The inclusion 
criteria included a date range of 1992-2012, English language only publications and 
scholarly (peer reviewed) journals. Keywords and Boolean operators were as follows: 
 Science AND speech and language therapy OR speech and language pathology;  
 Practice AND speech and language therapy OR speech and language pathology; 
 Pseudoscience AND speech and language therapy OR speech and language 
pathology; 
 Evidence-based practice  AND speech and language therapy OR speech and 
language pathology;  
 Clinical experience AND speech and language therapy OR speech and language 
pathology;  
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 Patient preferences AND speech and language therapy OR speech and language 
pathology; 
 Clinical decision making AND speech and language therapy OR speech and 
language pathology; 
 Clinical reasoning AND speech and language therapy OR speech and language 
pathology; 
 Evidence-based practice AND clinical experience OR patient preferences; 
 Evidence-based practice AND  health professionals, and; 
 Intervention AND decisions AND speech and language. 
Further literature was retrieved using references cited by relevant articles captured 
from the search process. A number of main texts and grey literature including 
unpublished theses and selected policy documents were also utilised. 
 
 
1.2 CLINICAL PRACTICE 
1.2.1. The context and nature of clinical practice 
‘The subject of therapy and what it encompasses is a big issue’ (Lum, 2002, p.154). 
 
At first glance the task of treating a patient appears fairly straightforward. Patient 
presents with problem. Therapist diagnoses problem. Therapist selects treatment 
method. Patient gets treated. Patient gets better. It seems simple enough. 
Nevertheless clinical practice frequently contains enough ingredients to make for less 
than predictable routines. In fact practice has been variously described as swampy 
lowlands (Schӧn, 1983), grey-zoned (Naylor, 1995) and uncertain (Thompson, 
McCaughan, Callum, Sheldon & Raynor, 2000). This suggests that rule-based methods 
may be insufficient to guide decision making and infers a high dependence on the 
individual clinician’s competencies and commitment.  
 
Clinicians exist in a multifaceted and dynamic arena (Sorenson & Yankech, 2008). 
They must respond to health services and professional standards which require more 
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accountability than previous generations. This includes the need to abide by 
continuing professional development requirements and adapt to economic 
restrictions and amended policies.  They also operate in the context of what Higgs and 
Jones (2000) call the ‘knowledge explosion’ (p.4), incorporating constantly emerging 
research, new treatments, attempts to persuade clinicians to buy something (Bowell 
& Kemp 2005), and the rapid obsolescence of practice knowledge 
(Higgs, Fish & Rothwell, 2004). Clinicians must both adapt to, and make on-going 
decisions about the reliability of such knowledge.  
 
Additionally, the role of the clinician has been subject to change. It is now less about 
expert models of practice, but encompasses co-operative decision making typified by 
the integration of patient perspectives into treatment decisions and the demands of 
team-based practices. This necessitates consideration of a broader range of factors.  
Moreover, areas of practice are expanding to include among other things health 
promotion, the use of sophisticated technologies such as voice-output communication 
aids, and non-oral feeding.  Clinicians are also encountering more complex patients 
represented by an aging population, increased social-cultural diversity and more 
acutely ill patients suffering from chronic diseases (Brunt, 2005).  This may all 
contribute to what Fish and Coles (1998b) call, ‘professionals under siege’ (p.3). 
 
Such developments may have increased rather than reduced the complexity of the 
clinician’s task and mean as Ely et al. (1999) comment, that the range of clinical 
decisions, questions and forms of uncertainty are infinite. Furthermore, EBP which 
intends to simplify the process may instead be perceived to have contributed to the 
complexity. Translating these multiple considerations into reasoned clinical decisions 
appears complicated, suggesting that clinical practice by its nature requires constant 
engagement and adaptation. This may mean according to Higgs, Burn and Jones 
(2001), that clinicians frequently make decisions where there are no right and wrong 
solutions or actions. Intervention may thus be constructed as inquiry-based practice 
(Schӧn 1988), reflecting the notion of practice as including experimentation, 
theorisation and trial and error (Riley, 2004; Ylivisaker et al., 2002), each episode of 
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care being what Logemann (2004) calls ‘an individual clinical trial’ (p.134). Such an 
unpredictable clinical context as Greenwood (2000) refers to it, implies a high 
dependence on the clinician’s capacity to reason.  Thompson et al. (2002) suggest that 
the clinician has two options: to ignore the uncertainty and let chance, and all the 
biases that come with unaided decision making influence the outcome, or; to 
acknowledge the uncertainty and find valid information that will reduce it. The 
response may revolve around whether clinicians feel the profession is scientifically 
grounded. 
 
1.2.2. Speech and language therapy as science  
‘The goal of striving for scientific status by a professional group is…not a trivial matter’ 
(Lum, 2002, p.2). 
 
The SLT discipline has developed within the scientific paradigm, this method being 
for a long time regarded as the only legitimate means of problem solving in the health 
professions (Baker, 1996). Roulstone (2001) in reviewing and discussing the nature 
of science in SLT, reports on some of the scientific characteristics of the profession 
such as objectivity, professional integrity and communication of ideas. Despite this, 
Roulstone (2001) references concerns that the field is not an autonomous science. A 
number of authors have pointed to borrowing from other disciplines, including 
behavioural sciences (Siegel & Ingham, 1987), social sciences (Bench, 1991) medicine 
and the arts (Lum, 2002). This has led to suggestions as Bench (1991) argues, that 
communication disorders while being unique, is a ‘heterogeneous discipline’ or an 
‘epistemological hybrid’ inferring a multitude of influences on practice (p.235).  
 
These ideas of science refer more to paradigms than science in action. Lum (2002) 
argues that it is not only the use of statistics which makes a discipline scientific. A 
broader view of science according to Roulstone (2001) refers to imaginative and 
creative activity as well as hypothesis formulation and experimentation. However 
characterised, Lum (2002) states that a profession which adheres to scientific 
doctrine must accept that this ‘entails a search for truthful knowledge’ (p.2), 
represented by the use of systematic logical processes to search for solutions (Apel, 
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1999). Science is seen therefore according to Finn, Bothe and Bramlett (2005) as ‘a 
virtual touchstone of truth’ (p.172). There is ample evidence of the profession seeking 
to be identified as scientific according to Lum (2002) including science degrees and 
activities such as research, conference meetings and journal publications. 
Furthermore, subscription to EBP in informing treatment selections suggests a 
scientific commitment (Lum, 2002). Therefore, while a scientific basis would seem to 
be uncontroversial (Herbert, 2003), the case is far from proven. Kahmi (2004), for 
example argues that ‘science, truth and logic have little impact on our professional 
identity’ (p.111). Perhaps the definition of science needs exploration. 
 
1.2.3. Understanding science 
‘Science is systematized knowledge derived from experimentation, study and 
observation’ (Federspil & Vettor, 2000, p.242). 
 
EBP is typically thought of as scientific, specifically research evidence, and it is the 
emergence of EBP into the language of the profession that has provoked the science 
debate. The function of science according to Packman and Attanasio (2004) is to 
uncover relationships between variables that are not apparent through common 
sense. It is ‘a way of asking questions and evaluating various possible answers’ 
(Beyerstein, 1995, p.2) and ‘a process of checks and balances (Kida, 2006, p.73). 
Indeed Lum (2002) describes science as adopting a principled approach to the 
discovery of knowledge, specifying criteria and standards for describing, explaining, 
and deciding what stands as real knowledge and truth. The insistence on rigour and 
replication to establish that results are not confined to one clinician or researcher or 
set of circumstances (Favell, 2005) is core to the differentiation and substantiation of 
science. This results in the minimisation of bias and of random influences from the 
environment (Beyerstein, 1995) providing for reliable outcomes. In clinical practice 
some of these characteristics may be difficult to ensure (Bench, 1991) given the 
individual nature of practice. Furthermore, even conventional notions of scientific 
practice are not as clear cut as might be thought. Apel (1999) points out for example, 
that ‘standardised tests seem scientific. They provide us with numbers. They allow us 
to duplicate procedures….document progress in intervention…to tightly control and 
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eliminate confounding variables’ (p.99). Yet he concludes they are often not valid 
measures as they do not test ‘the phenomenon of interest’ (p.99).  
 
Interpretations of science might deter its acceptance even in a scientifically-based 
profession. They include the appearance of arduousness, not conforming to common 
sense, the complexity of the process and the ‘perceived preoccupations with 
methodology’ over meaningfulness (Favell, 2005, p.20). Gambrill (2005) also argues 
that misconceptions may help explain some resistance including the assumption that 
science knows all the answers, that linear thinking is preferred over intuitive 
thinking, and that the accumulation of facts is the primary goal.  Furthermore, Favell 
(2005) suggests that resistance may emanate from negative evidence. If for example, 
the evidence for a favoured therapy is poor, what does the profession replace it with? 
Definitions of how a clinician should act scientifically may also play a part. McLean et 
al. (2007) for example, identify three core ways: the carrying out and publication of 
research; by tracking client progress through data collection; and, by clinical practice 
which is guided by the best knowledge regarding efficacious interventions.  These can 
be said to limit the clinician to what can be seen as essentially research use and 
hypothesis testing. Lum (2002) argues for a broader definition when she states that 
to be a scientist, is in ‘essence to think critically (or validly)’ (p.137). Science is 
therefore also about thinking as well as knowledge, what Greenhalgh (2002) refers to 
as ‘hypothesis generation’ (p.398). Cohen (1988) and Nelson (1994) refer to scientific 
thinking as scepticism and Nelson (1994) comments that clinicians also act 
scientifically when they avoid making guarantees regarding outcomes to patients. It is 
part of what Friel-Patti (1994) describes as responsible clinical practice. 
 
Thus, what underlies scientific behaviour might be best (but not only) described by 
the notion of critical thinking. Gambrill (2005) correctly points out other equally 
suitable terms including reasoning, clinical judgement, decision making, problem 
solving, reflection and scientific thinking. Buckingham and Adams (2000) refer to the 
“tangled web” of terminology in clinical decision making (p.984), giving the 
impression of overlap and interchangeable (King & Kitchner, 1994), synonymous 
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(O’Neill & Dluhy, 1997) definitions which are conceptually connected (Facione & 
Facione, 2000).  O’Neill and Dluhy (1997) perhaps come closest to differentiating 
critical thinking and clinical reasoning when they frame clinical reasoning as a 
domain specific skill and critical thinking a generic thinking skill, requiring broader 
considerations.  
 
In essence, such higher-order thinking skills are sciences’ ‘shortcut’ (Treweek, 2005, 
p.553) contributing to the adequacy of professional knowledge (Schӧn, 1983). 
However there remain issues with the role of higher-order thinking skills in clinical 
practice. Adams, Stover and Whitlow’s (1999) meta-analysis for example, showed no 
relationship between critical thinking and clinical competence. Murphy (2004) on the 
other hand, reports on studies which indicate that students who reflect are more 
active in the learning process, more self-aware and self-regulated and more complex 
in their thinking. The suggestion is that by combining this scientific thinking with 
research evidence, clinical decisions are rendered more sophisticated. 
 
Thus it can be said that there are different ways of working rigorously (Higgs, 
Andresen & Fish, 2004) or scientifically. Science which at first seems to clearly 
represent conventionally described practices typically carried out in laboratories and 
absent from the clinical context, may therefore be considered from a wider 
perspective, to include notions of scientific thinking and actions. In considering 
scientific behaviours, we need also to consider those which are not. 
 
1.2.4. What is not science 
‘At the borders of science, lurks a range of ideas that are appealing’ (Sagan, 1996, 
p.221). 
 
There is a risk for health professionals Newbold, Lohr and Gist (2008) argue, of being 
technical occupations rather than scientifically-grounded professions. This is perhaps 
most reflected in the uncritical adoption and habitual use of therapies, especially 
pseudoscientific, non-scientific and unvalidated practices. Speaking of clinical 
psychology, Newbold, Lohr and Gist (2008) note that the field is plagued with 
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procedures that lack empirical support, do harm, and yet are frequently practiced. 
Examples include memory retrieval and self-help tapes (Lilienfeld, 1998). SLT is not 
immune from pseudoscientific practices, most notably and recently typified by 
Auditory Integration Therapy (AIT), also known as Listening Therapy, and Facilitated 
Communication.  
 
A wider perspective includes complementary and alternative medicines (CAMs), 
practices not presently considered part of conventional medicine (Haltiwanger & 
Stein, 2009). The appeal of CAMs may be evidence of a desire for non-scientific or 
non-medicalised treatments. In the US in 2008, 38% of adults (and 12% of children) 
were using CAMs (National Center for Complementary and Alternative Medicine, 
2009). These include practitioner-based therapies such as chiropracty, acupuncture 
and reiki, although nutritional supplements (e.g. fish oils) were most commonly used 
among adults. CAMs use is especially prevalent for chronic or incurable problems and 
in the absence of effective therapies (Vyse, 2005), including conditions such as 
cerebral palsy and some forms of cancer. Use in clinical populations is relatively high: 
anywhere from 27%- 100% of individuals with multiple sclerosis (Olsen, 2009); 70% 
of children with autism spectrum disorder (Christon, Mackintosh & Myers, 2009), 
and; 43% of patients with voice problems (Sloane, 2006). According to Sloane (2006), 
female and younger clients were more likely to use CAMs. Chronic populations are 
more vulnerable perhaps to alternative treatment practices (Tharpe, 1999) because 
conventional disciplines are unable to offer a cure. Main reasons for CAMs use include 
the failure or ineffectiveness of conventional practices, a belief that CAMs would cure 
or alleviate symptoms, anecdotal reports of success and even doctors’ referrals 
(Olsen, 2009; Sloane, 2006).   
  
Use of CAMs is not limited to the general public. Poole, Lindsay, Memon and Bull 
(1995) for example, identified large minorities of registered psychotherapists in 
America and Britain using techniques such as hypnosis, dream analysis and guided 
imagery to recover memories of sexual abuse. A replication by Nunez, Poole and 
Memon (2003) found unchanged practices.  The discipline of physiotherapy has seen 
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the rise of invasive treatments such as acupuncture and dry needling despite as yet 
minimal evidence. Knupp, Esmail and Warren (2009) identified one third of 
occupational therapists as using CAMs including acupuncture, reflexology and reiki. 
Jarvis (1998) suggests a plethora of reasons to explain CAMs use in the health 
professions including: boredom, low professional esteem, placing intuitiveness above 
logic, beliefs encroachment, both profit and prophet motives, and even psychopathic 
tendencies. Furthermore, only one fifth of Knupp et al.’s (2000) clinicians cited lack of 
supporting evidence as a reason for non-use suggesting science was not a strong 
scaffold in therapeutic choices. Sagan (1996) explains CAM use in the professions is 
because they ‘provide easy answers, save us the trouble of thinking…making us 
routine and comfortable practitioners’ (p.13). It may also be as Tarvis (2003) argues 
that such therapies may be attractive because they promise certainty. For whatever 
reason, many unsubstantiated and ineffective treatments appear to make their way 
not just into mainstream society but into mainstream practice (Newbold et al., 2008). 
It may be as Kida (2006) says, that ‘pseudoscience is everywhere in our popular 
culture, while sceptical treatments are harder to find’ (p.41). 
 
The field of SLT has been subject to vigorous denunciation of two primary 
pseudoscientific therapies – AIT (ASHA, 2004; Mudford & Cullen, 2005) and 
Facilitated Communication (Charlton & Charlton, 2010; Schlosser & Wendt, 2008). 
Pseudoscientific therapies essentially claim to be scientific, but do not conform to 
scientific principles (Packman & Attanasio, 2004) and can be thought of as a body of 
beliefs and practices but seldom a field of active inquiry (Bunge ,1984). The 
characteristics of pseudoscience are numerous but essentially are what Newbold et al. 
(2008) call alternative and Lum (2002) refers to as non-scientific ways of knowing. 
These include practices based on faith or belief, authority, intuition, experience, 
popularity, and religion (Lum, 2002). Many pseudoscientific theories are not testable 
or falsifiable, being conjecture rather than science (Packman & Attanasio, 2004; 
Turpin, 2002). Despite clear mandates against use, the pseudoscientific practice of 
Listening Therapy is regularly advertised in the Royal College of Speech and Language 
Therapists (RCLST) professional magazine, suggesting implicit approval. On the 
Deconstructing clinical practice and searching for scientific foundations 
 
 
 
31 
 
 
listening program.com website a statement exists saying ‘Approved by the College of 
Occupational Therapy as relevant to the OT profession’. Clinicians must be confused 
by such apparent professional support.  
 
There has also been active debate over non-scientific practices specifically oral-motor 
therapy (OMT) and non-speech oral motor exercises (NSOMEs), practices devoid of 
empirical support and of theoretical questionability. Despite its questionable status, 
clinicians continue to use NSOMEs across countries (Joffe & Pring, 2008; Lof & 
Watson, 2008). We cannot Lum (2002) argues be scientist clinicians and act in 
pseudoscientific ways. The use of such practices undermines any attempts by a 
discipline to operate scientifically (Lilienfeld, Lynn & Lohr, 2003) and to make 
informed decisions (Beyerstein, 1995). This is not to imply as Lilienfeld (1998) says, 
that all practices not scientifically validated are harmful or barren of value, it being 
possible that some therapies will ultimately demonstrate efficacy. Cochlear implants 
are an example of one such treatment. Others may become naturally extinct.  Thus, 
empirical validation may be insufficient in providing direction for decision making 
especially as clinicians are often eager to try new methods (Creaghead, 1999) and 
testing a therapy can take time. Unscientific practice however, may not be limited to 
the therapies used, but to the nature of practice itself. 
 
1.2.5. Practice as art 
‘To overplay the hand of therapeutic techniques and minimise the contribution of 
personal and relational factors has more to do with the politics of evidence than its 
science’ (Larner, 2004, p.24). 
 
Clinicians face ‘ill-defined problems’ (Higgs & Jones, 2000, p.4) and one of the ways 
clinicians adapt and cope with the inexact nature of professional practice according to 
Higgs and Jones (2000) is to ‘look beyond the science’ (p.4). Research into why and 
how therapy works is virtually non-existent (Larner, 2004) and it may be in fact that 
techniques have very little to do with therapeutic success (Bernstein-Ratner, 2005; 
Hubble, Duncan & Miller, 1999). A review of interventions in dysphagia (Speyer, 
Baijens, Heijnen & Zwijnenberg, 2010) for example, shows remarkably little 
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difference in outcome between any types of therapies offered. This translates to other 
disciplines. Asay and Lambert (1999) report that 70-80% of psychotherapy 
outpatients show significant benefits as a result of a wide range of therapies that use 
very different techniques. Psychotherapy studies (Lambert, 1992) have shown that 
specific therapies account for no more than 15% of outcome. Furthermore, generic 
principles may have more impact. Tyler’s (2008) review of evidence-based 
interventions for speech-sound disorders for example suggests factors that lead to 
increased efficiency, such as planning for generalisation, use of carers in a structured 
home programme and increased frequency and intensity of intervention. Hubble et al. 
(1999) describe this as the repeated finding that ‘therapies and their associated 
technical operations do not significantly contribute to outcome’ (p.12), raising 
questions for both what is researched and what is practiced.  
 
Common therapeutic factors which are held to account for outcome are client and 
extra-therapeutic factors (e.g. ego strength and social support) and expectancy and 
placebo effects (Lambert, 1992). Such influences are worth considering given the 
interactional nature of practice and what Packman and Attanasio (2004) refer to as 
the complexities of the human condition.  It may be that therapeutic engagement itself 
is important. Systematic reviews show placebos consistently produce change in 
medical cases, from one third (Scovern, 1999) to one half of patients (Jerome, 1989) 
for a wide variety of diseases and conditions.  Barbour (1991) in studying placebo 
effects for hypertension demonstrated that individuals who responded to treatment 
talked to themselves with an active voice, were information seeking, and exhibited a 
sense of internal locus of control. Indeed long lasting change in psychotherapy 
appears more lasting in clients who attribute the changes to their own efforts 
(Lambert & Bergin, 1994). This all means as Herbert (2003) says, that ‘we know that 
virtually any intervention is superior to no treatment’ (p.417). 
 
It is not only the process and patients who can influence outcome but SLTs 
themselves. Lutterman (2001) says that SLTs are ‘at heart …grief workers’ and 
defines practice as being composed of ‘content counselling’ and ‘affect counselling’ 
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(p.3). Thus clinician skills such empathy, warmth and encouragement of risk taking 
have been shown to impact outcome (Blatt, Sanislow, Zuroff & Pilkonis, 1996; 
Lambert, 1992). Garske and Anderson (2003) report on a number of studies in 
psychotherapy which consistently confirm that therapist effects supersede individual 
therapy effects. Among the effects correlated with outcome are the clinician’s skill and 
interest in helping patients (Blatt et al., 1996), effective reinforcement, effective 
implementation of carryover procedures, and therapist flexibility in response to client 
needs (Oratio & Hood 1977), therapist understanding (Littauer, Sexton & Wynn, 
2005), therapist attentiveness (Palmadottir, 2006,) interpersonal skills (Williams & 
Irurita, 2004) and warmth, calmness and gentleness (Littauer et al., 2005; 
Palmadottir, 2006). Fourie’s (2009) patients identified ‘restorative poise’ as the ideal 
trait in SLTs and described therapeutic qualities (being understanding, gracious, 
erudite and inspiring) and therapeutic actions (being confident, soothing, practical 
and empowering) as important in the clinician. This underlines the argument 
regarding the importance of interactional factors, Fourie (2009) even going so far as 
to reiterate Brumfitt and Clarke’s (1982) contention, that SLT could be ‘deemed a 
special case of psychotherapeutic intervention’ (p.998).  
 
This feeds into the idea of therapy as more than science or specific technique, and 
leaves clinicians with few guidelines on why they might use one approach over 
another. The focus on science and relative neglect of art most epitomised by the 
dominance of EBP in recent years, has resulted in what Gabbay and LeMay (2004) call 
several dilemmas, including perhaps the devaluing of the contribution of artistry to 
outcomes. Resistance to acknowledging the impact of artistic elements may surround 
their intangibility and provoke comments such as Dowie and Elstein’s (1988), which 
queries whether claims to artistry represent a ‘refusal to apply the scientific 
approach’ (p.4).   
 
Neither are terms reflecting the unexplicated nature of some elements (emphasised 
by terms like tacit knowledge and clinical intuition) perhaps helpful in this regard. 
Law, Campbell, Roulstone, Adams, and Boyle (2007) argue that the inability to make 
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explicit exactly how these operate or what they comprise, is problematic for the 
profession in the context of a need to demonstrate scientific principles and adherence 
to rational decision making. This is further complicated in female dominated 
professions such as SLT according to Buckingham & Adams (2000) which tend to be 
associated with decision making which is viewed as predominantly ‘tacit, feminine 
and emotional’, whereas medical knowledge is viewed as ‘empirical and rational’ and 
therefore given greater societal value (p.982). The question of art in practice is 
therefore highly important not just for outcomes and decision making, but for the 
discipline as a whole. Recognising artistry as integral to practice may mean as Miles 
(2007) has argued, recognising that science can only be a tool rather than the soul of 
practice.  
 
1.2.6. Why science is important  
‘The thorny issues facing the profession are best analysed and resolved by reliance on 
scientific data rather than armchair philosophy, poorly grounded theory, and 
unsystematic observations and opinions’ (Garske & Anderson, 2003, p.146). 
 
Lum (2002) states that the SLT profession must reflect seriously at some point on 
what it means to be a scientific discipline. Abrandt-Dalhgren, Richardson and Kalmam 
(2004) contend that the label ‘profession’ is supposed to be a guarantee that choices 
of action are deliberate, well-founded and not arbitrary. The scientific method should 
enable clinicians Richardson, Higgs & Abrandt-Dahlgren (2004) reason, to be able to 
confidently defend their work and the quality of care the profession offers. The other 
option as Johnson (1999) points out is to risk credibility by utilising therapies from 
the ‘margins of science’ (p.67). 
 
As McLean et al. (2007) have appealed for clinicians to be active and discerning 
consumers of research, so too should they be active and discerning consumers of the 
interventions they employ. Coyle (2011) argues that ‘adoption of clinical methods 
without sufficient scientific justification does not make sense’ (p.110). The 
profession’s claim to being scientific is being increasingly tested with what Newbold 
et al. (2008) call ‘escalating commercialisation’ (p.1339), a growth of opportunities in 
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the market place for SLTs to connect with various forms of training and therapies. It is 
also strained as Adam (2000) points out by the increasing integration of 
complimentary therapies into conventional arenas. This stands in stark contrast to 
the principles of EBP.  
 
Use of unvalidated or ineffective treatments can in the very least be unethical through 
wasting patient’s time and resources.  Lilienfeld, Lynn and Lohr (2003) identify 
economic issues and opportunity costs – where a client could have gone elsewhere 
for efficacious therapy.  Beyerstein (1995) adds personal costs for patients including 
the encouragement of false hopes, deterioration in self-image and depression. 
Adherence to a scientific philosophy is perhaps most important where clinicians can 
do harm (Lilienfeld et al., 2003).  While iatrogenic effects are not broadly considered 
in the SLT literature, the relatively recent focus on dysphagia in clinical practice 
would seem to increase this potential. There are however, clear instances of harm 
from pseudoscientific therapies in the discipline. Lilienfeld et al. (2003) for example, 
point to untrue reporting of child abuse using the non-autonomous technique of 
Facilitated Communication. The subjection of a child to hours of continuous 
involuntary music through Listening Therapy is another possible example. The field 
of psychotherapy shows that on average, 10% of patients get worse after starting 
therapy (Jarrett, 2008) and that 28% of psychologists are unaware of the negative 
effects of their work (Boisvert & Faust, 2006). There are also lesser evils as Lum 
(2002) notes, such as clients (and the public) losing confidence in the profession’s 
ability to treat them. This needs to be seen in the context of evidence from the field of 
medicine which shows that that most complex interventions achieve between only 
10-20% change, with many not resulting in any change (Grimshaw et al., 2001), and 
that one-fifth to one-quarter of medical care provided is not needed or is potentially 
harmful (Eccles, Grimshaw, Walker, Johnston & Pitts, 2004). The story may be the 
same for SLT where Bernstein-Ratner (2006) comments that even validated 
treatments often do not ‘cure’. The suggestion is that the process of therapy is not so 
clear-cut, and that a principled approach is essential for the profession. 
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The question of science also revolves around the notion of professional versus 
technical identity. If clinicians are mere applicators of techniques, how might they 
distinguish themselves from SLT assistants? It can be suggested that a scientific 
discipline is not passive in practice and thus does not merely apply a therapy, 
whether validated or unvalidated. Basmajian’s (1975) advice remains. In an early 
article, he advised clinicians to regard all therapeutic procedures ‘with suspicion’ 
(p.608). Scientific thinking would therefore appear to be a sound basis to practice, the 
knowledge filter that facilitates the discrimination between truth and illusion 
(Shermer, 2001). Science is a threat to pseudoscience and therefore one would expect 
the profession of SLT to embrace it. 
 
 
1.3 THERAPIES & TECHNIQUES  
1.3.1. Definitions 
‘A search of today’s electronic marketplace for tools to support clinical decision making 
yields an overwhelming number, variety and complexity of products’ (Hayward 2004 
p.66). 
  
Interventions, therapies, programmes, approaches and techniques are among the 
labels given to the specific tools clinicians use to provide therapy. These terms 
however may vary in their foundations. Apel (1999) for example, says an approach is 
a set of procedures defined by its scientific base, whereas a tool is designed to provide 
intervention materials for the approach. Therapy refers to a type of approach such as 
oral-motor therapy, and techniques are the strategies or ways of implementing a 
programme or therapy. However, some therapies such as Talktools and Listening 
Therapy may be seen as both, as they provide both the equipment to carry out the 
procedures, sets of procedures, and in some cases theories upon which they are 
based.  
 
Therapies can also be classified. For example Turner and Whitfield (1997) identified 
three broad categories in physiotherapy (orthopaedic/musculo-skeletal, respiratory 
and neurological) in addition to a common denominator technique, which was 
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exercise. Odom, Boyd and Hall (2010) identified thirty comprehensive treatment 
models for individuals with autism, the majority based on an applied behaviour 
analysis framework, although a substantial minority followed a developmental or 
relationship-based model. We might therefore expect clinicians to use categories of 
therapies. In disability for example, augmentative and alternative communication 
(AAC) and interaction-based therapies might be prevalent. In speech disorders, it 
might be phonological or articulation approaches. In dysphagia, bolus modification 
and exercise techniques may be utilised.  
 
Furthermore, the term ‘conventional’ is used to describe standard, scientific and 
community agreed interventions. The terms ‘complimentary’ and ‘alternative’ places 
a treatment outside of the accepted or more conventional approaches. Additionally, 
the idea of complex interventions (Hayhow, 2010) or therapies influenced by several 
factors, leads to the notion that some therapies may not be unique in their own right 
suggesting it might not be a useful construct in some cases. Understanding the broad 
categories of therapies clinicians utilise may serves to facilitate an understanding of 
philosophies of practice. 
 
1.3.2. Conventional therapies in practice 
‘If there are more than two treatments for a disorder, there is probably no good 
treatment’ (United Cerebral Palsy Foundation, 1998, p.1).  
 
Most areas of practice have multiple intervention options. The volume of options may 
increase rather than reduce the complexity of the clinician’s task, being overwhelming 
(Doubilet & McNeil, 1988). Bernstein-Ratner (2005) argues however, that this 
diversity of approaches is positive as a dynamic, developing discipline should not be 
reduced to a ‘single manual of practice’ (p.178). Some therapies have good evidence 
bases such as Lidcombe for stuttering and Lee Silverman Voice Treatment (LSVT) for 
dysphonia. Nevertheless, many therapies in use do not have empirical support and 
some have been the subject of vigorous debate in the professional literature, the most 
obvious being oral-motor therapies. Moreover, Lum (2002) argues that 
disagreements on the merits of individual therapies tend to focus on superficial 
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aspects of treatment rather than on their intrinsic scientific value. Some therapies 
have clear theoretical bases and selection criteria for candidates such as Fastforward 
(Veale, 1999), whereas others are broadly applied to multiple populations (e.g. 
Facilitated Communication). This suggests a field without clear rules. Indeed, an 
influential report (Institute of Medicine, 1999) identified not only the underuse of 
effective treatments and tools, but the overuse of ineffective ones and misuse of some 
including some preschool hearing, speech, language and visual screening tests.  
 
Relatively speaking, there has been little exploration of the therapies SLTs use or 
their decision-making practices around therapies. A recent study by Joffe and Pring 
(2008) in the area of developmental speech disorders showed that therapies were 
often combined, with a mean of two being used by clinicians in this area. Turner and 
Whitfield (1997) also found that physiotherapy techniques rather than being used in 
isolation were used in combination. Joffe and Pring (2008) further report on clearly 
preferred (e.g. minimal contrast therapy) and non-preferred (e.g. core vocabulary) 
options. Behrman’s (2005) study of the assessment practices of voice therapists also 
indicated preferences, this time for non-instrumental approaches over the more 
objective instrumental techniques, suggesting perhaps a lack of appeal of 
instrumentation. The idea of preferred treatments appears to contradict Creaghead’s 
(1999) comment that different clinicians use different therapies and Pring’s (2004) 
argument that clinicians use different therapies because they know that patients 
differ and no single therapy will meet the needs of all patients.  Some therapies 
appear to be strongly entrenched in the professional repertoire. Sensory Integration 
Therapy (SIT) is a good example of this, being particularly used in the occupational 
therapy field for well over thirty years without accumulating evidence, and with a 
recent transfer into SLT. SIT is for example, always-used by 82% of occupational 
therapists working with children with autism (Watling, Dietz, Kanny & McLaughlin, 
1999). Discipline-specific examples include the use of traditional articulation 
exercises in the treatment of phonological impairments (Baker & McLeod, 2011) and 
NSOMEs in the treatment of speech disorders (Lof & Watson, 2008) in a vacuum of 
empirical evidence (Powell, 2008). Thus some therapies stand the test of time 
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according to Smith (2005), without accumulating supporting evidence along the way 
and sometimes despite strong empirical evidence against them. Furthermore, such 
therapies may be broadly applied such as the use of NSOMEs as a warm-up exercise 
(Watson & Lof, 2004), in acquired neurological disorders (Mackenzie, Muir & Allen, 
2010) and suspected childhood apraxia of speech (Kollias & Lester, 2005).  
 
This broad use of favoured and culturally based interventions may raise concerns 
about the application of therapies in a replicating (Strauss & McAlister, 2000) or 
technical mode (Ogles, Anderson & Lunnen, 1999) and therefore the scientific 
underpinnings of treatment decisions. It may be as Shermer (2001) states, that health 
professionals have a boundary problem between science and pseudoscience. This 
may also reflect on a discord between what is researched and what is clinically 
utilised. There are many studies of specific therapies such as Hanen which are 
examined by originators of the programme (e.g. Girolametto, Pierce & Weitzman, 
1996) or interested researchers (e.g. Pennington, Goldbart & Marshall, 2004). There 
are also many therapies which are used in clinical practice and fail to attract the 
interest of researchers.  As Bernstein-Ratner (2006) states, real world problems are 
typified by ‘frequently employed treatments’ with ‘little firm validation data’ and 
‘validated treatments not reaching the clinician’ (p.258). The net result may be what 
Rappolt and Tassone (2002) describe based on their interviews with rehabilitation 
therapists, as the typically ‘haphazard approaches’ to the evaluation and application 
of new knowledge (p.170).  
 
1.3.3. Pseudoscientific therapies 
‘Therapies are dubious when their rationales and purported effects are poorly 
substantiated; they are controversial when advocacy for their use persists despite 
evidence regarding the insubstantiality of rationale and or impact’ (Jacobson, Foxx & 
Mulick, 2005, p.xiv).  
 
Clear examples of therapies lacking in scientific underpinnings exist, especially from 
the complementary arena (e.g. homeopathy and osteopathy). A number of features 
differentiate science from pseudoscience. For example, pseudoscientific treatments 
for rely mainly or wholly on anecdotal and testimonial evidence to support their use 
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(Gambrill, 2005; Smith, 2005). Such evidence can be highly persuasive according to 
Finn et al. (2005), especially when presented by people who are motivated to help 
others. However, as Shermer (1997) states ‘anecdotes do not make a science‘ (p.48), 
being insufficient to justify a therapy’s claim to effectiveness, a ‘reluctant response to 
human fallibility’ (Sagan, 1996, p.181). It is suggested that anecdote however may be 
a dominant form of transmission in the health disciplines based on the influences of 
colleagues reported by clinicians (e.g. Gabbay & LeMay, 2004; O’Connor & Pettigrew, 
2009). Furthermore, it may be prevalent as a consequence of the absence of more 
empirically derived support for a therapy.  
 
Scientific and pseudoscientific treatments are also differentiated by a therapy’s 
capacity to be testable and open to experimentation (Federspil & Vettor, 2000; Kida, 
2006) and replication (Gambrill, 2005). Such testing provides a basis for modifying or 
eliminating ineffective treatments (Finn et al., 2005). Many pseudoscientific 
treatments are based only on the claims of originators or proponents, and are often 
‘vague, circumspect or tautologous in their descriptions’ (Finn et al., 2005, p.173) 
with untestable principles such as chiropractic adjustment, and untestable metaphors 
such as universal intelligence (Mootz & Phillips, 1997). As Sagan (1996) notes, 
explanations of such treatments ‘can explain anything and therefore in fact nothing’ 
(p.181). Therefore, pseudoscientific practices typically place emphasis on 
confirmation rather than refutation (Lilienfeld, 1998) with disconfirming evidence 
where it is present, ignored or rationalised (Gambrill, 2005; Shermer, 2001). This 
contrasts with receptive attitudes to new ideas and a willingness to change which lies 
at the heart of a scientific approach to knowledge. As Finn et al. (2005) note, science’s 
goal is not to prove what is correct, but what is true. Testability however, can also be 
problematic when interventions have ‘many potentially active elements’ (Metz & 
Mulick, 2005, p.241) and this may be said to refer to many treatments in the 
conventional arena. 
 
Pseudoscientific practices can be sometimes difficult to discriminate as they may 
amalgamate what Gambrill (2005) calls the trapping of science without the substance. 
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These trappings may include new or technical terminology and use of obscurantist 
language (Gambrill, 2005; Vyse, 2005), and misappropriation of constructs and 
concepts.  Newbold et al. (2008) provide the examples of phrenology or creation 
‘science’. Additionally, claims can be based on uncontrolled studies or studies with 
unvalidated measures, or sophisticated technology can be used in unvalidated ways 
(Smith, 2005). Despite these trappings, such treatments are more unlike science than 
similar to it. For example, scientific endeavours define clear populations and 
conditions for treatments and usually report to improvements of functioning in 
everyday situations (Smith, 2005). Pseudoscientific therapies tend to talk in terms of 
full cure, what Finn et al. (2005) label ‘grandiose’ claims. As a consequence, use of 
such treatments tend to be belief or person rather than data-based. Osborne (2005) 
suggests they are often characterised by comforting beliefs, for example, healing can 
be effected painlessly, instantly and without effort.  This means as Sagan (1996) 
comments, that pseudoscience ‘speaks to powerful emotional needs that science often 
leaves unfulfilled’ (p.14). Such treatments may also exist in what Lilienfeld et al. 
(2003) call the mantra of holism, a ‘plausible ideology’ according to Vyse (2005), 
particularly for complex conditions (p.14). As Mootz and Phillips (1997) point out, the 
concept of holism is difficult to approach from a scientific perspective as it is immune 
to measurement, testing and operational definition.  The inherent implication argue 
Finn et al. (2005), is that science has lost sight of the bigger picture.  
 
Thus a critical attitude is basic to scientific practice (Gambrill, 2005) but 
pseudoscience is characteristically a place where ‘passion passes for rigour’ according 
to Thompson (2008, p.123). Critical scrutiny typically involves peer reviewed 
publications whereas evasion of peer review is stereotypical of pseudoscientific 
practice (Lilienfeld et al., 2003). Publication in peer reviewed journals means that 
information is shared and dissected. Less scientifically-based therapies usually 
disseminate information by different methods, enabling them to circumvent the 
process of peer review. Such techniques may involve training workshops or courses, 
or going to the public directly through websites or the media.   
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The demarcation line between what is based in science and what is not may not 
always be clear however, there being a fuzzy middle ground which some therapies 
may fit into. These includes those which have not yet been validated but have made 
their way into clinical practice and those which have been in practice a long time but 
have not been empirically tested. Smith (2005) talks of ‘plausible’ but untested 
treatments which make sense theoretically, but have been untested or have some ‘red 
flags’ about them and offers as examples, theory of mind (core deficit), Floortime 
(untested), and Natural language paradigm (the word ‘natural’). Furthermore some of 
the characteristics which typify pseudoscience can be applied to non-scientific and 
even scientific treatments. For example, pseudosciences are often described as 
commercial ventures (Beyerstein, 1995), being subject to ulterior motives which 
compromise objectivity. However there are both valid and non-valid treatments 
which fit this criterion for example, LSVT and Talktools. Therefore it can be 
postulated that there exists from a scientific point of view potentially three levels of 
clinical practice: scientific, nonscientific and pseudoscientific. Perhaps to be termed a 
non-science, it is not necessary to be guilty of all the ‘sins’ described above, ‘only a 
reasonable number of them’ (Beyerstein, 1995, p.27). While Sagan (1996) says that 
‘the method of science, as stodgy and grumpy as it may seem, is far more important 
than the findings of science’ (p.22), it may often be difficult for clinicians to 
differentiate between treatments which are scientific and those which are less than 
scientific.  
 
1.3.4. Therapy specific reasons for selecting and using therapies 
‘Clinicians in our field have been trained and educated to make informed decisions 
concerning clinical practice’ (Kahmi, 1999, p.97). 
 
Decision making regarding interventions has been acknowledged to be one of the 
main kinds of clinical uncertainty clinicians encounter (Ely et al., 1999; McCaughan, 
2005). Despite this, clinicians obviously have reasons for using the therapies they do.  
Papadopoulos, Noyes, Barns, Jones and Thorn (2012) found physiotherapists aimed 
for simplicity and function in their treatment choices. Kahmi (1999, 2006a), likewise 
argues that clinicians are more likely to adopt approaches if they result in better or 
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quicker functional outcomes, and suggests that many clinicians are more influenced 
by behavioural changes  and ‘because it works’ (Kahmi, 1999, p.93) than theoretical 
beliefs. This concurs with Watson and Lof’s (2004) study of NSOME use which 
showed that 85% of therapists believe it works based on changes observed in clinical 
practice, this despite empirical evidence to the contrary. Such reasoning is not limited 
to SLTs but also seen for example in teachers (Gersten & Brengelman, 1996). The 
‘because it works’ attitude may be more complex than it first appears, perhaps subject 
to bias, influenced by manufacturer’s claims (Apel & Self, 2006) resulting from the 
placebo effect (Beyerstein, 2003) and even the will to believe (Beyerstein, 1997).  
 
Indeed it may be that for the clinician what is targeted is often more important than 
how it is targeted (Kahmi, 2006) and this may result in a healthy mix of (Bernstein-
Ratner, 2005) or an eclectic approach to treatments as seen in phonology studies 
(Joffe & Pring, 2008; Roulstone & Wren, 2001). Rosseau, Packman, Onslow, Robinson 
and Harrison (2002) also found eclecticism showing that half the SLTs using the 
Lidcombe programme for stuttering did not use it as set out by its authors. Joffe and 
Pring (2008) speculated that clinicians might be inclined towards eclecticism by 
reasoning that each child might receive some therapy which is beneficial. Certainly it 
might help to explain the wide-ranging application of some treatments. Mackenzie et 
al. (2010) in examining the use of NSOMEs in adult-acquired disorders reasoned that 
rather than being isolated to speech work, these exercises were simultaneously used 
by the clinicians to target other functions effecting drooling, dysphagia and sensory 
awareness. Furthermore, it may be that such broad-based or broadly applied 
treatments may be more appealing to less experienced clinicians. Joffe and Pring 
(2008) found for example that non-specific oral-motor work was popular with less 
experienced clinicians.  
 
Such a pragmatic rather than theoretical approach to intervention may mean as 
Mackenzie et al.’s (2010) SLTS and Papadopoulos et al.’s (2012) physiotherapists 
indicate, that clinicians aim for simplicity and function in their treatment choices. 
Theory may not therefore be a useful guide in selecting or applying treatments. 
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Indeed, Kahmi (1999) argues that most clinicians are pragmatists, and ‘have little 
problem with ‘theoretical inconsistencies’ (p.93) such as those evidenced in 
pseudoscientific practices (Creaghead, 1999). Thus if clinicians do not value theory, 
then pseudoscientific practices may not be problematic for them. However, 
intervention choices may not be as devoid of theory as suggested.  Kollias and Lester’s 
(2005) SLTs used oral-motor therapies primarily with children with motor and tonal 
problems (Down syndrome and Cerebral Palsy), suggesting that treatments aimed at 
motor functions are targeted primarily at individuals with motor problems.  Clark 
(2005) would contend this is the reason oral-motor treatments are offered 
inappropriately; clinicians she argues, understand that speech and swallowing are 
motor behaviours, therefore clinicians may believe that alleviating underlying motor 
impairments or facilitating motor system development will bring about improved 
speech and swallow skills. 
 
Other reasons may revolve around the relatively modest improvements yielded by 
scientifically-validated treatments (Smith, 2005), especially in areas such as 
developmental disabilities (Vyse, 2005). In the absence of a treatment that cures, 
SLTs may be more open to trying alternative options. Creaghead (1999) states that 
the combination of individuals for whom traditional intervention strategies do not 
produce the desired treatment gains and clinicians eager to try new methods might 
facilitate the use of pseudoscientific or non-scientific methods. This search for 
solutions may thus facilitate the premature entrance of unvalidated therapies into the 
clinical context. Additionally, such therapies may also enter into a clinician’s dialogue 
because a family brings it to the table, and clinicians may be responding to the 
family’s needs (Veale, 1999). 
 
In addition to patient responsivity, clinicians may also react to commercial and 
economic pressures when decision making regarding treatments. For example, some 
treatments may be more expensive than others and Veale (1999) argues decision 
making should be based on the attached cost. Whether clinicians use this criterion 
when selecting treatments is not well known and they may be influenced by 
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commercial factors in other ways including the influence of promotional materials 
(Beyerstein, 1997; Bowen, 2005). Certainly branding of therapies has become more 
evident in SLT. Bernstein-Ratner (2005) refers to treatment through allegiance to 
training regimens such as Lidcombe and LSVT. Lum (2002) expresses concern that 
clinicians often judge resources based on face validity rather than on the basis of any 
scientific explanation regarding efficacy, and suggests that critical evaluation of these 
products may be limited. This assumes an uncritical user. Evans, Over and Manktelow 
(1993) say that the sophisticated chooser will make allowances for promotional 
techniques. The growth of such consumerism say Dowie and Elstein (1988) entails 
greater accountability for professional judgments and decisions 
 
The nature of individual therapies themselves receives little attention in the literature 
to explain use. Stephenson (2009) points to the conceptual appeal of some therapies 
such as SIT which may explain its popularity. Ineffective practices may also spread 
because they are easy to use. Kahmi (2004) for example, suggests that the reason 
auditory processing disorders and sensory integration disorders have become 
commonplace is because they offer simple (even if superficial or incorrect) answers 
to the causation question and direct treatment goals. Kahmi (2006b) also highlights 
diverse and engaging activities that offer opportunities for measurable success as 
partly explaining the use of NSOMEs. What of the empirical evidence for a treatment?  
Kahmi (1999) says the ‘because it worked’ argument means that treatment efficacy 
studies may have limited impact on a particular approach a therapist uses, and EBP 
barrier studies appear to confirm this across disciplines including dieticians (Thomas, 
Kukuruzovic, Martino, Chauhan & Elliot, 2003), doctors (Gabbay and LeMay, 2004), 
occupational therapists (Bennett et al 2003; Curtin & Jaramazovic, 2001), nurses 
(Parahoo, 2000) and SLTs (Brener, Vallino-Napoli, Reid & Reilly, 2002; O’Connor & 
Pettigrew 2009). The relative lack of influence of negative research is evident in the 
use of less scientifically-based therapies. Ninety nine per cent of Watling, Dietz, Kanny 
and McLaughlin’s (1999) occupational therapists working with children with autism 
used SIT. This is similar to Watson and Lof’s (2004) study of SLTs’ use of NSOMEs 
which further suggests that clinicians may not be aware of the research evidence – 
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nearly two thirds claiming that evidence was supportive. Furthermore, even in cases 
where there is clear evidence for a treatment approach (Kahmi, 2006b points to the 
Complexity Approach in phonology), there remains under-use of validated 
treatments. It seems that clinicians choose not to use treatments for which there is 
evidence as well as those for which there is none. This concurs with Eccles et al. 
(2005) finding from medicine that around a third of practice was not provided 
according to current scientific evidence. There is no reason to think the figures for 
SLT would be much different. 
 
1.3.5. Unvalidated therapies and clinical practice 
‘Rehabilitation….requires the clinician to select interventions for which evidence of a 
reasonable likelihood of successful, important outcomes exists’ (Coyle, 2008, p.43). 
 
There is a proliferation of therapies available which are unsupported by empirical 
evidence.  Although there is criticism of clinicians adopting unproven therapies, Lum 
(2002) points to a common practice in SLT of trying new things, what Creaghead 
(1999) calls readiness to have a go. Lum (2002) presents a typical scenario: someone 
has a bright idea for therapy, the idea is then packaged for sale, and; busy clinicians 
with keen eyes for resources that might make their work more efficient, purchase the 
new untested idea.  The fact that clinicians do not require a seal of approval (Kahmi, 
1999) means that they are freer to explore new options.  Furthermore, Bernstein-
Ratner (2006) states that the expert clinician is obliged to ‘seek new information to 
improve therapeutic effectiveness’ (p.258). This all reflects on practice as dynamic.  
 
Lum (2002) ponders whether SLTs wrestle with the ethical questions of providing 
unsubstantiated treatments.  It may be that clinicians are not bound by the same 
standards as researchers. As Bernstein-Ratner (2006) states, ideal world scenarios 
would involve treatments emerging followed by validation followed by dissemination 
and application to ‘those whose profiles fit the trial population characteristics’ 
(p.258). Perhaps as Schwartz (2005) argues, clinicians might be doing their own 
testing and retesting of therapies, their own versions of evidence. The fact that some 
therapies might have limited rigour, and that clinicians attend courses on them, does 
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not mean that clinicians are ‘legitimizing the unscientific practices’ according to 
Sampson, French and Green (1999). Indeed, Nelson (1994) comments that most 
clinicians describe clinical interventions in cautious terms, avoid making guarantees 
and regard any new clinical breakthrough with a healthy degree of scepticism. 
 
Neither are all new therapies automatically integrated into practice. Even some that 
become pervasive can be abandoned (Jacobson et al., 2005), especially when as 
Creaghead (1999) comments, ‘their value was not supported either by lasting gains or 
research results’ (p.335). Creaghead (1999) also points to therapies which while 
initially rejected, prove their worth over time (e.g. phonological therapy). This implies 
argues Lilienfeld et al. (2003) that it would be ‘a serious error to dismiss any untested 
techniques out of hand’ (p.3), in other words to avoid premature dismissiveness as 
much as premature promotion. The scientific obligation for progression implies the 
discipline must remain open to new therapies with, as Sagan (1995) notes, a unique 
mix of open mindedness and scepticism. This appears to reflect practice. The problem 
however as Lum (2002) states, is that some questionable therapies tend to become 
established despite being unvalidated and once established, it can be difficult to 
remove a therapy.  
 
It might be fair to say that clinicians are not helped by the dearth of evaluation of 
therapies in use, and neither by the apparently poor outcomes of multiple 
interventions. Treweek (2005) speaking of the medical field but which is likely to 
have applications to SLT, reports that many interventions have no impact. This is of 
course highly concerning. After all, why provide a treatment if it results in no change? 
It must be considered that scientific measures may not measure clinically relevant 
changes. Clinicians after all may be concerned with functional outcomes (Kahmi, 
2006; Papadopoulos et al., 2012) rather than results on standardised tests. 
Furthermore, some interactions may not be directly measureable including those 
related to elements of the therapeutic alliance and self-reported outcomes. Indeed, it 
may be as Beutow, Upshur, Miles and Loughlin (2006) argue that patient-specific 
factors are more important or predictive of outcome. Intervention itself may be 
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subject to such individualisation that rules and regulations attached to individual 
therapies are seen as less important than responding to the individual patient. This is 
previously suggested by ideas of eclecticism and pragmatism. So how does EBP fit 
into clinical practice? 
 
 
1.4 THE CONTEXT OF EVIDENCE BASED PRACTICE 
1.4.1. Understanding EBP 
‘Evidence-based medicine is essentially literature-based medicine’ (Ioannidis & Lau, 
2000, p.110). 
 
The contemporary applied origins of EBP are clearly aligned to the need for 
accountability in service provision (Lum, 2002), the failure to apply consistent 
practice guidelines (Cohen & Hersh, 2004), the continuing use of ineffective therapies 
and poor uptake of effective ones (Walshe & Rundall, 2001), and the wide variations 
in clinical practice observed in the health professions (Tallon, Chard & Dieppe, 2008). 
SLT is not immune to these variations in practice. Mathers-Schmidt and Kurlinski 
(2003) for example, identified significant discrepancies in the practice of dysphagia. 
Other catalysts include consumerism, an upsurge of managerialism, and a concern 
with value for money (Swinkels, Albarran, Means, Mitchell & Stewart, 2002). Some 
professional bodies have incorporated EBP into their professional scope of practice 
thus formalising it (e.g. ASHA, 2005). The concept of EBP has effectively, according to 
Walshe and Rundall (2001) become part of the language of the health services 
throughout the world. Justice (2008) acknowledges pleasure about the impact of EBP 
on SLT, as it gives due consideration to scientific evidence making practitioners as 
Jenicek (2006) says, more ‘rational’ in subsequent decision making.  
 
Very early definitions of EBP were clear, state Beutow and Kenealy (2000), in 
equating evidence with empirical evidence. Sackett et al’s (1996) definition is 
considered the standard stating that EBP is: ‘the conscientious, explicit and judicious 
use of current best evidence in making decisions about the care of individual patients’ 
(p.71). In recent years the concept has come to embrace more fully less overtly 
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scientific forms of evidence. Dollaghan (2007) reflects this emphasis when she adapts 
the Sackett et al (1996) definition and defines EBP as: ‘the conscientious, explicit and 
judicious integration of 1) best available external evidence from systematic research, 
with 2) best available evidence internal to clinical practice, and 3) best available 
evidence concerning the preferences of a fully informed patient’ (p.2). This clearly 
highlights the three pillars of research, clinical experience and patient preferences, 
although it can be said that the highest credence continues to be given to research 
findings (Sackett, Straus, Richardson, Rosenberg & Haynes, 2000). In this way EBP 
can be seen in hierarchical terms and this is also reflected in the levels of evidence 
where the best evidence is based on the gold standards of randomised control trials, 
systematic reviews, and meta-analyses. The lowest levels of evidence are considered 
to be clinical expertise or clinical consensus. This attribution of value has significance 
for any discipline claiming to be scientific, especially in the absence of high-level 
evidence. As Roulstone (2001) notes, the dearth of top levels of evidence in SLT, 
means clinical expertise and clinical consensus are heavily relied upon in the 
profession.  
 
This idea of best evidence is not random given as Thompson (2003) explains, that 
EBP is ‘designed to be a systematic means of combating the biases that arise from 
uninformed decision making’ (p.231). It achieves this by use of the best evidence. 
‘Best’ in this context means research based on rigorous designs most likely to lead to 
valid and reliable results. Tensions exist between the values placed on the various 
pillars and Miles, Loughlin and Polychronis’s (2007) suggestion that EBP is an 
approach that was “operationalized” before being “conceptualised” may help explain 
this. There are calls for further broadening of the definition. Thompson et al. (2002) 
for example, argue for the inclusion of a fourth pillar centred on available resources.  
Beutow and Kenealy (2000) have suggested theoretic evidence, judicial evidence and 
ethics-based evidence should also influence decision making.  
 
In its current state, it is EBP’s commitment to the scientific method which is seen as 
an important reason for its adoption (Lum, 2002). Johnston (2005) for example, 
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reflects on EBP as an important renewal of the SLT profession’s commitment to the 
link between research and practice, keeping the discipline bound to the scientific 
tradition through identifying interventions most likely to produce positive outcomes. 
Essentially it discourages ineffective practice (McCluskey & Cusick, 2002), increasing 
the quality of optimal care to people with communication disorders (ASHA, 2004) and 
may be especially critical in dysphagia says Logemann (2011), where there is 
potential for harm. 
 
1.4.2. Standpoints on EBP 
‘The use of sound evidence is the best way to navigate the debates within our field of 
practice’ (Logemann, 2011, p.121). 
 
EBP has gained a significant place in the clinical world. Mykhalovskiy and Weir 
(2004) call it ‘arguably the most important contemporary initiative committed to 
reshaping biomedical reason and practice’ (p.1059). Rycroft-Malone et al. (2004b) say 
‘evidence’ may well be one of the most fashionable words in health care.  EBP has 
been seen as an approach towards rationalising clinical practice (Porta, 2004), an 
attempt to introduce more objectivity into practice (Ioannidis & Lau, 2000), and most 
importantly a process for facilitating clinicians to arrive at well-reasoned decisions 
(Gambrill, 2005). It is, Gambrill (2005) argues, essentially a process for handling the 
uncertainty surrounding decisions that must be made. Well-reasoned decisions 
means as Ylivisaker et al. (2002) note, that ‘responsible clinicians pay particular 
attention to validated population-evidence statements in making decisions about 
clinical management of individual cases’ (p. xxvii). Thus as Charlton and Miles (1998) 
state, EBP has ‘effectively labelled itself as rational, objective and altruistic – while 
any opposition was implied to be promoting a practice that is illogical, self-indulgent 
and opposed to evidence’ (p.371). Indeed rationality seems to be central 
characteristic of EBP and the ‘assumption appears to be that EBP is the right thing to 
do’ (Beecham, 2004, p.131). As Hammersley (2001) comments, it is deemed irrational 
to argue that practice should not be based on evidence.  
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Opposition perhaps as a consequence appears limited. Swinkels et al. (2002) would 
say levels of resistance to EBP have been generally low possibly, because it has been 
conveyed as rational and neutral. Indeed, studies indicate positive attitudes to EBP 
across disciplines (e.g. Bennett et al., 2003; Metcalfe et al., 2001; Risahmawati, Emura, 
Nishi and Koizumi, 2011; Zipoli & Kennedy, 2005). Curtin and Jaramazovic’s (2001) 
study of occupational therapists perhaps stands out as one study with a contrary 
finding having demonstrated that only 16% of respondents reported that research 
was an important influence on practice. It also appears that the most experienced 
practitioners express either the least favourable attitudes about EBP (Bridges, 
Bierema & Valentine, 2007) or the most (Turner, 2001) depending on the study.  
 
Yet EBP has been subjected to ridicule by a combination of quacks, egoists, 
curmudgeons and ideologues states Gibbons (2009). These include Murray, Holmes, 
Perron and Rail (2007) who argue that clinicians and researchers who blindly adopt 
EBP are acting without intellectual integrity. Furthermore, opposition is clearly 
expressed in the consistent failure of EBP to be integrated into SLT practice (e.g. 
Brenner et al., 2003; Nail-Chiwetalu & Bernstein-Ratner, 2007; Zipoli & Kennedy, 
2005) and SLTs may perceive more barriers than their colleagues in physiotherapy 
and occupational therapy (Metcalfe et al., 2001). Adam’s (2000) doctors highlight 
open antipathy. The vast majority considered EBP as a ‘direct threat’, ‘a restrictive 
approach’ and as opposed to ‘clinical freedom’ (p.250). Resistance is seen by 
researchers as well as practitioners. Terms such as omnipresent (Schlosser & 
Sigafoos, 2008), professionals under siege (Fish & Coles, 1998), methodological 
fundamentalism (Murray et al., 2007), patient-removed practice (Porta, 2006) and 
painting by numbers (Silverman, 1996) signify this. There are particular concerns 
that EBP may undermine clinical expertise (Charlton, 1998), undervaluing the 
importance of tacit clinical knowledge and encouraging ‘cookbook’ practice (Gabbay 
& LeMay, 2004). At the same time, Miles et al. (2007) state that EBP is divisive as it 
misrepresents evidence, disregards theory, and limits the development of knowledge. 
Other reasons for  resistance are offered by Rubin and Parrish (2007a) and include a 
Deconstructing clinical practice and searching for scientific foundations 
 
 
 
52 
 
 
negative view of positivist science; ignoring patient’s values and preferences, and; 
being seen as a cost-cutting tool.  
 
These however, may represent misinterpretation of what EBP is. It does not Fey 
(2006) argues limit SLTs to the use of practices that have been demonstrated to be 
efficacious through research. If constructed as a decision-support system rather than 
a decision-mandated system state Higgs, Jones, Edwards and Beeston. (2004), there is 
no reason to see why resistance should be evident. Furthermore, the modern 
definition of the concept integrating the pillars of experience and preferences, 
intimates a valuing of knowledge other than that which is empirically derived.  
 
1.4.3. Clinical experience and expertise 
‘External clinical evidence can inform but never replace clinical expertise’ (Malterud, 
2002, p.125). 
 
Practice can be said to be composed of two forms of knowledge – propositional and 
non-propositional (Rycroft-Malone et al., 2004b). Propositional knowledge explains 
Rycroft-Malone et al. (2004b), is formal, explicit, derived from research and 
concerned with generalizability. Non-propositional knowledge is informal, implicit 
and derived primarily through practice, and not usually concerned with 
transferability beyond the case or particular setting. Such knowledge however, is a 
rich source of similar patients to whom a patient-at-hand can be compared (Tonelli, 
2010), and  has the potential to become propositional knowledge once it has been 
made explicit, discussed, debated and verified through wider communities of practice 
(Rycroft-Malone et al., 2004b).  
 
Clinical experience is essentially knowledge originating from clinical practice which 
guides clinical decision-making (Higgs et al., 2001). Eraut (1994) describes this type 
of evidence as practical knowledge, Titchen (2000) as professional-craft knowledge, 
and Rycroft-Malone et al.’s (2004a) practitioners refer to it as practical evidence. It is 
this tacit knowledge of professionals which the EBP model defines as clinical 
expertise. Beutow and Kenealy (2000) explain it as an integral form of evidence as it 
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‘views positively the atypical case’ (p.87). Thus practical evidence is considered vital 
for its potential to deepen our understanding and to help to manage uncertainty (Ely 
et al., 1999) especially when immediate solutions are needed. It is also considered 
central as the integrator of the other pillars of evidence. In this way, EBP gives due 
credence to tacit knowledge (Sain, 2004) and recognises as Thompson (2003) points 
out, that for most day-to-day clinical situations; the evidence supporting decision-
making is experiential knowledge. Tonelli (2010) states that effectively clinical 
experience offers a way to help bridge the gap between research and care of the 
individual. 
 
Consequently, clinicians appear to value practical evidence highly. Zipoli and Kennedy 
(2005) for example, found SLT clinical experience and peer opinion were used to 
guide decision making more than research studies or clinical-practice guidelines. This 
finding is thoroughly replicated (Bennett et al., 2003; Copley & Allen, 2009; Lenne & 
Waldby, 2011; McCaughan, 2005; Oswald & Bateman, 2000; Thompson et al., 2001; 
Upton & Upton, 2006) across disciplines. Clinicians see themselves therefore, as 
Moerman (2002) states, as the ‘primary active ingredients” in treatment (p.95). Their 
knowledge however, is often interpreted as subjective and biased perhaps with 
reason.  As Jones, Grimmer, Edwards, Higgs and Trede (2006) note, experts are 
subject to cognitive biases and error (Kahmi, 2004) many of which arise directly from 
individual experiences (Bornstein & Elmer, 2001). Clinicians are aware of the 
potential for bias. Copley and Allen’s (2009) clinicians for example, were well aware 
of the possibility that practice-generated evidence was at risk of being biased. This 
underscores the influence of personal factors such as enthusiasm and belief in the 
effectiveness of a treatment approach (Garske & Andreson, 2003; Kahmi, 1999).  
 
The integration of clinical experience into the EBP model is problematic for other 
reasons. There continue to be questions for example, around what experience 
constitutes, an obvious failing especially as Dodd (2007) points out, that clinical 
expertise varies. King et al.’s (2008) study of paediatric rehabilitation therapists 
identified motivation and complexity of work experiences as central to the attainment 
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of expertise. Other characteristics include the volume of knowledge, better 
organisation of knowledge, deeper problem representation, executive reviews of 
reasoning (Gambrill, 2005), better management of uncertainty, running mental 
simulations and having a repertoire of patterns (Phillips, Klein & Sieck, 2005). Thus, 
experience alone does not constitute expertise and Choudry, Fletcher and Soumerai 
(2005) note that time in practice does therefore not appear to be associated with 
better patient outcomes. Furthermore, a number of definitive studies have shown 
people generally tend to be overconfident about their knowledge, when it comes to 
decision making or judgement tasks (Thompson, 2003). Experience can thus provide 
a clinician with a false sense of certainty and may be of little help when faced with a 
situation not previously encountered (Thompson et al., 2002).  
 
Despite acknowledged differences in clinical experience the EBP paradigm has failed 
to attach clear descriptions to this pillar such as seen for research evidence, or indeed 
define protocols to integrate practical with other forms of knowledge. This remains a 
problem for the model and implies it can only be surmised, a lesser valuing for 
practical evidence. This is typified by comments such as Coyle (2011) equating 
practice evidence with expediency and Dopson, Locock, Gabbay, Fearlie and 
Fitzgerald, (2003) saying it may be misleading and therefore needs to be interpreted 
cautiously. Given the uniqueness of clinical experience, Tonelli (2010) argues it will 
necessarily lead to variability. In this sense use of empirical evidence may be seen as 
Rappolt (2003) suggests as an effort to neutralise experience. Concerns are not 
always warranted. Charman (2010) for example, points to several studies in the field 
of autism which show that for two-year olds, expert clinical judgment is more reliable 
than the standard diagnostic instruments for diagnosis.  Tonelli (2010) comments 
that practical evidence is less explicated in intervention decision making than 
diagnosis which is of course the primary interest of EBP.   
 
Despite the concern with the human elements of practical evidence, clinical expertise 
is now seen to be fundamental to the delivery of EBP (King et al., 2007). It may for 
example, determine that a validated therapy is ineffective in the real world of clinical 
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practice. It facilitates the clinician in examining whether differences between a 
current and previous patient are relevant enough to influence treatment changes. 
According to Beutow and Kenealy (2000), it is not a weak alternative but ‘can build on 
science by supporting or establishing answers to questions that are larger than 
science’ (p.88) such as values and can bridge the intrinsic gap between research and 
the care of the individual patient (Tonelli, 2010). This implies the centrality of the 
clinician in decision making.  
 
1.4.4. Patient preferences and values 
‘Patient engagement and patient decision-making are of course central to clinical 
practice‘(Cayton 2004, p.1).   
 
Therapy is not acontextual but occurs in what Rycroft-Malone et al. (2004b) describe 
as a complex, multi-faceted clinical environment, a large part of which is balanced on 
the individual patient. Patient perspectives are one of the three pillars supporting 
intervention decisions in the EBP model. Such a scaffold is necessary partly as Tonelli 
(2010) argues because research ‘disembodies illness, intellectualising and 
abstracting’ it as though separate from the individual who experiences it (p.387). As 
Edwards, Jones, Carr, Braunack-Mayer and Jensen (2004) comment, many clinical 
tasks require an understanding of the person as well as the disease.  
 
This weighting on patient opinion is nothing new. For years, SLTs have been taught to 
consider their clients when making clinical decisions (Gilliam & Gilliam, 2006). 
However, integrating patient perspectives may not be as automatic as one would 
assume. While client factors do appear to be strong determinants in treatment choice 
as indicated by Joffe and Pring’s (2008) SLTs, these tend to be more patient 
characteristics such as the child’s age, severity of the disorder and cognitive abilities. 
Ylivisaker et al. (2002) highlight two patient-specific types of reasoning: patient-
specific hypothesis testing, and; single subject experiments. These are not the same as 
patient preferences. Watts-Pappas, McLeod, McAllister and McKinnon (2008) suggest 
there may be a gap between beliefs and practice with beliefs about the worthiness of 
patient involvement not always reflecting practice. Clinicians may enable client and 
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parent roles specifically with regard to the carrying out of therapy tasks. Iacono and 
Cameron (2009) found Australian SLTs while involving families in their children’s 
intervention, were on the whole using a directive approach. Watt-Pappas et al. (2008) 
also found that although SLTs involved parents in service delivery, involvement in 
service planning was less frequent. These findings suggest clinicians may be more 
inclined to incorporate patients and families as therapy assistants or technicians than 
engage them as co-partners in the process. There is evidence argue Edwards et al. 
(2004) that engagement with the patient and family provokes clinicians to ask 
different kinds of questions that may results in a different treatment direction being 
engaged. The potential neglect of patient considerations may therefore result in 
different treatments and different outcomes.  
 
Watts-Pappas et al. (2008) also found that the more experienced SLTs involved 
parents less in decisions, intimating that the accumulation of clinical experience may 
further negate patient input. Other factors which may contribute to the apparent 
inattention to patient opinion include the nature of SLT interventions. SLT on the 
whole is an arena where treatments are non-invasive, thus as Lum (2002) suggests, 
clients may rarely ask about the nature or proven value of treatments provided. 
Furthermore if as Kahmi (2006) points out that pragmatism is at work in clinical 
practice, it may be that practical factors such as treatment efficiency might explain 
decisions made about treatment, rather than treatment effectiveness or incorporation 
of patient preferences. Indeed, Rycroft-Malone et al. (2004a) believe that most 
clinicians become ‘closet eclectics’ because ‘their clients have need this from them’ 
(p.245). 
 
There is no real disagreement as to the ethical and moral positions of centralising 
individuals preferences in clinical practice, however, as Rycroft-Malone et al. (2004b) 
argue, it continues to be the case that in reality little is known about the role that 
patients play. Neither is the notion of patient preferences so clear cut. It may be that 
some patients require their clinicians to operate an expert model, to know which 
treatment is best for them and make those decisions in their capacity as a specialist in 
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their area. If so, clinicians may be responding naturally by not engaging patient 
perspectives. Occasionally, patients do demand specific therapies, particularly new 
ones or ones not provided in a service. In such cases clinicians are required, says 
Creaghead (1999), to balance the potential success of new treatment methods against 
the possibility of unrealised hopes rather than ‘colluding’ with patient preferences. It 
can be said that incorporating of patient preferences may provide clinicians and 
clients themselves with a dilemma. Beecham (2004) argues that although the ideal is 
the incorporation of patient preferences, it may not be as practically feasible as 
conceptually ideal. 
 
Moreover, even post the addition of patient preferences into the definition of EBP, 
explicit information on exactly how to integrate client preferences is still relatively 
absent in the literature (Entwistle & O’Donnell, 2001). This is surprising Tonelli 
(2010) argues given the difficulties of assimilating patient perspectives. Isolated 
examples are evident. Entwistle and O’Donnell (2001) assert that the client’s role is 
most critical in integrating the research evidence with client preferences. Farrell and 
Gilbert (1996) make a useful contribution in discussing two specific types of patient 
evidence, collective and individual involvement, collective involvement being about 
participation of groups or communities. Hideker, Jones, Imig and Villarruel (2009) 
discuss use of family paradigms to determine family values and preferences during 
family counselling which could be incorporated into SLTs practice to assist families in 
making informed decisions.  
 
The gathering and incorporation of individuals’ values, experiences, and preferences 
into evidence-based practice is thus a complex issue. Rycroft-Malone et al. (2004b) 
comment, that integrating evidence is most problematic particularly if the various 
sources do not fit together well, for example, the modest benefit of drugs vs. 
individuals’ positive experiences of taking them. Therefore the blending of patient 
opinion with other sources of evidence into intervention decisions requires care and 
expertise. This lack of harmony may go towards explaining the relative neglect of this 
pillar and also be obvious in the neglect of qualitative research as evidence (Rappolt, 
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2003), which given the client-centred nature of practice is perhaps most pertinent to 
practice. Barker (2000), in commenting on ‘caring’ in an evidence-based culture, 
emphasises that good practice cannot be separated from the unpredictable ways in 
which individuals and their families respond to concepts of health and illness 
(Chambers, 2008). Thus, although theoretically supported, patient perspectives 
appear not to be practically promoted. 
 
1.4.5. Adopting EBP  
‘Mere awareness of research is not sufficient for a profession that seeks truth and 
knowledge’ (Lum, 2002, p.1). 
 
The primary goal of EBP has been to reduce uncertainty in order to facilitate uniform 
decisions. Tonelli (2010) argues that it has favoured the results of research, thus 
undermining the importance of other kinds of knowledge. This may explain the 
consistent findings across barrier studies of EBP in SLT (e.g. Brener et al, 2003; 
Dunphy, 2009; Nail-Chiwetalu & Bernstein-Ratner, 2007; O’Connor & Pettigrew, 
2009; Zipoli & Kennedy, 2005) and across multiple disciplines (e.g. Pollock, Legg, 
Langhorne & Sellars, 2000; Risahmawati et al., 2011) which show poor uptake of 
what is called EBP, but which is essentially research evidence. Such findings suggest a 
‘pervasive interdisciplinary problem’ (Wilcox, Hadley & Bacon, 1998, p.11). 
Furthermore, Metcalfe et al. (2001) report that SLTs perceive significantly more 
barriers than their colleagues in physiotherapy and occupational therapy. Most 
importantly, clinicians appear unanimous. Copley and Allen (2009) in their 
qualitative study with occupational therapists for example, found that no participants 
articulated contrary opinion about the barriers to using research-generated evidence. 
There are also suggestions both within SLT and physiotherapy (McEvoy, Williams, 
Olds, Lewis & Petkov, 2011; Zipoli & Kennedy, 2005) of a transitory decline in the use 
of EBP in the first years of practice despite increases in confidence and knowledge. It 
may be as Than, Bidwill, Davison, Phibbs and Walker (2005) note, that ‘incorporating 
it into clinical practice is easier said than done’ (p.330). EBP therefore can be said not 
to have achieved the extent of acceptance that it set out to achieve among clinicians, 
this despite a high level of investment in research trials and dissemination through 
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research articles (Walsh & Rundall, 2001). Miles et al. (2007) on the other hand, argue 
that real measures such as a working knowledge of terminology, use of practice 
guidelines and frequent consultations of the Cochrane database illustrate a degree of 
integration into practice. Nevertheless, EBP remains problematic and has as Pope 
(2003) says, been dogged by conceptual and practical problems.   
 
SLTs most frequently cited barrier to use of research relates to the empirical evidence 
itself and includes: the volume of evidence (little or none); irrelevant evidence; and 
conflicting evidence (Mullen, 2005). SLTs essentially lack the evidence upon which to 
base treatment decisions (Law, Garret & Nye, 2004). Even when research evidence 
does exist, persuasive evidence can be problematic when evidence is inconclusive, 
inconsistent (Haynes, 2002) or of poor quality (Straus & McAlister, 2000). Findings 
are often equivocal (Bernstein-Ratner, 2006) leaving clinicians with no real guidance. 
This results as Burkhead, Sapienza and Rosenbek (2007) comment, in more questions 
than answers regarding how SLTS should most effectively approach intervention. 
Systematic reviews which are the amalgamation of results from therapy studies have 
been seen as a potential solution to these problems, but they are criticised for the 
absence of straightforward recommendations (Strauss & McAlister, 2000) often being 
equivocal themselves. Schlosser and Sigafoos (2009) use the term ‘empty reviews’ 
(p.1) and Pring (2004) calls them an ‘assessment of all therapies and no therapies’ 
(p.298). This no doubt contributes to clinician confusion. Part of the problem is that 
many studies do not even meet strict criteria for inclusion in systematic reviews 
(Pring, 2004) which means the effectiveness of therapies can neither be established 
nor disproved. This is not unique to SLT. El Dib, Atallah and Andriolo’s (2005) 
evaluation of decision making in health care analysed a random sample of over 1,000 
systematic reviews published in the Cochrane Library and found that half of reviews 
reported that the evidence did not support either benefit or harm. Thus, adhering to 
only validated treatments might lead to a restrictive list of treatments (Newsom & 
Hovanitz, 2005), what Bernstein-Ratner (2005) refers to as a “lesser evidence base” 
(p.164) and Fey (2006) calls a problem of critical mass. This results as Higgs et al. 
(2001) state, in the impossibility of limiting treatment selection to circumstances 
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where only evidence exists.  Moreover, Chapman and Sonneberg (2000) argue that 
this situation is unlikely to improve as research will never address more than a small 
fraction of the knowledge needed to support EBP. Neither does the use of clinical 
guidelines solve these issues Chapman and Sonneberg (2000) state, because they are 
subject to the same issues as research.   
 
Like practical knowledge, empirical knowledge may also be subject to bias which may 
further serve to reduce the available evidence. Research may for example be 
motivated by funding issues. Private corporations funded approximately one third of 
all original manuscripts published in the largest two general medicine journals in 
America (Friedman & Richter, 2004) and authors with a conflict of interest were also 
10-20 times less likely to present negative findings than those without (Tobler, 2004). 
It is also well understood that the negative cases are ignored and a proliferation of 
positive evidence is published when in fact negative outcomes are part of clinical 
practice. Bouffard and Reid (2012) comment that ‘even carefully planned 
interventions may not produce the desired effect and lead to negative outcomes’ 
(p.15).  
 
Additionally, the reliability of some evidence can be called into question. McLean et al. 
(2007) state that even scientists occasionally do not ‘play by the rules’ (p.85). This 
can include the drawing of overgenerous conclusions (Westen, 2005) or what 
Greenhalgh (2012) calls ‘abstracted generalisations’ (p.96). Rubin and Parrish’s 
(2007b) review of 138 outcome studies in social work showed 60% contained 
phrases that could be misconstrued or exploited as implying an inflated evidence 
based status. Steen (2011) in a review of retracted papers found an increase in 
retractions over a ten year period with one third of retracted papers having ‘scientific 
mistakes’. He further found that journals often fail to notify the reader of such 
retractions. The state of research generated evidence is thus far from reliable. 
 
It may also be naturally limited. Specifically, research may focus on investigations of 
individual and ‘perhaps idiosyncratic therapies’ (Pring, 2004, p.296) resulting in 
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individual therapies generating large volumes of findings by single research teams 
(e.g. Lidcombe programme, LSVT). A consumer / researcher mismatch is clearly 
suggested for example, by Tallon et al.’s (2000) study on desired interventions for 
osteoarthritis which found interventions that dominated the published research were 
not those which most interested consumers. This means that the treatments used by 
clinicians are not typically the ones researched. Westen (2005) argues that we 
therefore cannot assume that therapies which are untested are less efficacious than 
those identified as empirically supported.  This lack of clinical guidance provided by 
research Kahmi (2006) argues plays a role in the use of questionable therapies such 
as NSOMEs. Moreover, the evaluation of specific therapies may be, claim Joffe and 
Pring (2008), incompatible with the nature of clinical practice where eclecticism and 
pragmatism rule. Such eclecticism may result in issues around ‘fidelity to the 
treatment protocol’ (Hayhow, 2010, p.157) as demonstrated with the Lidcombe 
programme (Rosseau et al., 2002).  Nelson, Steele and Mize (2006) note that firm 
protocols regarding attendance may not be realistic given the large number of clients 
who drop out of or attend therapy sporadically.  Strict protocols may mean that 
individualisation is limited, elements such as spontaneity and creativity are discarded 
(Aldridge, 2003) and clinicians’ judgements restricted (Mykhalovskiy & Weir, 2004). 
Kahmi (1999) argues that ‘clinicians are not naive research consumers’ (p.94), and 
they know that efficiency is not always the most important factor in treatment. Thus 
as Wilcox et al. (1998) states ‘many validated approaches fail to meet real practice 
needs’ (p.12).  
 
Therefore it can be argued that the nature of the research base can be said to 
significantly contribute to poor uptake. It may also represent a rejection of scientific 
knowledge (Newbold et al., 2008) which may contribute to rationalisations of clinical 
practice as nonscientific. Poor uptake has also been associated with a perceived 
threat to clinician’s autonomy (Armstrong, 2002) and clinician’s resistance to change 
to new ideas (Walshe & Rundall., 2001). What is not often explicitly considered is 
whether the model itself is translationally challenged (Porta, 2004) and there may be, 
Pope (2003) argues, ‘fundamental differences between the sciences encapsulated in 
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EBP’ (p.273) and the nature of everyday practice. Professional practice is after all 
what Higgs et al. (2004) refer to as an inexact science. This naturally makes it 
incumbent on clinician to use practical knowledge. Additionally, Elman (2006) points 
out that certain populations of patients including those with severe problems or co-
morbidities may be underrepresented in trials that have homogenous subject 
selection criteria. Reviews of journal content in physiotherapy (Robertson, 1995) and 
SLT for example (Justice, Nye, Schwartz, McGinty & Rivera, 2008; Koenig & Gunter, 
2005) found only a small proportion of treatment articles relevant to therapies and to 
areas like developmental disability. There is no guarantee as Upshur (2002) 
comments that evidence is available at the time a clinical decision must be made. 
 
Furthermore, intervention may not be so easily definable and thus researchable. Fey 
(1990) pointed to the many variables in treatment packages in the profession, saying 
it was not surprising that research is less well represented in the discipline. Roberts 
(2010) in attempting to group therapies in autism found almost impossible as 
programmes were composed of a number of techniques. Speyer et al. (2010) clearly 
demonstrates this in their dysphagia review. Hayhow (2010) concurs that ‘complex’ 
interventions are more difficult to evaluate because of the potential for problems in 
developing, identifying, documenting and reproducing the intervention. Hayhow 
(2010) questions whether we should be evaluating principles rather than therapies to 
reflect more accurately the nature of practice. This would appear supported by 
Branson and Demchak’s (2009) systematic review of AAC therapies. They found that 
many different types of therapies resulted in communication improvements, and 
queried whether intervention can be effective when parents respond consistently and 
contingently to communication attempts, rather than perhaps a result the specific 
therapy utilised. 
 
Clinicians’ skills have often been said to contribute to uptake issues. Reilly (2004b) 
argues that existing clinicians do not have the back ground to use EBP, it being 
dependent on individual practitioner’s skills such as statistical knowledge (Cohen, 
Stavri & Hersh, 2003), knowledge of research methods (Haynes, 2002) literature 
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searching and critical appraisal (Straus, 2007). This tends to be confirmed in surveys 
(e.g. McCluskey, 2003; Metcalfe et al., 2001; Pennington, 2001). Pennington’s SLTS 
reported that research reports were difficult to read and interpret. Terminology may 
also be problematic. Yousefi-Nooraie, Shakiba, Mortaz-Hedjri and Souroush’s (2007) 
doctors and academics for example did not know the meaning of a number of 
regularly used terms (e.g. meta-analysis). Additionally, Upton and Upton’s (2006) 
study appears to indicate worryingly low levels of understanding about EBP itself. 
While psychologists and physiotherapists from the sample rated their knowledge as 
high, individuals from other professions including SLT rated themselves as having a 
low level of knowledge. Only thirteen per cent of doctors have a good understanding 
of basic EBP skills (Risahmawati et al., 2011). Skill issues may be partly due to 
resource constraints. Clinicians particularly identify time (e.g. Pennington, 2001; 
Pollock et al., 2000) as a factor, although high staff turnover and staff shortages 
(Curtin & Jaramazovic, 2001) and organisational structure (Upton & Upton, 2006) are 
also noted. Despite the recurring theme of time, some authors (Gillam & Gillam, 2006) 
argue that EBP is not time heavy. Fey (2006) disagrees, likening it to ferreting out 
information. Bernstein-Ratner’s (2006) own search produced 20,000 discipline-
specific articles of relevance. This suggests that EBP may not accommodate what 
Holland (1998) refers to as the realities of the workplace, despite the good intentions 
of clinicians.  
 
Bowen (2009) comments that while clinicians are mostly responsible for adopting 
EBP they have only had a small part in constructing it. This may have resulted in a 
model which while scientific, does not fit well with clinical practice, leaving 
aspirationally-scientific practitioners confused. It is also a model which has 
emphasized the most scientific pillar – research evidence (Schlosser & Sigafoos, 2009) 
- and neglected the other pillars. Rosseau (2009) goes so far as to state that it has 
‘supplanted the wisdom garnered…through the passage of time, relegating the 
individual clinical experience to the trash heap of progress’ (p.6). The simplistic view 
of implementation (Dopson et al., 2003) may not have not helped its uptake.  
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1.5 DECISION MAKING  
1.5.1. Understanding decision making 
‘The vehicle for the development of the knowledge base of the profession is clinical 
reasoning and not EBP’ (Higgs, Jones, Edwards & Beeston, 2004, p.196).  
 
Clinical reasoning refers to the thinking and decision-making processes that are used 
in clinical practice (Edwards et al., 2004). Independent and responsible decision 
making is regarded as one of the characteristics of an autonomous profession. Despite 
this, the literature on clinical reasoning in SLT suffers by comparison with its allied 
disciplines (McAllister & Rose, 2000). This results in limited knowledge regarding the 
decision making of SLTs when selecting interventions. Hoben, Varly and Cox (2007) 
however, acknowledge the global characteristics of health professions which means 
knowledge learned from other professions can be applied to SLT.  Furthermore, there 
exists no simple prescription for choosing an intervention approach as many factors 
may play a part and vary from one clinician and one patient to the next. It is currently 
unclear what scaffolds support intervention decisions and the scientific nature of 
those scaffolds. For the purposes of this study, the focus can be broadly split into two 
sections; scientific and nonscientific thinking. 
 
1.5.2. Scientific or valid thinking 
‘Too often science is presented as a disembodied collection of facts’ (Sherman, 2009, 
p.35). 
 
Sagan (1996) argues that science is not merely a body of knowledge but a way of 
thinking, arguing that the scientific method ‘is far more important than the findings of 
science’ (p.22).  While scientific behaviours and actions are most typically associated 
with the use of research evidence, rational clinical decisions ‘must be supported by 
considerations that extend beyond population evidence’ (Ylivisaker et al., 2002, 
p.xxix).  This is especially so given that the standardised circumstances of research-
generated evidence are almost never achieved in clinical practice. Cronje & Fullan 
(2003) argue that individual and contextual factors are central to rational judgment. 
This includes the distinctiveness of each patient according to Hunter (1996), which 
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prohibits any purely rule-based methods for selecting treatments. Thus, clinical 
reasoning may involve both deductive and inductive reasoning, being primarily 
deductive when based on empirically-based knowledge, and inductive when based on 
clinical experience (Doody, 2011).   
 
Scientific thinking may be considered an umbrella term for the many labels used to 
describe and examine elements of this process including critical thinking, clinical 
judgement, clinical reasoning and logic (Appendix 1). Lum (2002) refers to valid 
thinking. Shermer (2001) defines it as ‘a set of cognitive and behavioural methods to 
describe and interpret observed phenomena…aimed at building a testable body of 
knowledge open to rejection or confirmation’ (p.98). The implication is that the 
scientific process is evident in an organised, structured approach rather than 
randomness and unsubstantiated guesswork (Kida, 2006). In this way, the concept of 
scientific thinking is similar to the production of research (Berkwits, 1998). Higgs et 
al. (2004) state that there are different ways of working rigorously. Thus scientific 
thinking can include behaviours such as testing and cognitive methods such as 
generating hypotheses (Shermer, 2001), questioning (Profetto-McGrath, 2005), 
argumentation (Jenicek, 2006), problem solving (Klahr, 2000) and a variety of other 
analytic behaviours such as interpretation, inference, explanation, monitoring and 
correcting one’s own reasoning (Facione, Facione & Giancarlo, 2000). As Gambrill 
(2005) states, a scientific approach to practice requires the use of a broad range of 
methods.  
 
Packman and Attanasio (2004) provide a model upon which to understand scientific 
endeavour. They refer to the three domains of inquiry: theory, logic and empiricism. 
Each domain is concerned with specific issues: the theoretical domain with 
propositions; the logic domain with arguments contained in such propositions, and; 
the empirical domain with scientific observation and experimentation – evidence 
which might support or weaken a proposition. The last domain is external but the 
first two are internal to the clinician. Therefore any review of scientific thinking must 
acknowledge a character component, an intellectual commitment to acting 
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scientifically (Brookfield, 1987; Ennis, 2000; Baker, 1996), that is, whether a clinician 
chooses to think in this way (Facione et al., 2000). Many clinicians demonstrate 
scientific practice when they document as standard the rationales for their goals and 
use measures to monitor outcomes. However, engagement through other behaviours 
can be said to represent a true commitment to the scientific method: a conscious 
effort to use treatments which are efficacious and to validate through their own 
practice ones that are not empirically supported. Characteristics which support 
scientific practice are said to include truth-seeking (Facione & Facione, 2007) rather 
than accepting, unchallenged other opinion (Jones & Brown, 1991), scepticism, 
openness (Kida, 2006) and motivation (King & Kitchner, 1994; O’Neill & Dluhy, 1997). 
Furthermore, such scientific practice requires awareness from clinicians of their own 
biases. 
 
Typically, cognitive science models of clinical reasoning dominate our understanding 
of how clinicians operate. The hypothetico-deductive model of reasoning remains 
perhaps the most persistent model and describes the process whereby clinicians use 
cues from or about the patient, generate provisional hypotheses and confirm, negate 
or adapt these on an on-going basis as further patient information is obtained and 
interpreted.  It is what Edwards et al. (2004) describe as a continual process of 
hypothesis creation and evaluation. It is a model which fits the scientific paradigm in 
that it aims using measurement to ‘validate data acquired from the patient …in a 
reliable fashion’ (Edwards et al., 2004, p.314). Schӧn (1983), the originator of the 
concept of reflective thinking, defined practice as a professional activity consisting of 
‘instrumental problem solving made rigorous by the application of scientific theory 
and technique’ (p.21). In this way, clinical practice can be characterised as scientific. 
Evidence of unscientific thinking would suggest differently. 
 
1.5.3. Unscientific or invalid thinking  
‘Wisdom comes from evidence and not from belief’ (Coyle, 2011, p.113). 
 
Unscientific practice may be best observed in the use of pseudoscientific and non-
scientific therapies. However, a number of forms of non-rigorous thinking such as 
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hunches, guesses, and ideas (Shermer, 2001), intuition and common sense (Aldridge, 
2003) may also be seen to represent less than scientific practice. Kida (2006) 
identifies characteristics of pseudoscientific thinking including deliberation (or single 
mindedness), use of evidence in a biased manner and valuing beliefs rather than 
scepticism and openness. McLean et al. (2007) add credulity and cynicism. Therefore 
the quality of thinking (Di Vito-Thomas, 2000) is crucial to clinical practice. 
Defensible judgements state King and Kitchner (1994) are based on evidence and 
reasoning and not beliefs. Reasoning is required argues Kida (2006), to counteract 
our natural tendencies to err and avoid confirmation bias. It may be that clinician’s 
use of therapies because they believe it works (Kahmi, 1999), fit this idea of non-
scientific thinking.  
 
Invalid thinking is problematic for a number of reasons according to Kida (2006), 
including a decrease in the ability to make well-informed decisions and the diversion 
of resources that could be spent on more productive activities. However, not all such 
forms of thinking may be invalid. Greenhalgh (2002) argues for example, that labels 
such as intuition may be misconstrued. She describes intuition as a valid decision 
making method characterised as a rapid, unconscious context-sensitive process, 
involving selective attention to small details and making sense of multiple, complex 
pieces of data. Rather than being unscientific she argues, it is creative and 
fundamental to hypothesis generation in science. The influence of anecdote on 
practice decisions is also seen as questionable but Gibbons (2009) argues that 
anecdote is the natural way for humans to reason. As Kida (2006) points out, humans 
prefer stories to statistics. Moreover, Gibbons (2009) argues that anecdote is an 
effective means of dealing with the constant deluge of information clinicians needs to 
process. Thus it is seen as natural, efficient and responsive to complex and dynamic 
systems. In the EBP model, such forms of knowledge and reasoning are considered 
lowly forms of evidence, being especially subject to bias and subjectivity.  
 
Habitual or routine practice may also be constructed as evidence of lack of scientific 
engagement, thinking being ‘vital to intelligent practice that is reflective rather than 
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routine or reflexive’ (Saylor, 1990, p.11). Facione and Facione (2008) argue that 
repeating previous care-delivery behaviours unreflectively is not a standard of 
practice clinicians should aspire to. Reasoning models which focus not so much on the 
process but more on the organization and accessibility of clinician stored knowledge 
might help explain elements of routine practice. These include illness scripts and 
pattern recognition (Higgs & Titchens, 2000) and suggest that knowledge stored in 
memory enables the clinician to recognise certain features of a case almost instantly, 
leading to the use of stored information in managing the case. Greenhalgh (2002) 
points out that this might also be interpreted as intuition. Moreover, contrary to the 
myth that experts think more logically than novices (Greenhalgh, 2002), operating 
routinely may be most associated with accumulated experience resulting in in less 
logical decision making (Boreham, 1988; Greenhalgh, 2002). Thus clinicians make 
countless judgments for which they cannot state the rules (O’Neill & Dluhy, 1997) and 
practice based on such tacit understandings might be deemed illogical, and result in 
what appears to be the routine application of treatments.  
 
It may be that the reasoning which is inherent to practice is not the same as that 
which is valued in EBP. King et al.’s (2008) study of rehabilitation therapists showed 
the critical thinking scores of all groups including expert clinicians, were lower than 
what are considered to be strong scores. Jensen and Givens (1999) showed that 
rather than being highly scientific, nurse’s clinical judgments more closely resembled 
practical reasoning (knowing how) than a more rational, theoretical approach. This 
stands in contrast to ideas that clinical judgement can only be successful if it is logical, 
quantitative, detached and statistical (Dowie & Elstein, 1988). Furthermore, Jensen 
and Givens (1999) comment found that many clinicians tend to be overconfident in 
their judgements and thus fall prey to basic errors in reasoning. Joffe and Pring’s 
(2008) study demonstrated that four out of five SLTs were confident in their 
decisions. Unscientific thinking combined with individual’s misplaced confidence in 
their own powers of judgement (Sutherland, 1992) may combine to make for poor 
decision making, or what Swinkels et al. (2002) call erroneous conclusions.  
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Clinicians can be fooled by therapies that are ineffective, even harmful (McLean et al., 
2007) for a variety of reasons including beliefs (Beyerstein, 1997). Furthermore, a 
strong scientific knowledge base may not be enough to insulate a person against 
irrational beliefs (Shermer, 1997), but beliefs can be maintained by lack of scientific 
thinking such as ignoring or failing to seek contradictory evidence (Sutherland, 1992). 
Sutherland (1992) thus argues that decision making in therapy should be free of such 
influences especially because people believe in therapies because they feel good, are 
comfortable and consoling (Shermer, 1997) rather than being effective. Invalid 
thinking argues Sagan (1996), results in decisions based on faith, not logic and 
reason. This leads us to the question of whether the scaffolds used by clinicians in 
making treatment decisions reflect on scientific or non-scientific underpinnings. 
 
1.5.4. Decision making scaffolds 
‘Selecting effective patient treatments in dysphagia is a thinking clinician’s job’ 
(Logemann, 2011, p.122).  
 
The early decisions clinicians make regarding the provision of intervention are among 
the first and possibly the most important in a sequence of decisions made as part of a 
client’s management (Roulstone, Peters, Glogowska & Enderby, 2008). However, 
there exists no model that ensures that an SLT will make the best clinical decisions 
(Kahmi, 2006b).  Even with growth in the number of empirically supported 
treatments Jones et al. (2006) note that clinicians still operate under conditions of 
uncertainty. Thus health professionals frequently make decisions where there are no 
right and wrong solutions or actions, in the grey zones of practice (Schӧn, 1983).  
Despite this, Kahmi (1999) comments that clinicians have been educated to make 
informed decisions, although decision-making emerges as one of the least visible 
aspects of practice. Some potential scaffolds are discussed below. 
 
1.5.4.1 Practice-based scaffolds 
EBP barrier studies and reasoning research tells us that clinicians primarily use 
knowledge originating from clinical practice as evidence to guide clinical decision 
making (Law et al., 2004), whether it is the clinicians’ own experience (e.g. Bennett et 
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al, 2003) or the clinical experience of colleagues (e.g. Nail-Chiwetalu & Bernstein-
Ratner, 2007). This applies not just to SLTs but to other health professionals 
(Areskoug-Josefsson, Kammerling, Sund-Levander, 2011; Dopson et al., 2003; Gabbay 
& LeMay, 2004). SLTs are more likely to be guided by clinical experience and the 
opinions of colleagues (and even old texts) than scientific sources (Bennett et al., 
2003; O’Connor & Pettigrew, 2009). Interestingly, Mackenzie et al. (2010) found that 
while more experienced clinicians were more likely to be influenced by their own 
experience, the use of such reasoning by SLTs was used to validate both use and non-
use of therapies. This reliance on personal experience may result in clinicians 
employing what is familiar and what they or their peers have seen to work (Kahmi, 
1994).  
 
So although a clinician’s own experience is the most relied upon scaffold, the 
experience of colleagues is also a decision facilitator (Gabbay & LeMay, 2004; 
O’Connor & Pettigrew, 2009; Papadopoulos et al., 2012; Rose & Mackenzie, 2010). 
Such reliance may be partly explained by the concept of memes, originally developed 
by Dawkins (1976) as the selfish gene, later defined as a ‘unit of cultural transmission’ 
passed on particularly by imitation (Kahmi, 2004, p.105). Profession-specific 
examples include the use of terms such as language disorder vs. specific language 
impairment and the use of culturally-based therapies such as bolus modification in 
dysphagia.  Confirmation of the strength of memes may be suggested from MacKenzie 
et al.’s (2010) study of practice in acquired dysarthria which indicated that the use of 
NSOMEs was not associated with years of experience. In Germany 85 drugs are 
prescribed for low blood pressure and there are high annual consultation rates 
regarding this condition. This contrasts to the UK where hardly anyone gets treated 
for low blood pressure and doctors in the US think it amounts to malpractice 
(Saunders, 2000). 
 
Such memes Kahmi (2004) argues help shape the profession and may also explain the 
poor uptake of EBP. Stronge & Cahill (2012) found that non-EBP practising fieldwork 
educators in occupational therapy were important barriers to EBP use for students. 
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Memes also facilitate an understanding of why unproven practices are developed and 
maintained (Stephenson, 2009) as selection favours memes that are easy to 
understand, remember and communicate to others (Kahmi, 2004). It may be that 
collective opinions can blur the line between valid and invalid therapy approaches 
(Lum 2002) and group influences can lead to poor decision making. On the other 
hand, Cronje and Fullan (2003) point to the ‘rationalising forces that comes from 
humans sharing their judgments collectively’ (p.362). Therefore consensus may 
dictate what interventions are used (Lum, 2002; Roulstone, 2001; Tarvis, 2003). 
Additionally, according to Eraut (1994), the professional mind-set tends to be 
justificatory rather than self-critical, which can then be validated in a group 
environment and explain variations in regional practice. This may be especially in 
conditions of uncertainty where the most comfortable and safest position for a 
clinician is to do what others are doing (Eddy, 1988). The effect could be the adoption 
and maintenance of ineffective or pseudoscientific practice with popularity validating 
therapies (Laperchia, 1987) rather than science. Furthermore, such a cultural effect 
may lead to the inhibition of the questioning of practice identified by O’Connor and 
Pettigrew (2009).  
 
1.5.4.2 Educational scaffolds 
There is also evidence that in selecting therapies health professionals rely on 
knowledge acquired in university (Mackenzie et al., 2010; Turner & Whitfield, 1999) 
and from continuous education (e.g. Bennett et al., 2003; Turner & Whitfield, 1999). 
Training may serve to influence the use of less scientific practices such as Watson and 
Lof (2004) found for NSOMEs. Knupp et al (2009) found the same for one third of 
occupational therapists who were using CAMs. Moreover, four out of five clinicians 
identified lack of training as a reason for not using such therapies. Thus training is 
influential in decisions to both use and not use treatments. Furthermore, such 
training may not contribute scientific knowledge. Law and McColl (1989) showed 
continuing education to be by far the lowest contributor to theoretical knowledge 
than other sources suggesting training may lead to a ‘fuzzy’ understanding of 
therapies used (Basmajian, 1975). Stanley, Al-Shehri and Thomas (1993) also argue 
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that such learning reinforces dependent learning, suggesting automated rather than 
autonomous practice. This can be seen as especially relevant in the context of a trend 
towards mandatory certification for selected therapies (e.g. LSVT, Listening Therapy, 
Hanen, and dysphagia). The situation may not be helped by a lack of active policing by 
professional organisations. The professional organisation role is considered essential 
in the context of a general media which is less than supportive of scientific practice. 
Singh and Ernst (2008) report on Ernst’s analysis of four British broadsheets across 
eight days, finding that articles relating to alternative medicine were unanimously 
positive and articles relating to conventional medicine 60% critical. 
 
1.5.4.3 Contextual scaffolds 
Clinicians’ treatment decisions may also be influenced by the consideration of 
contextual and patient factors (Miles, 2007). The clinical decisions health 
professionals are strongly influenced by the context in which they are made 
(Areskoug-Josefsson et al., 2011; Bucknall, 2000; Parahoo, 2000). Rose and 
Mackenzie’s (2010) occupational therapists partly based their decision making on the 
availability of resources. It may be also be that specific client considerations scaffold 
treatment decisions although this may be more about patient characteristics than 
patient preferences (e.g. Joffe & Pring, 2008). There is however, some evidence to 
suggest that expertise may influence the use of patient perspectives. In a study of 
physiotherapists working with children with diplegia, Embrey, Guthrie, White and 
Dietz (1996) found experienced clinicians more patient-oriented than novices who 
were more activity-oriented. There are also suggestions from occupational therapy of 
a patient-centred focus in that field (Rose & Mackenzie, 2010; Knupp et al., 2009), 
although such rationalisation is broadly applied – to the use of both conventional and 
alternative treatments. There is little data in SLT to suggest that decisions are wholly 
or partly scaffolded on patient opinion as of yet. However it may be that patient 
considerations are represented by a functional approach to intervention (Kahmi, 
1999; Fey & Johnson, 1998). Furthermore, King et al. (1998) in a study examining the 
effects of rehabilitation services for children with disabilities, provide evidence that 
focusing on functional goals is worthwhile in leading to improvements in children’s 
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function and indicating rationality in a functional approach. The ‘because it worked’ 
(Kahmi, 1999, p.93) attitude to explain treatment choices may, rather than reflecting 
a casual stance be explained by such pragmatic considerations.  
 
1.5.4.4 Internal scaffolds 
Additionally, internal clinician factors such as hope and belief may also have a role to 
play in the choice of therapies used, including the ‘because it works’ belief. Watson 
and Lof’s (2004) study of SLTs use of NSOMEs shows the part belief plays in adoption 
and use of therapies. Over two thirds use oral-motor exercises because they believe 
they are a foundation for more complex motor movements necessary for speech 
production. Gee (1992) found that any method worked if the teachers believed in it 
and the parents supported it at home. The conclusion was that nonspecific factors 
such as enthusiasm, belief, advocacy and parent support were more important than 
the teaching methods. As Westen (2005)  states, ‘the problem is heightened by the 
fact that most treatments for most disorders tend to work when tested by 
investigators and conducted by therapists who believe in them’ (p.168). Placebos are 
a case in point (Evans, 2003; Moerman, 2002).   
 
1.5.4.5 Theory scaffold 
So what of the more scientific scaffolds such as theory? Theory is one of the core 
pillars upon which practice can be scrutinised and by which clinicians can 
demonstrate their commitment to rational, scientific practice (Higgs et al., 2004). 
Friel-Patti (1994) calls theory fundamental for building effective and efficient 
intervention programmes. Understanding a treatment’s theory facilitates a clinician 
to adapt a treatment to meet an individual’s needs (Dodd, 2007) and Vandenbroucke 
(2002) warns that atheoretical therapies means clinicians should be on their guard. 
Many new methods have theories which are not well described, absent or 
inconsistent with existing theories (Creaghead, 1999) and many therapies for the 
same disorder (e.g. speech) are often theoretically incompatible resulting in 
confusion in the profession about which approach might best to use (Kahmi, 2006).  
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Few studies examine clinicians’ understanding or use of theory in SLT. Theory 
investigations mainly emanate from the field of occupational theory where findings 
typically suggest low valuing and use of theory (Elliott, Velde & Wittman, 2002; 
O’Neal, Dickerson & Holbert, 2007; Wikeby, Lundgren-Pierre & Archenholtz, 2006). 
Joffe and Pring’s (2008) SLTs appeared to demonstrate a lack of dependence on 
theory or theorising. However, practice may not be as atheoretical as implied. Use of 
NSOMEs is typically reported to be based on motor models (Watson & Lof 2004, 
2008). Most clinicians have clear reasons for using bolus modification strategies - the 
prevention of liquid penetration or aspiration. A phenomenological study (Law et al., 
2007) of SLT’s underlying rationales for intervention with children with receptive 
language disorders identified clear underlying theoretical models such as skills 
acquisition, although only a third of SLTs in the study identified explicit theories. 
However, there may indeed be a disconnect between theory and practice. Sanchdev 
and McCurtin (unpublished) indicate discord between clinician’s theoretical 
orientations and their treatment choices in fluency disorders which supports O’Neal 
et al.’s (2007) findings in occupational theory with clinicians favouring remedial 
theories (e.g. sensory integration and motor control) but using compensational 
(adaptive, staff training) interventions. The authors concluded that theory was not 
considered a useful decision making tool by clinicians. Perhaps clinicians find it 
impractical (Eraut, 1994) to distinguish theory and practice as separate entities 
(Murray et al., 2007). It may also be that clinicians value simple explanations with 
popular therapies having plausible theoretical explanations (Kahmi, 2004). 
Familiarity and comfort with a theory led Law and McColl’s (1989) clinicians to 
integrate it into practice and complexity may lead to decline (Bernstein-Ratner, 2005) 
which might explain the decrease in use of operant or speech behaviour treatments 
for stuttering (Kahmi 1999). There are indications that scientific scaffolds such as 
critical thinking are positively correlated with years of experience (Kuiper & Pesult, 
2007), the suggestion being the clinicians with more experience are more 
scientifically oriented in their decisions. O’Neal et al.’s (2007) findings for example, 
suggest that theory valuing has a developmental component such as longevity of 
practice and higher level academic qualifications.  Part of this may be as Hoben et al.’s 
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(2007) study on clinical reasoning suggests that SLT novices demonstrate difficulty in 
conceptualising problems at a deep, abstract level.  
 
Thus, decision making may not be simply constructed but composed of a number of 
forms of knowledge and evidence (Higgs et al., 2001), what Prutting et al. (1988) refer 
to as ‘many different hammers chipping away at the ontological stone’ (p.300). The 
notion of a ‘best solution’ argues Kemm (2006, p.319), ignores the complexity of the 
decision-making process which necessitates the clinician act in a pivotal thinking 
manner. It is timely, as Upshur (2007) puts it, to ask if SLT is fundamentally a 
thinking-based discipline.  
 
1.6 THIS STUDY 
‘We should ask ourselves if we are behaving scientifically’ (Newsom & Hovanitz 2005, 
p.40). 
 
Regarding interventions, Basmajian (1975) commented that ‘the science behind them 
is not as strong as the faith’ (p.608). This thesis aims to examine what underpins SLT 
intervention decisions and whether in fact, science plays a part in practice.  
Fish and Coles (1998a) use the metaphor of the iceberg of professional practice, 
arguing that roughly one tenth of practice is visible, and as Roulstone (1997) advises 
we need to make explicit the thought processes of clinicians if we are to understand 
the reasons underlying clinical decisions and actions. Furthermore, as Richardson et 
al (2004) state, an evaluative approach to clinical practice can help ‘to actualise and 
build links between clinical practice and research which can provide a means for 
developing an evidence base of practice that is relevant to the skill and aspirations of 
individual professions’ (p.12).  
 
The goal of this study is to explore the scaffolds clinicians use when making 
intervention decisions and place it in the context of EBP, non-scientific practice and 
the scientific origins of the profession, all of which mandate a critically-engaged 
clinician. The study aims are outlined at the beginning of the next chapter. 
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Chapter 2: Methodology & Methods 
 
2.1 METHODOLOGY 
 
2.1.1. Study aims 
‘If….decision making is to be improved, it must first be understood’ (Chapman & 
Sonneberg, 2000, p.17). 
 
The aim of this research was to examine decision making scaffolds in SLT clinical 
practice. To explore the topic two things needed to happen: an investigation of WHAT 
therapies and techniques were utilised by clinicians, and; the exploration of WHY 
clinicians choose the therapies they do, that is, what influences their decisions in this 
regard. Therefore the research questions are as follows: 
What are the bases of SLT intervention choices? 
Do intervention choices and reasoning reflect on practice in the profession as 
scientific? 
What do decision making scaffolds say about the nature of clinical practice? 
  
2.1.2. Mixed-method design 
‘There is no one indisputable method for determining the truth’ (Mead, 2000, p.112). 
 
Oppenheim (1996) advises that it is one of the key responsibilities of researchers to 
choose data generation and collection techniques which are likely to do justice to the 
research question. Mixed-method research is the combined use of quantitative and 
qualitative methods which facilitates the researcher in addressing both exploratory 
and confirmatory questions (Tashakkori & Teddlie, 2008). Therefore it is argued that 
use of a mixed-methods design will enable a more balanced perspective (Morse & 
Chung, 2003), a more complete understanding of the phenomenon (Tashakkori & 
Teddlie, 2008; Glogowska, 2011) by providing different perspectives (Rossman 
1985), effectively neutralising the weaknesses (Tsui, 2001; Greene, Caracelli & 
Graham, 1989) that may be associated with the use of a single research method. 
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Essentially, quantitative research focuses on data breadth or insight, whereas 
qualitative methodologies focus on depth or illumination (Prothroe, Bower & Chew-
Graham, 2007). Indeed, it may even be as Rossman (1985) suggests that a false 
dichotomy exists between these two types of methods. 
 
Specifically, a mixed methods approach can: 
 Facilitate complementarity and corroboration by measuring overlapping but 
different facets of a phenomenon (Greene et al., 1989; Tashakkori &Teddlie, 
2008);  
 Prompt new interpretations and suggest new areas for exploration; (Fielding, 
2008); 
 Highlight paradox, weak evidence and gaps in the argument rather than 
confirmation only (Fielding, 2008), and; 
 Improve the accuracy of conclusions (Rossman, 1985) and strengthen the results 
yielded thus reducing the threat to validity and the chance of reaching false 
conclusions or wrong interpretations (Bryman, 2008; Hammersley, 2008).  
Rossman (1985) comments that ultimately combining methods in a single study is 
triangulation.  
Mixed-method research is therefore a valid way to examine the questions posed by 
this study as the research questions are more likely to be comprehensively answered 
by a combination of data from these methods.  
 
2.1.3. Deduction and induction 
‘Not wedded to any pre-existing theoretical framework’ (Braun & Clarke, 2006, p.81). 
 
This research can be considered both deductive and inductive. It is deductive in that it 
is driven by the research question focusing on science and the researcher’s 
theoretical interest. Deductive research essentially tests theory against the data. 
However, the study is also inductive in that it will be correspondingly data driven, 
with theory emerging from the data.  
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The inductive elements of the research perhaps come closest to grounded theory than 
other methods of inquiry. Grounded theory is a general methodology which seeks to 
discover or generate theory from data (Hammer, 2011) and is ‘considered an 
appropriate choice when a phenomenon has not been adequately explained’ (Skeat 
and Perry, 2008, p.97). However, this study is not characterised by the iterative 
process of moving back and forth between empirical data and emerging analysis to 
the extent typified in the ground theory method (Bryant & Charmaz, 2007). Instead, it 
moves sequentially from literature to quantitative data to qualitative data to theory 
presentation.  
 
According to Strauss and Corbin (1998), a theory inductively derived from the 
phenomenon it represents meets a number of central criteria: fit (theory fits data); 
understanding (theory is comprehensible to all involved in the study) and; generality 
(theory is applicable in variety of contexts). In tying both deductive and inductively 
obtained data, it is further intended that theory emerging will meet a ‘ 
representativeness’ criteria, that is, it needs to be an accurate representation of the 
entire data set (Braun & Clarke, 2006).  
 
Statistical estimation and testing will be employed for quantitative data and thematic 
analysis for the qualitative data in order to both test and develop theory. Thematic 
analysis will be both theory and data driven (Braun & Clarke, 2006). Thus, using 
deductive and inductive elements should facilitate progression from diversity to 
shapes in the data (Richards & Morse 2007). 
 
2.1.4. Theoretical sampling 
‘The researcher’s deliberate attempt to seek out sources of information that might 
generate theoretical leads, instead of trying to limit the influence of any specific 
variables’ (Fourie, 2009, p.985). 
 
Utilising both deductive and inductive methods may be a balancing act which will be 
facilitated by employing theoretical sampling. This refers to the purposeful use of 
knowledge to produce theoretical leads.  This openness to influences beyond the 
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narrow confines of the researcher’s interest may be considered inductive. Theoretical 
leads were generated by reviewing the literature for the quantitative phase to 
sensitise the researcher to potential leads (Strauss & Corbin 1998), and utilising 
quantitative phase data for exploration in the qualitative phase.  
 
2.1.5. Systematic analysis 
‘If qualitative research is to yield meaningful and useful results, it is imperative that the 
material under scrutiny is analysed in a methodological manner’ (Attride-Stirling, 2001, 
p.386) 
 
Statistics are typically thought of as objective and systematic. Qualitative 
methodologies can be Oppenheim (1996) comments, seen as less reliable, valid, 
objective and comparable. Thematic analysis will be utilised for the qualitative data in 
this study. Essentially, thematic analysis is pattern coding: ‘a method for identifying, 
analysing and reporting patterns within data’ (Braun & Clarke, 2006, p.79). This 
technique needs to reflect the same systematicity and objectivity typically associated 
with quantitative techniques in order to stand alongside quantitative methods as an 
equal albeit different partner.  
 
While acknowledging that coding is an interpretive act and ‘not a precise science’ 
(Saldana, 2009, p.4), coding is fundamentally about arranging things in a systematic 
order (Saldana, 2009). In this way systematicity can be seen to be represented in both 
methodologies used in this research, being made further explicit by use of the 
principles of thematic networks. Thematic networks essentially ‘systematises the 
extraction of lowest to highest order premises evident in the text’ (Attride-Stirling, 
2001, p.387).   
 
2.1.6. A pragmatic approach 
‘Many researchers have begun to take a pragmatic approach in the selection of research 
methodology, choosing the methodology best suited to answering the research question 
rather than conforming to a methodological orthodoxy’ (Glogowska, 2011, p.251). 
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Therefore this research might be best typified as pragmatically oriented, utilising 
various components and representing an eclectic approach to examining the research 
question. It is a mixed-methods exploratory/explanatory model, comprising both 
deductive and inductive elements. Thus, this research strives both to examine and 
develop theory across and between method phases. This notion of pliable use of 
paradigms fits with Braun & Clarke’s (2006) argument regarding grounded theory; 
that there are different manifestations of the method.  
 
2.1.7. Sequential phases 
‘It can be challenging to integrate two sets of different forms of data and their results in 
a meaningful way’ (Cresswell et al., 2008, p.72). 
 
2.1.7.1 Overview 
This study is characterised by two complimentary, sequential phases. Operationally, 
the quantitative phase preceded the qualitative phase thus moving from generic to 
specific data collection (Rossman, 1985). Use of a phased approach enables targeted 
data gathering, with phase one providing constructs for examination in phase two. 
Thus elaboration is used in order to explain the understanding obtained in the 
previous strand, (Tashakkori & Teddlie, 2008; Bryman, 2008), improving the validity 
of findings and leading to theory confirmation, negation or generation. Therefore, the 
design is as outlined in Figure 2.1.                     
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Data 
fusion 
Focus group data 
gathering & 
analysis 
(Section 2.5) 
Focus group script and question 
development  
(Section 2.4) 
Survey data gathering & analysis:  
 (Section 2.3) 
Survey development (Section 2.2) 
 
 
 
 
                             
Reviewof the literature 
Expert consultation 
Ethics approval 
Survey recruitment 
Survey piloting 
 
Survey publication  
Survey data analysis  
Running focus groups 
Focus group data analysis 
Review of the literature 
Review of survey data 
Piloting 
Focus group recruitment 
 
Figure 2.1 Study phases 
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2.1.7.2 Quantitative phase: Survey design 
‘The analytic, relational survey is set up specifically to explore the associations between 
particular variables’ (Oppenheim, 1992, p.21). 
 
Phase one was survey based, utilising an electronic questionnaire to generate data. 
This phase focused on exploring the study questions and developing initial theories of 
practice. The survey design was informed by three main sources – a review of the 
literature, the study question and expert consultation.   
 
A questionnaire was chosen because it is an objective way of gathering information 
which can cover widely dispersed populations (McColl et al, 2001) and minimise the 
risk of socially desirable responses. It has been suggested that participants respond 
more truthfully to sensitive questions by using this approach, and make more critical 
responses than in face-to-face interviews. There is however a lack of evidence to 
support this (McColl et al., 2001; Glogowska, 2011). Despite this, the potential to 
remove the social impact of groups is part of the reason the survey phase preceded 
the group phase – in order to provide meaningful data for deep exploration in the 
qualitative phase.  
 
2.1.7.3 Qualitative phase: Group interviews 
‘Qualitative methods are a positive step towards deeper understanding of social 
phenomena and their dynamics’ (Attride-Stirling, 2001, p.385). 
 
Focus groups were chosen as the vehicle for the qualitative phase for a number of 
reasons: to obtain a range of opinions; to provide insight into the social not individual, 
and; to explore concurrence and divergence between settings but within the same 
profession. Focus groups are considered to be naturalistic which can reflect more 
reliably the true opinions of the group (Krueger & Casey, 2000) and therefore 
articulation of the collective view. This enables the researcher to learn or confirm not 
just the facts, but the meaning behind the facts.  
 
Neergaard et al. (2009) advise that the limitations of such a methodology should be 
kept in mind. These include social norms and peer influences which may impact the 
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expression of honest opinion. Furthermore, as Braun and Clarke (2006) note, in 
analysing group data some depth and complexity is necessarily lost. Nonetheless, 
such techniques provide a rich overall description, especially important in under 
researched areas of SLT (Braun & Clarke, 2006), and function to balance the reliance 
on statistical techniques. After all, as Oppenheim (1992) comments, ‘human lives and 
human causality are not composed of layers of regression coefficients’ (p.18).  
 
 
2.2 SURVEY DEVELOPMENT PHASE 
 
2.2.1 Overview of the survey 
The survey aimed to identify the therapies and techniques used by SLTs in Ireland, 
and explore the bases of decision making regarding therapy selections. Two core 
elements influenced design and content: 
a. Meaningfulness: It was important to ensure the survey was of interest to 
clinicians. This the survey focused on practical issues felt to be relevant to 
clinicians, and interest and ownership of the survey was developed in a number of 
ways. These included engagement of professional communities, advance 
notifications, use of a clear and simple survey title and a stated commitment to 
dissemination of results;  
b. Ease of use: This was achieved through multiple means including use of an 
electronic survey; easy opt in through survey link, clear instructions and 
navigation, use of concise questions and clear language throughout and, 
simplifying responding behaviour by use of drop down boxes and closed 
questions. 
 
2.2.2 Survey format 
In designing the survey, two main options were considered: postal and electronic 
(web-based). Until recently, postal surveys have been the standard format utilised. 
However given advances in technology, the web-based survey format needed to be 
considered. Cost (Kaplowitz, Hadlock & Levine, 2004) and ease of access using a 
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survey link are the main advantages of electronic surveys, especially with targeted 
populations. Additionally, survey data returned in an electronic format saves data 
inputting time and reduces potential errors. Electronic surveys also have faster 
response times and less interference or impacts on submission than postal surveys 
(Sheehan & Hoy, 1999; Yun & Trumbo, 2000). Potential issues include technical 
limitations, administration challenges and poor response rates resulting from 
reluctance or inability to use electronic formats (Andrews, Nonnecke & Preece, 2003). 
In addition, in contrast to paper formats, potential respondents can delete a survey 
link quickly.  
 
A web-based survey was selected for many of the above reasons and also to reflect 
21st century work styles. A supplementary paper option was offered to potential 
respondents on request. Mixed-mode surveys (the use of both postal and electronic 
survey formats) may improve response rates (Kaplowitz et al, 2004) but to use this 
reliably, researchers are advised to demonstrate equivalency and complementarity 
(Dillman, 2000). However, as Andrews et al. (2003) note, many paper-based surveys 
can be adapted to electronic format and vice versa as was done in this case.  Only one 
respondent chose a paper option and this was reportedly due to technical difficulties. 
 
2.2.3 Survey design 
2.2.3.1 Survey components 
The survey was split into four sections as per Table 2.1. 
Table 2.1 Survey sections 
Section Title 
Part 1 Demographics 
Part 2 Therapies & techniques 1 (Disability) 
Part 3 Therapies & techniques 2 (Dysphagia) 
Part 4 Decision-making scaffolds 
 
Although Oppenheim (1992) has recommended that demographic questions are 
placed at the end of the survey (mainly to convince respondents that the survey is 
genuine), the researcher felt placement of demographic questions initially might ease 
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respondents into the survey. Additionally, Andrews et al. (2003) have defined the 
placement of personal data first, not last as a response rate quality criterion.  
 
Respondents could, depending on their area of practice complete all sections or only 
two sections. Respondents working in disability and dysphagia could complete Parts 
2 and 3 which related specifically to therapies used in those areas. All respondents 
could complete Part 1 and Part 4, both sections being generic rather than specific. 
 
2.2.3.2 Survey navigation 
Dillman & Bowler (2001) speaking of web surveys, suggest the need for specific 
instructions. Clear instructions were provided at pivotal points. For example:  
‘If you are a disability therapist go to Part 2, if you are a dysphagia therapist, go to 
Part 3, if you are neither, go to Part 4…’  
To convey a sense of where the respondent was in the process, the survey used time 
notes for example:  
‘This part will take about 2 minutes’.  
 
2.2.3.3 Survey formatting 
One of Dillman & Bowler’s (2001) principles for the design of web surveys is the use 
of colour so that figure-ground, consistency and read-ability are maintained and 
navigational flow is unimpeded. Therefore two simple but subtle colours were used to 
separate lines of text and questions from answers. Where possible single lines were 
used for each item or statement to ensure ease of use. In most cases this was 
achieved.  
 
As inconsistent formatting increases attrition (Knapp & Heidingsfelder, 1999), 
uniform formatting was used throughout but in particular between Parts 2 and 3. 
Consistent formatting helps participants anticipate and does not require too much 
‘new’ reading.  Drop down menus were chosen as the main responding format to 
facilitate question placement, responding behaviour and decrease reliance on 
memory. Closed questions were utilised as attrition rates may increase when there 
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are too many open ended questions (Crawford, Couper & Lamias, 2001). Only one 
open question (Question 23) was used, this being a final ‘any other comments’ box 
and this was optional. Randomness in presented options was used occasionally to ally 
the immediacy effect, for example when choosing preferred therapies (Questions 15 
& 20). 
 
2.2.3.4 Survey language 
One of the main sources of survey error is measurement error resulting from 
inaccurate responses that stem from poor wording (Dillman & Bowler, 2001).  
Attempts were made to ensure questions and statements were comprehensible. 
Capital letters were used to highlight important words in certain questions e.g. 
‘NEVER-use’, ‘ALWAYS-use’ (Questions 14 & 19).  The language used in the survey was 
deliberately non-ambiguous, simple, clear and technical including: 
 Starter words such as ‘first’ and ‘now’;  
 Simple introductory phrases (Oppenheim, 1992) such as ‘First , please advise how 
often you….’ to ensure knowledge of the required task;  
 Clear instructions for each section were provided e.g. ‘…by placing the number in 
the column opposite the item…’, and;  
 Familiar, technical wording was used where possible.  
 
Additionally, as attitudinal questions are more sensitive to wording (Oppenheim, 
1992); special attention was paid to the wording in Part 4 to ensure lack of ambiguity. 
The guidelines of Pett, Lackey & Sullivan. (2003) were followed in this regard 
including: 
 Declarative statements strongly worded without ambiguity; 
 Each item expresses only one idea; 
 Use  positively and negatively worded items; 
 Avoid jargon, use of negative to reverse wording of an item, exceptionally lengthy 
items, multiple negatives, double barrelled  items, leading questions and value-
lead universal words. 
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2.2.4 Response enhancement strategies 
A number of strategies were adopted in order to positively impact response rates. 
These included the following: 
 Ease of use, navigating respondents clearly from start to finish with a logical 
sequence of questions (a quality criteria for surveys outlined by Andrews et al, 
2003); 
 Minimisation of hard cognitive tasks including the demand for memory recall 
achieved mainly through the use of closed questions and set options; 
 Making the survey visually appealing. This included arranging the survey 
elements so they fit on a page and the use of colour (Dillman & Bowler, 2000); 
 Image use was reduced so as not to negatively impact on download time (Couper, 
Traugott & Lamias, 2001);  
 Completion time was highlighted for each section. Andrews et al (2003) note that 
the perception of effort required to complete the survey may impact on response 
rates although survey length does not automatically correlate with the number of 
returns (Witmer, Coleman & Katzman, 1999; Crawford et al., 2001);  
 Promotion of ownership. The information contained in the email contacts 
functioned to ensure respondents understood the research and relevance of the 
survey, and could believe in the usefulness of the questionnaire (Krosnick, 1999); 
 Assurance of anonymity which has been identified as response rate quality 
criteria (Andrews et al, 2003). This is pivotal in the Irish context given the small 
number of SLTs;  
 Single emails containing both invitation and survey are likely to cause high non 
response rates (Witmer et al., 1999; Sheehan & Hoy, 1999; Cho & La Rose, 1999). 
Thus, multistep invitations including advance notification and reminders were 
used; 
 The respondent group was targeted via multiple avenues; 
 Respondents were offered a hard copy return option, and; 
 Piloting of the questionnaire to ensure the best possible survey design. 
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2.2.5 Survey section: Demographics 
Demographic questions were designed to retrieve information which would enable 
relationships between respondent characteristics and other data to be analysed. 
Specific demographic questions were based on data retrieved subsequent to the 
review of the literature. For example, higher degree status has been found to reflect 
scientific reasoning (e.g. O’Neal et al., 2007; Lizarondo, Grimmer-Sommers & Kumar. 
2011), therefore a question pertaining to degree status was included. The question on 
self-determination of grade reflects the limited grading structure in the Irish context 
and the need to reflect skill in an extended way.  
 
In summary, ten demographic questions were utilised as per Table 2.2. Additional 
demographic questions were included about specialised experience at the beginning 
of Parts 2 and 3.  
 
Table 2.2 Demographic questions 
No. Type of data Detail 
1 Survey source Source from where respondent 
accessed survey link 
2 Years of experience Number of years respondent is 
practising as an SLT 
3 Employment grade Formal SLT grade  
4 Self-determination of 
clinical grade 
Self-determined level of expertise 
5 Geographical region Health region in which respondent 
works 
6 Work setting Primary work setting of respondent 
7 Population Main population with which 
respondent works  
8 Population age Main population age with which 
respondent works 
9 Highest qualification Highest professional  qualification 
10 Recency of highest 
qualification 
Time since most recently acquired 
qualification 
11/17 Years of specialised 
experience 
Number of years respondent is 
practising as an SLT in specified area 
12/18 Percentage of work time 
in specialised area  
Time spent during working week in 
specialist area 
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2.2.6 Survey section: Therapies and techniques 
2.2.6.1. Process of informing content 
A structured process was undertaken to determine which areas of practice and which 
therapies and techniques would be selected for inclusion in the questionnaire for 
Parts 2 and 3. It was decided that inclusion of two areas of practice would facilitate 
the exploration of concurrences and contradictions between areas. The sequence of 
activities generating content information is outlined in Table 2.3.  
 
Table 2.3 Process of informing content for Parts 2 and 3 of the survey 
Stage Detail 
Consultation phase Gathering of expert opinion 
Generation of further therapies 
using database searches 
Use of literature to supplement 
expert opinion 
Defining items  Definition of items to be included 
 
These stages functioned to:  
 Inform the comprehensive identification of therapies used, or known about in 
current clinical practice;  
 Ensure a breadth of data which reflected current practice;  
 Enable the inclusion of a range of both scientific and non-scientific items;  
 Define best terminology, and;  
 Determine specific areas of practice to be targeted. 
 
2.2.6.2 Consultation phase 
The consultation phase involved the gathering of expert opinion regarding therapies 
used in specific areas of clinical practice. Representations from both clinical practice 
(specialists/experts) and academia were utilised to ensure comprehensiveness. The 
use of informed opinion has a number of advantages:  
 The credibility and validity of the research is strengthened;  
 High content validity is obtained through use of an expert and heterogeneous 
panel (Goodman, 1987);  
 A wealth of experience informs the development of survey;  
 Participants do not have to be brought together (Walker & Selfe, 1996), and;  
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 There is relative immediacy of contact.  
 
The main disadvantage centred round the non-anonymous nature of the exercise as 
participants were recruited through purposive sampling, university websites and 
snowballing. However, as the data retrieved was not particularly sensitive this cannot 
be seen as a major concern. This method increased the chances of obtaining 
redundant data over multiple areas of practice which were not used in the survey 
phase.  
 
Participants were contacted via email explaining the purpose of the exercise and 
attaching the Specialist Information Request (SIR) (Appendix 2) for completion. The 
request was designed to elicit four main pieces of data as per Table 2.4. The SIR was 
piloted on a convenience sample of two specialist clinicians and two academics. Two 
respondents made suggestions for changes which were accommodated.  
 
Table 2.4 Specialist Information Request data 
Information detail Reason 
Respondent background data To ensure a range of respondents from 
academia and practice 
Area of practice/specialism To ensure coverage of areas of practice 
Therapies and techniques  To elicit representative range of therapies 
used in clinical practice 
Reasons for use of therapies  To facilitate collapsing and condensing of 
data 
 
Potential respondents were plotted onto a table highlighting different areas of 
practice within the profession of which 20 were initially identified. A consensus 
threshold was not set although the aim was to achieve two respondents per area 
(preferably one academic and one clinician). It was predicted that some areas of 
practice would result in no responses given the small possible pool of respondents 
(e.g. there are no cognitive impairment academics in Ireland). A reminder email was 
sent at four weeks and gaps in data recruitment identified. Snowballing was 
employed to fill in gaps. Sampling continued over three rounds and three months in 
order to meet this goal. At this stage, sampling ceased.    
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Round 1 achieved returns from 30 individuals and covered 77.5% of areas of practice. 
At the beginning of Round 2 a number of areas of practice for which the researcher 
had not been successful in identifying any participants (e.g. head and neck oncology 
and hearing impairment) were removed.  Reminders were sent to 23 non responders. 
In Round 3, reminders were sent to 12 non responders. Seven additional contributors 
were identified via snowballing to fill in gaps in data (e.g. acquired communication 
disorders, motor speech disorders). The total sample pool was 37, and the coverage 
rate was 62%. 
 
A decision matrix was utilised to rationalise the reduction and reorganisation of the 
data obtained and included the following stages: 
a) Combining respondents’ data by area of response; 
b) Reframing leading to combining of dysphagia items; 
c) Removal of non-therapeutic and unclear items; 
d) Condensing of duplicated items and development of clarity and specificity; 
e) Tidy up of data; 
f) Similarities and differences check; 
g) Final condensing and volume considerations;  
h) Final groupings for survey instrument; 
i) Member checking, and; 
j) Final review of content for inclusion, accuracy and specificity. 
The process was evolutionary being defined by the data produced by respondents 
and the nature of the process itself. Areas of practice which clearly did not elicit 
sufficient content for survey purposes were eliminated.  Review of the data after the 
initial phase identified some disorders which translated across a number of areas of 
practice. For example, dysphagia items were numerous across multiple areas or 
practice (e.g. Head & Neck oncology and physical disability). To better reflect this and 
ensure data was not lost in the process, data was reorganised under additional 
headings. It was thus clear that a number of areas of practice provided insufficient 
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data to permit future analysis (e.g. dysphonia and craniofacial disorders) and these 
were eliminated.  
 
A number of options for survey inclusion were evident towards the end of the 
process: dysphagia, disability, developmental speech disorders, language 
delay/disorder, and fluency disorders. In this context, disability referred to global 
conditions impacting upon multiple areas of development, most specifically 
intellectual disability, physical disability and autism spectrum disorders. Disability 
and dysphagia were selected as these groupings: 
 Opened up the possibility of comparing practitioners working in adult and 
paediatric settings and with different types of disability; 
 Reflected higher recruitment potential given the development of both dysphagia 
and disability services in Ireland in recent years, and; 
 Reflected the researcher’s expertise best. 
 
Once data were condensed and areas of practice selected, member checking took 
place in order to reduce any researcher bias and to further identify any omissions. 
Two members per area were utilised for member checking. Of the four requests made 
for member checking, two respondents fedback. One individual identified further 
therapies (disability) and these were included in the final list. At this stage the total 
number of therapy items identified for survey inclusion was 81 (35 in dysphagia and 
46 in disability). 
  
2.2.6.3 Generation of further therapies using searches 
To ensure comprehensive coverage, database and journal searches focusing on the 
target areas of practice were then carried out covering the period 2000-2010. A 
number of trial keywords were used to establish best terms. Most searches yielded 
the same and highly generic articles reflecting the broadness of some terms. There 
was a high degree of redundant information retrieved. From these searches eight 
items were added to the disability therapies list and twenty to the dysphagia list 
yielding a total therapy list of 109 items.  
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At this stage the final lists were reviewed once more for specificity, clarity and 
duplication and a number of changes made resulting in 103 items remaining (52 in 
disability, 51 in dysphagia). 
 
2.2.6.4 Defining items 
In order to ensure accuracy and avoid retrieving incorrect data, all items were 
defined through respondent definitions, internet searches, professional texts etc. The 
researcher was forced to define a small number of items by nature of her own 
knowledge (e.g. MORE) for which no definitions were found. A number of 
amendments were made resulting from this exercise. For example, the item ‘Tongue 
hold’ was removed as it was found to be similar to the technique identified as the 
‘Masako Manoeuvre’. At this stage, 97 items remained for inclusion (52 in disability, 
45 in dysphagia). These are represented in the final survey (Appendix 3). To ensure 
commonality of understanding in the final survey, respondents were directed to a link 
document through which they could check item definitions.  
 
Therapies were then classified according to best fit with scientific standing using a 
rating scale developed (Appendix 4). This scale was necessary given the 
incompleteness of the evidence base in SLT. Based on this scale, it was deemed that 
the therapies included in the survey represented the scientific spectrum as per Table 
2.5.   
 
Table 2.5 Scientific nature of therapies included in survey 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Scientific spectrum Disability 
 
Dysphagia 
Scientific intervention 4 1 
Probably scientific intervention 13 7 
Neither scientific nor unscientific intervention 11 23 
Probably unscientific intervention 9 9 
Pseudoscientific intervention 4 1 
Unknown 11 4 
Deconstructing clinical practice and searching for scientific foundations 
 
 
 
94 
 
 
2.2.6.5 Use of therapies 
Both frequency of use of therapies and rankings were obtained from respondents. 
Frequency of use (Questions 14 & 19) was based on a five point Likert scale (always-
use, frequently-use, sometimes-use, rarely-use and never-use). This is a summated 
rating scale purporting to measure use. Scaling was utilised as the construct could not 
be measured directly (Pett et al., 2003). Rankings (Questions 15 & 20) were obtained 
by asking respondents to identify a minimum of one and maximum of ten preferred 
therapies.  
 
2.2.7 Survey section: Reasons for use and non-use 
For each therapy, respondents were also asked to select from a choice of reasons to 
indicate why they either use or do not use (Questions 14 & 19) that item. A number of 
potential categories (see Appendix 1 for definitions) for use and non-use were 
identified from the research question and the review of the literature (Figure 2.2). 
 
Figure 2.2 Categories guiding selection of reasons for use options 
 
 
Therapies  
&  
 Techniques 
Clinician 
specific factors 
Science  
Client specific 
factors 
Profession 
specific 
factors 
Other 
sources of 
information 
Therapy 
specific 
factors 
General 
treatment 
factors  
Other 
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A number of potential statements were generated based on these categories. For 
example, source of information statements were generated representing training, 
media, profession specific literature and research evidence. From the multiple 
statements generated, two statements were selected for each category. Therefore 16 
potential reasons were selected for reasons for use and 16 for non-use (Appendix 5). 
Piloting was carried out on a convenience sample of two clinicians and there was no 
concern with the number of options. Multiple potential answers provided for a 
comprehensive range of reasons and ensured that most respondents had options for 
answering which reflects their individual reasoning. At the suggestion of a piloter, an 
additional item was added to non-use reasons: ‘I don’t know about this therapy’. The 
possibility of an immediacy effect cannot be ignored given the volume of options and 
this was monitored for and disregarded given the nature of responding.  
 
For convenience, the questions pertaining to reasoning were situated as columns 
across from each stimulus (therapy) item. Therefore, for each stimulus item, the 
respondent would first identify frequency of use and based on this answer, then 
identify reasons for non-use or use. 
 
2.2.8 Survey section: Decision making scaffolds 
To build on therapy specific reasoning, general statements not attributed to specific 
therapy items were included in Part 4 of the survey. A five point Likert scale was 
again utilised. A neutral value was included to give an option to respondents despite 
the potential it would be used as a ‘go to’ response, as Pett et al. (2003) point to the 
danger of non-completion if this option is not provided.  
 
As the aim of this section was primarily to understand the general attitudes 
contributing to treatment choices, it was important to include statements that 
covered a wide variety of scaffolds, some of which interlinked. Based on respondents’ 
data, scaffolds could be later accepted or rejected. Statement development and 
inclusion were influenced by the research question and the literature including 
surveys used in previous studies. Some surveys influenced specific statements. For 
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example, some statements were lifted unchanged from original surveys given their 
meaningfulness to this research question, e.g. ‘I chose treatments that are less complex 
to understand and implement’ (Grol & Grimshaw, 2003). The findings of studies also 
influenced content. For example, Joffe and Pring (2008) found clinicians were partly 
influenced by individual’s age, language and cognitive abilities. These findings 
prompted statements regarding client suitability.   
 
A number of statements were included in the initial pool. Using a decision matrix 
statements were then developed, modified for clarity or rejected and then regrouped 
based on the categories previously outlined (Figure 2.2). The reduction of data 
enabled the selection of the most relevant items. Use of a codebook – a systematic 
record of all decisions and how each statement was coded, facilitated the reduction of 
initial options in a logical and clear manner. Additionally, once the initial pool of 
statements was sufficiently reduced, a research colleague ranked and agreed the final 
statements. The number of statements included considered respondent fatigue and 
amenability to statistical analysis. A total of 56 statements were thus retained from an 
original 185. These were plotted against a five point Likert scale ranging from 
strongly agree to strongly disagree. 
 
2.2.9 Comments 
It has been reported that including a space for comments at the end of a series of 
attitudinal questions can double response rates (McColl et al, 2001) and this was 
done (Question 23). 37 respondents chose to utilise the comment box.  
 
 
2.3. DATA GATHERING AND ANALYSIS FOR QUANTITATIVE PHASE 
 
2.3.1 Piloting of the survey 
The process of survey piloting involves making preparations for the fieldwork and 
analysis so that not much will go wrong and nothing will have been left out 
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(Oppenheim, 1992). Oppenheim (1992) advises that the pilot should deal primarily 
with the comprehensibility of questions. Typical respondents (Andrews et al., 2003) 
representing a convenience sample of seven clinicians were sent the survey 
electronically. Three completed the piloting of the survey: One individual completed 
the whole survey (Parts 1-4); one individual completed three sections (Parts 1, 3 & 4), 
and one individual completed two sections (Parts 1 & 4). It is acknowledged that this 
is a small sample for piloting purposes; however the researcher was wary of 
overusing the limited potential pool of respondents nationally.  
 
Piloters were asked a specific set of questions and for their general comments. In 
addition to the survey, piloters also viewed the series of emails accompanying the 
survey. Minimal changes were suggested and these were incorporated.  
 
2.3.2 Respondent sample 
Dillman & Bowler (2001) note that a main source of survey error is coverage and 
sampling error. This survey was limited to SLTs practising in Ireland – a defined and 
relatively small group. However, accessing this group was problematic as there was 
no national register or employment statistics. The professional body estimates there 
about 750 SLTs in the country. While high response rates are desirable because they 
increase the precision of parameter estimates and reduce the risk of non-response 
bias (McColl et al., 2001), Cook, Heath and Thompson (2000) argue that response 
representativeness is more important than response rate. In order to achieve the 
highest possible distribution in this context and best representation, the potential 
pool was accessed in four ways as per Table 2.6. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Deconstructing clinical practice and searching for scientific foundations 
 
 
 
98 
 
 
 
Table 2.6 Accessing the sample 
Source Detail Sample 
size 
Estimated 
response 
rate 
Practice 
Educators 
University 
Database 
(PEUD) 
The database developed and 
used by the SLT department in 
the researcher’s workplace. This 
represents SLTs who provide 
clinical placements to students.  
N= 225. 22=90* 
SLT 
Managers 
University 
Database 
(SMUD) 
Professional SLT managers who 
lead SLT departments.  
Managers to forward web link to 
their staff. 
N= 66 
managers  
Unknown 
Special 
Interest 
Groups 
(SIGs) 
SIGs attached to the IASLT. 12 
SIGs were identified. Secretaries 
to forward web link to 
membership. 
N= 589.  59-236 
Irish 
Association 
of Speech & 
language 
Therapists 
(IASLT) 
website 
As agreed with the organisation 
chair a link was posted on the 
IASLT website on the same date 
as the Data collection email was 
circulated.  
N =417 
practising 
clinicians 
 
41-125 
Total   111-446 
*Based on a response rate for postal questionnaires of between 10-40% (Weisber, Krosnick & 
Bowen, 1996) 
 
A number of clean up measures were undertaken in order to ensure accuracy of the 
databases used. For the PEUD database a process updating was set in place.  This 
occurred within 2 months preceding the Advance contact email (ACE). The SIG list 
provided by the professional body was three years old. The researcher updated this 
list by contacting SIG secretaries to request current information. In all cases except 
one, more up to date contacts were retrieved. Current secretaries were then 
contacted to request permission to use the secretary as a gatekeeper. All SIG 
secretaries agreed.  
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Despite the lack of a national register, this multi-pronged approach was felt to 
effectively address the issue of coverage. In ideal circumstances cross matching would 
have occurred to reduce duplicated contacts and estimate numbers more accurately. 
This was not possible given the use of gatekeepers.  
 
 
2.3.3 Protocol 
2.3.3.1. Ethics 
Research ethics approval was applied for and granted through the University of 
Limerick Research Ethics Committee. Issues of access, consent, confidentiality, data 
retention and dissemination were addressed in the ethics application. 
 
2.3.3.2 Advance Contact Email  
The Advance contact email (ACE) (Appendix 6) functioned to prepare the target 
group for the survey and to develop interest. Yun & Trumbo (2000) advise that the 
researcher needs to establish credibility quickly through subject lines and opening 
statements therefore the ACE provided clear information including the survey title, an 
introduction to the researcher and information on access modes which indicates 
survey quality (Andrews et al., 2003). Assurance of anonymity was provided 
(Sheehan & Hoy, 1999). The ACE was forwarded by email two weeks before the 
survey link went live. 
 
2.3.3.3 Data Collection Email 
The Data collection emails (DCE) (Appendix 7) accompanied the survey link and 
functioned to both reiterate points made in the ACE (e.g. anonymity) and guide 
potential respondents in opening and navigating the survey. It included an estimate of 
completion time as a measure of convenience. 
 
2.3.3.4 Survey Reminder Emails  
The Survey reminder emails (SREs) functioned to remind potential respondents to 
complete and return the survey and advised of the closing date. The aim was to 
improve response rates. The SREs were kept simple so as not to annoy potential 
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respondents and those who had already completed the survey. Dillman (2000) argues 
for three reminders, however while reminders increase the likelihood of responding 
(Sheehan & Hoy, 1999), they do not necessarily increase the likelihood of completion 
(Crawford et al., 2001). Two SREs were sent two and four weeks after the DCE. While 
a lengthier interval period is recommended (Lee, Taylor, Kielhofner & Fisher, 2008), 
long intervals may also contribute to respondents neglecting the survey. The survey 
was closed within six weeks of the DCE being sent.  
 
2.3.4 Data analysis 
2.3.4.1. Clean up, data checking and preparation 
All data were exported from the web site and entered into SPPS V18 where clean-up 
of the data set was initiated. This included cases where only demographic information 
was completed and coding of missing data. A number of procedures were followed 
throughout to ensure accuracy of data and analysis e.g., random samples were double 
checked; numerical and written label matching was verified. At this stage a number of 
variables were manipulated and recoded into new variables to facilitate analyses. 
 
2.3.4.2 Descriptive statistics and statistical tests 
A number of statistical analyses were employed to best make use of the data. 
Descriptive statistics included frequency distributions, cross tabulations and 
measures of central tendency and spread.  
 
2.3.4.3 Inferential statistical tests 
Inferential techniques utilized included tests of significance (Pearson’s chi squared 
test and Fisher’s exact test) depending on the number of cases in the analysis. The 
differences in averages between groups were analysed using the t-test for two-group 
comparisons and ANOVAs for three-group comparisons where appropriate.  
 
2.3.4.4 Multivariate methods: multidimensional scaling 
Multidimensional scaling was utilised to analyse clusters of therapy use i.e. whether 
therapies fitted into meaningful groups. This requires no assumption about the 
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underlying distributions of the data or about the level of measurement (Turner & 
Whitfield 1997). Multidimensional scaling calculates the coefficient of continuity and 
thus the proximity between data profiles and represents them as points in an n-
dimensional space, whereby the closer the points, the more similar their profiles. 
Alternatively, the more distant the points are within the space, the more dissimilar 
their profiles.  This technique also provides a measure of goodness of fit which is the 
extent to which the spatial representation represents the data.  
  
2.4.4.5 Multivariate methods: factor analysis 
As Pett et al. (2003) state, not all science is hypothesis testing – sometimes research is 
interested in the structure of a phenomenon. Factor analysis allows for structural 
analysis using responses from Part 4 of the survey. Factor analysis represents a 
complex array of structure analysing procedures used to identify interrelationships 
among a large set of observed variables, and then through data reduction, to group a 
smaller number of these variables into dimensions or factors that have common 
characteristics (Pett et al., 2003). This reduces the number of variables in the analysis 
(originally 56 statements), by using surrogate factors to represent a number of 
variables, that is, it simplifies the data set where appropriate. Identification of such 
factors can facilitate the naming, differentiation and highlighting of specific 
phenomenona. This is considered especially useful given the possible complexity and 
abstractness of decision making. Principal axis factoring followed by varimax rotation 
was the method used in this study. Pett et al.'s (2003) model for factor analysis was 
followed (identify the problem, generate the items, assess the adequacy of the 
correlation matrix, extract the initial factors, rotate the factors, refine the solution and 
interpret the findings).   
 
Tests of matrices were employed (KMO and Bartlett’s Test of Sphericity) initially to 
test whether the data would support a factor analysis in the first place and these 
suggest that it was worthwhile. Factor analysis is a technique that requires a large 
sample size for correlations to stabilize.  On average there were 247 responses per 
statement representing a fair-good sample size (Comrey & Lee, 1992).  A varimax 
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(orthogonal) rotation with 100 iterations (for a converged solution) was employed as 
it produces ‘‘reasonably simple structure in most situations’’ (Floyd & Widaman, 
1995, p.292). The scree plot of un-rotated factor eigenvalues (Safren et al, 2000) 
indicated anywhere between a four and 36 factor solution (using the latent root 
criterion or eigenone-value criterion eigenvalues >1). Both a 13 or 20 factor model 
were preferred and of these the 13 factor model appeared most suitable as it 
favoured fewer factors and explained over 51.5% of the variance of the data. Pett et 
al. (2003) advise with regard to measures of sampling adequacy that that all values 
for the factor score covariance matrix should be higher > .70. In the 13 factor solution, 
seven of the 13 factors meet this criterion. The original factors 11, 12 and 13 had low 
measures of sampling adequacy. Pett et al. (2003) recommend that if some items have 
scored less than .6 there may not be an underlying structure, to summarize 
relationships. Three of the 13 factor solution met this criterion.  Factors 10 and 11 are 
single statements but represent clear constructs and so were used in analysis. Factors 
were labelled to interpret the factor dimensions. 
 
Statements were considered to load on a factor if the factor score met or exceeded .30 
(Comrey & Lee, 1992; Floyd & Widaman, 1995). Where items loaded onto multiple 
factors it was generally assigned to the factor with the highest loading score (Safren 
et al, 2000). Cronbachs alpha coefficient which measures the degree to which items 
‘hang together’ (Pallant, 2007) was used on extracted factors to check reliability. 
 
 
2.3.5 Reliability and validity 
A number of methods throughout have been seen to respond to issues of reliability 
and validity. These include: 
 The linking up with theory and evidence from the literature thus ensuring 
construct validity; 
 The use of clinicians and colleagues at various stages including piloting, decision 
matrices and the consultation phase contributing to content validity which seeks 
to establish that the questions are a well-balanced sample of the domain to be 
measured;  
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 The use of decision matrices for the main sections of the survey (Sections 2, 3 and 
4) ensured that the material utilised in the survey was arrived at through rigorous 
means; 
 Piloting of the SIR and main survey, and; 
 Data clean up and data checks 
   
 
2.4 DEVELOPMENT OF FOCUS GROUP SCRIPT AND QUESTIONS 
 
2.4.1 Overview of group interviews 
‘Focus group research involves organised discussion with a selected group of individuals 
to gain information about their views and experiences of a topic’. (Gibbs, 1997, p.1). 
 
Focus groups were utilised to enlist the opinions of SLTs. This format was chosen as 
groups provide for a wide range views, multiple participants can facilitate a deeper 
consideration of issues to be discussed and groups may make participants feel less 
threatened than they might be in individual interviews. Viewpoints were gathered 
across a number of work settings, thus exploring concurrence and/or divergence 
between settings but within the same profession. Three work settings were targeted 
reflecting the primary contemporary work settings in Ireland: community care, 
hospital and voluntary organisation. 
 
2.4.2 Script  
A script (Appendix 8) was devised to ensure clear structure of the sessions and 
provide for a cohesive and consistent format. This included introduction and closing 
elements. 
 
 
2.4.3 Stimulus questions 
Participants were asked to facilitate the moderator in making sense of the constructs 
presented. Trigger questions, probes and summarising comments were used to 
facilitate discussions. The same format was maintained for all groups to provide for 
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comparison between groups although naturally some variation in probes or the 
sequence of probes is inevitable. Emergent themes from previous group discussions 
were not incorporated into subsequent group discussions to maintain reliability. 
 
Stimulus questions (Appendix 9) were intended to add depth to the survey data by 
focusing on the main emerging constructs and the primary research question. Three 
main questions were selected on the basis of survey data as per Table 2.7. 
 
Table 2.7 Focus group question topics 
Question Topic 
1 Client suitability 
2 Clinical experience 
3 Training 
4 Science 
 
Client suitability (Question 1) was the primary reason for using therapies and the 
second reason for not using therapies. Client issues were also reflected in Part 4 of the 
survey.  Clinical experience (Question 2) was the second most commonly used reason 
for using therapies and highly reflected in Part 4 of the survey. Not trained (Question 
3) was the primary reason for not using therapies and the issue of training was felt to 
be amenable to exposing the bases of practice decisions. A further question directly 
focused on the role of science (Question 4) in clinical practice which has been at the 
origin of this research. This question was placed last in the sequence in order not to 
bias discussions.  
 
Questions were phrased using deliberately open wording to prevent researcher bias 
permeating the proceedings.  To facilitate group discussion, minimise researcher bias 
and for transcription purposes, the moderator kept her own contributions to a 
minimum.  
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2.5 DATA GATHERING AND ANALYSIS FOR QUALITATIVE     
         PHASE 
 
2.5.1 Piloting 
To obtain advice on wording and facilitate reflection, stimulus and probe questions 
were informally piloted on the researcher’s work colleagues and discussed with the 
supervisory team. No changes were recommended. A formal pilot was arranged on a 
convenience sample represented by an SLT department in the geographical region of 
the researcher. This group was cancelled and rearranged by the gatekeeper on three 
occasions. This meant that piloting did not take place, as time ran out between the 
piloting timeframe and the prearranged focus groups.  
 
2.5.2 Sample 
Managers of SLT departments were targeted using the Practice Educators University 
Database (PEUD). A recruitment email and information sheet (Appendix 10) was 
distributed electronically. Managers were asked to discuss participation with their 
departments using the information sheet and contact the researcher within a month if 
they were willing to be involved. Selection was based on the first three volunteering 
respondent groups representing the following:  
a. SLT department working in community care; 
b. SLT department working in acute hospital services, and; 
c. SLT department working in voluntary body. 
Kreuger & Casey (2000) note the goal of focus groups is to fill room with a minimum 
of 1-12 participants that are similar as this similarity will improve the quality of the 
data. For this reason a minimum of seven participants was specified on the 
recruitment email. 
 
Seven managers responded offering their department’s participation in the following 
sequence: 
1. Community care – HSE Dublin area 
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2. Community care – HSE Dublin area 
3. Voluntary organisation – HSE South Area 
4. Community care– HSE Dublin area 
5. Acute hospital – HSE Dublin 
6. Voluntary body – HSE Dublin 
7. Community care – HSE Dublin 
Groups 1, 3 and 5 were selected for participation based on the criteria with Group 2 
acting as a backup.  
 
2.5.3 Protocol 
2.5.3.1. Location 
Managers were offered a choice of location for groups. These were: 
  Their own department; 
  A place convenient to their work (e.g. hotel premises) or; 
  The workplace of the researcher.  
All gatekeepers opted to provide a room within their own work setting for the 
convenience of their team members.  
 
2.5.3.2 Timing and sequence 
Each group was given a maximum of 90 minutes. Groups varied in their use of the 
time. Group 1 took 75 minutes in total, Group 2, 60 minutes and group 3, 80 minutes. 
Sessions were organised as per Table 2.8.  
Table 2.8 Focus group session plan 
Time allocated Activity 
15 minutes Warm up / Introduction of research and research 
Information sheet reading 
Consent form signing 
Demographic sheet completion 
Explanation of procedures 
70 minutes Stimulus questions (approximately 17-18 minutes 
per question - 4 questions) 
5 minutes Member checking form 
Thank you 
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2.5.3.3 Data recording 
Two Marantz digital recorders (main and backup) were used to record the 
discussions. The moderation plan involved asking participants to state their name 
prior to each contribution to facilitate identification. The moderator kept a notepad to 
back up or contextualise comments. For example, if a participant did not identify their 
name. Alternatively, the moderator added a comment into the recording e.g. ‘Thanks 
for that comment Katie, that was really interesting'. In this way most utterances were 
attributed. Data was downloaded onto a computer within a day of the recording, 
backed up and then deleted from the recorder. The data was then transcribed and 
anonymised. 
 
2.5.3.4 Managing participation 
No limit was put on the number of group members as departments sizes vary 
countrywide and there was a limited pool from which to draw on in Ireland. 
Additionally, it was thought that natural dropout rates might impact on eventual 
group size. This resulted in larger than anticipated group sizes for Groups 1 and 3 (n= 
23 and n = 16).  
 
Efforts were made to be aware of and prevent domination of the group by individuals 
(Walker & Selfe, 1996). Such monitoring and facilitation is especially important in 
healthcare where there may be a strong hierarchy. Logistically it is not always 
practical or possible to ensure all participants contribute and there is a balance to be 
struck between enabling equal participation and coercion. Participants were provided 
with notepads for those who wished to either jot reminders to themselves during the 
discussion or, to provide the moderator with comments in writing after the group. No 
participants availed of this facility. 
 
The researcher reflected on the running of each group in order to facilitate smoother 
running of subsequent groups and an understanding of potential influences on data. 
 
 
Deconstructing clinical practice and searching for scientific foundations 
 
 
 
108 
 
 
2.5.4 Data analysis 
2.5.4.1 Data transcription 
Each group interview was transcribed verbatim from the digital recorder (Braun & 
Clarke, 2006), using a standard word processing programme. Nonverbal data was not 
included. Interjections, word and phrase repetitions and personal names were 
transcribed to provide as full a flavour as possible of the content. As advised by 
Anderson and Felsenfeld (2003), purely social or extraneous comments and 
redundant remarks were excluded. 
 
Each transcribed session was checked against the recorded data to ensure accuracy 
and reliability of the transcribed data. Data was then anonymised using the ‘find and 
replace’ tool in word. The script was checked to ensure full anonymising had taken 
place and variation in spelling or names were addressed in this way. Spell check was 
employed to ensure anonimisation had not undone some regular words. Anonymised 
versions were used for analysis and the original transcriptions deleted.   
 
2.5.4.2 Member checking 
At this stage a summation of the data for each group was circulated by email for 
member checking. This was to ensure initial impressions of the data reflected 
participants interpretation of the discussions, that is, that summaries had face 
validity. Participants were also asked to add any details that they felt were not 
reflected in the researcher’s summation. 
 
Eleven members of Group 1, nine members of Group 2, and 13 members of Group 3 
requested member checking. One participant provided feedback.  This indicated that 
while a ‘coherent summary of what we said’ was achieved, there was concern whether 
emphasis on "clinicians know what works or what doesn't" was reflective the group 
discussion. This concern about potential researcher bias was borne in mind during 
analysis. 
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2.5.4.3 Data immersion 
To immerse the researcher in the data and improve reliability and accuracy of 
transcription, recordings were listened to in four stages: 
1. Listen through without transcribing for immersion purposes; 
2. Listen and initial transcription with playback where researcher was unsure, 
where comment was unintelligible or there was attribution issues; 
3. Confirmation and correction of transcription via next listen through while reading 
transcription to check for accuracy, and; 
4. Reading transcription while playing recording to ensure accuracy of transcription.  
 
Most of the data was attributed and intelligible with minor gaps remaining.  
Lines and page numbers were added to the scripts to enable identification of pieces of 
data during the analysis process. A randomly selected two-minute sample was 
listened to by a research colleague to check inter-rater reliability regarding data entry 
with an agreement rate of 92%. Disagreement was primarily for non-content words 
e.g. fillers and some unintelligible utterances. Agreement was reached by joint 
listening. Transcription was felt to be reflective of the discussion.  
 
2.5.4.4 Thematic analysis 
Coding is a method that enables organisation of similar data into categories because 
they share some characteristics. There are three basic elements to the process per 
Corbin & Strauss (1990): concepts, categories, and prioritisation. The essence of 
coding is categorisation which reflects progress towards the thematic, conceptual, 
and theoretical (Braun & Clarke, 2006). Themes were identified that were specific 
enough to be discrete and broad enough to encapsulate a set of ideas in numerous 
text segments. The development of themes was guided by Braun and Clarke’s (2006) 
direction that a theme is meant to capture something important about the data in 
relation to the research question and, represent some level of patterned response or 
meaning within the data set.  
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Coding was analysed initially on a question by question basis, then across the groups. 
The data was worked through systematically giving full and equal attention to each 
data item. Braun and Clarke’s (2006) recommendations were followed regarding 
coding to ensure important themes were not missed. These included coding for as 
many potential themes as possible and coding individual extracts into as many 
different themes as they fit into. Large margins were left on the side of each page to 
facilitate the making of notes, comments and initial descriptive coding. 
 
Refinement and recoding in subsequent cycles facilitated connections that formed the 
basis of repeated patterns across the data set (Braun & Clarke, 2006). In this way 
preliminary codes were subsumed by other codes, relabelled or dropped altogether 
to eliminate redundancy and improve representation and accuracy. Thus coding 
progressed from salient to latent themes in order to reflect the progression from 
descriptive to meaningful interpretation.  
 
Data was therefore coded and themed through eight evolutionary phases per Saldana 
(2009). Coding is a cyclical act and rarely is the first cycle of coding perfectly 
attempted (Saldana, 2009) and the process reflected this. During first order coding 
the researcher compared the number of codes between groups and noted more 
detailed and larger volumes of codes for Groups 2 and 3 than for Group 1. As a result 
the researcher revisited coding for Group 1 to reflect more detailed and consistent 
coding. The first and second stages were more or less replicated to ensure ‘meticulous 
attention’ (Saldana, 2009, p.10) to all pieces of data. This is reflected in the low 
reduction of codes between first and second order coding.  
Thus the phases of coding were as per Table 2.9. 
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Table 2.9 Coding cycles 
Phase Function 
1st  order Immersion and initial noding 
2nd order Start of reduction of codes 
3rd order Combining codes and naming codes 
4th order Sub codes development 
5th order Subtheme development 
6th order Main theme development across 
groups and questions 
7th order Super theme development 
8th order Meta theme establishment 
 
Every attempt was made to ensure rigour in analysis while at the same time 
understanding that analysis is not a linear but a recursive process (Braun & Clarke, 
2006). This recursive process is itself an indication of rigour in the search for 
meaning. During each phase a record of amendments or reattributions was 
maintained in order to ensure transparency and coherent themes (Braun & Clarke, 
2006). Examples of dissonance were searched for to ensure solidity of themes and 
findings.  
 
2.5.4.5 Theme representation: Mind maps and networks 
Thematic networks aim ‘to facilitate the structuring and depiction of themes’ (Attride-
Stirling, 2001, p.387). Networks are essentially an organisational principle (e.g. basic, 
organising and global themes) and a representational means, making explicit the 
procedures that may be employed in going from text to interpretation. Thus, theme 
extraction is systematised from lower to higher order premises with the development 
of categorisation and encapsulating principal metaphors. In thematic networks these 
levels are then represented as web like maps depicting the salient themes at each of 
the three levels, illustrating the relationship between them. For this study a modified 
networks approach using the principles of networks were employed but the levels of 
data were extended to reflect the eight levels of coding. 
 
Thus the data can be viewed as a thematic map (Braun & Clarke, 2006) or thematic 
networks (Attride & Stirling, 2001). To enable plotting, mind maps were used which 
portray the sequence, expansion, reduction and content of coding (see Appendix 11 
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for sample) at each phase. These were colour coded so the allocation of codes and 
themes could be followed.  
 
2.5.4.6. Reflective summaries 
At each stage reflective summaries were undertaken to facilitate reflection and 
understanding of the data and ensure reliable theming.  
 
2.5.5 Reliability and validity 
Lincoln and Guba’s (1985) approach for assessing quality in qualitative studies refers 
to the constructs of credibility, transferability, dependability and confirmability. 
Confirmability refers to the transparency of the research process which is detailed 
previously. Given the similarities of findings between groups there is little question 
that dependability (replication of findings in a similar context) and transferability 
(relevance of findings to another setting) are evident. The research is credible (do the 
findings make sense and are they believable) to the researcher and hopefully the 
reader. 
 
A number of specific strategies were used to ensure rigour and representativeness 
including: 
 Immersion of the researcher in the data prior to transcription and analysis; 
 The researcher recorded each stage of the coding process with data clearly 
assigned or reassigned to codes at each stage;  
 Mind maps were utilised to show the development of coding; 
 To determine coding reliability per Anderson and Felsenfeld (2003) a research 
colleague was provided with all 12 thematic categories and 12 quotes randomly 
selected from each category by a third party.  This colleague was asked to place 
each quote into the thematic category felt to be most appropriate. Inter rater 
agreement between the research and the reliability judge was 91% (i.e. 11 out of 
the 12 quotes were assigned to the same thematic category by both raters 
independently) confirming the face validity of coding; 
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 Member checking was utilised to confirm the validity of recorded data and 
tentative interpretations;  
 Data that conflicted with emerging patterns were vigilantly searched for, 
documented, and analysed; 
 Triangulating data from various work settings; 
 The same question format was used between groups so there was limited variance 
in the main stimulus questions, and; 
 Reflective summaries were carried out at each stage of coding 
 
 
2.6 SELF-REFLECTION 
To further stimulate critical self-reflection in the interpretative research process, a 
number of methods (reflective diary, memos to self, questions) were used to record 
procedures, methods, hunches, and approaches to analysis for subsequent review. 
These were maintained in a reflective diary in line with traditional models of 
conducting qualitative research. However, in this case, the reflective diary was 
utilised from the initial research stages and through both quantitative and qualitative 
phases. Use of such reflective tools ensured that the researcher was aware of the 
potential for bias but also open to other constructs emerging from the data order to 
ensure that the study outcomes were not a self-fulfilling prophecy.  
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Chapter 3: Survey Results 
 
The results of the survey phase are provided below. 
 
3.1 RESPONDENT DEMOGRAPHICS 
This section presents the results of the characteristics of the sample. 
 
3.1.1. Responses 
Ireland has a small population of SLTs, the exact number being unknown. A response 
of 354 surveys with 271 of these useable represents a substantial figure for the Irish 
context. Nearly one quarter (23.4%) of starters exited the survey before completion. 
Most non-completers areas of practice (e.g. disability 33.7%) were appropriate to the 
survey content.  
Of the useable responses, 92.5% (n=250) completed Part 1 (Demographics) and Part 
4 (Decision scaffolds), 44.3% (n=119) completed Part 2 (Disability) and 42.8% 
(n=116) completed Part 3 (Dysphagia).  
The Practice-Educator-University-Database (PEUD) resulted in half of all responses 
(46.9%). One-quarter (25.5%) of responses were obtained via SLT managers acting as 
gatekeepers. A further one-quarter (25.8%) emanated from profession-specific 
Special Interest Groups. The professional website resulted in least responses (1.8%). 
 
3.1.2. Demographics 
3.1.2.1 Overall demographics 
Demographics (Table 3.1) are presented in reduced form to facilitate interpretation. 
For example, skill was reduced from five levels (novice, developing, experienced, 
specialist and expert) to three representative categories (emergent, experienced and 
expert).  
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Table 3.1 Respondent demographics 
Demographics Disability  Dysphagia  Neither 
disability 
nor 
dysphagia 
 All  
Respondents N % N % N % N % 
Complete respondents 119 43.5 116 42.8 81 29.9   
Total       271  
Years working         
Early (0-4.11) 45 38.1 46 39.7 31 38.3 112 41.3 
Middle (5-14.11) 44 37.3 47 40.5 36 44.4 106 39.1 
Later (15+) 29 24.6 23 19.8 14 17.3 53 19.5 
Total 118  116  81  271  
Grade         
Basic 37 31.4 28 24.1 26 32.0 84 31.0 
Senior 58 49.2 65 56.0 41 50.6 140 51.7 
Manager 16 13.5 16 13.8 3 3.7 24 8.9 
Other 7 5.9 7 6.0 11 13.6 23 8.5 
Total 118  116  81  271  
Skill         
Emerging 39 32.8 35 30.2 32 39.5 97 35.8 
Experienced 59 49.6 63 54.3 37 45.7 132 48.7 
Expert 21 17.6 18 15.5 12 14.8 42 15.5 
Total 119  116  81  271  
HSE region         
Dublin Mid-Leinster 37 31.1 40 34.5 32 39.5 90 33.2 
Dublin North-east 27 22.7 31 26.7 16 19.8 66 24.4 
South Ireland 25 21.0 29 25.0 16 19.8 59 21.8 
West Ireland 30 25.2 16 13.8 17 21.0 66 24.4 
Total 119  116  81  271  
Work setting         
Community 27 22.9 30 25.9 61 75.3 114 42.0 
Voluntary 67 56.8 33 28.4 3 3.7 71 26.2 
Hospital / Rehabilitation 5 4.2 45 38.8 7 8.6 54 20.0 
Other 19 16.1 8 6.9 10 12.3 32 11.8 
Total 118  116  81  271  
Population         
Disability 77 65.3 33 28.4 7 8.6 105 38.7 
Adult-acquired 5 4.2 46 39.7 2 2.5 67 24.7 
Community paediatrics 29 24.6 11 9.5 57 70.4 90 33.2 
Other 16 13.6 26 22.4 15 18.5 9 3.3 
Total 118  116  81  271  
Population age         
Paediatric 92 77.3 39 33.6 73 90.1 177 65.3 
Adult 25 21.0 77 66.4 6 7.4 90 33.2 
Other 2 1.7 -  2 2.5 4 1.5 
Total 119  116  81  271  
Highest qualification         
Professional only 93 78.2 86 74.1 62 76.5 210 77.5 
More than professional 26 21.8 30 25.9 19 23.5 61 22.5 
Total 119  116  81  271  
Years qualified         
Most-recently qualified 56 47.1 57 49.1 35 43.2 131 48.3 
Mid-time qualified 45 37.8 45 38.8 39 48.1 109 40.2 
Longest qualified 18 15.1 14 12.1 7 8.6 31 11.4 
Total 119  116  81  271  
Specialised experience         
Least-special(0-4.11) 58 48.7 72 62.1 - - - - 
Mid-special(5-14.11) 43 36.1 36 31.0 - - - - 
Most-special(15+) 18 15.1 8 6.9 - - - - 
Total 119  116  - - - - 
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Demographics Disability  Dysphagia  Neither 
disability 
nor 
dysphagia 
 All  
 
Dedicated time 
N % N %     
Least-time (0-40%) 18 15.1 55 47.4 - - - - 
Medium-time (41-60%) 16 13.4 19 16.4 - - - - 
Most-time (61-100%) 85 71.4 42 36.2 - - - - 
Total 119  116  - - - - 
 
3.1.2.2 Experience 
The demographics represent a young clinical sample with nearly half (41.3%) 
working less than five years since qualification and over two-thirds (68.6%) working 
under ten years. Basic and senior grades (n=244) represented 82.7% of the sample. 
Over a third (35.8%) of respondents considered themselves at an early stage of skill 
growth (emergent). Only 15.5% were experts and approximately one-fifth (18.5%) 
were working more than fifteen years. This is likely to reflect the Irish, professional 
and perhaps gender demographic. The less-experienced sample may also be reflected 
in degree status with 22.5% having undertaken additional qualifications. Those with 
less experience,  less-specialised experience, lower grading and skills were 
significantly more likely to have a professional-only qualification (p<0.001), further 
qualifications being accumulated with additional experience. Highest-qualification is 
just below significance for population (p=0.059) with adult-acquired clinicians more 
likely to have obtained additional qualifications (36%). Those working longest in the 
areas of disability and dysphagia tended to be longer working generally, be higher 
graded, higher skilled and higher qualified (p<0.0001).   
Nearly all (99%) SLTs in the early years of their careers were basic grades (p<0.001). 
Those in their middle years were most likely to be senior SLTs (63%) and managers 
were more likely (62.5%) to be in the later years of experience. The same pattern is 
seen for self-determined skill (p<0.001) as 82.3% of early-years SLTs classified 
themselves as emergent SLTs, over half of experienced SLTs (57.6%) have middling 
experience, and over two-thirds of expert SLTs (69%) had more than 15 years’ 
experience. This suggests a correlation in the minds of respondents between 
expertise and length of service. Managers were the only group who reported their 
skill level lower than their grade describing themselves as experienced, perhaps 
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reflecting their administrative component. More clinicians considered themselves to 
be specialists (n=34) than the actual number of specialists responding (n=10). Given 
the few specialist posts in the country, this is not surprising. 
Variation in skill was also seen by region and work-setting (Table 3.2). For example, 
fewer West respondents considered themselves experienced SLTs. More respondents 
in the Dublin mid-Leinster region considered themselves emergent SLTs than in other 
regions. This is compatible with a higher number of basic grades in this region. There 
were significantly less expert SLTs and more emergent SLTs in community than other 
settings, thus community settings were more likely to represent less-skilled 
respondents. There were significantly more experts and managers in disability 
settings. Voluntary-setting respondents on the whole represented those with more 
experience, 41% being in SLTs in their later years. Similarly, specialised-experience 
for both disability and dysphagia was significant (p<0.001) for grade and skill but not 
dedicated time (percentage of work in an area), indicating that years of specialised 
experience influence grading most.  
Table 3.2 Grade and self-determined skill of respondents 
Demographic  % Skill   % Grade  
Region Emergent Experienced Expert Basic Senior Manager 
Dublin mid-Leinster 35.1 31.8 33.3 35.7 32.9 29.2 
West  21.6 16.7 31.0 19.0 19.3 20.8 
Dublin North East 22.7 27.3 19.0 23.2 25.0 25.0 
South 20.6 24.2 16.7 21.4 22.9 25.0 
 p =0 .500   p =0 .998   
Work-setting       
Voluntary 26.4 29.1 40.0 27.6 25.8 65.2 
Hospital & 
Rehabilitation 
16.1 23.9 34.3 18.4 21.9 17.4 
Community  57.5  47.0 25.7 53.9 52.3 17.4 
 p=0.029   p=0.003   
Population       
Disability 31.6 39.6 50.0 30.0 36.6 75.0 
Adult-acquired 
disorders 
17.7 24.3 30.0 17.1 25.9 20.0 
Community paediatric 50.6 36.0 20.0 52.9 37.5 5.0 
 p = 0.049   p=0.001   
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3.1.2.3 Work context 
Slightly more respondents worked in the Dublin Mid-Leinster region, most likely 
reflecting the population distribution. Most respondents (42.0%) worked in 
community settings and along with those working in voluntary and 
hospital/rehabilitation settings, represented 88.1% of the overall sample. Although 
not significant, SLTs in the West were more likely to be community clinicians 
(61.4%). South (74.6%) and West (76.4%) SLTs were more likely to work with 
paediatric clients (p=0.055) and nearly one-third (31.7%) worked with community-
paediatric clients. Adult clinicians were more likely to work with adult-acquired 
clients (p<0.001) in Dublin mid-Leinster (p=0.055) and hospital-rehabilitation 
settings (p=0.050). SLTs working with clients with intellectual disability represented 
one-quarter (25%) of the sample, while approximately one-sixth (16.6%) worked 
with clients with adult-acquired disabilities. Work-setting was significant for 
population (p<0.001) with voluntary respondents more likely to work with disability 
populations (95.2%), community respondents with community-paediatric 
populations (76.8%), and hospital-rehabilitation respondents with adult-acquired 
populations (97.1%) indicating clearly differing work environments. The pattern 
holds for population-age (p<0.001) with hospital-rehabilitation respondents most 
likely to work with adults (86.8%) and voluntary (77.9%) and community 
respondents (80.7%) with paediatric clients. Work setting was also significant for 
years of specialised dysphagia experience (p=0.011) with more community and 
voluntary respondents most likely to be in their early years, and hospital-
rehabilitation respondents more likely to have above 5 years’ experience. This 
identified respondents working with adult populations as having more experience.  
The majority of respondents (66.8%) worked with paediatric clients. Underdeveloped 
elements of services are clearly represented by the categories of children under 2 
years (n=5), adolescents (n=4), child & adolescent mental health (n=9) and physical 
disability (n=7). Intellectual disability and adult-acquired groups (p<0.0001) were 
likely to have more dedicated time in disability than community respondents, and 
adult clinicians more likely than paediatric clinicians (p<0.001). Respondents 
spending the most dedicated time tended to be experienced SLTs. A similar pattern is 
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seen for dysphagia as for disability with hospital-rehabilitation settings (p<0.001) 
and adult clinicians (p<0.001) having more dedicated time. This suggests that those 
working with adult neurological populations are most likely to have more dedicated-
dysphagia time.  
 
3.1.2.4 Areas of practice 
A total of 119 respondents completed the disability section. Over one-third (38.0%) 
had under five years’ experience and three-quarters (75.4%) had under 15 years’ 
experience. This represents a relatively young-experienced group similar to the broad 
demographic. While not significant, more respondents in the country regions of South 
and West (32%, 30%) had later-years’ experience than their colleagues in Dublin 
mid-Leinster (18.9%) and Dublin north-east (17.9%). In total, 58.3% worked more 
than 80% of their time and 71.4% worked more than 61% of their time in disability 
representing considerable specialisation. Community settings account for 22.5% of 
disability clinicians while voluntary settings account for over half (55.8%). The 
intellectual-disability population represented the majority of the disability sample 
(56.7%). Similarly most disability respondents (77.3%) worked with paediatric 
clients. For skill, there were more experts in the West than the South (19%) and 
Dublin north-east (16.9%), a pattern repeated for the overall demographic. 
A total of 116 respondents completed the dysphagia section and tended to be a 
slightly less-experienced group than their disability colleagues. Most dysphagia 
respondents (62%) were in their early years and there were less respondents with 
later-years’ experience than in disability. Dysphagia respondents in the West (43.8%) 
are likely to have more than 15 years’ experience. This contrasts with other regions 
where most respondents were in their early years. Dysphagia also had fewer 
respondents with most-dedicated time (36.2%). Nearly half (47.4%) of dysphagia 
respondents worked less than 40% of their time in this area, while only 8.3% worked 
more than 81% in dysphagia. A third (34.5%) worked in Dublin mid-Leinster and a 
quarter (26.7%) in Dublin north-east. Dublin regions therefore represent the majority 
of dysphagia respondents. Voluntary settings accounted for 28.4%, community 
settings 26%, and hospital-rehabilitation settings 38.8% of the dysphagia sample. 
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One-third (34.5%) of dysphagia respondents worked with adult-acquired clients, 
22.4% with clients with intellectual disability, and 66.4% with adult populations. 
Dysphagia respondents therefore represent adult-based practice on the whole.  
An additional group completed the statements-only section and are neither disability 
nor dysphagia clinicians. These respondents tended to be predominantly SLTs 
working in community settings with community-paediatric clients.  
 
 
3.2 CHOICE OF THERAPIES 
This section presents the results of respondents’ choice of therapies in disability and 
dysphagia. 
 
3.2.1. Therapy selections 
3.2.1.1 Main therapy choices 
For both dysphagia and disability there were a relatively small group of well-utilised 
therapies and clear favourites (Table 3.3). The scale representing five points of use 
(always, frequently, sometimes, rarely and never) has been reduced to three levels 
(always, sometimes and never) to reflect high and low-frequency use. The complete 
list of ratings can be found in Appendices 12 and 13. 
Table 3.3 Most and least-used therapies in order of use 
Area Most-used (Top 5) Least-used (Bottom 5) 
Disability Hanen 
Lamh 
Communication boards/ books 
Derbyshire Language Scheme  
Communication passports 
Conductive Education 
Aided language modelling 
Cranial Sacral therapy 
Kidspiration/Inspiration 
Speechviewer 
Dysphagia Texture modification 
Thickening liquids 
Changes in position 
Double Swallow 
Adapted /modified utensils 
Surface electromyography (SEMG) 
Vitalstim therapy 
Homeopathy 
Deep pharyngeal neuromuscular 
stimulation (DPNS) 
Intra-oral appliances/prostheses 
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Mean use (Table 3.4) indicates therapies are often combined with 2.35 the mean 
number of therapies always used (preferred options) in disability compared to 0.79 in 
dysphagia. The combined number of therapies always and frequently used can be said 
to represent the repertoires of clinicians.  
 
Table 3.4 Mean number of therapies used  
Frequency of use by 
area of practice 
Mean number 
of therapies 
used 
Standard 
deviation  
Range 
Disability    
Always 2.35 2.96 0-15 
Frequently 8.25 4.37 1-23 
Always plus frequently 10.57 5.41 2-30 
Dysphagia    
Always 0.79 1.77 0-9 
Frequently 7.61 4.01 0-23 
Always plus frequently 8.53 4.54 0-23 
 
 
3.2.1.2 Choice of disability therapies 
At least half the sample always-use five main disability therapies. Hanen (76.7%) and 
Lamh (75%) are clear favourites being regularly used by three-quarters of disability 
respondents. This does not vary when ranking is employed although Lamh, an 
adapted signing system, is chosen by 98% of disability respondents. Nearly equal 
numbers choose Hanen (75%) which is an interaction and language programme, and 
Derbyshire (72%), a language programme. The only therapy to change significantly 
between use and ranking analyses is visual timetables. This ranks fourth in 
preference but was always-used by only 14% of respondents. The ‘sometimes’ rating 
explains this – it is a therapy used by most respondents but mostly on an occasional 
basis. The same applies to oral-motor therapy which over one-quarter (27.5%) of 
respondents always-use, but 70% of respondents use at least some of the time.  
Use of therapies to reflect occasional use is represented by medians (Figure 3.1). This 
confirms the picture of a relatively small number of therapies dominating 
intervention choices (median 4). Additionally, it identifies therapies which are used 
but less frequently (median 3), and those which tend not to be used (medians 2 & 1). 
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Figure 3.1 Disability therapies used based on median ratings 
 
Thus, there were large numbers of never-used or under-used therapies. 30 therapies 
(57.5%) were rarely or never used by 50% or more of respondents and 16 therapies 
are never-used by at least three-quarters of respondents. Four of the ten least-used 
therapies represent pseudoscientific or non-scientific practices and most would not 
be considered profession-specific. (e.g. Cranial-sacral therapy). Three were 
technologically-based (e.g. Speechviewer) and one not discipline specific 
(reminiscence therapy). Of those therapies selected from a search of the literature, 
three were represented in the 16 least-used (e.g. Aided-language modelling).   
 
Deconstructing clinical practice and searching for scientific foundations 
 
 
 
123 
 
 
3.2.1.3 Choice of dysphagia therapies 
In dysphagia, three therapies are used most frequently. These are texture 
modification (80.0%), thickening liquids (76.6%) and changes in position (70.0%). 
Three-quarters of respondents selected all three most-used options. There was a 
clear gap between these three techniques and other therapies as indicated by 
frequency and median ratings. The next most-used therapies were double swallow 
(44.2%), adapted utensils (42.5%) and volume regulation (41.2%). Videofluroscopic 
swallow study biofeedback (VFSSB) was the only technological intervention favoured 
in the top ten.  Use correlated with ranked interventions on the whole although chin 
tuck moved from 12th to 5th place when analysed by preferred options. 
A total of 25 therapies are never-used by 50% or more of respondents and 13 by at 
least three-quarters of respondents. The least-used therapies (and with a median of 
1) were Surface electromyography (SEMG), Vitalstim and Homeopathy, being never-
used by 92.5% of all respondents. Three of the ten least-used were technological (e.g. 
intra-oral appliances); two were non-profession specific (e.g. Bobath) and four were 
neuromuscular approaches (e.g. Ora-light). Of the 20 least-used therapies, 50% can be 
considered neuromuscular treatments. The neuromuscular technique to rate highest 
was range of motion (ROM) exercises for the tongue in 12th place. Nearly half of 
clinicians (44%) chose one of the six swallow techniques as a preferred intervention.  
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Figure 3.2 Dysphagia therapies used based on median ratings  
 
 
 
3.2.2. Therapy combinations 
3.2.2.1 Approaches to treatment 
In disability, half of the top-ten items were augmentative and alternative 
communication (AAC) therapies (e.g. communication passports). Switch toys may also 
be included in this category if used as single-message-voice-output devices. Hanen 
and Derbyshire represent language-oriented approaches. Two speech therapies (e.g. 
minimal pairs) were favoured. Of those rating a median of 4.0, five of the seven were 
AAC-based and two language-based, suggesting preferred approaches. When choice is 
analysed by groupings, AAC interventions rated highest (50.3%), followed by speech 
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therapies (35.3%), oral-motor therapies (14.3%) and pseudoscientific therapies 
(9.0%). Those retrieved from the literature rate lowest (7.0%). 
In dysphagia, nearly one third of the top-ten therapies can be categorised as bolus-
modification techniques (e.g. volume regulation). One-fifth involved physical 
strategies (e.g. physical support) and 30% were technique driven (e.g. verbal cueing). 
Only one technique related directly to the swallow (double swallow). Two of the three 
rating a median of 4 were bolus-modification techniques. If choice is analysed by 
grouping, bolus-modification techniques rated highest (43.8%) being significantly 
impacted by the low numbers using carbonation (5.8%). Swallow therapies were 
second highest (31.6%) being considerably impacted by the high ratings of the non-
rehabilitatory techniques of double and effortful swallows. Technique-based 
therapies rated third (31.6%) and postural fourth (26.7%). Neuromuscular 
techniques (8.4%) and physical agents such as SEMG (6.2%) rate lowest. Ten of the 
17 therapies rating a median of 1 were neuromuscular techniques 
 
3.2.2.2 Clusters of therapies  
It can be postulated that treatment techniques are not used in isolation. Calculating 
the proximity between therapies to identify clusters was employed using the 
multivariate method of multidimensional scaling.  
In disability, the most-used therapies (e.g. Hanen, PECs) clearly group loosely to the 
right of the space (Figure 3.3). A number of AAC therapies are grouped in the middle 
and bottom right of the space. These suggest therapies used together. However, these 
therapies are relatively distal from each other within their groupings which suggests 
while grouped, they may be used separately rather than in combination. Some 
therapies within clusters are also more proximal to each other than to other items in 
the cluster. For example, Hanen and Derbyshire are more proximal to each other than 
to other therapies in the cluster. This can be said to form a subdivision of that group.  
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Figure 3.3 Clustering of disability therapies 
The AAC therapies can also be further subdivided into two clusters, one of which 
includes the therapy Intensive interaction. This subdivision may be related to 
population age. While neither adult nor paediatric clinicians differ in use of the AAC 
therapies to the upper-right of the cluster (e.g. PECS), adult clinicians use and choose 
the other therapies in the cluster significantly more including communication 
passports (p<0.003), communication boards / books (p<0.001), voice output 
communication aids (p<0.017) and objects of reference (p<0.001). This suggests a 
valid sub-cluster. 
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A speech cluster (e.g. Metaphon, articulation) is identifiable in the middle-top left of 
the space. Nuffield is loosely tied to this cluster but also distal, suggesting more 
isolated use. Analysis however, indicates that clinicians who always-use Nuffield are 
also more likely to always-use minimal pairs, and clinicians who never-use one are 
more likely to never-use the other (p<0.001). This suggests compatibility in use. The 
same is true for articulation and Nuffield (p<0.001). Metaphon, oral-motor therapy 
and Talktools are more closely positioned together suggesting differentiation of 
clinicians who use oral-motor therapies; however this is not borne out by analysis. 
For example, although those who always-use Nuffield are more likely to sometimes 
use Talktools (p<0.001), this group both always and sometimes-use oral-motor 
therapy (p<0.001). Overall, speech therapies tend to be clustered more tightly than in 
other clusters suggesting overlapping use. Finally, the lesser-used therapies are 
clustered fairly proximally to the middle and bottom left of the space as a large 
collection. This may point to a group defined by infrequent use.  
In dysphagia, five therapies can be said to occupy space at the top of the chart (e.g.  
texture modification, adapted utensils). Within this cluster the bolus-modification 
techniques are most tightly clustered suggesting a bolus-modification cluster. 
Changes in position and adapted utensils are more proximal to each other and distal 
from other therapies within this cluster suggesting that they are used in combination 
with each other. Swallow techniques also form a tight grouping to the bottom and 
right of the space suggesting combined use of these therapies. Analysis shows that 
swallow techniques are more used by adult clinicians. A number of other therapies fit 
within this cluster by virtue of their proximity to these items including thermal-tactile 
stimulation and cough/throat clear.  It can be postulated that clinicians use these 
therapies together with the swallow techniques to directly target the pharyngeal 
functions suggesting reliability of clustering. Chin tuck and VFSSB while slightly more 
distal to the cluster are more proximal to this group than any other indicating they 
also focus on swallow intervention. Taste and temperature modification form a small 
cluster in the left-mid space and although not frequently-used, this suggests they may 
be used in combination with each other but not necessarily other bolus-modification 
therapies from which they are distal. Lesser-used therapies as for disability, occupy 
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the bottom left space being more proximal to each other and distal from other 
therapies. 
Figure 3.4 Clustering of dysphagia therapies 
 
Thus, the 52 disability and 45 dysphagia therapies can be reduced to a couple of 
clusters of intra-related items. This clustering also eliminates non-used therapies 
suggesting a maximum of 40 disability and 37 dysphagia therapies are utilised. It is 
thus reasonable to subdivide disability and dysphagia therapies into clusters 
(Appendix 14).  
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3.2.3. Therapy selections by demographics 
3.2.3.1 Therapy selections by experiential demographics 
Low cell counts in analysis of some therapy-demographic relationships (e.g. 
Kidspiration) reflected the degree to which respondents were using and not using 
individual therapies. Most therapies did not demonstrate a difference in use with 
experience. For disability, the main exception was communication boards/books 
which was significant for six experiential variables including specialised experience, 
skill and grade (Appendix 15). SLTs in the early years were least likely (52%) to use 
this therapy. Increasing use was seen with accumulated experience rising to over 
two-thirds (68%) of SLTs in their later years using it. The developmental pattern was 
further highlighted via the original groupings with 35.7% of SLTs with under 2 years’ 
experience using this therapy, rising sequentially to 77% of clinicians with 25+years. 
The overall picture was one of increased use with increased experience regardless of 
how it is measured.  
Dedicated time was the demographic which had most impact on the use of disability 
therapies generally (13 in total) and AAC therapies specifically, those with most time 
being most likely to always-use AAC therapies (Appendix 15). SLTs with most time 
were most strongly represented (p<0.0001) by voluntary organisation and 
intellectual-disability clinicians, and least by community-paediatric respondents. 
Those with most experience, more than a professional qualification, as well as senior 
SLTs and managers also chose more literature-based therapies. The original group of 
specialists were least likely to use literature-based therapies. The accumulation of 
therapies with experience is clearly represented in Figure 3.5. 
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Figure 3.5 Significant differences in disability therapy choices and use by experiential 
demographics 
 
Less-experienced clinicians also showed clear differences for speech therapies. For 
example, there was an increasing trend towards never-use for articulation with 
experience (20.0%, 34.0%, and 44.4%). For specialised experience however, the 
middle group were least likely to use it.  
For dysphagia, most therapies did not demonstrate a difference in use with 
experience. The exception was volume regulation which revealed the most differences 
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and was chosen most by basic grades (p<0.006) who were 100% least experienced, 
but used most by the longest qualified (p<0.011) and most experienced (p<0.011).  
SLTs in their middle years showed a dip in use (52.1%, 23.9%, 65.2%) being most 
likely to sometimes-use and never-use this therapy. Contradictions were also 
apparent in some other bolus-modification therapies and tube feeding. While there 
was fairly even use of tube feeding, SLTs in their early-years were most likely (54.5%) 
to never-use this therapy with the middle group most likely (22.2%) not to never-use 
it. The most-experienced (p<0.035) and most-specialised SLTs (p<0.008) were most 
likely to choose tube feeding. However, respondents with a professional-only 
qualification were also more likely to always-use this therapy (23% vs. 17%) and to 
never-use it (43.9% vs. 23.1%). Given that years of experience and further 
qualification were related positively (p<0.0001) an explanation does not result from 
qualification status.  
For dysphagia instrumentation, SLTs in their middle years were more likely (45.6%) 
to utilise VFSSB. This contrasts with 25.5% of SLTs in their early years and 22.7% in 
their later years. For the original groupings, specialists showed more choice of 
instrumentation therapies, with no usage for novices and a trend of increasing use 
with increasing experience except for expert SLTs who showed decreased use. This 
pattern of reduced usage in higher skills levels was replicated for neuromuscular 
treatments.  
Swallow techniques appear to be used based on dedicated time with increased use 
with more time (Appendix 16). For example, use of the double swallow rose 
sequentially with increased time (31.4%, 44.4% and 65.8%). However, while the 
effortful swallow was most sometimes-used by those with most dedicated time and 
medium-specialised experience, those with most-specialised experience were most 
likely to never use it. Those with more dedicated time in dysphagia were most 
represented by the adult-acquired respondents (p<0.001) and adult settings 
(p<0.001) which suggests population criteria may explain this outcome especially as 
those with most dedicated time in dysphagia were equally represented by the various 
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levels of experience. Significant therapies based on experience are shown in Figure 
3.6.  
Figure 3.6 Significant differences in dysphagia therapy choices and use by 
experiential demographics 
 
 
3.2.3.2 Therapy selections by work context   
At a regional level, few effects were noted although West respondents were most 
likely to use the Derbyshire (82.7%) and Floortime (23.3%). Fewer differences were 
evident in dysphagia. Significant relationships increased when other work-context 
demographics were considered (Figures 3.7 and 3.8). Adult and voluntary-
organisation clinicians and those working in intellectual disability were more likely to 
use AAC therapies. Visual timetables was the only AAC therapy to cross the 
population divide. Manual systems were used more by SLTs working in community 
settings. SLTs in community settings serving community-paediatric populations were 
more likely to use speech therapies. The only exceptions were oral-motor therapy and 
tactile-sensory stimulation which were used more by voluntary-organisation 
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respondents. These therapies target function more than speech. The pattern of work 
setting and population demographics impacting on choice continued for other 
categories of therapies, for example, language-based therapies which are utilised 
more in community than non-community settings. Clear work-setting boundaries are 
indicated.  
Figure 3.7 Significant differences in disability therapy choices and use by work-
context demographics 
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For dysphagia, respondents based in hospital-rehabilitation and community settings 
responded more similarly than those in voluntary organisations. The suggestion is of 
clearly utilised neuromuscular therapies based on work and population 
demographics. Neuromuscular therapies (e.g. stretching) were used infrequently by a 
small number of respondents. Only ROM-tongue and resistance had medians of 3.0 
indicating isolated exercises may be valued. Dublin regions, mid-specialised, adult-
acquired and adult clinicians were much more likely to use the various swallow 
techniques. Some of the usage differential was stark.  For example, those with most-
dedicated time (2.30/10), specialists (2.25), older-client (2.1), rehabilitation (1.75), 
adult-client (1.52) and community (1.27) clinicians ranked these therapies higher 
than those working in voluntary organisations (0.34/10) suggesting use is localised 
to adult-based services and non-transferable.  This include dedicated time as adult-
acquired clinicians were most likely to be working more time in the area (p<.0001) 
than their intellectual disability colleagues. 
Adult-acquired and hospital-rehabilitation clinicians used the compensatory postures 
of head turn and chin tuck more than intellectual disability and voluntary 
organisation clinicians, although those in community settings showed most 
preference for head turn. Along with cough/throat clear, these techniques can be 
related to work on pharyngeal function which ties in with adult clinicians more 
frequent use of swallow techniques. Paediatric, intellectual-disability and voluntary 
clinicians were more likely to use the compensatory technique of physical support. 
The intellectual-disability group preferred Bobath and position changes as did the 
paediatric group. 
Similar to previous findings, the paediatric, intellectual-disability and voluntary-
organisation clinicians preferred or used more the bolus strategies of temperature 
modification and taste modification. These suggest specific age related uses of some 
minor and major bolus-modification therapies. Adult and adult-acquired clinicians 
also showed more use and or preference for VFSSB and tube feeding. Those working 
in voluntary organisations, with intellectual disability and in paediatrics were more 
likely to use adapted utensils. These indicate clear setting choices.  
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Figure 3.8 Significant differences in dysphagia therapy choices and use by work-
context demographics 
 
3.2.4. Summary 
Clear differences in use and groups of use are evident by both experiential and work-
context demographics. The suggestion is that choice of therapies is both relatively 
limited in term of volume and defined by the area of practice a clinician works in, with 
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little transfer across those boundaries. More therapies were accumulated with 
increasing experience. 
 
3.3 REASONS FOR SELECTING THERAPIES 
 
Respondents were offered a number of potential reasons to explain their therapy 
choices which this section highlights.   
 
3.3.1. Overall reasons for selecting therapies 
Client suitability and clinical experience dominated as the main reasons interventions 
were used, these two reasons alone accounting for nearly two-thirds of all reasons 
given (Figure 3.9). The reason least used was ‘it doesn’t matter which treatment I use’ 
(0.1%).  
Figure 3.9 Top ten overall reasons for selecting therapies 
 
The pattern of reasons appeared fairly consistent between disability (n= 1621 
responses) and dysphagia (n=1368 responses). Client suitability was the primary 
reason, although disability clinicians most cite this reason. Dysphagia clinicians 
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the reasons of concreteness, theory and expertise. Disability clinicians preferred 
patient motivation. Clinical experience is the only non-significant reason between the 
groups among the main reasons (Table 3.5).  
Table 3.5 Significant findings for selecting therapies by areas of practice 
Main reasons for  Disability  Dysphagia  p value 
always use n % n %  
Client suitability 695 42.9 435 31.8 <0.001 
Clinical experience 426 26.3 387 28.2 0.219 
Concreteness 65 4.0 150 11.0 <0.001 
Theory as a guide 65 4.0 114 8.3 <0.001 
Valuing of expertise 50 3.1 70 5.1 0.005 
Patient motivation 96 5.9 27 2.0 <0.001 
 
3.3.2. Reasons for using specific therapies 
3.3.2.1 By area of practice 
60% disability and 35.5% dysphagia therapies were predominately used for client 
suitability reasons (Appendix 17). AAC and bolus-modification therapies were 
characterised by this reason. Suitability was used to explain reasoning between AAC 
and non-AAC items, for example, between Hanen and Lamh (p=0.001) and Derbyshire 
and communication boards/books (p=0.002). It also explained a difference between 
the bolus-modification therapy of thickening liquids and the swallow technique of 
Shaker (p=.012). 
In disability, 17.3% of therapies were primarily explained by clinical experience 
compared to 31% in dysphagia. While experience did not tend to differentiate 
reasoning between therapies, it was on the whole used to support neuromuscular 
therapies, less-scientific practices in disability and lesser-used therapies in dysphagia. 
It also explained two favoured therapies in disability (Hanen and Derbyshire), 
although these therapies also showed high use of client suitability. These two main 
reasons accounted for 77% of the dominant reasoning for all therapies in disability 
and 66.7% in dysphagia.   
A few other therapies showed a scattering of main reasons. In disability these 
involved claims of working, motivation and availability and mainly applied to 
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technological or non-scientific options. The use of motivation for switch toys (35.8%) 
and reminiscence therapy (57.1%) suggests targeted reasoning.  In dysphagia, minor 
reasons included theory (12.5%), claims of working (13.5%) and motivation (6.25%). 
Use of such reasoning may apply to specific categories of therapy. For example, the 
lesser-used swallow techniques (e.g. Shaker) were most used because they made 
sense theoretically. The technologically-based therapies (e.g. VFSSB) were used for 
reasons of concreteness. Some neuromuscular therapies (e.g. ROM-tongue and 
Vitalstim) also showed high use of the reason ‘claims to work’. However, these 
therapies had very low numbers of users – meaning they did not feature highly in the 
main reasons.  Some therapies showed a near balance of both these main reasons 
although this combined reasoning was more evident in disability than dysphagia. 
 
3.3.2.2 Reasons for use by experiential demographics 
SLTs in their early years showed highest use of client suitability with little change in 
use of this reason between the middle and later years of experience. Dysphagia SLTs 
in their middle years showed a relative dip in use of this reason, being more inclined 
to use clinical experience than their disability colleagues.  
Figure 3.10 Percentage of client suitability as a reason for always-use by years of 
experience and area of practice 
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When analysed by original groupings (Figure 3.11) a trend of reduced use of client 
suitability with increasing experience is suggested.  
Figure 3.11 Percentage use of client suitability by original years of experience 
groupings and areas of practice 
 
 
This pattern remained constant for other experiential variables including grade, 
qualification and skill. It changed only with dedicated time in disability (51.4%, 
62.2%, and 63.5%) and dysphagia (48%, 48.4%, and 56.0%) where small upward 
trends were noted. The indications are that those with less experience and more 
dedicated time were more likely to cite client suitability.  
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reasons may provide some insight. There appeared to be an increasing reliance on 
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two main reasons, followed by a return to favouring client suitability which again 
diminishes towards the later years. This pattern remained stable for general and 
specialised experience. Except for those periods where a balance is observed, there 
also appears to be an inverse arrangement within most groups e.g. groups favouring 
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Figure 3.12 Percentage use of two main always-use reasons by original years of 
experience groupings 
 
 
3.3.2.3 Therapies of significance for experiential demographics 
For the two main reasons a number of therapies were statistically significant 
(Appendix 18). Approximately 10% of all therapies were significant for years’ 
experience, but not especially for specialised experience. 5% of therapies were 
significant for grade. On the whole fewer therapies were significant for dysphagia. 
Thickening liquids is a dysphagia therapy for which all groups cited suitability most 
rather than experience. 
Those with less years’ experience (as well as less-specialised experience and basic 
SLTs) were most likely to reference suitability for all significant therapies. These 
included oral-motor therapy (88.9%), Facilitated communication (100%), thickening 
liquids (86.9%) and texture modification (80.8%). The only exception was for AAC 
therapies for which both basic and senior SLTs tended to cite suitability confirming 
this reason as an important in the selection of AAC therapies. Those with most years’ 
experience were most likely to reference clinical experience. This applied to oral-
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motor therapy, thickening liquids and Facilitated communication. The least 
experienced predominately cited suitability and the most experienced clinical 
experience suggesting reasoning was related to experience rather than specific 
therapies. The exceptions to the general trend were for lesser-used therapies (e.g. 
carbonation), with the least-experienced SLTs citing experience most, and the most-
experienced citing suitability most. The trend to use clinical experience more with 
experience was seen across a number of experiential variables including skill.  
SLTs in their middle years were far more likely to reference clinical experience for 5% 
of therapies than those with less or more experience. Their similarity to other groups 
tends to be inconstant suggesting a time of change. For dysphagia therapies, emergent 
SLTs were most likely to cite experience similar to expert SLTs, and experienced SLTs 
were most likely to cite suitability. For all disability therapies, emerging SLTs were 
most likely to cite suitability and expert SLTs most likely to cite clinical experience. 
On the whole, the middle group of experienced clinicians were equally likely to cite 
the two main reasons. 
 
3.3.2.4. Reasons for use by work-context demographics 
In disability, all regions showed higher values for suitability (approximately 2:1) 
except for those in the West (53%: 47%).  The indications are that those in the West 
may be a different demographic and though not significant, they were more likely to 
work in community settings. Analysis of minor reasons indicated some subtle 
differences between mainly original groupings. Hospital SLTs (17.6%), dysphagia 
SLTs (18.0%) and SLTs working with older clients (16.5%) showed a higher 
preference for concreteness.    
 
3.3.2.5 Therapies of significance for work-context demographics 
A great volume of individual therapies were significant for work context (Appendix 
19), particularly for disability (21% compared to 4.4% for dysphagia). Seven (13.5%) 
disability therapies were significant for population. Community SLTs were more 
likely to cite experience and those in voluntary settings to cite suitability. In 
dysphagia, adult-setting respondents also cited client suitability more.  
Deconstructing clinical practice and searching for scientific foundations 
 
 
 
142 
 
 
 
3.3.3. Summary 
Client suitability was a dominant reason but less favoured with increasing experience. 
Disability clinicians showed a higher preference for suitability reasoning and a lower 
preference for experience reasoning. Clinical experience was used more with 
increasing experience. Indications are that community clinicians relied more on 
clinical experience as a reason than other groups.  Of all variables, the work-setting 
demographic produced most differences in use of the two main reasons. 
 
 
3.4 REASONS FOR NOT SELECTING THERAPIES 
Respondents were offered a number of potential reasons to explain their reasons for 
not choosing therapies which this section highlights.   
 
3.4.1. Overall reasons for not selecting therapies 
Dominant reasons (n = 5659 responses) for not selecting therapies were lack of 
training, lack of suitability, lack of awareness and ‘Don’t know enough’ (Figure 3.13). 
These accounted for 82.5% of all responses indicating a limited reasoning range. 
Knowledge-based reasons, representing three of the main reasons, accounted for over 
half (57.4%) of clinicians’ decisions not to use a treatment. The least used reason was 
‘not engaging’ (0.20%). 
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Figure 3.13 Top ten reasons for not selecting therapies 
 
 
Those working in disability (n= 3263) cited training most (Figure 3.14). When non-
training knowledge reasons are combined, suitability as a reason for disability 
respondents dropped to third place.  Dysphagia clinicians (n=2396) highest 
preferences was for lack of suitability and they placed a slightly higher value on lack 
of research evidence (5.1%:3.5%), this being the fifth reason overall.  
Figure 3.14 Main reasons for not selecting therapies by area of practice 
 
31 
25.1 
14.1 
12.3 
4.1 
3.1 
2.4 
1.8 
1.5 
0.8 
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35
Not trained
Not suitable
Not aware of
Don’t know enough 
Research evidence against
Not in workplace
Not SLT therapy
Department doesn’t use 
Not practical
Not easy to use
Percentage of all responses 
R
e
as
o
n
s 
fo
r 
n
o
t 
se
le
ct
in
g 
35 
21.6 
16.9 
13.3 
26 
30.1 
9.6 11 
31 
25.1 
14.1 12.3 
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
Not trained Not suitable Not aware Don’t know 
enough 
P
e
rc
e
n
ta
ge
 o
f 
re
sp
o
n
se
s 
Main reasons 
Disability
Dysphagia
Whole sample
Deconstructing clinical practice and searching for scientific foundations 
 
 
 
144 
 
 
 
All differences between the two areas of practice are significant (Table 3.6).  
Table 3.6 Differences in use of main reasons for not selecting therapies by area of 
practice 
 
 
 
 
*combines lack of awareness and don’t know enough reasons 
 
3.4.2. Reasons for not selecting specific therapies 
3.4.2.1 By area of practice 
Some therapies were so heavily used that the sample for non-use was too small to 
generate any real meaning (e.g. thickening liquids n=3). Lack of training was primary 
for 42.3% of disability and 22.2% of dysphagia therapies (Appendix 20). In dysphagia, 
use of this reason was typically applied to neuromuscular therapies or technology 
targeting neuromuscular functions. For 38.5% of disability therapies, lack of 
suitability dominated, especially for AAC therapies. It accounted for 55.5% of 
dysphagia therapies, primarily swallow, bolus-modification and postural techniques.  
Knowledge-based reasons were cited most for 13.5% of disability therapies, 
rationalising all literature-based therapies. In dysphagia, it represented the most used 
reason for two neuromuscular therapies, two feeding techniques and one lesser-used 
bolus modification technique.  
Negative research evidence mostly justified why oral-motor therapy (35.7%) and 
Talktools (45.1%) were not used in disability and why Talktools (24.2%) was not 
used in dysphagia. It was the second reason accounting for non-use of the 
pseudoscientific practice of Listening therapy (30.9%) although lack of training 
ranked first (46.4%). Lack of training also ranked first for other controversial 
treatments such as homeopathy (31.0%), sensory-integration therapy and Cranial-
 Disability  Dysphagia  p value 
 n % n %  
Lack of training 1012 31.0 633 26.4 <0.0001 
Lack of suitability 819 25.1 721 30.1 <0.0001 
Lack of awareness 555 16.9 230 9.6 <0.0001 
Don’t know enough 434 13.3 264 11.0 0.010 
Lack of knowledge* 861 26.4 494 20.6 <0.0001 
Deconstructing clinical practice and searching for scientific foundations 
 
 
 
145 
 
 
sacral therapy, with only one-fifth to one-quarter of respondents identifying them as 
non-SLT therapies.  
Dysphagia SLTs referenced practical issues more, specifically availability for four 
therapies, primarily equipment-based therapies (e.g. VFSSB) although 30% of 
respondents in the utensil group also chose lack of suitability. Taste (27.6%) and 
temperature modification (36.4%), both rated primarily as ‘not practical’.  
A few therapies in disability showed heavy combined reasoning but most had one 
dominant reason. Dysphagia therapies were more likely to show combined reasons 
and this reflected a variety of reasons.  Some were cited for the two main reasons, (i.e. 
thermal-tactile stimulation, ROM-other and intraoral appliances). Non-use of adapted 
utensils was explained equally by both workplace availability and lack of suitability. 
Temperature modification was equally not practical and not suitable. Talktools was 
equally explained by lack of training, suitability and research. This may reflect more 
varied decisions making in dysphagia. Significance testing on lesser-used therapies 
suggests reasoning is different for different therapies (Table 3.7).  
Table 3.7 Comparison of reasoning for not using lesser-used therapies 
 Speech 
viewer / 
reminiscence 
therapy 
Listening 
therapy / 
Aided 
language 
modelling 
SEMG 
/head back 
DPNS / 
carbonation 
Lack of training     
Therapy 1 30.6 83.3 77.8 69.6 
Therapy 2 26.8 20.0 4.6 8.0 
p value 0.623 <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 
Lack of 
suitability 
    
Therapy 1 9.4 9.4 9.7 20.3 
Therapy 2 44.3 7.1 86.2 24.0 
p value <0.0001 0.773 <0.0001 0.664 
Lack of 
knowledge 
    
Therapy 1 60.0 16.7 12.5 10.1 
Therapy 2 27.8 72.9 9.2 68.0 
p value <0.0001 <0.0001 0.594 <0.0001 
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Exploring reason for groups of therapies also helps elucidate decision making.  For 
example, speech and AAC therapies were mostly not used because of lack of 
suitability. Behavioural therapies (e.g. TEACCH, applied behaviour analysis) 
evidenced a higher frequency of training reasoning (51.0%) than average (31.0%) 
even despite the absence of training programmes attached to some behavioural 
therapies. Training was also high for least-used, interaction-based, non and 
pseudoscientific therapies, and both discipline and non-discipline specific therapies. 
 For non-SLT, non-scientific therapies across both areas of practice, one would have 
expected to see reasoning such as not-SLT therapy and scientific responses 
dominating the response set.  This was not the case. While 17.5% of respondents did 
identify that these therapies were in fact not SLT therapies, and while there was an 
increase in responses citing negative research evidence (17.5% vs. average 4.1%), 
training (37.0%) and knowledge-based (31.4%) reasons dominated. Scientific 
reasons themselves accounted for only one-fifth (19.8%) of all responses for 
pseudoscientific therapies.  
 
3.4.2.2 Reasons for not selecting therapies by experiential demographics 
For disability (n=3242 responses), there was an increasing trend to use lack of 
training with accumulated experience, a decreasing trend to use lack of knowledge, 
and a relatively unchanging use lack of suitability (Figure 3.15). The trends for 
dysphagia (n=2396 responses) are similar (Figure 3.16) except for middle group who 
show a dip in use of training and a small increase in suitability. 
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Figure 3.15 Use of the main reasons for not selecting disability therapies by 
experience 
 
 Figure 3.16 Use of the main reasons for not selecting dysphagia therapies by 
experience 
 
For other experiential demographics the patterns remained the same. For example, 
while disability and dysphagia basic and senior SLTs showed a balance in use of lack 
of suitability, senior SLTs were slightly more likely to reference lack of training and 
basic SLTs to reference lack of knowledge. The two main knowledge-based reasons 
were used interchangeably between groups. Least experienced respondents tended to 
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3.4.2.3 Therapies of significance for non-use reasons by experiential demographics 
For the three main reasons, a range of therapies were significant (Appendix 21). 
Trends observed previously tended to be maintained and most experiential 
demographics produced significant differences in reasoning. Years of experience 
(17.3% disability therapies, 8.9% dysphagia), skill (9.6% disability, 11.1% 
dysphagia), specialised experience (15.5% dysphagia), grade (9.6% disability) and 
years since highest qualification (11.5% disability) demonstrated most differences. 
Those with most experience in disability tended to cite lack of training more. Those 
with most experience in dysphagia cited lack of knowledge more. Individual therapies 
however, can reflect considered responding. Dysphagia experts cited lack of training 
most for Masako and tube feeding. For Irish sign language, expert SLTs were more 
likely to cite suitability than training (21.4%) in contrast to other groups (emergent 
SLTs 65.4%, experienced SLTs 55.5%). The shortest-qualified were most likely to cite 
training for never-using communication passports and conductive education. Overall 
there was a suggestion that lesser-used therapies yielded more significant differences 
in reasoning than popular therapies. 
For minor reasons, specialist SLTs were most likely to cite lack of research evidence 
(8.7% vs. average 2.5%). Disability experts (3.9% vs. average 0.5%) and those with 
research-masters qualifications (7% vs. average 4%) were most likely to cite ‘not 
scientific’. Diploma respondents were least likely to use a range of scientific reasons. 
For example, disability SLTs with diplomas were least likely to use ‘the argument 
against is sound’ (0%), ‘not scientific’ (0%) and lack of research evidence (1.7%). 
Dysphagia SLTs with diplomas were also least likely to use lack of research evidence 
(1.6% vs. average 5.1%) with increasing use shown with further qualifications.  
 
3.4.2.4 Reasons for not selecting therapies by work-context demographics 
There were minimal differences for work-setting in disability but in dysphagia, 
voluntary respondents were most likely to cite suitability and least likely to cite 
knowledge than other groups - this group is represented by more respondents with 
most experience. For disability, community-paediatric clinicians were more likely to 
cite training than their intellectual-disability counterparts (52%: 39.5%), tending to 
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be composed of more basic SLTs (50:50) than their colleagues in intellectual 
disability (34:66).  For dysphagia, adult-acquired clinicians were more likely to cite 
training (42.3%) and intellectual-disability clinicians more likely to cite suitability 
(56.2%) although both groups have more senior than basic SLTs (2:1).  In disability, 
paediatric clinicians were more likely to cite training (42.5%: 33%) and less likely to 
cite suitability (20.8%:35.7%) than their adult colleagues. The reverse is true for 
dysphagia. Adult-clinicians tend to dominantly work in adult-acquired settings (74%) 
and intellectual-disability clinicians in paediatric settings (p<0.0001). 
 
3.4.2.5 Therapies of significance for not selecting reasons by work-context demographics 
A number of therapies are significant for work-context demographics (Appendix 22) 
with population and population-age evidencing the largest number of significant 
items. In disability, 27% of therapies were significant for population age, less so in 
dysphagia. In dysphagia, 13.3% of therapies were significant for population, less so in 
disability. Neuromuscular therapies comprised 40% of significant therapies for the 
population demographic and 66.7% for work-setting.  
 
3.4.3. Summary 
Being not suitable and not trained dominated reasoning suggesting a limited 
repertoire of reasons upon which to argue against using therapies. There are clear 
indications that accumulated experience resulted in more reasoning around training 
and less knowledge-based reasoning which were used more by less-experienced 
clinicians. Experience may result in slightly more use of scientific reasons although 
scientific reasons do not rate highly in reasoning provided by respondents. The 
variables of population and population age tend to differentiate reasoning most. 
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3.5 ATTITUDES UNDERLYING THERAPY CHOICES  
In order to investigate general attitudes, respondents were asked to rate agreement 
with statements that reflected a range of potential decision-making supports. 
Approximately 91% of respondents replied to this section (average n=247), varying 
slightly for each statement.  
 
3.5.1. Statement agreement 
3.5.1.1 Statements with highest and lowest agreement 
Table 3.8 outlines statement agreement for the whole sample and respective groups.  
 
Table 3.8 Percentage statement agreement from highest to lowest  
 
by Speech & LangnStatements Whole 
sample % 
Neither 
disability 
nor 
dysphagia 
% 
Dysphagia 
% 
Disability 
% 
The individual nature of each client influences my 
choice of therapy or technique 
96 95 95 98 
Clinicians should provide rationales for the therapies & 
techniques they use 
95 95 95 95 
It is important that I am able to argue and defend my 
choice of therapies & techniques 
95 95 95 95 
I make efforts to keep up to date with developments in 
clinical practice 
94 93 95 96 
Specialist / expert clinicians are valuable sources of 
information when considering therapies & techniques 
93 92 94 92 
My decision to use a therapy or technique is 
influenced by my clinical experience 
92 89 92 92 
A therapy or technique should have clear goals that 
can be tested 
91 91 89 89 
I like exploring new treatment options 90 91 87 88 
I use the therapies & techniques I do because they 
work 
90 93 89 89 
I prefer therapies & techniques which are person-
centred 
89 88 90 92 
It is important that the therapies & techniques I use 
have a sound theoretical basis 
87 84 89 91 
Understanding why a treatment works is as important 
as understanding whether it works 
87 81 91 89 
I use therapies & techniques I learned from 
watching/working with other clinicians  
85 86 87 82 
I focus on the patient’s specific deficits and choose 
therapies & techniques based on this 
79 80 82 70 
A patient’s preferences and values influence my choice 
of therapies & techniques 
77 68 77 85 
I am confident about the therapies & techniques I use 76 75 78 82 
Deconstructing clinical practice and searching for scientific foundations 
 
 
 
151 
 
 
nStatements Whole 
sample % 
Neither 
disability 
nor 
dysphagia 
% 
Dysphagia 
% 
Disability 
% 
I use therapies which I learned from doing specific 
training to learn that particular therapy or technique 
76 77 78 72 
The therapies & techniques I use are the standard of 
care in speech & language therapy 
73 65 78 70 
Once a treatment has research attached to it, I am 
more likely to believe it to be effective 
72 69 74 69 
I like therapies & techniques that can be used with a 
variety of fun games and activities 
69 86 45 86 
I read research regularly to keep updated on therapies 
& techniques 
68 61 73 72 
I prefer to use therapies & techniques which are more 
concrete than abstract for my patient’s sake 
66 62 70 69 
I place a high value on the opinions of colleagues when 
deciding whether to use or stop using a therapy or 
technique 
65 65 64 63 
The therapies & techniques I use are the standard of 
care in my workplace 
65 72 75 55 
The easier a therapy or technique is to understand the 
more likely I am to use it 
60 59 55 55 
Science should be used to decide whether therapies & 
techniques work 
58 59 57 57 
I use therapies & techniques that are easy to 
implement 
56 57 58 52 
Speech & language therapists can waste time by the 
use of un-validated or non-scientific treatments 
55 49 56 59 
The patient must take responsibility for ensuring 
treatment success 
53 74 41 42 
I prefer to use hands-on therapies & techniques 52 56 50 46 
Family preference influences my therapy & technique 
choices 
49 42 44 59 
I rely on clinical experts/specialists to help me make 
decisions about therapies & techniques 
49 51 46 47 
Clinical experience is the best guide to deciding what 
therapy or technique to use 
48 46 51 46 
Speech & language therapists can do harm by the use 
of un-validated or non-scientific treatments 
47 31 58 52 
I don’t have enough time at work to spend reading and 
thinking about developing my treatment repertoire 
and therefore implement new therapies & techniques 
45 50 43 40 
It is difficult to convert research into clinical practice 42 38 42 44 
I am limited in the therapies & techniques I use by 
what is available to me 
39 29 52 34 
I rely on speech & language therapy textbooks to 
inform my use of therapies & techniques 
39 41 39 33 
The placebo effect (any treatment once they are 
receiving treatment) is a factor in outcomes in speech 
& language therapy intervention 
35 33 38 33 
I tend to use a lot of therapies & techniques I learned 
in college 
32 35 33 26 
What the patient brings to therapy is more important 
than the therapy or technique 
31 33 31 31 
Speech & language therapy department policy 
determines my choice of treatments 
27 28 27 21 
I believe in my therapy & technique choices even if 
there is no research evidence to support them 
24 31 24 18 
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Statements Whole 
sample % 
Neither 
disability 
nor 
dysphagia 
% 
Dysphagia 
% 
Disability 
% 
Once purchased, or learned I will use a therapy or 
technique to ensure good value 
24 27 22 22 
I tend to have a repertoire of favourite treatments 
which I use with most clients irrespective 
19 18 20 17 
I use therapies & techniques that I have read in the 
print media 
18 15 22 19 
The patient therapist relationship is what is important 
in treatment, not the therapy or technique used 
16 10 14 25 
I continue to use older textbooks to guide my use of 
therapies & techniques 
15 18 13 14 
I use the therapies & techniques I do because there 
are no other options available 
 
13 5 25 6 
I use alternative or complimentary practices in my 
work 
9 16 6 7 
If a therapy or technique is in use by the profession for 
a long time then it must be good 
8 3 11 7 
I rely more on commercial products than research in 
making treatment choices 
5 6 2 5 
Any treatment or technique will work if the therapist 
believes in it 
4 3 3 6 
I don’t tend to adopt new therapies or techniques in 
clinical practice 
4 4 5 4 
Research evidence does not influence the therapies & 
techniques I use in clinical practice 
3 13 7 3 
I use therapies & techniques that I have seen/heard on 
the radio or TV 
2 1 4 4 
 
 
A large number of statements achieved high-agreement, 54% garnering agreement by 
at least half the respondents. The highest-agreed statements centred on patient 
issues, clinical experience, active practice and scientific constructs. Statements with 
low-agreement reject less-scientific and non-scientific scaffolds in addition to passive 
practice.  
 
3.5.1.2 Statements about patients 
The top-rated statement was related to the influence of the individual nature of the 
patient. Person-centeredness also rated in the top ten. Specific deficits and patient-
preferences ranked 14th and 15th respectively.  Thus, respondents highly agreed that 
patient factors were important in decision making and disagreement across 
experience groupings was uniformly low (Figure 3.17) with a trend toward more 
disagreement with more years working. This implies that more experienced decision-
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making may be slightly less scaffolded on patient factors. Furthermore, clinical 
patient data supersedes client preferences when making treatment choices. 
Figure 3.17 Disagreement with patient statements by years of experience 
 
A number of statements can be seen to differentiate the groups (Appendix 23). The 
trend is similar to that of the overall picture with the least experienced more likely to 
agree with the impact of patient variables and the more experienced least likely to 
agree. For example, SLTs in their early-years agreed more regarding specific deficits 
(p=0.028) and patient responsibility (p<0.001), as did basic SLTs (p=0.036). SLTs in 
their middle years agreed most that what the patient brings to therapy is important 
(p=0.033), and both agreed and disagreed on the influence of the family (p=0.048). 
Adult-acquired (p<0.0001) and hospital-rehabilitation respondents (p=0.007) agreed 
most regarding the influence of specific patient deficits, and disability SLTS agreed 
most regarding the influence of patient preferences (p=0.038) 
 
3.5.1.3 Statements about science 
Scientific statements rated highly with three ranking in the top ten (argue and defend 
choices, provision of rationales and having clear goals). While nearly three-quarters 
of respondents agreed on the value of research in informing practice decisions, nearly 
half concurred on the difficulty of converting research into practice. Respondents 
were least likely to agree that science should decide the direction of treatment, 
although this still rated a relatively high agreement rate (58%). On the whole 
respondents appeared to value scientific influences with one-quarter of all 
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respondents strongly agreeing with these statements. The agreement rate showed 
little variation for years’ experience.  
The pattern remained the same for grade, regional and work-settings. There tended 
to be a sequential rise in agreement, perhaps most influenced by the research 
statement. For example, diploma respondents agreed with this statement to the tune 
of 80.4%. This rose sequentially to 100% for PhD respondents. Voice and physical 
disability respondents agreed most (average 94%) with this statement, while those 
working with in child mental health, fluency and acute-paediatrics agreed least 
(average 75%). 
For individual statements, only one statement - ‘read research regularly’ - was 
significantly different between groups with those with more experience tending to 
agree more. This was represented particularly by SLTs in their later years (p=0.003), 
managers (p=0.013), expert SLTs (p=0.013), later-years disability SLTs (p=0.048), 
most-dedicated time in disability (p=0.012) and those with more than a professional 
qualification (p=0.012). Disability (p<0.0001), voluntary (p=0.014) and adult 
(p=0.017) respondents also agreed most.  SLTs in their middle years, senior SLTs, 
dysphagia SLTs with medium-dedicated time (p=0.002) and community-paediatric 
SLTs agreed least.  
Respondents also tended to reject belief-based practices and less-scientific sources.  
As a group (n = 1239), the non-scientific statements (use alternative therapies, rely 
on commercial products, believe in even if no evidence, don’t use research, use 
because they work) showed high disagreement (56%). Conversely, they also 
produced relatively high agreement (39.4%). Agreement was lowest for the original 
groupings of 20-24.11 years (15%), but highest for those in their middle years of 10-
14.11 years and 15-19.11 years (30%, 32.2%). Disagreement was highest for voice 
(80%), physical disability (70%) and PhD (73.3%) respondents, and least for child 
mental health (35%) and diploma (47%) respondents. This suggests less valuing of 
non-scientific factors with higher qualification and in specific areas of practice. 
Deconstructing clinical practice and searching for scientific foundations 
 
 
 
155 
 
 
A number of exemplar scientific and non-scientific statements were compared against 
choice of a pseudoscientific therapy (Facilitated communication), non-scientific 
therapy (Talktools) and conventional and highly favoured therapy (Hanen) in 
disability. For dysphagia, a favoured therapy (thickening liquids), swallow therapy 
(Masako) and neuromuscular therapy (thermal-tactile stimulation) were compared 
against the research statement using Pearson’s chi square test of significance. 
Agreements rates between and within these therapies do not appear to be effected by 
therapy choices (Appendix 24) although Facilitated communication was just below 
significance (p=0.051) for the statement ‘I use conventional and alternative therapies 
in work’.  
 
3.5.1.4 Statements about clinical experience 
Statements regarding clinical experience ranked thrice in the top ten. Additionally in 
ninth place was what can be deemed an experiential statement: ‘I use the treatments I 
do because they work’. A further experiential statement, ‘watching working with other 
clinicians’ ranked 13th. In contrast, less than half of respondents relied on experts. 
Basic SLTs were also most likely to agree with experience statements (77.6%) and 
specialists least likely (66%). This changes when the single statement relating to their 
own experience is analysed with specialists agreeing highly (100%). These patterns 
are replicated for clinical skill. There was a high starting point for the valuing of 
clinical experience overall.  
Furthermore, three-quarters of the overall sample stated that they were confident in 
their therapeutic choices.  Independent sample t-tests indicated that those who were 
most confident are managers (p=0.038), the experienced and expert SLTs (p=0.036), 
later-years disability clinicians (p=0.025), and SLTs with the most dedicated time in 
disability (p=0.002).  Confidence ratings were not affected by the choice of therapy. 
For example, 75% of respondents who used the pseudoscientific therapies of 
Facilitated communication and Listening therapy agreed that they are confident. This 
compared to 80.2% of those who don’t use these therapies. High confidence ratings 
do not apparently translate to beliefs, with only 24% of respondents believing in their 
selections if not supported by research. 
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There is an increasing reliance on autonomy with experience. While SLTs in their 
early-years agreed most that clinical experience is the best guide (p=0.003), senior 
SLTs were most likely to agree that they use the therapies they do because they work 
(p=0.048) and SLTs in their middle years disagreed most with placing a high value on 
colleague opinion (p=0.001). Furthermore, later-years (p=0.019) and longest-
qualified SLTs (p=0.014) were most influenced by their own experience. No work-
context demographics were significant. 
 
3.5.1.5 Statements about active and passive practice  
Respondents ranked keeping up to date and exploring new options in the top ten 
reasons. When combined, these can be said to represent the construct of active 
practice (excluding research engagement). Additionally, only 19% of respondents 
agreed that they had a repertoire of favourite treatments.  
Over half (53.5%) of the 15 lowest-agreement statements represented passive 
practice with respondents rejecting long-time practices and older influences in 
particular. SLTs in their early years agreed most with these statements such as not 
having enough time (p=0.003) and difficulties converting research (p=0.001). Those 
with more than a professional qualification disagreed most. The adult-acquired group 
were most affected by availability (p=0.007). For the statement regarding time, those 
with most experience were most likely to disagree (p=0.022), there being an 
increasing trend towards more active practice with years of experience. This suggests 
time may be a factor in active practice rather than years of experience. Specialist SLTs 
(65%), expert SLTs (93.8%) and managers (83.3%) were also most likely to disagree 
with passive statements.  
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Figure 3.18 Percentage agreements with selected active statements by years of 
experience 
 
 
 3.5.1.6 Statements about sources of information 
Respondents were mostly influenced by profession-specific sources and rated 
colleagues and specific training highest in this category. While department policy did 
not determine practice (27% agreement), respondents reported that the 
interventions they use are the standard of care in their workplace (65%) and 
profession (73%). Only 3% agreed that research did not influence their decisions. 
Respondents disagreed that non-professional sources (TV/radio, print-media, 
commercial products and CAMs) influenced them. They also rejected more than 
accepted older sources of information (old textbooks and old practices). There were 
no differences between those choosing and not choosing preferred therapies for 
exemplar profession-specific statements. 
Demographics did not differentiate respondents on the four core statements 
representing less-scientific sources. The exception was for reliance on commercial 
products with those with more than a professional qualification and adult-acquired 
clinicians disagreeing most that they relied on them. There were obvious differences 
for profession-specific sources. For example, those with only a professional 
qualification were more likely to be influenced by watching-working with other 
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clinicians (p=0.005). Early-years (p=0.005) and basic SLTs (p=0.004) agreed that they 
are most influenced by college learning. SLTs in their middle years were most likely to 
both agree and disagree (p=0.011) that they relied on experts. They also most 
disagreed they relied on college learning (p=0.005). The group with more than a 
professional qualification were also significant across a number of statements. For 
example, they most disagreed with college learning (p=0.030), textbooks (p=0.048), 
commercial products and that research does not influence them (p=0.006).  
 
3.5.1.7 Therapy-specific statements 
Over half of respondents agreed that ease of use is important when using a therapy 
and preferred therapies which are hands-on, dysphagia clinicians being more inclined 
to use these types of reasons. Over two-thirds of clinicians preferred therapies that 
can be used through a variety of fun games and activities and concrete therapies.  A 
high proportion also opted for person-centeredness in a therapy. 
Those with only a professional qualification were more likely to agree that they like 
easy to understand (p<0.0001) and easy to implement (p=0.002) therapies which can 
be used with a variety of activities (p=0.036). A variety of demographics representing 
paediatric, voluntary and disability respondents also most agreed with this last 
statement. Those with more experience and working in adult-acquired settings 
disagreed most with therapy-specific features influencing choices. 
 
3.5.1.8 Extra-therapeutic statements 
The influences of extra-therapeutic factors were rejected, including the therapeutic-
alliance and a clinician’s belief in a treatment effecting outcome. Most clinicians were 
neutral for example, about the patient-therapist relationship. Equal numbers agreed 
and disagreed regarding the placebo effect, (35% and 30.9%). Neither did agreement 
with these statements appear to be impacted by years’ experience (Figure 3.19) 
although minor variations are observed in the middle years.  
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Figure 3.19 Extra-therapeutic statement agreement by years of experience 
 
Paediatric clinicians disagreed most with the placebo effect (p=0.009) as did 
dysphagia SLTs with medium-dedicated time (p=0.004). Paediatric (p=0.008) and 
disability (p=0.048) respondents also disagreed most with the therapeutic alliance.  
SLTs in their early years agreed least that what the patient brings to therapy 
(p=0.033) impacts outcome, those in their middle years agreed most. SLTs with more 
than a professional qualification also disagreed (p=0.026) with this as they did about 
belief in therapy choices without supporting evidence (p<0.001), to which the longest 
qualified agreed most (p=0.048). Community-paediatric clinicians most agreed that 
any therapy will work if the therapist believes in it (p=0.038) while disability 
respondents agreed least (p=0.002). 
 
3.5.1.9 Statements about practical issues 
Respondents were not overly influenced by resource or practical issues. Equal 
numbers agreed and disagreed that they were limited by availability and slightly 
more than not suggested they have insufficient time to develop their treatment 
repertoire. More disagreed than not that once purchased they will use a therapy. 
Practicality is most reflected when more respondents than not agreed that it was 
difficult to convert research into practice despite reporting that it influenced their 
decision to use a treatment, being more likely to believe in an empirically validated 
therapy and reading research regularly. The demographics indicate that those with 
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less experience and those in adult-acquired and community-paediatric settings were 
most constrained by practical issues (Appendix 25). Those with least experience and 
represented by a variety of demographics (e.g. basic SLTs p<0.0001) were most 
constrained by time. Adult (p=0.012), adult-acquired (p=0.019) and dysphagia 
clinicians in their early years (p=0.034) agreed most that they are limited by 
availability. Community-paediatric (p=0.004) and community (p=0.012) respondents 
used a therapy once purchased more than other groups.  
 
3.5.1.10 Statements reflecting neutrality  
A number of statements achieved high neutrality. These represent a variety of 
constructs although three of these items relate to extra-therapeutic factors. Over a 
third of respondents were neutral about the harm-potential of therapies. The most-
experienced (p=0.042), adult-acquired (p<0.001) and hospital-rehabilitation SLTs 
(p=0.0001) in addition to those working medium-dedicated time in dysphagia 
(p<0.0001) agreed most with the potential for causing harm. Emergent SLTs 
(p=0.009), paediatric respondents (p=0.002) and those with more than a professional 
qualification (p=0.006) were most likely to disagree.  Disability SLTs in their middle 
years were more concerned with the potential to waste time (p=0.019) being the only 
demographic to agree with this statement. Those with more than professional 
qualification group again disagreed (p=0.016). 
  
3.5.1.11 Statements differentiating areas of practice 
Disability and dysphagia respondents are not necessarily separate samples, with 
16.5% (n=45) of the overall sample practicing in both disability and dysphagia. 
Despite this, they evidence a number of differences (of greater than 5%).  Dysphagia 
clinicians are far more likely to agree about the influence of specific-patient deficits 
(82% vs. 70%) and workplace effects such as standards of care in the workplace 
(75% vs. 55%) being limited by availability (52% vs. 34%) and lack of options (25% 
vs. 6%). Disability clinicians are far more likely to agree on fun activities (86% vs. 
45%), the patient-therapist relationship (25% vs. 14%), client preferences (85% vs. 
77%) and family influences (59% vs. 44%). When the three groups are compared 
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using the Pearson chi-squared test, the patterns hold (Appendix 26).  Patient 
statements tend to differentiate respondent groups, but scientific and clinical-
experience statements are obvious by their relative absence in signalling differences. 
 
3.5.1.12 Summary 
Some differences are evidenced based on years of experience. Patient influences may 
dominate more for less-experienced clinicians. However, the high agreement rates 
overall for patient statements concur with earlier data that patient issues are 
important in decision-making, and these are more stable for disability than dysphagia 
respondents throughout the years. Less-experienced SLTs also agreed most that 
clinical experience was the best guide and relied on the experience of colleagues and 
college learning. They also valued concreteness, reference workplace issues and have 
difficulties translating research more.  
The group in the middle years of their careers and represented by a variety of 
demographics, showed a move away from those sources more valued by their less-
experienced colleagues and a move towards self-reliance. Those respondents with 
most experience disagreed with many of those statements including patient-centred 
ones. Of all experience variables, qualification status is highly interesting with twenty-
one statements showing differences. This group are represented by high agreement 
with scientific statements 
Work-context issues are most differentiated on population and work setting. Regional 
influences do not impact, the only difference centred on having insufficient time to 
develop practice. Although not significant (p=0.074), the majority of West 
respondents (61.4%) are community-based which may help understand this finding 
as community respondents were most likely to agree with this. The community group 
appear impacted by practice constraints. For example, in line with their lack of time, 
community-paediatric clinicians were most likely to state that research doesn’t 
influence them and least likely to read research although they were also least likely to 
disagree that therapists’ beliefs effect outcome. They were also most likely to use a 
therapy once purchased and if easy to implement. They were most influenced by 
department policy and have least time to develop options.  
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Adult-acquired clinicians also demonstrated workplace issues. While they were most 
likely to disagree with reliance on commercial products, they were most likely to agree 
that once purchased they will use a therapy. It therefore follows that they use 
therapies because there are no other options available and are limited by availability. 
Availability also impacts adult clinicians who also agreed most with long-time use. 
Adult clinicians were conversely also more likely to read research regularly. Adult–
acquired respondents were also most influenced by the standard of care in the 
workplace and the harm potential of treatments as were the hospital-rehabilitation 
group. Adult–acquired respondents were most likely to have dysphagia caseloads 
(p<0.0001), a considerable 92%, followed by respondents in voluntary (39.3%) and 
community settings (12.8%), and this reflects the relative agreement with this 
statement.  
Voluntary and disability clinicians were least impacted by workplace issues. For 
example, voluntary respondents most disagreed regarding having insufficient time to 
develop practice, and disability respondents were less limited by availability, once 
purchased must use and easy to implement therapies. However, they also preferred 
fun activities, as did community respondents. The voluntary group were most likely 
to disagree that any treatment would work based on belief and long-time use, and 
agreed most regarding reading research along with their disability counterparts. 
Voluntary and disability respondents were most likely to believe in a range of patient 
statements such as patient-centeredness, the therapeutic alliance and patient 
preferences. Community and paediatric respondents agreed most regarding patient 
responsibility, whereas the hospital-rehabilitation group agreed most regarding the 
influence of specific-patient deficits as did their adult-acquired counterparts.  
Altogether, respondents suggest in principle an appreciation of scientific thinking in 
practice, as well as their own clinical experience, active practice and patient 
characteristics. The latter two concur with that evidenced in earlier data but there is 
also some dissonance evident. Valuing of research is demonstrated more by those 
with more experience, particularly in the later years and with higher qualifications. 
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There is also the emerging suggestion that there is a change in values of SLTs in their 
middle years, particularly regarding clinical experience. 
 
3.5.2. Factors underlying decision making  
3.5.2.1 Factor analysis 
Principal Axis Factoring was used to explore the 56 dimensions to uncover 
statements assumed to participate in common underlying factors. A 13 factor model 
(Table 3.10) was selected to represent the data. Each factor was composed of selected 
statements (Appendix 27).  
Table 3.9 13 dimension output for rotated-solution factor analysis 
Factor Factor label 
1 Uncomplicated practice 
2 Scientific practice 
3 Ethical-scientific practice 
4 Pragmatic practice 
5 External influences 
6 Clinician-client belief dyad 
7 Speech and language therapy culture 
8 Not so scientific sources 
9 Clinical experience 
10 Research belief 
11 College learning 
12 Patient as person 
13 Specific training 
 
3.5.2.2 Extracted factors and demographics 
Exploration of levels of agreement with extracted factors was undertaken using one-
way between-groups analysis of variance or independent-samples t-test depending 
on the number of conditions in each analysis. Significant findings for demographics 
are highlighted (Appendix 28).  
Those with more than a professional qualification are evident in their rejection of 
many statements in Factor 1 (Uncomplicated practice) compared to those with a 
professional qualification only (t(246) = -5.0, p= .000). Community-paediatric 
respondents valued the influences of research least (F (2,197) = 13.5, p =.000). 
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Agreement by this group with other statements in Factor 1 suggests this may be 
practically constrained. Those with more experience represented by a number of 
demographics evidenced more valuing of research and research is the only statement 
in Factor 2 (Scientific practice) which showed a difference between groups. The 
overriding suggestion is that less experience is correlated with less-complex practice 
and this may also be associated with community settings. This lack of complexity is 
also seen in attitudes to the harm potential of therapies with emergent SLTs agreeing 
least with this (F (2,244) = 7.8, p =.001) as seen in Factor 3 (Ethical-scientific 
practice). Factor 4 (Pragmatic practice) indicates that those with more than a 
professional qualification were least likely to be constrained by such issues (t(246) = -
5.0, p= .000) whereas those working with adult populations (t(242) = -4.6, p= .000) 
with adult-acquired populations  (F (2,197) = 3.1, p =.045) were most likely to be thus 
constrained. Those with more than a professional qualification (t(246) = -5.0, p= .000) 
were also least amenable to external influences such as those represented by Factor 
5, while those with least experience again represented by various demographics such 
as years of experience (F (2,244) = 11.7, p =.000) were most likely. Disparity was seen 
in Factor 6 (Client-clinician belief dyad). Adult-acquired clinicians were less likely to 
believe in the therapeutic alliance, those with more than a professional qualification 
least likely to value what the patient brings, and paediatric clinicians least likely to 
agree with placebo effect. This variability suggests this factor may in fact represent a 
discordant construct although the results of individual statements concur with 
previous data on patient statements and both paediatric and adult clinicians (t(242) = 
-2.2, p= .029) and those differing in qualification status differ for this factor (t(245) =  
-3.0, p= .003). For Factor 9 (Clinical experience), senior SLTs were most likely to value 
therapies ‘because they work’ and differed from basic SLTS (F (2,224) = 3.3, p =.036).  
Factor 11 (College learning) indicates that those with less experience were most 
influenced by college and this cannot be seen as surprising. 
 
3.5.2.3 Extracted factors and respondent’s choices of therapies 
Using the same statistical tests as previously and respondent’s choice of therapies, a 
limited number of therapies were found to be significant for the extracted factors 
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(Appendix 29). These tended to be the preferred disability and dysphagia therapies in 
addition to some oral-motor therapies in disability and more complex therapies in 
dysphagia. Communication boards/books (Factors 1: F (2,99) = 7.3, p =.001, Factor 2: 
F (2,99) = 4.5, p =.014, Factor 12: F (2,99) = 3.5, p =.035, and Factor 13: F (2,100) = 
3.7, p =.028) and the bolus-modification therapies of thickening liquids (Factors 2: F 
(2, 99) = 3.463, p =.035,  Factor 3: F (2, 98) = 3.413, p =.037 and Factor 6: F (2, 99) = 
3.073, p =.050) and texture modification (Factors 2: t (-2.326) = 16.645, p= .033, 
Factor 4: t (-2.486) = 16.645, p= .015 and Factor 6: t (2.209) = 100, p= .029) are the 
only therapies to differentiate across a number of factors.  Respondents using these 
items appeared to consider themselves to be more scientific and for bolus-
modification techniques, more ethically scientific. Interestingly, texture modification 
which is differentiated by the pragmatic Factor 4 may thus be a pragmatic choice. 
Choice of communication boards (F (2,99) = 7.3, p =.001) and articulation therapy (F 
(2,96) = 7.1, p =.001)  is differentiated by Factor 1 (Uncomplicated practice). Use of 
articulation is clearly correlated with reliance of commercial products, fun activities 
and less time to develop practice. Those working least time in the area of disability 
were more likely to always-use articulation (52.6%) and are more likely to work in 
community settings (p<0.001). However, those working mid-time were also more 
likely to work in community settings.  Respondents using the favoured double 
swallow techniques were significantly influenced not by textbooks but by expertise  
for Factor 5 (F (2, 99) = 5.827, p =.018). Factor 9 (Clinical experience) differentiated 
Hanen users and non-users (F (2,98) = 5.3, p =.006) although it is not clear which 
direction this takes. Those using the non-scientific therapies of oral-motor therapy (F 
(2, 100) = 6.1, p =.003) and Talktools (F (2, 99) = 4.7, p =.012) were more likely to 
value non-scientific sources (Factor 8). Communication boards/ books (F (2,99) = 3.5, 
p =.035) were differentiated for Factor 12 (Patient as person) and while the direction 
is unclear, it may be that those using this therapy are more functionally inclined and 
therefore more likely to value person-centeredness. Finally a number of therapies 
(Lamh: F (2,100) = 5.0, p =.008, PECS: F (2,99) = 3.2, p =.045, communication 
boards/books: F (2,100) = 3.7, p =.028, VFSSB: F (2, 96) = 3.064, p =.032  , tube 
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feeding: F (2, 96) = .232, p =.042) were significant for Factor 13 (Specific training) 
although all except one of these does not have a programme of training attached. 
 
3.5.2.4 Extracted factors summary 
Extracted factors produce further understandings and can be said to enhance our 
knowledge of decision-making. There is an indication that use of favourite therapies 
may be linked to perceptions of scientific, ethical, pragmatic and uncomplicated 
practice. Use of some non-scientific options is clearly linked to non-scientific 
influences. Furthermore training still dominates as a factor, perhaps for more 
apparently complex interventions but certainly not for ones requiring certified 
training. Less-experienced practice may be less complex and more experienced 
practice may be more complex. Reading research is the only statement to differentiate 
among respondent groups in the scientific factor, suggesting clinicians still equate 
science with research. 
 
3.5.3. Summary 
Analysis of statements indicates a number of clear things. The first is a clear 
dissonance between aspiration or believed values and practice as represented by data 
from various elements of the survey. The influences on treatment choices appear 
restricted to a few constructs. Science does not feature predominately although those 
with more experience including higher qualification and those using favoured 
therapies clearly define themselves as more scientific. Dysphagia clinicians appear 
more practically oriented. Disability clinicians may not change their patient values as 
they accrue experience in contrast to other groups who may become less patient 
oriented. Specific training is influential but perhaps only for complex and skill-specific 
therapies.  
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3.6 CHAPTER SUMMARY 
Clinical practice is defined somewhat narrowly by clinicians. This is represented in 
terms of the relatively limited range of preferred interventions used, and the limited 
reasoning regarding treatment choices. These centrally relate to clinician 
(autonomous clinical experience) and client (patient-deficits) pivots and include 
knowledge-based reasoning specifically when choosing not to use therapies. There 
also appears to be a disconnect between what is practiced and what is preached. 
Clinicians claim to value science, but scientific reasons including research evidence 
are not explicated when reasoning is specifically targeted. Changes in reasoning with 
experience are suggested: SLTs in their early-years appear focused on developing 
skills and are highly pivoted on colleagues’ experience; those in their middle years are 
stabilising those skills and becoming highly autonomous therapists, and; clinicians in 
their later-years are more responsive to external effects and influences specifically 
research. 
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Chapter 4: Discussion of survey 
findings 
 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
Findings from the survey must be viewed in the context of the demographics that 
provided the data. The vast majority of the sample responded via the practice-
educator database. Given their contribution to student education, it is probable that 
they represent a group which are interested in practice issues. Additionally, the 
relatively young sample, even if representative of the broader profession, may have 
implications for understanding more experienced decision making. Disability findings 
may also be affected by the dominance of intellectual-disability clinicians in the 
sample. However, the data may also have told the same story whatever the 
constitution of the respondent group. The findings will be considered under a number 
of synthesised discussion points. 
 
 
4.2 NARROW RATHER THAN BROAD 
 
The findings suggest that clinical practice is relatively constrained, the implication 
being that it may be less complex than typically constructed.  Alternatively, 
simplification may result from a need to effectively manage a complex activity. The 
contraction of practice as implied by this data is discussed below. 
 
4.2.1. Limited therapies 
For both dysphagia and disability, there are a relatively small number of highly-used 
and preferred therapies. If one assumes the survey options were representative of a 
broad range of possibilities, then this implies that clinical practice is more confined 
than might have been anticipated. However, it also reflects findings from other 
studies (e.g. Joffe & Pring, 2008). The group of core therapies is augmented by further 
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therapies which are less frequently exploited. Furthermore, dysphagia practice is 
more restricted than disability. Indeed, analysis was often restricted by the high and 
low numbers using certain techniques, thus contributing to the perception of reduced 
options. As a result of the limited number of potentially useful interventions, there are 
large numbers un-used and under-used therapies. This includes literature-based 
therapies and reflects on the poor influence of research on practice, agreeing with 
previous studies such as Turner and Whitfield (1999) who found the use of journal 
literature virtually absent as a basis for selecting techniques in physiotherapy.  
Practice may therefore be reduced to a couple of clusters of related but mostly 
individually-utilised techniques.  
 
Additionally, most therapies did not demonstrate a difference in frequency of use 
with increasing years of experience. This promotes a picture of a culture of 
interventions, perhaps supporting Kahmi’s (2004) argument regarding the cultural 
transmission of interventions. Clear individual favourites and favoured categories 
were observed, and it appears that the combination of favourite therapies meets the 
majority of the intervention needs. Disability SLTs for example, can target language, 
interaction and AAC if using the core options. Technologically-based items fare badly 
in both areas of practice, a finding corroborated by Behrman’s (2005) study of voice 
therapists. This can be seen as worrying in a 21st century profession, especially as 
ratings for such interventions correlate with those of pseudoscientific therapies. 
Disability practice on the whole can be defined as an AAC endeavour, and dysphagia 
as a bolus modification endeavour. 
 
4.2.2. Limited reasons 
While it is unlikely that there is a single rationale to explain why intervention choices 
are made, the dominance of a few core reasons for therapy choices is compelling. 
Therapy selection is effectively scaffolded upon client suitability and clinical 
experience. The dominance of practical evidence as a decision scaffold is not a unique 
finding and mirrors both discipline-specific (e.g. Mackenzie et al., 2010) and allied 
discipline (e.g. Papadopoulos et al., 2012) evidence.  However, it confirms the notion 
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that clinicians are persuaded by practical evidence in making treatment decisions. 
Client characteristics explain decision making similar to that seen in Joffe and Pring’s 
(2008) study, and client suitability is also dominant in deciding not to use a 
treatment. This indicates that it fundamentally supports clinical decisions. 
Knowledge-based reasons including training also explain lack of use, accounting for a 
dominant 57% of all reasons not to use a treatment. Knowledge was referenced by 
disability clinicians more than dysphagia clinicians, a finding which can be explained 
by the mandatory training required for dysphagia practice. It may also explain the 
higher use of suitability by dysphagia respondents for not selecting therapies. This 
would suggest that once knowledge is obtained, suitability as a reason becomes more 
central. Thus practical knowledge and client characteristics are at the forefront in 
both treatment selection and non-selection. Therefore, the immediate clinical context 
– the client and the clinician – supports decision making almost to the exclusion of 
other factors, accounting for nearly 90% of all therapies in disability and over 70% in 
dysphagia. Clinicans on the whole reject other pivots such as practical, scientific and 
personal reasons. 
  
Clinical experience is not differentiated between the groups indicating it is a nuclear 
decision scaffold. Furthermore, the two main reasons are not dramatically affected by 
the nature of individual therapies or groups of therapies. This picture is further 
enhanced by the use of these core reasons for pseudoscientific and less-scientific 
practices as well as conventional therapies. Lack of training is also over-used to 
explain therapy non-use where training is not required and appears as an important 
pivot in other studies (e.g. Turner & Whitfield, 1999). Therefore, it can be reliably 
stated that case evidence, practical evidence and specific knowledge override 
practically all other potential reasons, and that both clinical experience and client 
suitability largely interact to scaffold therapy choices. 
 
4.2.3. Limited definition of practice 
A picture of a highly harmonised group is emerging and further enhanced by 
explication of attitudes. Patient issues, clinical experience, active practice and 
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scientific concepts all produce highest agreement among the sample, with the former 
two concurring with reasons for use. Furthermore, SLTs appear to have a narrowly 
defined interpretation of intervention. Respondents do not value the importance of 
therapy-specific factors. They reject or are neutral about the influences of extra-
therapeutic variables such as the therapeutic-alliance and the placebo effect. The lack 
of appreciation of extra-therapeutic factors is in conflict with research in the 
psychological literature which indicates a bearing on treatment outcome (Hubble et 
al., 1999). Moreover, there is little difference between demographics with respect to 
these factors. Combined with previous observations, this leads one to the conclusion 
that clinicians see their own individual skills as THE central factor in decision making, 
and hold extra-therapeutic, therapy-specific and patient influences (rather than 
patient pathologies) in less regard than internal clinician factors. 
 
4.2.4. Non-transferability 
There are also indications of clear boundaries, with a lack of transferability of 
therapies between populations served and disciplines. SLTs see a clear differentiation 
between therapies which are profession-based, and those which are either broad-
based or not originating within the profession. This implies discipline-specific 
preferences and non-arbitrary borders. An exemplar is manual sign systems. Three-
quarters of disability respondents use the adapted signing system Lamh, but less than 
two per cent use its parent, Irish Sign Language. This division is also seen in 
behaviourally-based therapies. Nearly one-half of clinicians use PECS which has a 
clear communication function, as opposed to less than seven per cent who use applied 
behavioural analysis. This unsurprisingly extends not only to alternative treatments 
such as homeopathy, but also to therapies originating in the allied health disciplines, 
such as conductive education, Bobath and reminiscence therapy.  Additionally, within 
categories of therapy there are clearly defined useable items. In dysphagia, the 
neuromuscular technique to rate highest is ROM-tongue and this differentiates itself 
from other neuromuscular techniques as it is both SLT-specific and task-specific. The 
suggestion is that such divisions are not random.  
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Categories of therapies provoke further suggestions of confined practice, in this case 
across client groups. In disability for example, less-specialised clinicians favour 
speech therapies, more-specialised clinicians favour AAC approaches, as do clinicians 
working in voluntary organisations and with individuals with intellectual disabilities. 
Differences in usage can be glaring. For communication passports for example, two in 
three intellectual-disability respondents use it compared to one in twenty community 
clinicians. The manual therapies Lamh and ISL are the only AAC item to be chosen by 
significantly more of the community group.  Thus, therapies can be classed according 
to populations. AAC can be categorised as a disability intervention, specifically an 
adult-disability intervention. Speech and language therapies are mostly community 
based. Disability clinicians use the neuromuscular therapies of oral-motor therapy 
and tactile-sensory stimulation most. Swallow therapies are specific to adult-acquired 
disorders. Differences in use are again large. The shaker exercise for example, is used 
by one in twenty intellectual-disability SLTs compared to one in two adult-acquired 
clinicians.  Differences in use therefore, appear pivoted upon the populations served 
and the work settings inhabited with large numbers of therapies significantly 
differentiated by work setting and population. There is very little overspill from one 
population to another with the exception of some dominant therapies. The picture 
emerging is of highly-defined practice, being primarily demarcated by population 
features. 
 
   4.2.5. Potential attributions for uncovered limitations  
The explanation for such apparent limitations may not be as simple as the limitations 
themselves. A few conjectures are offered for consideration.  
 
4.2.5.1 The culture 
Many of the dominant therapies can be classed as traditional speech and language 
therapies, uninfluenced by interventions originating outside the discipline or client-
group. Such a restricted range of highly-used and valued therapies is bound to 
influence the practice of the group, especially less-experienced members of the group. 
This is particularly so when the data shows that less-experienced clinicians are most 
influenced by their colleagues, also indicated in other studies (e.g. Nail-Chiwetalu & 
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Bernstein-Ratner, 2007) and across disciplines (e.g. Gabbay & LeMay, 2004). This 
points to the weight of the group influence.  The cultural effect does not extend to 
regional variations although the size of the country in this study would militate 
against any such findings. Furthermore, there are clear suggestions that this limited 
repertoire is relatively uninfluenced by external factors such as research evidence, 
concurring with previous studies (e.g. Mullen, 2005), further enabling the dominance 
of internal workplace influences. Even internal constraints such as treatment 
availability are far less impactful than might be expected.  
 
Subcultures within the culture are also suggested. Adult and adult-acquired clinicians 
for example, were most limited by availability and lack of options, the suggestion 
being that SLTs working predominately with adult populations are most influenced 
by practical issues. This corresponds to data originating from studies of nurses 
working in acute settings (e.g. Parahoo, 2000). Associated with this is adult-acquired 
SLT’s preference for more concrete therapies, implying a highly pragmatic orientation 
in this subgroup, a type of cultural effect which might mean problems for clinicians 
inhabiting the same workplace but not of a similar attitude. Indeed, this lean toward 
practicality may influence the use of specific therapies. For example, those who use 
texture modification report themselves significantly more limited by availability and 
lack of options. This indicates some regularly used therapies may result from 
practical constraints within a workplace context. It also suggests that different groups 
may explain their reasoning in a similar way raising notions of groupthink. This 
suggestion of the influence of culture is undermined by lack of use of the reason ‘the 
department doesn’t use it’. However, two-thirds of respondents do feel that the 
interventions they use are the standard of care in their workplace  
 
Culture may also be represented in the approach to treatment, for example, client-
centeredness. Dysphagia SLTs for example, do not feel patient responsibility is as 
important as other respondents, and adult clinicians agree least with patient-centred 
statements but most with specific patient deficits, suggesting a tendency towards the 
consultative/expert model in this area of practice. Disability clinicians on the other 
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hand are most likely to be centrally concerned with patient values, show a higher 
preference for suitability as a reason than the general respondent pool, and feel 
themselves to be more client-centred. This suggests that disability respondents, as a 
group, are most influenced by client factors generally and may operate more social 
models of practice. This indicates that the area a clinician works in (or elects to work 
in) may be pivotal to the values they hold, suggesting a specific cultural-effect within 
workplaces. This in turn may have implications for how scientific practice or 
knowledge is valued in different work contexts. 
 
4.2.5.2 A training effect 
The acquisition of knowledge is a primary reason for not using therapies being 
similar to findings from other studies where health professionals reference training in 
decisions to use treatments (e.g. Bennett et al., 2003).  Regional differences indicate a 
training effect when selecting therapies. Over four-fifths of disability SLTs in the West 
use Derbyshire, being more likely to use this therapy than other regions. This group 
are also most likely to the less-used Floortime therapy. Given that the training for 
both these interventions is organised from that region, a training effect is clearly 
implicated. This is also seen in other regions. Disability respondents in the South opt 
for Lamh more significantly than other regions and this is where the headquarters for 
that training is based. So the use of specific therapies may be related to training 
opportunities available or provided locally. Therapies which are more generic and do 
not require specific training e.g. communication boards/books show no effect for 
region. There are fewer differences for training in dysphagia most likely due to the 
mandatory general training attached to this area of practice.  
 
Lack of training as an explanation tends to primarily explain non-use of technological 
and training-based programmes. However, this reason is over-used to explain choices 
where training is not required, that is, general SLT therapies such as AAC therapies 
and for pseudoscientific items where one might expect scientific reasons to be more 
in evidence. This indicates that training is highly important in decision making, with 
clinicians unlikely to use therapies for which they have not received training. It may 
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be that therapies which require specific or new skills or are considered more complex 
or less discipline specific are unlikely to be utilised without specific training. This 
indicates that training is constructed as a broader concept than attending a course, 
and may also reference on the job training. It also infers that clinicians value 
knowledge acquisition and practical experience with a therapy prior to using it, 
training perhaps acting as a base point from which to make judgements about a 
therapy. Furthermore, Dublin-region respondents show a more dominant use of this 
reason than their rural counterparts perhaps reflecting more reliance on training 
where perhaps there are more training opportunities. It may be that such a focus on 
training results in passivity or deferment.    
 
Neither does the reference to training dissipate with experience. Respondents 
working in disability in the later years of their career are more likely to cite lack of 
training. Additionally, despite their general training, dysphagia experts also cite it 
most for individual therapies. There is a stepped use of this reason from dysphagia-
novice to expert which may reflect periods of stabilising of skills before new training 
is required. The suggestion is, that the further away from original training a clinician 
moves, the more training is a decision-maker. Additionally, it emphasises the on-
going importance to clinicians of knowledge acquisition. Training is also highest in 
disability for those spending very least time in this area of practice (<20%). This is 
logical as spending less time implies less skill development. Training appears to be a 
dominant force even with high levels of accumulated experience.     
  
4.2.5.3 A compensatory approach 
The overall suggestion is one of a functional orientation reflecting previous work (e.g. 
Papadopoulos et al., 2012) across disciplines. Both areas of practice tend to reflect 
compensatory rather than rehabilitation approaches to patient management. In 
disability, this is predominantly represented by AAC. Hanen and Derbyshire, the other 
favoured therapies reflect language and interaction-oriented approaches, but may 
together with the AAC therapies, represent a lean towards environmental methods in 
disability. Speech-based items which are the next dominant grouping may indicate an 
Deconstructing clinical practice and searching for scientific foundations 
 
 
 
176 
 
 
inclination to rehabilitatory techniques. However, these are mostly used in 
community settings with clients who are possibly less disabled.  
 
In dysphagia, the top ten selections can be categorised as bolus modification, physical 
strategies and a number are technique driven. Most are compensatory.  The only 
swallow technique to find a place in the top ten is a compensatory technique.  In fact, 
rehabilitatory-swallow exercises were not well favoured with the two compensatory-
swallow techniques rating highest. As a group of techniques, only neuromuscular 
therapies and technologically-based interventions were rated lower. A culture of 
compensation can be seen within both areas of practice.  
 
Kahmi (1999) proposes that therapists are pragmatic – more behaviourally oriented 
than theoretically bound. The data presented here suggests an appreciation for 
functionality. It is highly interesting that clinical choices reflect a relative absence of 
rehabilitatory therapies. Perhaps this is pragmatism, but is pragmatism wisely 
targeted?  This question is absolutely integral to understanding why clinicians do 
what they do.  
 
 
 
4.3 LESS THAN MORE SCIENTIFIC 
 
The emerging picture is that the scaffolds supporting practice decisions with regard 
to treatment choices are not overtly rooted in scientific reasoning: this is now 
explored further. 
 
4.3.1. Research evidence 
The notion of a limited repertoire of treatments implies that research evidence may 
not be a useful scaffold. It did not differentiate the favoured from the least-favoured 
therapies. This undervaluing of research cannot be unexpected as this finding is 
replicated across multiple studies (e.g. Zipoli & Kennedy, 2005) and consistently over 
twenty years (McCurtin, 2012). In disability, literature-based therapies highlight this 
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point, being underused primarily for knowledge-based reasons. Even non-scientific 
and pseudoscientific-therapies rated higher and some clearly contraindicated 
practices are employed. Oral-motor therapy for example, has been hotly debated in 
the professional literature and suffers from poor evidence (Lass & Pannbacker, 2008) 
and problems with task specificity. It is however, used by over two-thirds of disability 
clinicians at least on an occasional basis. Neither did experience differentiate use. 
Scaling data indicates that oral-motor tools are incorporated into speech work 
concurring with previous studies (e.g. Mackenzie et al., 2010). The suggestion is that 
clinicians are not scientifically-responsive practitioners, that they have valid reasons 
for using less than credible therapies, or that such therapies are part of the 
profession’s intervention culture. For example, ROM-tongue which has not been well 
researched but possesses negative evidence (e.g. Teasell, Foley, Martino, Bogley & 
Speechley, 2006) may be part of the adult-neurological culture.  
 
While there is evidence of clinicians using some therapies with supporting evidence 
(e.g. Hanen) most techniques they employ are not supported by high level evidence. 
AAC for example, has theoretical support and is well-researched. However, the large 
evidence base is mostly reliant on single-case designs (although this might appeal to 
client-centric clinicians) and absent in some cases, for example, communication 
passports (Sherlock, 2008) and visual timetables (Schneider & Goldstein, 2010). 
However, the theory behind such therapies appears sound and such interventions are 
also easy to operationalize. It can be suggested that AAC choices pivot not so much on 
the evidence but on the functional and concrete appeal of AAC work. Given the lack of 
clear scientific undertones to preferred items generally, the latter must be considered.  
 
Dysphagia clinicians are beset by similar issues. They show relatively high use of 
some physical techniques for example, and while logically based they are not well 
served by examination in the literature on the whole (e.g. Burkhead, Sapienza & 
Rosenbek, 2007). The highly favoured therapy of thickening liquids is represented by 
a contradictory evidence base which is limited to adult-neurological populations in 
particular (e.g. Foley, Teasell, Salter, Kruger & Martino, 2008). So the literature for 
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dysphagia therapies suffers from much the same problems as in disability. Moreover, 
nearly half of respondents agreed on the difficulty of converting research into 
practice concurring with previous barrier studies (e.g. Pennington, 2001). Thus the 
evidence base does not appear to provide clinicians with a wealth of firm grounding 
upon which to make decisions even when therapies are researched, there also 
appearing to be a disconnect between what clinicians do and what researchers study 
(McCurtin & Roddam, 2012). However, even if what was practiced was also studied, 
clinicians it appears would not be wholly influenced by research.  While negative 
evidence accounts for some reasoning in non-scientific and pseudoscientific practices 
and it can be postulated that the low use of pseudoscientific and non-scientific 
therapies may be somewhat accounted for by this, research evidence is not the first 
point of judging a therapy. Practice whether scientific or not scientific, is primarily 
validated by other scaffolds such as experience, suggesting a reason why literature 
may not impact on some clinicians choices. Experienced clinicians across a number of 
demographics however, seem to both use literature-based therapies more and value 
scientific scaffolds to a larger degree, implying increased scientific practice with 
experience.  
 
 
4.3.2. Evidence of scientific thinking 
There is consistently low use of scientific reasoning to explain therapy choices and 
this is noticeable even for blatantly pseudoscientific treatments. While scientific 
reasoning is higher for these items, it still only accounts for only one-fifth of 
responses. It can be said therefore, that clinicians do not use scientific reasons to 
explain their decision making, for even the most non-scientific of therapies.  
 
Subtle differences in scientific reasoning are observed. Compared to disability SLTs, 
dysphagia respondents demonstrated twice the preference for theory to explain use. 
This related specifically to swallow techniques indicating that categories of items may 
have singular or dominant pivots. Training in dysphagia typically emphasises the 
mechanisms of action for swallow therapies and perhaps the training rather than the 
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theory is influential. It may also be explained in that suitability as a reason is less 
utilised than for disability practice, meaning a wider range of reasons are employed 
by dysphagia SLTs. Use of theory remains minimal however, and this concurs with 
studies both within and outside the profession (e.g. Law et al., 2007). This may 
support Kahmi's (1999) assertions that unlike research, practice is not theory bound 
and imply that therapy choices may potentially be devoid of theoretical 
underpinnings. Without theory, states VanDeusen Fox (1981), a discipline is about 
technique and technology. It might be expected that experts would make most use of 
theory but this is also not evident, and there is a decreasing reliance on theory by 
disability clinicians with increased self-determined skill. This points to increased 
autonomous decision making with accumulated experience, although such reasoning 
may be integrated into expert reasoning and not readily explicated. 
 
Despite scientific reasoning being in short supply, there are indications that those 
using favoured therapies believe themselves to be operating scientifically in both 
disability and dysphagia. For example, those who use bolus-modification therapies 
are more likely to significantly agree with use of theory, rationales, making efforts to 
keep up to date and reading research. The indications are that this group feel more 
scientific, and so must feel these therapies are scientifically grounded despite the 
contradictory literature. This is not to say treatment decisions are not based on logic, 
even if not explicated. It is interesting for example, that ROM-tongue is the highest 
rated neuromuscular technique in dysphagia. This can be considered an SLT-specific 
treatment which is more task-specific than generic treatments such as vibration. It 
implies considered rationales. Most dysphagia clinicians are working with adult-
acquired populations where there is a window for recovery of function. Disability 
clinicians who use oral-motor therapy more are mostly represented by paediatric and 
intellectual-disability populations where there are clear developmental and 
neurological overtones. Community-paediatric respondents most use this therapy 
however, perhaps understanding there is a critical time when such interventions 
might work. Thus choices might be more considered than the data suggests.  
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The valuing of science was evident in attitudes rather than practice with three 
statements ranking in the top ten and low-agreement statements appear to reject 
non-scientific thinking in practice. However, those who use less scientific practices 
(i.e. oral-motor therapy and Talktools) were significantly more likely to be influenced 
by non-scientific and non-professional sources as well as older sources, indicating a 
connection between less-scientific practice and non-scientific influences. 
Furthermore, the appreciation of scientific behaviours reflect far less on conventional 
constructions of science, that is, research, than on scientific behaviours and actions 
such as argumentation. The least valued scientific statement directly references 
science - perhaps the conventional scientific constructs of research and science are 
not appealing, unlike scientific behaviours. 
 
More experienced clinicians across a number of variables and factors show higher 
value for science and less for non-science, probably related to an established skill 
base and perhaps confidence. Time may be a factor in this reflecting on findings from 
multiple studies across the health professions (e.g. Upton & Upton, 2006). More 
experienced clinicians (based on years and skill) disagree significantly more that they 
don’t have enough time to develop practice implicating time in the ability to be 
scientific. Scientific valuing is less apparent in community respondents. A more likely 
interpretation is that this group are more practically constrained by both time and 
resources which the data indicates. Scientific practice thus appears to be impacted 
upon by practicalities. However, those with most qualifications tend to be 
significantly more scientific, concurring with Lizarondo et al.’s (2011) systematic 
review findings which found education degree correlated with research use. The 
question to be asked therefore is whether more experience, specifically further 
qualifications sway clinicians toward science, or do those who pursue such 
qualification have a scientific nature anyway? The findings from qualification also 
provoke an additional suggestion. If those with higher degrees are more scientific, 
perhaps those in academia who produce the evidence that is meant to guide clinicians 
have essentially different values to those who practice. Additionally, although the 
numbers of respondents were low and no real meaning can be thus extrapolated, 
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voice and physical disability SLTs tended to be most scientific and those working in 
child mental health least. The suggestion is that the area of work might influence 
values or that clinicians elect to work in areas that concur with their values.  
 
Such values may in fact influence therapy choices. While not many therapies were 
significant for the non-scientific and scientific extracted factors, those therapies that 
were may shed a light on practice. For example, articulation, a traditional speech 
therapy is currently less favoured in the literature, phonetic approaches being less 
preferred than phonological ones. It was however, the dominant model of 
intervention in speech disorders until the 1990s. A currently unpublished thesis 
(Pyne, Maxwell & McCurtin, unpublished) shows it continues to be one of the 
favoured therapies for developmental speech disorders in Ireland. It is significant 
only for the non-scientific factor, and those using it opt for simpler options, are more 
influenced by the fun element and commercial products, and clearly indicate they 
have less time to develop their practice. This suggests specific influences may operate 
in choosing a specific therapy; in this case it may be that articulation is an easier 
option. It is also more used by those in the early years of their career which may 
imply that the early years are typified by less complicated therapy options than in the 
later years.  
 
In all, respondents are more likely to cite workplace availability than refer to a 
therapy’s scientific merits explicitly, which begs a return to the question about 
whether SLT is a scientific profession.  
 
4.3.3. Other EBP pillars 
What emerges is that the immediate clinical context – the client and the clinician – is 
pivotal almost to the exclusion of other factors. A good deal of reasoning can be said 
to centrally revolve around clinical experience. This is reflected in other studies. 
Mackenzie et al., (2010) for example, in evaluating dysarthria management, found 
that SLTs using NSOMEs cited evidence from their own practice as important in this 
treatment choice, with the more experienced clinicians most influenced by this 
scaffold. Data from this study concurs. Furthermore, experience is used to validate a 
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range of questionable and unscientific practices, and used in combination with 
suitability to support conventional, less-used and non-scientific therapies. The 
dominant reliance on practical evidence to explain use of neuromuscular therapies in 
both dysphagia and disability practice suggests little room for other scaffolds to 
support decisions. Moreover, experience as a guide rises sequentially through the 
years. Senior SLTs for example, are significantly more likely to use therapies because 
they work, also found to be a strong determiner is other studies (e.g. Watson & Lof, 
2004). This indicates the ‘because it works’ argument is likely to derive from 
experience although reliance on experience starts at a high level, with four out of five 
respondents relying on it even from even the early years of their careers. 
Additionally, it is the only main reason for use not to differ between dysphagia and 
disability respondents indicating an SLT wide, culturally strong practice pivot. 
Experience may in fact help define the profession. Cementing this, reliance on 
experience is evident even for those who value scientific scaffolds. Those with 
doctorates for example while valuing scientific reasoning, also believe unreservedly 
their own experience. 
 
The concept of suitability may also be said to reflect the clinicians own skills. This is 
implied when it is considered that patient and family preferences are poorly 
represented, mainly in reasons for use but also in attitudes. Few responses overall 
relate to client preferences which compares poorly to the use of patient-specific or 
pathological characteristics. While, the top rated statement was related to the 
influence of the individual nature of the patient and this corresponds to dominant 
therapy reasoning, this may be interpreted to mean patient data rather than patient 
preferences. It is probable that clinical patient data supersedes preferences 
suggesting expert type models of practice. It may also indicate that integrating patient 
values is not a pragmatic exercise, or considered operationally valid.  Thus, of all the 
EBP pillars, clinical experience can be said to be the only one directly explicated in 
therapy choices as opposed to attitudinal statements, suggesting that EBP is not 
practically applied, and that scientific thinking has not been directly illuminated when 
practice was examined. 
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4.4 CLINICAL LIFESPAN 
 
Changes to SLTs’ reasoning throughout the years of experience is indicated. This 
cannot be radically unexpected although it must be interpreted in light of the 
continued dominance of core reasons and values throughout the career lifespan. In 
other words, while changes are suggested, a profession-specific effect is still obvious 
and extended data are warranted to strengthen the proposed idea of a lifespan.  
 
4.4.1. Early accumulation and stabilisation 
The beginning years of practice appear to differentiate themselves in a number of 
ways. It may be that newer clinicians are developing core skills. Clear therapy 
preferences were evident and are especially important in the light of the limited 
repertoires observed. Those in the early-career years in disability for example, tended 
to use the therapies of Hanen and parent-child interaction more (though they may not 
rank them as highly as other groups). In dysphagia, early-career SLTs tended to use 
texture modification more. These are treatments which can be considered core 
therapies, involving basic skills required by newer clinicians. Thus, this group may be 
learning new therapies and using them more frequently than other groups, but may 
not necessarily rank them as favourites. Use may instead reflect recent training and a 
more limited range of options. Less-complex practice was also seen with this group, 
SLTs in their early years reported they have most difficulties translating research but 
valued concreteness and fun activities more, especially in disability.  
 
This group also differed in that they show higher use of the reason client suitability 
than those in the middle or later years of their career, the trend being for less use of 
suitability as a reason with increasing experience. For example, nearly three-quarters 
of all basic SLTs cited client suitability compared to between a half and two-thirds of 
senior SLTs. This least-experienced group as measured by a number of demographics 
were most likely to reference suitability for all significant therapies, including the 
less-scientific practices of oral-motor therapy and Facilitated communication, and the 
more traditional bolus-modification techniques. This is the opposite of the most-
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experienced group who cited experience most for these items.  This dependence on 
suitability may in fact result from a greater reliance on patient-specific deficits to 
guide management. Respondents in the early years of their careers and dysphagia 
respondents with least time were more likely to agree that specific patient-deficits 
influence therapy choices. SLTs in the later years of their careers were more likely to 
disagree. Least-experienced SLTs across a number of demographics also agreed more 
regarding the importance of patient, patient responsibility and patient preferences 
although the values of disability clinicians remain relatively unchanged with 
increasing experience. The implication is that patient issues such as preferences and 
deficits become less depended on with the accumulation of experience and perhaps 
less compatible with experience. This would concur with the picture of the 
autonomous clinician developing over time.  
 
However in the absence of experience those in the early years in disability are more 
likely to cite suitability than their dysphagia colleagues which implicates training in 
use of this reason. This implies that training (and experience) may facilitate use of 
experience as a pivot for decision making and lessen the impact suitability. Training 
may therefore be a component in the definition of experience.  On the whole, basic 
SLTs cite lack of knowledge more as a reason not to select treatments and this makes 
sense, as they would be expected to have accumulated less knowledge. Less-
experienced clinicians acquired knowledge through other clinicians more than those 
with more experience. They relied more on colleagues and experts than other groups, 
agreed most that clinical experience is the best guide and most learned by working 
with other clinicians. This is expected given the lesser clinical experience of this 
group. This group were also similarly most likely to reference other professional 
sources to guide them such as department policy and standards of practice in the 
workplace. This suggests that the early years of practice are more heavily dependent 
on profession-specific influences. 
 
This beginning stage of an SLT’s career might be typified by reduced complexity, less 
autonomy and the need to establish core skills. The dependence on external sources 
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appears to decrease with accumulated experience as clinicians move toward more the 
autonomous practice.  
 
 
4.4.2. Mid-years regrouping 
While not being significantly different from either end of the spectrum, there are 
suggestions that the group in the middle years of their careers may be a slightly 
different faction based on isolated occurrences. For example, dysphagia SLTs in the 
middle years of their careers showed a significant reduction in use of volume 
regulation and were least likely to not use tube feeding, Hanen and articulation 
compared to their colleagues in the early or later years of their careers. However, not 
all such explanations can be accounted for by the middle group. For example, while 
swallow therapies were most used in the middle years, this is explained by dedicated 
time. SLTs who used them most have most dedicated time in the area and this group 
also tended to be adult-acquired clinicians which may also explain why they used 
dysphagia instrumentation more frequently. The indications are that there may be a 
tendency to stabilise practice in the middle phase, a kind of regrouping or 
reconsideration of intervention options which may result in a review of use of some 
therapies, perhaps followed by a return to use in later years. This group may also be 
trying out lesser-used options in this phase, exemplified by senior SLTs use of 
carbonation more than their colleagues. 
 
Some differences are also evident in reasoning. Senior SLTs as previously noted, were 
most likely to use therapies ‘because they work’ reflecting a move towards autonomy 
in this group. This was also seen in dysphagia respondents’ relative reduction in use 
of suitability and more use of clinical experience in the middle years of their careers. 
One in twenty therapies showed significant differences in reasoning between the 
middle-years clinicians and other groups, with those in the middle years far more 
likely to reference clinical experience for those items. While this is not a high volume, 
it suggests that the differences observed may have some merit. Where those in the 
mid-years are similar to other groups this tended to be the early group suggesting 
sequential development of reasons for some items but non-sequential for others. 
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This middle phase of clinical experiences appears unsettled. For all significant 
disability therapies, emerging clinicians were most likely to cite suitability and 
experts most likely to cite experience. On the whole, the middle group of experienced 
clinicians were equally likely to cite these reasons. For the one dysphagia item, it is 
the experienced SLTs who were most likely to cite suitability while the emergent SLTs 
and expert SLTs were most likely to cite experience. The small number of items being 
significant and low cell count numbers prevents extrapolation of any real meaning. 
However, the pattern of similarity between this and other demographics of the early 
years relying more on suitability, the middle-experienced group using both main 
reasons or being different, and SLTs in the later years of their careers using clinical 
experience suggests this idea may be worth considering.  The original groupings also 
suggest perhaps changes over multiple time frames. Equity between the two main 
reasons for use is for example, most represented at the periods of 5-10 and 25+ years. 
Early experience leads to an increased reliance on clinical experience as a scaffold 
over time, followed by equity of the two main reasons, followed by a return to 
favouring suitability which again diminishes towards the later years. This pattern 
remained stable for general and specialised experience. 
 
SLTs in the middle years of their careers were also different in their subtle tendencies 
to defer external influences. For example, those with middling experience and 
represented by a variety of demographics were most likely to disagree that 
department policy, research, college learning, colleague opinion or experts influence 
their decisions. Specialists in disability and dysphagia for example, showed no regard 
for expert opinion and there was a decreasing reliance on expert opinion by disability 
respondents with increasing self-determined skill from novice to expert.  This 
suggests a move away from those sources most valued by less-experienced 
practitioners and implies increasing autonomy. SLTs working medium-dedicated in 
disability may be even more internally focused than their dysphagia colleagues. They 
were least likely to make efforts to keep up to date or read research and most likely to 
disagree with the placebo effect and person-centeredness. Furthermore, they least 
agreed that one can waste time or do harm and agreed most with non-scientific 
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statements. This contributes to a picture of practice highly pivoted upon the 
individual clinician at this stage and least susceptible to external influences. This may 
be explained by increasing confidence in skills, a period of stabilisation of learned 
skills or reframing of practice. It may also be more simply explained as SLTs with 
middle-years’ experience and senior SLTs disagree most they have enough time to 
develop practice, and are perhaps more constrained by busy work lives.  
 
4.4.2. Later years de-selection and expansion 
Experience is also central to the later-career years. There is increasing agreement 
cross the lifespan with reliance on clinical experience rising to 100% after 15 years. 
SLTs in the later years of their careers were most likely to cite this reason but showed 
less regard for the experience of colleagues. So they possessed a higher value for their 
own judgement than that of others. Thus, expert SLTs were least likely to use other 
experts as information sources and it may be that expertise is a learning tool in the 
less-experienced years. SLTs with later-years’ experience also cited training most, 
suggesting that the further away from original training a clinician moves, the more 
that clinician uses lack of training as a decision-maker. Alternatively, it may imply an 
increased regard for knowledge as a scaffold to choices. Increasing experience also 
resulted in less susceptibility to patient influences as seen across various 
demographics similar to Watts-Pappas et al., (2008) findings that more experienced 
clinicians involved parents less. The group in their later-career years were less likely 
to agree that patient preferences influence them or value what the patient brings to 
therapy, and also disagreed more that specific-patient deficits influence them. 
However, literature on clinical reasoning (e.g. Higgs & Titchens, 2000) would suggest 
that many skills become less conscious with practice and it can be also postulated that 
the influences are integrated from previous learning, and unexplicated rather than 
diminished in influence.  
 
A picture of a highly autonomous clinician emerges, with decisions less dependent on 
external than internal factors. This corresponds to an increase in confidence with 
years of experience especially seen for grade and skill. There was also an increasing 
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trend towards more active practice with years of experience and this may reflect both 
confidence and accumulated experience which support such active practice. Specialist 
SLT, managers and expert SLTs were the groups most likely to disagree with passive 
practice. It may be that promotion facilitates time to become active and involved, or 
perhaps clinicians who believe themselves more active and engaged, are more likely 
to achieve higher status. Given that the demographic is weighted towards the younger 
group, it may be the case that had the respondents been more balanced, clinical 
experience may have emerged as the dominant reason for use.  
 
Despite the internal focus in the later years, increased experience also entails an 
increased appreciation of research, also suggested by Lizarondo et al., (2011). Across 
a number of demographics, this group were most likely to disagree that research did 
not influence them, that it was difficult to translate and to agree that they read 
research regularly.  Reading research was less differentiated among the dysphagia 
than disability groups, indicating that research values in dysphagia practice may be 
less altered throughout their clinical experience. It may be that initial training affects 
this susceptibility to research. The suggestion is that accumulated experience 
facilitates access to research appreciation and the EBP model becomes more useable 
with increased experience. 
 
There are indications that practice is also increasingly complex. For example, 
increasing use of communication boards/books was seen with increasing experience 
across demographics with the largest effect for specialised experience. A 
developmental pattern is clear for the original groups with one-third of those working 
under two years using this therapy, rising sequentially through all groups until over 
three-quarters of clinicians working more than twenty-five years were using them. 
The overall picture is one of increased use with increased experience however it is 
measured. Complexity is also indicated by tube feeding. While there was fairly even 
use of use of it between groups, SLTs in the early years of their careers were most 
likely not to use this therapy. Furthermore, less-specialised clinicians favoured 
speech therapies although the explanation may pivot upon the populations served by 
these groups rather than experience itself. The indications are that while AAC 
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dominated the repertoire of experienced disability clinicians, these were also 
primarily pure disability clinicians. So complexity for both dysphagia and disability 
may be more particularly about specialisation and population than years of 
experience.  
 
Practice may however also be constructed in more complex ways. There may be an 
ethics effect since SLTs in the later years of their careers agreed most with ethics 
statements seen across a number of demographics. Experience, therefore in whatever 
way it is represented seems to effect a change in ethics. This complexity was also 
represented in the accumulation of a broader range of options especially in disability 
practice. Fewer therapies were never-used by those with most disability experience 
and they used a variety of therapies more frequently. The pattern appears to indicate 
the development of a repertoire with specialised practice. Experienced clinicians also 
seemed to use literature-based therapies more as represented by years of experience, 
professional qualification and grade. This suggests either more access to or use of 
literature with experience in an area. Perhaps experience or expertise is partly 
represented by accessing the literature. 
 
Similarly, more experienced clinicians may also discard some (but not all) therapies.  
For example, although Hanen is a preferred therapy overall and respondents in all 
years of their career showed strong use of this intervention; those in their later years 
were most likely not to use it, perhaps using it less over time. ROM-tongue, the 
preferred neuromuscular technique in dysphagia, was used most by basic SLTs. 
Dysphagia SLTs in the later years of their careers showed a drop in use of 
instrumentation therapies, swallow therapies, neuromuscular treatments and 
individual therapies such as articulation.  This may reflect deliberate de-selections by 
experienced clinicians or perhaps less-experienced clinicians are still in the process of 
testing their usefulness.  
 
However, the discard hypothesis may be also explained by a generational effect which 
is also postulated. There were clear differences across some therapies based on 
length of time since qualification. Those longest qualified in dysphagia were most 
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likely to use stretching and deep massage which were least used by those who were 
shortest qualified and who chose vibration more. SLTs that were qualified a medium 
amount of time were more likely to use Oralight. Those with more than professional 
qualification and most-specialised experience in disability used tactile-sensory 
stimulation most. However, the limited repertoires make it difficult to reliably argue 
this case although there are hints from broader interventions. For example, those in 
the middle years of general and specialised experience, and SLTs with more than a 
professional qualification who are an older demographic were more likely to use 
Bobath, a therapy which emerged into prominence in SLT in the late 1980s through 
the 1990s. Oral-motor therapy is a classic case in point. Expert SLTs were more likely 
to choose this and emergent SLTs least likely contradicting MacKenzie et al.’s (2010) 
study of practice in acquired dysarthria which indicated that the use of NSOMEs was 
not associated with years of experience. The underlying suggestion from this data is 
that those recently trained are not using it due to its prominence in professional 
debates. Expert SLTs were perhaps using this therapy either because they trained in it 
or they see its value contrary to literature. Other examples are evident. Narrative 
therapy was used more by those with less experience as measured by a number of 
demographics and is a more recent introduction into the field of clinical practice.  
TEACCH was most used by Seniors SLTs, expert SLTs and those in the later years of 
their careers. SLTs with middle-years disability experience used MORE most; this 
therapy emerged into prominence in the late 1990s. SLTs in the later years of their 
careers were more likely to use Listening therapy, this initially emerging in the 80s 
and being rebranded a number of times.  Sensory-integration therapy was highly 
fashionable in the 1980s and 1990s, and this may be reflected in its more frequent 
use by senior SLTs, those SLTs who are longest qualified, and those with most 
dedicated time in disability practice. However the shortest-qualified SLTs also used 
this therapy which might be explained by its re-emergence or possibly a reduction in 
use by SLTs in the middle years of experience. The same pattern was seen for 
articulation therapy where both early and later-experience groups used it most. It 
was a standard for speech intervention through to the 1990s. Perhaps clinicians in the 
later years of their careers are passing it down to their less-experienced colleagues. 
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The impact of experienced colleagues is clear throughout the literature (e.g. Stronge & 
Cahill, 2012). In light of this, it is interesting that expert SLTs are least likely to value 
long-time use. 
 
Thus a career lifespan is proposed. This incorporates a dependent early stage, which 
is subject to profession-specific and patient sources and prefers less-complex 
practice. At this stage, clinicians are developing core skills and have a more limited 
range of options than other clinicians. The middle-phase clinician is regrouping 
having become more autonomous and uses this stage to stabilise prior to moving 
forward. Finally, the clinicians in the later years of experience while also reflecting 
that autonomy, in addition to complexity, also display openness to selected sources in 
this case, research evidence. 
 
 
4.5 DISSONANCE NOT CONCURRENCE 
 
While there is a high degree of harmony in the data and the road map towards 
understanding clinical practice appears clarified, there are a number of points of 
dissonance that help both broaden understanding of practice and raise questions 
which need consideration. 
 
4.5.1 Research use 
On the whole SLTs place a high value on research evidence. Nevertheless, when 
specifically explicated using therapies, it is clear that the influence of research in 
guiding decisions is limited. Thus, while most studies (e.g. Risahmawati et al., 2011) 
suggest a respect for research explicated via attitudinal statements, it may be that 
elucidating actual practice as opposed to aspirations provides for a more accurate 
picture. At the very most, underuse of research as a pivot may suggest translational 
concerns as reflected by this data and by other authors (e.g. Bernstein-Ratner, 2006).  
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Despite this, clinicians appear to feel their treatment choices are well supported by 
research when in fact this is not the case, concurring with Watson and Lof’s (2004) 
findings regarding NSOMEs. Even experienced clinicians who report using literature-
based therapies more, evidence contraindications represented by the therapies they 
use. Expert SLTs for example, are significantly more likely to choose oral-motor 
therapy.  The clear suggestion is that practice is constructed less on research and 
more on practical evidence. Indeed, recent new evidence (Clark, 2012) suggests that 
neuromuscular therapies may be more evidence based and theoretically sound than 
previously thought. If research can change direction, then clinicians under use of 
literature to scaffold decisions appears more logical than perhaps it was previously 
thought to be. The use of oral-motor therapy for paediatric populations suggests for 
example, perhaps considered use during a critical learning period (although the 
combined use of speech and oral motor therapies might suggest the opposite).  
 
Additionally, it is interesting that specialist SLTs are least likely to use literature-
based therapies. This implies that expertise is constructed as being mostly about 
experience. Furthermore, the aspirational statements differ more on experiential 
demographics, perhaps indicating that those with more experience have more 
aspirations or are more tactical in how they complete surveys. 
 
4.5.2. Scientific values 
Discord is also apparent between practice and aspiration for scientific values. For 
example, the analysis of the statement regarding science as deciding the direction of 
treatment shows no differences between those choosing and not choosing 
pseudoscientific therapies. In fact, higher numbers choosing these therapies tend to 
agree with the influence of science in treatment decisions, suggesting a clear 
detachment between what is practiced and what is preached. This also applies to 
CAMs, non-scientific therapies such as Talktools, as well as the more traditional 
options.  This clearly suggests that science does not influence decision making and 
that aspirations are more fantastical than reality-based. 
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4.5.3. Ethics 
Despite, the lack of scientific overtones, it is suggested that the low use of non-
scientific and pseudoscientific practices in general reflects on a profession with clear 
scientific and ethical underpinnings. Likewise, responding behaviour suggests that 
personal reasons such as believing in, or familliarity with a therapy or technique are 
insufficient grounds for using an intervention. Surprisingly, over a third of 
respondents were neutral about the harm-potential of therapies. However, the most-
experienced SLTs and those who worked in dysphagia were most convinced of the 
potential for harm, indicating that clinical experience and the area of practice impacts 
on such values. Disability clinicians, who work in areas where there may be more 
scope for pseudoscientific and non-scientific practices, were most likely to agree with 
wasting time. This infers a direct link between the area of practice and attitudes.  
 
There does not however, appear to be a link between aspirations to science and 
ethical leanings. SLTs with more than a professional qualification, who were more 
aligned to scientific values, were also significantly more likely to disagree with the 
potential for harm and wasting time, indicating a disconnection between scientific 
and ethical values. A clear ethical stance did not emanate from the data. Perhaps SLTs 
have high confidence in their profession and its scientific basis. Perhaps they 
reference their own practice when making attributions, and clearly they are confident 
that their own practice is sound. 
 
4.5.4. Confidence and passivity 
Confidence is clearly present and furthermore not related to selected treatments. It is 
apparent for example, that use of the discipline-specific pseudoscientific and non-
scientific treatments does not impact on confidence; clinicians who use these 
therapies are as confident in their choices as colleagues who do not. However, while 
confident as a group, this does not correlate with beliefs with over eight out of ten 
SLTs opposing practice based on therapist beliefs. Such beliefs are obviously not 
interpreted to mean believing in a treatment ‘because it works’, as 90% do use 
therapies for this reason similar to Gee’s (1992) teachers. Do such beliefs and such 
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confidence translate then into passivity? The answer is not necessarily if looking at 
the passive statements, as the group as a whole believe they can effect change and are 
active practitioners. This is itself may have a dissonant ring if the limited range of 
therapies used in practice is accurate.  
 
4.5.5. Clinical experience 
There is a high regard among all groups for clinical experience, a finding replicated in 
other studies (e.g. O’Connor and Pettigrew, 2009). Except for those in their early 
years of practice however, the knowledge and skill which tends to be valued is the 
clinicians own experience and not that of colleagues. This reflects on the overarching 
valuing of a clinicians autonomous and internal experience in making decisions, and 
the increased reliance on that internal scaffold with the accumulation of clinical 
experience. Thus clinical experience can be interpreted as a highly individual 
construct. 
 
4.5.6. Training 
Training explains to a significant degree the non-use of therapies similar to that seen 
in Turner and Whitfield’s (1999) study, and there is harmony between this in both 
practice and aspirations. However, lack of training explains both use and non-use of 
the same therapies within the sample, even in dysphagia where there is mandatory 
training. The same effects are seen in disability for therapies which require training 
and those which do not. This might suggest that training is used habitually as a 
reason.  It is postulated that the definition of training might explain this dichotomy. 
Training may in fact embrace informal methods in additional to formal ones, thus 
clinicians may require some training in whatever form before making a decision to 
use a therapy. Furthermore, training also continues to be crucial in the later years of 
the clinical lifespan concurring with this suggestion. The acquisition of knowledge 
may therefore be enable clinicians to reliably evaluate therapies prior to making a 
reasoned decision regarding use. 
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4.5.7. Practicality 
SLTs are not overly influenced by resource or practical issues and thus appear less 
influenced by practical issues (in theory) than the findings from other studies suggest 
(e.g. Rose and Mackenzie, 2010). However they do report that they are constrained by 
practical issues applying to research evidence with more SLTS agreeing than not that 
it is difficult to convert research into practice. Furthermore, this is so despite the vast 
majority reporting that research influences their decisions regarding interventions, 
that they are more likely to believe in a therapy if research evidence is attached to it 
and reporting that they reading research regularly. Thus, practicalities are used to 
explain only research underuse and not considered relevant elsewhere. It may be that 
practicalities do not truly explain research underuse given SLTs disregard for it 
elsewhere. If however, the lack of use of research evidence in the clinical context is 
accounted for by concerns with translation, then it suggests that practice and 
research my not be compatible arenas.   
 
4.5.8. Patients 
Client suitability would appear to form a core component of decision making. 
However, data from attitudinal statements suggest that suitability refers primarily to 
patient characteristics as previously argued. Patient values and preferences tend not 
to be utilised by respondents when making actual treatment decisions. What this 
implies is that suitability as constructed by clinicians is more about the clinician’s 
skills in using client-deficit information than consideration of patient values. The 
implication is that the pillar of EBP which relates to patient issues, much like the 
research pillar, is less utilised than the experience pillar, and may even be considered 
obsolete. 
 
4.5.9. Repertoires 
It is quite clear that practice is effectively represented by a reduced number of 
therapies for both areas of practice. However, only one in five of respondents agree 
that they have a repertoire of favourite treatments and they report that they actively 
explore new therapy options.  It can be postulated that SLTs may actually pursue new 
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options and despite this, limited new therapies make their way into practice. 
However, the overlying suggestion is that clinicians prefer to believe that they act 
differently and perhaps more scientifically than they actually do. 
 
 
4.6 CHAPTER SUMMARY 
 
The fact that so many dimensions produced by factor analysis are needed to explain 
practice is really not that surprising. Clinical practice is a pot with many ingredients 
and not simply explained by one or two constructs. However, given that clinicians 
effectively define practice quite narrowly, the extrapolation of multiple factors may 
be interpreted as another sign of dissonance. There is clearly a practice-preach divide 
represented by disconnections between attitudes as explicated and practice as 
defined by respondents. This mismatch suggests that clinicians either present a face 
which they think is appropriate although there is no reason for this to happen on an 
anonymous survey, or they believe what they say is what they do. It may also 
represent actual aspirations which may be impacted by the realities of practice. It 
implicates attitudinal studies as lacking in substance in accurately informing us how 
the profession operates.   
 
Differences in use and reasoning may result from movement through the clinical 
lifespan, with increasing scientific valuing evidenced in later years. While therapies 
are not used for scientific or research reasons, neither are non-scientific practices 
well represented. This would suggest an engagement with scientific thinking although 
this is not realised in reasoning attached to therapy use. The indications are that the 
pragmatic clinician is operational, being more influenced by therapies that are 
functional and can be operationalized (Odom, Boyd & Hall, 2010). The case for 
scientific practice is unproven, although defining what SLTs means by suitability and 
experience may yield scientific characteristics, and this need to be understood before 
excluding any scientific merits they may incoportate.  
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Intervention decisions are highly therapy centred and clinician centred. The 
dominant reliance on clinical experience to rationalise choices indicates practice 
continues to be validated by experience, perhaps suggesting why literature may not 
impact on clinicians’ choices. It implicates an inadequacy in EBP. It can be said that 
clinical experience is the pillar which effectively supports clinical practice and the 
other two pillars may be less useful. It also suggests that the EBP model needs 
rethinking. Essentially, the nature of clinical practice needs more explication but the 
overall suggestion is that the scientific aspirations of a scientific profession are not in 
fact realised. 
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Chapter 5: Group interview results 
 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
Three focus groups served as the data sources for this phase representing 
participants from different work settings. The aim of the qualitative phase was to 
further explore clinical practice and augment the data from the survey. Questions 
were developed based on the original research aims and outcomes from the survey 
data. Therefore, the four questions which constituted the pivots of the focus groups 
concentrated on the constructs of client suitability, clinical experience, training and 
science. The findings are outlined below. 
 
 
5.2 DEMOGRAPHICS 
 
It is important to consider representativeness when summarising this data. Group 
make-up representing three communities of practice may not be archetypal of the 
profession as a whole. Additionally the nature of shared opinion in focus groups may 
function to constrain individuals as group dynamics may influence articulated 
opinion. However, the similarity of data across groups is striking and the data may be 
said to reliably represent current opinion. 
 
SLTs working in voluntary (disability), hospital (acute) and community settings 
characterised the focus groups. The disability group was from the South region. The 
other groups represented the two Dublin regions. The majority of participants 
represented senior grades, paediatric populations and had basic professional 
qualifications.  
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Table 5.1 Focus group demographics 
 
Demographics Disability Hospital Community Total % 
No. members 23 9 16 48  
Years’ experience      
0-5 years 11 5 4 20 41.6 
6- 15 years 6 4 5 15 31.3 
15+ years 6 0 7 13 27.0 
Time since qualification      
0-5 years 11 5 4 20 41.6 
5- 15 years 5 4 5 14 29.2 
15+ years 7 0 7 14 29.2 
Grade      
Basic 11 3 3 17 35.4 
Senior 11 5 11 27 56.3 
Deputy manager 0 0 1 1 2.0 
Manager 1 1 1 1 2.0 
Area of practice      
Intellectual disability only 8 0 0 8 16.7 
ASD only 4 0 0 4 8.3 
ID & ASD 11 0 0 11 22.9 
Dysphagia 3 8 2 13 27.0 
Acquired-neurological 
disorders 
0 6 2 8 16.7 
Developmental speech &  
language disorders 
0 2 13 15 31.3 
Population age      
Paediatric 18 2 14 34 70.8 
Adult 0 7 2 9 18.8 
Mixed 5 1 0 6 12.5 
Setting      
Voluntary 23 0 0 23 48.0 
Hospital 0 9 0 9 18.8 
Community care 0 0 11 11 22.9 
Language class 0 0 4 4 8.3 
Rehabilitation unit 0 0 1 1 2.0 
Clinical      
Clinical 22 8 15 45 93.8 
Administration 1 1 1 3 6.2 
Highest qualification      
Diploma 3 0 2 5 10.4 
Bachelors 14 3 6 23 48.0 
Masters (professional) 
qualification 
6 3 3 12 25.0 
Post-graduate diploma 1 0 0 1 2.0 
Masters by research 1 3 5 9 18.8 
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5.3 THEME DEVELOPMENT 
 
5.3.1. Development of themes 
Coding took place over eight phases in total. Amendments were made for incorrect 
coding and revisions made accordingly (Appendix 30). Phase one coding was 
revisited immediately post coding as coding was deemed to be unbalanced between 
the first and last groups due to under-coding. The evolution of coding was as follows:  
 
Table 5.2 Coding evolution  
Stage Total 
codes 
First order 1329 
Second order 800 
Third order 106 
Fourth order 41 
Fifth order 37 
Sixth order (Main themes) 12 
Seventh order (Super-themes) 3 
Eighth order (Meta-theme) 1 
 
An example of initial coding is provided (Appendix 31). 
 
5.3.2. Member checking 
As part of a rigorous approach to data analysis member checking was undertaken. 
Participants who consented to be approached for this purpose were sent summaries 
based on initial researcher impressions of the data following transcription. Of those 
participants who consented to receive member checking (n=33), one response 
(Annie) was received as previously referenced. Annie’s comments were taken on 
board by the researcher during data analysis. 
 
5.3.2. Meta theme 
The meta-theme emerging from the data is ‘Practice as grey-zoned, contradictory, 
dynamic and individual’. This reflects the balance and complexity of clinical practice 
as described and constructed by clinicians. Clinical practice is essentially multi-
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faceted and compound, not neat and tidy, reflecting less a black & white construct 
than the ‘grey zones’ or quagmire initially described by Schӧn (1983). Practice is also 
composed of contradictions. It is for example art and science, both active and 
habitual, external and internally influenced, appreciator but not necessarily user of 
research. 
 
The explanations for such practice appear to be pivoted on the uniqueness of each 
patient, resulting in continually dynamic and pragmatic practice, constraining the 
application of unadulterated therapies and rule-based treatments, and promoting 
flexibility and online reasoning instead. Patient uniqueness is mostly concerned with 
specific clinical characteristics and not necessarily patient preferences.  
 
Essentially, practice is influenced by multiple variables and has the appearance of a 
chaotic enterprise but is scaffolded on a number of solid constructs which represent 
both the thinking and routine clinician. These are primarily the combination of a 
clinician’s accumulated repertoire; co-operative evolution, and; trial and error with 
each singular patient. Practice is in essence, an experimental event, more ingredients 
than recipes. This means that at its core, it is not so much guided by translationally 
challenged external research evidence, as by the internal clinician functioning as 
sometimes scientist and sometimes artist. The metatheme is derived from three 
superthemes (Figure 5.1) 
Figure 5.1 Metatheme and superthemes 
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5.3.4. Superthemes 
Three superthemes represent the meta-theme: Practice imperfect; Practice as 
grounded and growing, and; Critical practice. These superthemes paint both a 
complementary and contradictory picture of clinical practice as constructed by 
clinicians. Essentially, the superthemes suggest that clinical practice is not a textbook 
and seamless occupation, is continually shifting although grounded in previous 
learning, and requires flexibility in operation. The suggestion is that scientific 
thinking is a component of practice, a tool with which to approach the various 
ingredients and dynamic nature of such practice. However, these scientific elements 
do not necessarily reflect EBP as typically constructed.  
The main themes which produced the superthemes are represented below (Figure 
5.2). 
 
Figure 5.2 Superthemes and main themes 
 
 
The results of the superthemes are presented below. 
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5.4 SUPERTHEME 1: PRACTICE IMPERFECT 
‘It’s more science than art, but there’s a lot of art in it…I think there are both; I think it’s 
a mixture of both’. (May). 
 
The supertheme ‘Practice Imperfect’ is constructed from four main themes (Figure 
5.3). 
 
Figure 5.3 Practice imperfect main themes
 
The main themes represent multiple constructs which essentially define practice as 
inconstant. Fundamentally, clinicians infer that practice is not overtly rule-based, not 
mirroring a recipe which the clinician can follow to produce a perfect intervention 
episode. While not disordered, it is highly responsive to a variety of factors. It is 
composed of manifold elements, impacted by clinicians themselves and the 
professional culture, but mostly by pivotal patients to whom treatment is individually 
tailored. Therapies are consequently not used without reference to the individual 
patient and therefore without modification. Field evidence contributes to this 
variability and dynamism, and clinicians recognise research evidence as flawed in 
guiding clinical practice in this erratic context.  
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5.4.1. Patients, profiles, populations and practicalities 
 ‘We couldn’t possibly create a package that would be one size fits all’. (Matt). 
 
The idea of unpredictable practice revolves predominantly around its human 
element, that is, the centrality of each individual patient in treatment decisions. Thus, 
many participants construct practice as ‘individual packages’ (Lizzie). In effect, ‘you 
can’t just have a fast and hard rule for everyone’ (Nora). Such responsive behaviour 
implies that there are no cookbooks and mandates that treatment selections are 
primarily scaffolded on each single patient’s characteristics. Participants across all 
groups identify a number of these including cognitive ability, medical issues and 
parental competencies. This therefore entails ‘a very symptomatic approach’ to 
intervention according to Leah, a hypothetico-deductive model of reasoning 
characterised thus:   
‘You evaluate how they responded, and that’s what guides you……you’re 
constantly evaluating what you’re doing and saying did that work, did that not 
work…why did that not work’ (Niamh). 
 
This infers that therapies are not the primary influence when making management 
decisions, rather patient characteristics are matched to the therapy.  In other words: 
‘We wouldn’t be trying to fit the child to the therapy, but really would the 
therapy work with the child’ (Annie).  
As a result of this patient-first focus, criteria attached to individual therapies 
constrain their use across client groups meaning that patients may not ‘fulfil the 
criteria for that particular type of therapy’ (Becca). The nature of therapies may also 
restrict their selection. Matt for example, tells us that:  
‘The patient needs to have….the motivation and the buy in to the 
therapy…particularly with very intensive therapies like LSVT’.  
Practicalities also influence decisions such as ‘whether they’re likely to attend’ (May), 
‘class dynamics’ (Annie), and ‘if they're an outpatient they might not be able to transfer 
back in’ (Nuala). Therefore, a clinician’s treatment choice rests initially on the whole 
patient context. 
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The singular patient also has a broader context – that of the client group he or she 
represents. There appear to be treatments which are population appropriate, for 
example, ‘the Shaker….I felt it was never appropriate for our population for the most 
part’ (Becca). Interventions may therefore be deselected if not fit for the population 
being treated. The Nuffield for example, was ‘discarded that because it wasn’t working 
for our client group’ (Stephanie). This does not imply that deselected therapies are 
valueless, just that they are population unfriendly. As Annie comments regarding the 
Derbyshire, ‘whereas if I was going with a different client group I probably would use 
it’. The client group a clinician works with impacts treatment options in two ways. 
Firstly, deselection of treatments: 
‘I didn’t have anybody at the time which meant….I had never used that 
programme since the training I did’ (Maryanne).  
Secondly, the precedence of population-specific experience: 
‘I prefer to go to a surgeon who has a number of operations under his belt 
than….maybe to a therapist who has very little experience’ (Julie).  
This implies a constrained circle of knowledge which extends to other potential 
scaffolds such as research as ‘you’ll probably know more about the evidence base that’s 
around the client group you’re working with’ (Eleanor). However, the importance of 
population-specific effects does not appear to override the patient-specific effect as 
‘even with the same bag of tricks…..you’re tailoring it to that person’ (Caroline).  
 
So decision-making cannot be divorced from either the individual patient or the client 
group. However, patient issues appear defined by specific characteristics and deficits 
rather than any broader construct. Patient preferences for example, are infrequently 
mentioned across the three groups, the suggestion being that patient values form a 
lesser component of decision-making.  Whatever the explanation, decision-making is 
effectively scaffolded on the unstable basis of each individual patient’s characteristics 
and the clinicians experience with the patient group. This makes practice episodic and 
subject to multiple, unique and sequential decisions. The implication is that practice 
may not be wholly scientific as Tara argues: 
‘A lot of what we use is so open to slight changes…that invalidates…the results 
because it is so individual both to the clinician and the client’.  
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Thus the uniqueness of each episode of intervention essentially means that practice 
does not follow rule-based approaches. 
 
5.4.2. Practice not perfect 
‘You have to take on board factors very difficult to control in a research environment’. 
(Claire).  
 
Conventional science may not accurately represent practice. As May points out, ‘I 
would think what I’m doing isn’t remotely scientific because it’s a lot of bubble blowing’. 
This is particularly noted by disability and community groups and is highlighted by 
ideas of immeasurable practice. Stephanie for example, comments on a recent case 
that: 
‘She has certainly improved but if I was to write out what she did on her 
assessment she hasn’t made any improvements at all…how do you measure 
that?’ 
 Tracy concurs saying: 
‘Another girl…she had grown a foot taller….you could see the smile, the 
confidence. How do you measure that, you know?’ 
The implication is that making a difference is not the same as producing a quantifiable 
outcome, and ‘outcome isn’t just based on the impairment so, while a person’s scores 
may not change…you actually made a difference to their lives’ (Maryanne). On the 
whole clinicians argue for the valuing of non-measurable work. As Caroline notes,  
‘The creative art we do…probably has…. more real outcomes…for our 
clients…they don’t really care about their scores at the end of the therapy 
block’.  
This supports arguments that clinicians are bound by behaviour change and making a 
difference may be defined functionally rather than scientifically. 
 
There are indications of a context of clinical uncertainty, articulated by participants 
across groups and ‘sometimes you’re not even 100% sure what the diagnosis is yet’ 
(Claire). This lack of surety may mean that clinicians then ‘you have to depend on trial 
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and error’ (May). So practice is not always predictable, being largely explained by the 
human element. It is after all, 
‘…impossible to control for all the variables, human beings are so different and 
changeable from moment to moment, so that makes it hard to…have it an 
exact, kind of science’ (Helen).  
 
The nature of practice itself also contributes to this uncertainty. There are for 
example ‘incidentals in your therapy that can make a difference’ (Becca) which 
furthermore, ‘might be a little bit difficult to unpick’ (May). Clinicians across settings 
appear highly aware of extra-therapeutic factors such as the placebo effect and the 
therapeutic alliance. As May emphasises:  
‘Sometimes there a danger that….it’s the therapeutic relationship that was 
doing it…regardless of what you actually (do)’.  
This has implications for acting scientifically as ‘it’s hard to be hard to be scientific 
about some of the aspects of our therapy’ (Susan). Furthermore, being scientific may 
not be paramount, even in the context of pseudoscientific practices. Annie states that 
while ‘there is no evidence for AIT...it’s nice that a parent and child sit down for half an 
hour to do something together’. This entails a broader construction of practice.  
 
Practice is also unstable as it appears subject to trends or ‘swings and roundabouts’ 
(Stephanie). Niamh equates this to fashion: ‘some therapies come into vogue and then 
they go out of vogue’. An experienced clinician even notes that ‘if you stay around long 
enough they come back’ (Moira).  Participants mention a number of approaches which 
were ‘all the rage at one stage’ (Nuala). These changes can often lead clinicians to 
question practice such as ‘why did I stop doing it in the first place?’ (Stephanie). 
Perhaps the seasonal nature of some therapies means they are less susceptible to 
being researched. 
 
Clinicians acknowledge however, that imperfect practice may be reduced by the use 
of science and it appears that this notion of being scientific revolves essentially 
around monitoring and the use of outcomes as expressed by a number of participants. 
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Most clinicians ‘would be thinking in terms of outcomes from the beginning’ (Eabha). 
Nevertheless, this may not be habitual: 
‘Part of what makes it hard for us to talk about it being science is that we don’t 
document it very well either’ (Becca). 
This promotes the suggestion that practice needs to be more scientific, 
essentially that ‘we do need to tighten up things’ (Caroline). Moreover, research 
evidence rather than reducing uncertainty, may instead contribute to it. May 
underscores this feeling when she states that ‘you’re not really sure, for a lot of 
things we do there isn’t really clear evidence about specifics of things’. This leads 
to questions such as that posed by Stephanie: ‘so if there isn’t an evidence base 
what do you do? Do you not do it?’. Thus, SLTs reference this lack of certainty 
resulting from research output explicitly, most exemplified by Catriona’s 
contention that practice ‘can’t be scientific in the sense that it is not clear cut’. 
Practice effectively, does not permit perfection.  
 
 
5.4.3. Different paths 
‘You have to be able to make your own clinical judgement as someone who works a lot’. 
(Ruth). 
 
Clinicians construct both themselves and the discipline as unique in many ways. They 
admit that practice is impacted by individual clinicians, what Oliva calls ‘personality 
preference’. This results in variable practice even with defined programmes, given 
that:  
‘Even if you take an off the shelf package, the way I might do it might be very 
different to the way Matt might do it’ (Nuala).  
Moreover, this is not necessarily a bad thing as ‘none would be wrong, just (a) different 
slant’ (May). In fact there is a clear expression of being different as being okay across 
all groups, from Leah’s rationalisation that its ‘okay to take different routes because 
everyone’s putting a lot of….thought into it anyway’, to Matts contention that it doesn’t 
make a lot of difference ‘as long as you reach that goal’. The belief that reaching the 
goal is most important is agreed with by multiple participants. However, this 
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dependence on the individual clinician has implications. Essentially, each clinician is 
essentially responsible for the quality of their own practice, being  
‘…as experienced as you put into it, so somebody could be on a single track for 
twenty years and really not develop’ (Annie).  
Thus, scientific practice may rely on a number of traits including ‘seeking the 
experience…taking the initiative’ (Nuala), and ‘your willingness to take on different 
things’ (Lizzie). This implies a heavy dependence on each clinician to act scientifically. 
 
Differentiation may extend to areas of practice, with some areas being considered 
more traditionally scientific. After all, ‘it depends…on the setting that you work in’ 
(Claire). Indeed, SLTs who do not work in acute settings reference such settings as 
being more scientific:  
‘Sometimes SLTs…can define themselves a little more scientific because they’re 
working in more medical scenarios…than…particularly for us working in the 
community’ (May), and; 
‘If you worked in a hospital setting…you could scientifically evaluate that….a 
lot more clearly than…the population we work with’ (Claire) 
Dysphagia in particular is cited as more potentially scientific because it is ‘a lot more 
concrete’ (Matt). It is not clear whether clinicians elect to work in areas that fit them 
or they fit into the culture of their work setting. Perhaps, Sarah asks, ‘if we worked in a 
different environment would we be leaning in a different direction?’   Furthermore, 
there appears to be a reference to the group to check practice as Rose exemplifies: 
‘I find it reassuring because that’s not what I do so….I’m saying to myself well if 
no-one else is doing it…I’m not too bad!’ 
 
Some clinicians also construct the profession as unique and different from other 
professions– this is most commented on by the hospital group and a large part of this 
identity refers to creative elements: 
‘We have a degree of creativity in our profession that other professionals 
don’t….OT & Physio….have more of the same programme for every patient 
than we do...it’s not that simple from not being able to talk to being able to 
talk’ (Matt). 
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Part of this difference seems to imply that SLTs are more responsive to patients than 
other professions, for example: 
‘What we do can be quite interpersonal with people, and maybe that’s what 
physios don’t get the opportunity to be’ (Nuala), and; 
‘We’re not like teachers; we don’t have a prescribed curriculum’ (Niamh).  
The implication is that other disciplines have prescribed interventions which do not 
entail a creative or interpersonal component. Being different encompasses therefore 
both the clinician and the profession. 
 
 
5.4.4. No recipes 
‘We don’t have recipes really, we just have loads of ingredients and we decide to put 
them together in the way that we want’. (Niamh). 
 
Clinicians quite clearly indicate that practice is dynamic, requiring them to be 
continually engaged. It is comprised of many variables which effect decision making. 
Beth reflects multiple voices when she calls practice ‘a package then’. Fundamentally, 
there is the requirement for intervention to be multiply scaffolded on a combination 
of ‘both science and creativity together’ (Clara), being essentially defined as: 
‘You have an idea…that’s the art, and the science part is the fact that you 
measure things and you’ve theories and…the evidence base’ (Lorcan).  
Practice thus requires flexibility and this is reflected continuously by the data, 
perhaps most specifically by notions of trial and error which occurs ‘constantly’ 
(Catriona), being ‘used an awful lot’ (May) resulting in an apparently causal attitude: 
‘So you try something and you know, it doesn’t work and you have to go a different 
route’ (Stephanie). 
 
The idea of absent recipes is further enhanced by the eclecticism which defines 
practice among all respondent groups. The feeling is that ‘most therapists take an 
eclectic approach anyway, they mix and match’ (Rose) resulting in practice which is ‘a 
bit of this and a bit of that’ (Stephanie).  In fact, there is an underlying suggestion that 
clinicians are comfortable with such styles of working in that they ‘like to be flexible….I 
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don’t rigidly stick to it if it’s not appropriate for that person (Maryanne). Thus, 
clinicians appear reluctant to follow more stipulated and less individually-based 
practices and are grateful for the latitude:  
‘Like in America there’s only prescribed things you can do…we’re very 
fortunate here in that there is that leeway to try a bit of this, that didn’t work, 
give this a go’ (Sarah). 
Indeed, while ‘there’s very few off the shelf programmes’ (May), the underlying 
complaint is that such interventions are not representative of the patients typically 
presenting in clinics, being for ‘dream children really’ (Jackie). This sentiment 
transfers across the area of practice. 
 
The lean towards flexibility may in fact explain the appeal of some preferred 
therapies, that is, their very adaptability - even when not recommended.  
‘A lot of therapists go on courses and….take the really good bit out of it 
and…we might end up doing a form of treatment with a client that’s a little bit 
of a few things’ (Clara).  
In effect, clinicians take ‘aspects of it and implement it….as it suits your client group 
(Beth). There is an overriding view that ‘a lot of therapies are…flexible, and can be 
adapted’ (Catriona). The lack of appeal of some interventions might be similarly 
explained. Maryanne for example, speaks positively about LSVT, but also suggests it is 
too rigid: ‘it’s very effective, and its very evidence based, but you have to stick to it’.  
Clara in referencing MACS, contrasts this ‘very much dictated approach as opposed to 
being flexible and adaptive with clients’. This inclination towards tailoring therapies, 
while representing the accommodating and active clinician, has major implications 
for the use rule-based therapies and research evidence 
 
The freedom to alter therapies enables clinicians to exploit less frequently-used 
options and results in fewer discarded therapies than might be imagined: 
‘I would…use…part of it, I don’t think I can think of anything I’ve completely 
dismissed and put away in the back of a filing cabinet’ (Sarah). 
Clinicians then appear to be highly pragmatic in practice and may also be less likely to 
follow the rules over time, after all: 
Deconstructing clinical practice and searching for scientific foundations 
 
 
 
212 
 
 
‘Therapies and adapting them…comes very much comes with clinical 
experience’ (Olivia). 
So while, 
‘Maybe initially you’d follow it to the letter of the law….but later on…as your 
clinical experience kicks in, it’s more pick and mix’ (Julie). 
Thus clinicians appear to select from various sources to construct interventions. Such 
eclecticism may emerge from a pragmatic and responsive attitude towards the 
singular patient.  Accommodating the human element is likely to increase uncertainty 
and appears to be expected by clinicians, after all:  
‘Patients have a habit of responding and talking back! You know, change the 
whole flow of it!’ (Nuala).   
 
Internal and external influences may also integrate to scaffold practice and reduce 
uncertainty with many participants talking about amalgamating experience and 
research. Thus, practice can be ‘a mixture of the practical, what you’ve tried, and the 
scientific’ (Claire).  Despite this, the tone of comments tends to indicate a heavier 
reliance on the practical. Even if the therapy is disproved in the literature the 
consensus appears to be that if experience showed a treatment worked, clinicians 
would ‘probably still continue to use it’ (Maryanne). The implication from such data is 
that clinicians choose not to ignore the lack of recipes, but to respond by placing a 
heavy reliance on practical evidence which includes ‘what’s worked and what hasn’t 
worked’ (Catriona). Thus, clinician’s ‘knowledge about what has worked with a similar 
client is going to inform…decision making’ (Heather). This idea of ‘what works’ appears 
based on the clinician’s trial and error practice. Rose tells us for example that she has 
‘used (it) with a couple of children and, it sometimes worked and sometimes didn’t’. 
Furthermore, this concept indicates problem solving behaviours. According to Niamh: 
‘You’re constantly….saying did that work, did that not work, what, why did that 
not work, was that a level too high, how can I make this a little bit easier’. 
 So ‘what works’ essentially appears to refer to a knowledge base accumulated from 
previous experimental practice which supports the creation of unique recipes for 
each individual client.  
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5.4.5. Summary 
Decision making is scaffolded on the unstable basis of each individual patient. This 
makes practice episodic and subject to multiple, unique and sequential decisions in 
line with theories of hypothetico-deductive reasoning. The implication is therefore 
that practice cannot be totally scientifically grounded or predictable. However, there 
is the suggestion that clinicians are operating within the restrictions of dynamic and 
individualised practice in this uncertain context using both scientific and less 
scientific behaviours.  
 
 
SUPERTHEME 2: PRACTICE AS GROUNDED AND GROWING 
‘The longer duration that you work, the more patient exposure you have, the more 
patient exposure you have…you’ve done more reading around different things you’ve 
come across….so you’ve kind of learned from others for longer, you’ve learned from your 
patients for longer, you’ve learned from the literature for longer…it’s the exposure 
to….the day to day being a speech therapist….you learn so much every day that the 
longer you do it’. (Leah). 
 
This super-theme is constructed from four main themes (Figure 5.4).  
 
Figure 5.4 Practice as grounded and growing main themes 
 
 
Clinical practice as reported by participants is not stagnant. While hinged upon a 
clinician’s portfolio - an accumulated repertoire of skills which develops over time – it 
is typically continuously cultivated and fluid. Practice as grounded and growing 
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therefore represents two core elements of a clinician’s practice: that which is 
grounded in learned knowledge and skills, mainly composed from trial and error, an 
understanding of what works and client experience, and; that which is added to this 
tool bag over time. The learning which enhances a clinician’s stock is on-going, both 
informal and formal but mainly informal, and heavily influenced by the solicitation 
and use of colleague knowledge. Clinicians utilise external sources of knowledge in 
addition to their own trial and error learning, thus representing considered and 
systematic behaviour.  
 
5.5.1. Automaticity 
‘I personally tend to...favour other things first, like I would tend to use postural 
techniques first…..I tend to engage with…ones…I know would probably work quite well’. 
(Matt). 
 
Clinical practice leads to the accumulation of a range of skills and techniques which 
despite the lean towards eclecticism, results in a degree of automaticity. Heather for 
example, refers to practice as ‘constant online problem solving almost…we have 
become quite good at that and it’s so automatic…we almost do it….without thinking 
about it’. It has clear echoes of pattern recognition: 
‘It's almost like a little unwritten database in that’s in your head….it's nothing 
that you can concretely print off…it's very intangible…you know what works, 
what doesn't work, you know what’s gotten you into trouble, what hasn't, you 
know what clients have liked, what they haven't liked’ (Nuala).  
This represents components of practice as vague and nebulous. Such automaticity 
however, may not be without logical merit merely because the thinking underpinning 
such rapid and reflexive practice is not readily articulated. In others words, ‘it doesn’t 
mean it doesn’t include scientific knowledge’ (Moira). Matt hints at a logical process 
when he states that clinicians take ‘the bits that work and leav(ing) the bits that don’t 
work’. 
 
There is however, apparently much potential for routineness: 
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‘You become used to what you use, because it’s easy and its fast and it has been 
effective and…you do kind of rely on it.…sometimes…you try…and think 
about…other therapies that are available…but often you might go back to your 
bag of tricks anyway’ (Becca). 
In other words as Siobhan says, ‘I feel I’m using….what I’ve previously used or what I 
might have used a lot of at the time’. This underscores practice as habitual, 
highlighting concerns that therapies may be mechanically employed by clinicians. 
Thus clinicians may not be ‘really specifically targeting…anything’ (Nuala) suggesting 
some interventions may not have clear rationales, and furthermore, that clinicians are 
aware of this. There may also exist a supposition of scientific underpinnings, and ‘it 
might just be ingrained’ that clinicians ‘would assume science….the evidence was there’ 
(Olivia) further suggesting casual practice. Indeed clinicians may ‘sometimes….just rely 
on what we see and…move onto the next step without measuring outcomes’ (Catriona). 
Caroline suggests that this is not as stark as it might seem as ‘it might be the old 
reliable but….you’re using it in a different way’, suggesting once more, experimental 
practice.  
 
So robotic or not, this accumulated inventory may be said to partly or effectively 
represent clinical experience, being constructed from trial & error, pick n’ mix and 
knowing what works and what doesn’t. This may be what Tara calls ‘on the ground 
evidence’. Such practical evidence is not just limited to the clinicians own experiences 
but incorporates those of colleagues, after all, ‘that’s experience, isn’t it…if it’s worked 
for somebody else before’ (Ruth). Essentially, such routine practice operates as a 
shortcut and may be said to be epitomise efficiency especially as ‘certain key areas 
appear to crop up again and again’ (Evie). Knowledge of the client group influences 
routineness with familiarity breeding automaticity. For example:  
‘The same thing I suppose springs to mind each time….it’s seems…like the 
obvious thing to do’ (Ruth), and; 
‘The more you see of the same problem the more experience you get, which 
informs your future practice’ (Maryanne.) 
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The move towards automaticity happens over time being relied upon more heavily 
with the amassing of clinical experience. It exponentially affects a clinician’s 
confidence. Stephanie’s confidence kicked in after a year and a half and it was then 
she ‘felt confidence…it’s about you feeling….I know what I’m doing’. This confidence 
may also be constructed as ‘comfort’. There is for example, ‘a certain comfort that’s 
offered in knowing that something works’ (Leah), also reflected in being ‘comfortable 
with the client group’ (Moira). It may also contribute to definitions of expertise as 
Maryanne argues:  
‘Wouldn’t you as a service user want to be seen by somebody who’s done it a 
good few of times…..that’s how I would feel’.  
Thus, while the fundamentals of practice involve core skills, experienced practice does 
not involve repeated learning and clinicians effectively ‘come to every patient with 
that experience’ (Nuala). This concurs with knowledge-based models of clinical 
reasoning.  Automatic practice includes what can be referred to as tool bags. 
 
 
5.5.2. Tool bags 
‘So you will have a bag of tricks as it were’. (Niamh). 
 
A clinician develops a tool bag which scaffolds practice. All clinicians start from a set 
base – college learning - which as multiple participants note, enables the clinician to 
work across most areas. The tool bag is augmented based on the area of practice so 
‘there’s specific knowledge and skills that we would require people to achieve’ (Nuala). 
Additions vary with work context. In disability for example, ‘everybody here should 
have some form of training in a core group of things’ (Tara). However, this does not 
infer that each clinician has a similar tool bag as each may have their own ‘pet 
methods’ (May).  This does not limit the group influence as clinicians may add to their 
tool bags ‘because everybody did it, everybody started it; everybody loved it’ (Tara).  
This suggests a cultural effect to some acquisitions. Furthermore, there are no specific 
scientific overtones to these procurements.  
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Kahmi’s ‘what works’ query may be explained in this context as knowing what works 
represents the contents of a tool bag. As Grace states, ‘certainly a lot of stuff I would do, 
I just do it, because it works’. This experiential knowledge appears to supersede 
scientific knowledge. Clinicians use therapies even though ‘there’s no great evidence 
behind it but yet you know from the results that you’re getting that some of the things 
do work’ (Nuala). Knowing what works contributes to feelings of comfort as ‘there’s a 
certain comfort that’s offered in knowing that something works’ (Leah). Thus, being 
comfortable and confident with a therapy impacts upon its addition to the collection, 
or selection once added. Nuala exemplifies this when saying that, ‘I never felt 
comfortable using it ...so I don’t think I gave it a chance to see if it worked’. Indeed this 
ease with a therapy may be pivotal: ‘I think you have to be comfortable using it to be 
effective’ (Niamh).  
 
It is clear that tools bags are an important instrument for structuring practice. The 
appeal of structure is evident as ‘sometimes it would be lovely to say, this is exactly 
what you do, these are the materials you use, you use it twice a week’ (May). This 
structure can be represented by the concept of packages. Clara also notes that she 
‘…would love….if that’s the pack you use for speech, and that’s the pack for 
language and it can be frustrating sometimes because our work is never really 
that’.  
Nuala also aspires to ‘a little machine that you could measure somebody using it’. The 
implication is that the tool bag fulfils part of the need to structure of practice.  
 
If practice does naturally evolve into this bag of tricks, there are clear consequences 
for EBP. This comfortable approach to practice may negatively influence critical 
engagement as while clinicians ‘sometimes do….try…think about…what’s new’ , they 
also ‘often…go back to the bag of tricks anyway’ (Becca). This means there is potential 
to: 
‘…get stuck in a bit of a rut as well. You…tend to do the same thing…. 
probably….because you can’t think of anything else…it’s just that I’ve done it 
for a long time’ (May). 
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This repository of options reduces the weight experimental practice and may 
represent pragmatic practice as Rose tells us: 
 ‘I think if you’re confident that the old, goldie oldie one is gonna work then 
you’ll use it, rather than bumbling around in the dark and possibly missing the 
mark’.  
Trial and error learning itself contributes to the contents of the tool bag as…  
‘You can try something and it doesn’t have to work…it’s not a lost session because 
you’ve learned about the child…and just put something else in the tool bag’ (Eabha).  
Not only does trial and error contribute to the tool bag, but it is also enabled by it. 
According to Elaine, clinicians have ‘a bigger bag of tricks from which to do…trial and 
error’.  Thus tool bags can facilitate flexibility.  
 
5.5.3. Casual learning 
‘Most of my day to day stuff wouldn’t have been….influenced by training…day to day 
stuff it isn’t like, you go on a course, you apply it and that’s that’. (Grace). 
 
Clinicians tend to go on formal training only ‘if there was a training programme there’ 
(Lorcan). Often, there’s ‘not necessarily going to be a formal training course’ (Nuala) or 
as Siobhan says ‘not every type of therapy will come in a nice little package’. This 
necessitates a certain pragmatism, and thus, a clinician accumulates part of her 
repertoire from casual learning.  Indeed, even in the presence of formal training 
options, clinicians tend to be flexible. As Stephanie says, ‘I wouldn’t have done the 
training and I would have been quite happy to work away at it’. Part of the valuing of 
casual learning may also reflect disappointed experiences of formal training such as 
not seeing ‘the value of it, and how you’re going to use it’ (Niamh). In fact, casual 
learning may be appreciated because of its relevance, whereas formal training might 
be translationally challenged. Thus ‘on the day of the course it seems brilliant and 
fabulous but when you’re back in the clinic, it mightn’t just fit right’ (Caroline). 
 
 
This flexibility results in what a number of participants refer to as ‘dipping’: 
‘I haven’t been specifically trained…yet colleagues have, and I can dip on 
them…or kinda take bits out of that’ (Beth), and; 
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‘The programme…people had been using bits of it….we used to dip in and out of 
it’ (Niamh). 
Dipping may represent the nature of learning in practice, and be also characterised by 
the idea of giving it a go, a ‘just go and do it’ (Nuala) approach.  As Siobhan tells us: 
‘If I hadn’t had experience in something…I’d have no problems sort of going in 
and using it….I’d think I’d give that a go’.  
This suggests an active, experiential approach to learning. Such an approach naturally 
produces errors which then also contribute to learning as ‘you’ve learned an even 
bigger lesson because then you’ve learned to go forward’ (Susan). Mistakes are in fact 
integral and highly formative as Eabha previously explained. 
 
Thus it seems that clinicians actively participate in learning. This includes reflecting 
on, or evaluating the merits of learning. With regard to formal learning, Heather 
contends that: 
 ‘If you don’t reflect on it afterwards and discuss it, then training doesn’t 
actually have the value…(it) might have…you have to do that piece afterwards’.  
Clinicians do not appear to accept new knowledge without exploring it fully. Training 
therefore does not equal commitment but consideration as Katie declares, ’I definitely 
would need the training and then decide myself’. Use of new therapies and new 
knowledge therefore appears contemplated and measured and suggests 
conscientiousness. Learning formally does not therefore equal roboticism and is not 
an end point but a base point from which clinicians are ‘in a position to be 
flexible…around it’ (Catriona). Thus formal learning also results in casual use. 
Clinicians therefore appear to form maximum relevance through flexibility. While 
formally acquired knowledge guides clinicians on ‘how important it is to do some parts 
exactly as designed and other parts that you can be a bit artistic about’ (Elaine), 
clinicians can be creative around the rules attached to individual therapies.  
 
So clinicians acknowledge the need to be grounded in many ways e.g. in experience of 
similar clients, by having a repertoire and by learning. This learning itself forms a 
basis upon which the willing clinician adds new knowledge.  Contrary to having 
repertoires, clinicians are aware of the need to keep growing. In other words,  
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‘It’s important…that you don’t get stuck in, because this has worked for the last 
ten kids I’m not going to be open to try new things’ (Erica). 
Training whether casual or formal is one way of achieving this and acknowledges the 
importance of knowledge. It is interesting that conventional book learning is rarely 
mentioned by clinicians, instead experiential learning characterised by ‘just doing it’ 
appear as one of the most valued and relevant sources of growing practice. 
 
 
5.5.4. Not lone rangers 
‘You’re not as much a lone ranger’. (Elaine). 
 
Colleagues are also a primary source of learning, what Siobhan calls ‘drawing from 
other’s experiences’. This reflects again on the values for relevance, practicality and 
shortcuts. A clinician can after all, ‘get your clinical experience in talking to…people’ 
(Rita). It appears clinicians actively pursue co-operative growth. Indeed in some cases 
it is essential given the absence of training options. For example, ‘there’s no generally 
specific training course for ICU….so it tends to be you’re shadowing somebody’ (Nuala). 
Colleagues often replace formal training, it being ‘one way of doing it without having 
done the training’ (Caroline). It may be most appreciated by new graduates, being 
considered ‘invaluable’ (Susan).  
 
Thus, use of colleagues appears to constitute a normal part of practice. Indeed, ‘for 
most cases…you watch somebody else’ (Nuala). This can take many forms, including 
‘shadowing’ (Olivia), ‘talking’ (Maggie), ‘demonstration’ (Nuala) and ‘pull(ing) 
experience from others’ (Ciara). More experienced colleagues are most valued. 
Clinicians identify others ‘who...are more expert than we are…if there’s a stammering 
child everyone heads to Alice’s office’ (Heather).  Thus, the solicitation of colleague 
opinion is usually the seeking of measured opinion. As Eleanor notes: 
‘If I’m looking to somebody for advice I know they’ve got a lot of 
experience…they’ve looked into the evidence that supports what they’re doing 
too’. 
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Colleagues are recognised as providing balance to a clinician’s own experience ‘where 
that’s more reliable’ (Heather). This is especially important as ‘if you are working on 
your own then it’s quite easy to have tunnel vision’ (Beth).  Furthermore, contemplated 
action tends to follows that sought opinion, clinicians being ‘able to take from her 
experience and information on it and adapt it’ (Siobhan).  
 
So colleagues influence ‘change’ (Eleanor) and this co-operative growth has many 
levels. This includes peers who ‘alert(ed) us to the most recent research there is on 
outcomes’ (Alice), and; students and new graduates who are a source of up-to-date 
knowledge, and can ‘bring in an idea that nobody else has really been using in the 
department’ (Ruth). However, clinicians distinguish between SLT and non-SLT 
colleagues with discipline-specific sharing being more valued. Other professionals 
‘may not fit ones needs as precisely as if it was a team of SLTs’ (Elaine). But there is an 
acknowledgement that external influences are important, as Ruth points out, 
‘you…look to outside as well’. This reflects an awareness of the potential for stagnancy 
and the importance of not ‘get(ting) stuck in (what has) worked for the last ten kids’ 
(Erica). 
 
Importantly, the wisdom of colleagues is prized more than other sources of 
knowledge and is reflected in words such ‘invaluable’ (Sarah). It has ‘more impact 
maybe than lots of stuff you read in a book’ (Pamela). There appear to be two main 
reasons for this. Firstly, such knowledge is expedient, after all ‘it’s much quicker to 
access somebody whose next door…than it is to read an article or several articles’ 
(Heather). Secondly, it is more practical or relevant. So clinicians ‘want to know what 
do they practically do within the forty five minutes, and that’s the kind of info you can 
get from others’ (Siobhan). Practicality extends to comparison with formal training as: 
‘The experience of other people in a similar setting can be a lot more 
practical…than….when you come away from a course’ (Caroline).  
This relative valuing of colleague knowledge extends to positive research evidence as 
clinicians would use this opinion to fortify their own doubts, that is, ‘just get their 
experience and kind of reinforce it that way’ (Becca).  
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Thus, colleague knowledge and opinion act as a powerful influences on decision 
making and promote confidence because ‘if someone says this has worked….it gives you 
maybe more confidence to try it’ (Pamela). Clinicians therefore learn the art of practice 
in large part from profession-specific colleagues.  This indicates a heavy reliance on 
what could be termed at the very least anecdotal sources, or at the very most expert 
opinion. 
 
5.5.5. Summary 
Practice as grounded and growing represents the skills and knowledge upon which all 
practice is founded – learned and accumulated repertoires stemming from working 
with specific populations, and the on-going learning that adds to those skills, mainly 
from experiential and colleague influences.  
 
 
 
SUPERTHEME 3: CRITICAL PRACTICE 
‘You don’t necessarily need…throw the….baby out with the bath water…totally change 
everything if new evidence comes along’. (Jill). 
 
 
This super theme is constructed from four main themes (Figure 5.5):  
 
 
Figure 5.5 Critical practice main themes 
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In essence, clinicians indicate that they are critical thinkers, being active rather than 
passive participants in clinical practice. They exist in a world where decisions are 
constantly being made based on assorted considerations such as patient 
presentations, pragmatics, science and knowledge. Clinicians ground themselves in 
solid principles and accumulated skills, and are typically conscientious and rigorous. 
They may consider themselves to be more scientist than artist but this may be 
influenced in degree by the setting they elect to work in, and there are clear concerns 
with the concept of scientist. They are sceptics about both non-scientific practices and 
EBP. They demonstrate scientific behaviours in ways that are not conventionally 
constructed.  
 
5.6.1. The right way 
‘They say you have to do the training there’s a reason why, so that you actually 
understand the principle of that particular programme, and that you can use it better’. 
(Niamh). 
 
Clinicians acknowledge the need do things correctly. They see distinct advantages to 
formal training and demonstrate a considered approach to it. In some ways they see it 
is as following the rules and there is the idea of ‘you can’t’ with regard to certain 
training.  Beth says for example, ‘you’re not just gonna read the book and run a course, 
you can’t do that’. In other words, ‘there are certain things you do training’ (Rita). As 
Siobhan notes, ‘if I hadn’t gone on the PCI course I wouldn’t even attempt it’. It appears 
that formal learning builds assurance: 
‘We don’t feel like we…are confident in the therapy we are doing unless we’ve 
been on a training programme and have received instruction on it’ (Matt). 
This sentiment echoed throughout the groups.  
 
Doing things the right way by undertaking formal training has other outcomes. It 
essentially means being better informed about a therapy, having ‘the core concept (of) 
what’s behind it’ (Catriona), ‘so that you actually understand the principle of that 
particular programme’ (Niamh), or as Elaine calls it, ‘the essence of it… why it’s 
working or….how important it is to do some parts exactly as designed’. This information 
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leads to better decisions about treatment choices. Furthermore it may not be so much 
that training teaches a clinician to carry out a technique ‘not necessarily a right way, 
but…a better way’ (Niamh). 
 
Such training does not replace the experiential learning previously discussed. It is 
specific to certain therapies- including those for which there are potential for harm, 
that is, ‘if it’s …a particular thing that can actually cause harm’ (Rita). Thus there is a 
feeling that ‘now I can’t do any harm because I’ve been trained’ (Leah). This idea of 
harm is pervasive, especially in settings where dysphagia is practised, especially if ‘it’s 
an invasive therapy like…DPNS’ (Matt). Comfort is important: 
‘There’s things I wouldn’t….feel very comfortable in doing….if I’m not trained in 
it and it involves putting stuff on somebody’ (Sarah). 
Some respondents in disability also express notions of harm related to 
communication therapies. Eabha for example lets us know that ‘PECs is one….that 
requires training, because a lot of prompt dependency can develop and you can do 
damage’. Furthermore, not undertaking training means ‘it’s never going to be in its 
purest form….and that has an impact on possibly quality of service’ (Olivia).  
 
The right way also means that clinicians can be assuredly adaptive, as subsequent to 
training rules can be bent and modifications made. Catriona calls this ‘being flexible’ 
with training, essentially once trained clinicians can ‘then… go away and tweak it 
based on your own experience’ (Elaine). However, the right way is not always adhered 
to as clinicians can still feel comfortable to ‘take bits out of that’ (Beth) and be ‘quite 
happy to work away at it’ (Stephanie) without undergoing training.  The implication is 
that some therapies can be appropriately used without such training if the knowledge 
base of the profession enables an understanding of the therapy. In other words, ‘you 
don’t dip into things which you’ve absolutely no background in whatsoever’ (Katie). This 
infers that flexible practice is not random but emerges from a firm knowledge base. 
So training can be considered as a measured exercise, undertake for ‘those courses 
that you need to really learn a specific skill and you need to be certified’ (Nuala). The 
right way indicates solid knowledge informs decision-making but does not restrict 
flexibility.  
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5.6.2. Relevance and value 
‘That kind of research doesn’t really speak to what we do, or the value in the work that 
we do’. (Caroline). 
 
Clinicians value relevance to their practice as indicated by co-operative learning and 
when discussing training. Essentially, clinicians undertake training ‘that would benefit 
(the) most rather than single’ (Katie). This suggests that training is predominantly 
defined as client relevant and not as personal growth. As Aoife notes, ‘it’s very 
important about maximising the outcomes for the patient’. This results in an economic 
and pragmatic approach to training defined by the word ‘benefit’. It means that a 
clinician ‘can’t just sign up for everything…because you won’t necessarily get the benefit 
out of it’ (Stephanie). Extracting maximum relevance may involve investigation 
typified by Stephanie’s comment: 
‘You think “oh my god this could be fantastic”. But you really have to look more 
into it more…it’s like a parent looking at an alternative therapy that claims to 
do everything. Training can often claim to do everything’.  
 So use of a new therapy with or without formal training is contemplated and 
measured in order to increase value. Additional worth is also realised in what was 
previously outlined, whereby a clinician actively participates in evaluating the merit 
of a therapy after training.   
 
Clinicians place relative values on sources of information which guide their decision-
making. While there is a relatively high valuing of colleague experience, clinicians also 
appear to have regard for research. This is reflected probably best by older clinicians: 
’The research is coming out now and that’s wonderful and we talk about 
evidence base and it’s becoming more scientific and that’s the way to go’ 
(Catriona). 
 Clinicians do appear responsive to research evidence by changing practice: ‘There 
was a lot of talk in research…so I probably wouldn’t use that anymore’ (Eleanor).  On 
the whole however, clinician’s behaviours appear less than accommodating. Similar to 
Eleanor saying she probably wouldn’t use a therapy with negative research evidence, 
there is a perception that it is ‘not the only way’ (Catriona). In other words, ‘you don’t 
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have to take them as gospel’ (Niamh) particularly as ‘there’s always going to be 
evidence that shows both sides’ (Leah). This implicates clinicians as being less than 
convinced about using research. Therefore the right way appears to reflect research 
appreciation but not necessarily practice alteration. This is not to say that an 
obstructive attitude prevails, as a scientific attitude is evident. Ruth for example says, 
‘you’d have to evaluate that disconfirming evidence’ and there are a number of reasons 
clinicians offer why this is. Most reference the quality of published research. Perhaps 
‘it could have been a crap article…that wasn’t in any way rigorous …it can be rubbish 
evidence’ (Nuala). Basically, clinicians agree that ‘just ‘cos it’s published research 
doesn’t mean its good research’ (Heather). The implication is that research evidence 
cannot be used as intended, in the correct way. It does however indicate that research 
evidence is integrated with practical evidence as recommended by the EBP model.  
 
There is also evidence that clinicians feel research is not pure and is open to abuse 
thus impacting on its worth. Eleanor points to the dangers of over interpretation: 
‘There was a paper that was out…to say that speech and language therapy 
doesn’t work…and it was something like, they come twice a year for therapy’.  
They are suspicions of therapies, particularly pseudoscientific ones who abuse 
research, essentially, ‘how valid is their research’ (Tara). Commercial products are not 
immune, some therapies being ‘packaged products designed to…make people feel as 
though they are evidence based’ (Matt).  Thus while suspicious of research evidence, 
clinicians also use it to undermine the worth of some practices. Of Listening therapy 
Jackie states, ‘I don’t know that there’s a lot of evidence for, and there seems to be a lot 
against’. Research supporting clinicians’ opinion can result in a positive reaction such 
as ‘I never believed in it, and, then when the research came out…I was delighted’ 
(Heather). What is evident therefore is a contradiction. Research evidence has some 
appeal specifically in terms of discrediting questionable practices, but may not be 
necessarily useful otherwise.  
 
The suggestion therefore is that clinical experience is the right way. Leah reflects the 
mood when saying: 
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‘This paper comes out that says it doesn’t work at all. You might kind of go well 
I’ve ten other patients that say otherwise’.  
This reflects what can be said to be a pragmatic orientation. 
 
5.6.3. Being practical 
‘Sometimes when deciding if I’m going to use one method or approach or another 
approach, it would sometimes depends on the teacher…the teacher’s approach and 
preferences impacts hugely on my work’. (Rose). 
 
Practically takes many forms including extracting value discussed previously. It 
represents a construct of practice which defines clinicians as pragmatic. This is 
perhaps most demonstrated by the identification of the patient as pivotal in decision 
making, and a concern for functionality and behaviour change which a number of 
clinicians specifically refer to: 
‘Really he needed...something to make his communication functional’ 
(Siobhan), and; 
’Keeping it functional to the needs of the child, rather than following a set 
programme that’s recommended’ (Beth).  
Such functionality may include breaking the rules i.e. adapting therapies, which 
‘would be adapted because of the very different needs’ (Beth).  
 
Indeed, the eclectic clinician discussed previously may at heart represent the practical 
clinician, resulting in the adoption of a pick & mix approach to practice. As Clara 
comments: 
‘A lot of therapists…take the really good bit out of it and…we might end up 
doing a form of treatment with a client that’s a little bit of a few things’.  
This emphasis means intervention may be less about a programme than a practical 
outcome. As Tara tells us when she talks about an individual client:  
‘A particular child walked out on a ramp…who had major behavioural 
problems….that that is monumental in this child’s life, and for this family’.  
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Thus the clinician’s recognition and valuing of individual needs results in a pragmatic 
practitioner who may place less importance on non-practical sources. As Grace 
admits:  
‘Certainly a lot of stuff I…do, I just do it, because it works, but I certainly 
wouldn’t have checked up…to see…if there’s evidence behind it’. 
 
Practicality is also apparent when considering resources. Ciara for example talks 
about ‘lengthy training, like its five days’ being a barrier. Such lengthy training may 
only be undertaken if patient benefits can be achieved. But mostly it’s about trying to 
‘map that onto what’s practical and what’s available in your setting and your resources’ 
(May). This focus on practicality may also help explain the dominance of experiential 
learning and why clinicians elect not to utilise formal routes where possible.  
 
Such pragmatism may also be a fountain for scepticism particularly noted among 
disability respondents for some mandated training programmes. Clinicians provide a 
number of examples: 
‘Two people have to be trained to run it together. One person trained could 
train another person….there’s nothing outside of what we do’ (Eabha), and; 
‘Unless you’ve done a course in the last three years, you lose your certification 
and have to be retrained again….I mean that’s complete money making you 
know’ (Julie).  
Scepticism is also apparent for commercial programmes and includes an awareness 
of the lack of scientific merit of some programmes. Thus says Olivia: 
‘Talktools…..that’s an example of a very well packaged programme that’s…..got 
lots of lovely…and expensive resources and there isn’t really a whole lot of 
evidence there for it’.  
This scepticism extends to the research evidence as previously outlined but is 
particularly focused on the translational problems with research. Many of the 
sentiments expressed echo and identify differences between what research does and 
what clinical practice is. Research is essentially ‘done in sort of ideal conditions…not…. 
real clinical situations’ (May). So this idea that different arenas are operational is 
clearly highlighted, after all: 
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‘Those children don’t really exist in the real world…so, you can’t take exactly 
what they’ve discovered in their research paper and apply it to your hundred 
clients because it’s just not going to work in that way’ (Heather).  
These translational issues extend to cultural issues, there being ‘a lot of articles 
(which) are US based or UK based….there are small cultural differences here’ (Heather).  
 
Practical problems extend to the paucity of research evidence. Thus, ‘for a lot of things 
we do there isn’t really clear evidence’ (May). This may be particular to specific client 
groups and despite the best efforts of clinicians. Stephanie tells us that she works ‘in 
adult services and…we’ve trawled the journals looking for evidence…and it isn’t there’. 
Concern also extends to ‘conflicting evidence’ (Claire) and lack of clear direction as 
‘always papers at the end of it say….further research’ (Leah). In effect: 
‘Quantitative stuff….doesn’t tell you very much because they’re not real 
people…and so then you can’t transfer it’ (Heather).  
This does not translate to case studies, as clinicians clearly express appreciation of 
such research, underlining the meaningfulness of case evidence (and perhaps 
anecdote) to practice. It would, for example,  
‘…be much more useful to read a very detailed case study about somebody….so 
you have a real picture….and you have something useful to take away from 
that that you might be able to apply to a similar client down the road’ 
(Heather).  
In this climate then, clinicians are knowingly using therapies which do not have 
supportive research evidence, ‘certainly there’s stuff that I would do that….wouldn’t 
have a strong evidence base’ (May). This may merely reflect the pragmatic practitioner 
operating in the absence of research rather than an unengaged clinician.  
 
5.6.4. Being scientists  
‘They might say the decision making is based on clinical experience but that doesn’t 
mean clinical experience doesn’t include scientific knowledge’. (May). 
 
This leads to questions about whether clinicians consider practice to be either partly 
or wholly scientific in nature. Some think practice ‘isn’t remotely scientific (May). 
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Others would be ‘more comfortable being called a scientist than an artist’ (Nuala), 
stating that: 
‘We are clinicians; to say speech therapy….is an art is…doing your profession a 
bit of a disservice….it is…a science’ (Maggie).  
However, while numerous clinicians agree to a scientific canopy, they also express a 
‘science but’ argument. Eleanor pronounces that ‘we are scientists but we’re maybe 
more along the qualitative bit’. Heather argues that ‘there is a definite scientific base 
but it’s not science in the way that medicine is science’. This ‘science but ‘assertion 
extends across numerous participants and is fundamentally defined as ‘science but not 
exact science’ (Annie), even ‘the art of science’ (Leah).      
 
Practice as art is not a concept which has no appeal. Art can be defined ‘clinical 
experience….the kind of no real….hard, bedrock what you’re doing’ (Lorcan), or ‘the 
more creative elements’ (Clara). This creativity may not necessarily be devoid of 
scientific components as ‘sometimes…you’re….trying to create solutions or being 
imaginative’ (Clara). As with science, the concept of artistry is not straightforward.  It 
can be perceived as ‘a…bit too frothy’ (Caroline), sounding ‘a bit like you’re …making 
stuff up’ (Lorcan). Additionally the interface between art and science is not clear-cut:  
‘Scientists just don’t politely do formulas and techniques, they are quite 
creative….they have to be to come up with ideas’ (Nuala).   
There is however, a hesitancy to embrace science which Caroline conveys: 
‘We’re reluctant, we don’t see ourselves as scientists, but we see science and all 
that concreteness that as something very desirable….we really do have a very 
uneasy relationship with that whole question...I think we’d kind of like to be 
more scientific than we are’.  
The overall suggestion is that SLTs essentially have not found a satisfactory construct 
to which they would comfortably align themselves.  
 
Some clinicians also feel they are being compelled by an incompatible construct 
which is EBP. This apprehension with the perceived pressure of EBP includes 
concerns for the art in practice, essentially whether ‘creativity (would) be squashed as 
the evidence gets stronger’ (Lorcan).  A few participants refer to ‘being pushed, for 
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example, ‘that’s the way the professions…. are being pushed’ (Ruth). Eleanor talks about 
being coerced:  
‘We’ve been probably shoehorned to go down the quantitative stuff but 
actually we’re probably more about the qualitative, human side’.  
This feeling of being coerced appears to reflect the non-scientific nature of the 
profession. As Heather says,  
‘What frustrates us is trying to shoehorn it into that mode of science that it 
maybe doesn’t sit in there in that very pure science because there is a lot of 
other aspects to it’.  
There is almost a notion of siege offered by Eleanor ‘so yeah, you’re not going to say, 
okay, I give up, do you know!’ It may be that being artist or scientist depends on 
individual clinician’s areas of practice, with some areas being more traditionally 
scientific as previously referenced. Group influences may also impact. When Tara says 
she used a therapy because ‘because everybody did it, everybody started it, everybody 
loved it’ and Catriona reveals that despite concerns she ‘went along with it up to a 
point’, questions may be asked whether the culture impacts on scientific practice.  
 
Moreover, when asked to define their scientific practice, clinicians first go to 
conventional and traditional definitions of scientific acts including ‘formal 
assessments’ (Jean) and ‘recording’ (Rita). Across groups, measurement arose as key 
to scientific practice; essentially measurement is ‘what makes it scientific…..we always 
measure it’ (Leah). Such measuring means that ‘it’s very much like a scientific process 
that we’re going through’ (Olivia). Measuring also functions as a scientific behaviour 
to support unvalidated therapies, that is, its okay ‘as long as you’re evaluating it’ 
(Nuala). Other scientific behaviours which support practice such as having ‘a clear 
rationale why you’re doing something’ (Julie), and using theory, mentioned by many 
clinicians. Leah directly relates it to science: 
‘The theory behind it is to target something scientific…..you….make use of 
neuroplasticity or something scientific’.  
Clinicians therefore clearly report scientific behaviours which directly support the 
idea that practice contains scientific components. Experimentation is identified 
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explicitly including ‘testing hypotheses’ (May). These behaviours are clearly aligned to 
the idea of science: 
‘You start off with a hypothesis…and then you test that through whatever 
therapy you’re using, and then change….what you’re doing….is what most 
scientists do if they’re doing an experiment’ (May), and; 
‘That’s part of us being the scientist…we are…..experimenting with an 
approach, evaluating the outcomes and the modifying it so see that is effective’ 
(Leah). 
Also clearly explicated is ‘problem solving’ (Beth). Susan calls clinicians ‘problem 
solvers’ and Lizzie says practice is about ‘looking for different reasons, or different 
causes or solutions’. However it may be that such scientific behaviours are not 
conscious, that while ‘people actually do have scientific knowledge…some of it is very 
deeply integrated‘(Caroline). It might be that ‘people aren’t great at reflecting on, or 
actually unpicking, yes that does come from a scientific basis’ (May), replicating ideas of 
automaticity, but not negating scientific elements to practice. 
 
Scepticism, previously referenced, appears pervasive, incorporating EBP and being 
seen across a number of discussions. Clinicians for example, display concerns 
regarding some therapies especially those which may be well-packaged or ‘very 
strongly commercialised’ (Siobhan). After all states Heather, ‘that’s just expert opinion 
just like my expert opinion or your expert opinion’. This scepticism extends to those 
therapies which ‘factor in training ‘ (Niamh) especially as ‘more and more now there 
are training programmes out there where you so need to be certified to carry them out’ 
(Olivia). There is a feeling voiced by Julie that certification and retraining is ‘complete 
money making’. This scepticism extends to a fear that American models which 
embrace commercial interests will infiltrate the Irish context. Ruth expresses a 
communal concern: 
‘I would hate it to go the way it’s gone in the states…it has to be a pre-packed 
programme because then you have companies marketing things and lobbying 
to get things put on…..the reimbursement scheme….and there isn’t really any 
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evidence there it’s just a very strong marketing department that have got that 
out there’.  
The appeal of science may be most seen in a critical approach to therapies which are 
not scientifically based. Clinicians clearly identify pseudo and non-scientific practices. 
As May states, ‘anything with huge promises and a lot of money is worrying’. Indeed, 
money appears to be a red flag: 
‘Where something new arrives….it’s pretty obvious that it’s just quackery and 
they’re looking for money I think that usually gives you a fair idea’ (Nuala).  
Erica also argues that patients ‘perceive it to be the superior because they’re paying 
money for it’. However money is not the only factor, clinicians being also concerned 
with promises made and broken. As Siobhan relates of one of her cases: 
‘People trying to fix him and…poor parents, you would have thought they were 
seeing this as the holy grail and it didn’t turn out to be the holy grail of course’.    
 
Scientific practice is also clearly demonstrated in considered opinion formation 
referenced previously. This occurs mainly through use of colleagues, trial and error 
practice, reflection post training and a judicious approach to evidence. It reflects 
awareness that sources of information need to be validated. Marie advises that 
‘finding out where the idea came from’ is important. This represents a commitment to 
critical practice and also an insistence on clarity and precision which extends to 
clinicians’ intervention episodes. Clinicians question whether it ‘is…actually that 
method I found that’s working or is it, something about the way that I’m doing it?’ 
(Helen). It all centres on being analytical, as Leah says ‘it comes back to….critically 
evaluating’ and generally ‘critically thinking and analysing’ (Caroline). This ensures 
openness to reasoned change: 
‘We’re all flexible here….we’ve all changed what we’re doing, we’re not just 
going to stick to it because we like it’ (Eleanor).  
Clinicians also act to share their scientific and critical knowledge facilitating scientific 
behaviours in others both colleagues and clients. These include: 
‘Print(ing) out….a summary of the research and give it to them to read’ 
(Eabha), and; ‘Prepar(ing) a list of questions that they should ask of any 
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approach they were considering…..so we gave them tools to analyse it 
themselves’ (Tara).  
All this lends weight to the idea that practice is not a random occupation where 
clinicians are not ‘blindly just doing something’ (Nuala). There is an overwhelming 
sense of informed decision-making representing a scientific approach  
 
5.6.5. Summary 
These behaviours represent engaged practice, with the clinician acting as sometime 
scientist, sometime artist but grounded in the constructs of science, mostly though 
scientific thinking and behaviours. The data also indicates a reluctance to be classified 
as wholly scientist (or wholly artist). It suggests that clinicians do not feel that the 
discipline fits neatly under the science umbrella. 
 
 
CHAPTER SUMMARY 
 
Practice is complex, perhaps both art and science and pivoted on the patient as a 
group and patient as an individual. There is no clear suggestion that clinicians may 
prefer practice to be located more towards the science on the art-science continuum, 
and they demonstrate some problems with EBP as a model, specifically research 
evidence. This does not appear however, to result in unscientific practice as they 
display scientific attitudes and behaviours, with the clinician acting as sometime 
scientist, sometime artist. This lack of centring the discipline on one preferred 
construct references the dynamic and multifaceted nature of clinical practice, which is 
as yet under defined. 
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Chapter 6: Focus groups discussion 
 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
The aim of this research was to explore decision making scaffolds in clinical practice, 
with specific attention paid to scientific constructs including EBP. As previously 
noted, group dynamics must be considered when contemplating group interview data 
as the influence of the group may be felt in restrained or compelled opinion.  The 
findings between the groups nonetheless are quite universal, and suggest either a 
strong cultural effect or reliability of the data. Both may also be assumed.  
 
The super-themes which evolved paint a picture of clinical practice as constructed by 
clinicians. Essentially, they suggest that clinical practice is not a textbook-based and 
seamless occupation, it is continually shifting although grounded in previous learning, 
and it requires flexibility in operation. The findings will be considered under four 
emerging constructs:  
A different arena;  
The pivotal patient;  
Science but, and;  
The authority of clinical experience. 
 
 
6.2 A DIFFERENT ARENA: THE REALITY OF CLINICAL PRACTICE 
‘A problem–solving, manoeuvre –according–to-circumstances approach’ (Conture, 1997, 
p.240). 
 
Decision making is effectively scaffolded on the unique basis of each individual 
patient’s characteristics and the clinician’s experience with the patient group. This 
makes practice episodic and subject to multiple, distinctive and sequential decisions 
in line with theories of hypothetico-deductive reasoning (Higgs & Jones, 2008). 
Deconstructing clinical practice and searching for scientific foundations 
 
 
 
236 
 
 
Essentially, this implies that rule-based interventions whether they are individual 
therapies or research evidence, do not fit seamlessly into clinical practice, and may 
even fail to recognise the realities of that arena.  Therefore, many of the sentiments 
expressed by participants echo Firensuoli’s (2000) argument, that there is an 
identified difference between what research does and what clinical practice is.  
 
6.2.1. Uncertainty 
‘Perhaps the most important skill for any health care professional to master in their 
career is the ability to recognise and handle such clinical uncertainty’ (Kitson, 1999, 
p.x).  
 
Clinicians demonstrate a regard for functionality that may not reflect conventional or 
purely scientific values. Although representing a responsive attitude, pivoting 
practice on individual patients results in uncertainty, replicating Schӧn’s (1983) 
concept of practice based on swampy ground. Instability also results from other 
influences including extra therapeutic effects, supporting findings (e.g. Garske & 
Anderson, 2003) which give due weight to such factors.  
 
Clinicians appear to acknowledge both general uncertainty, and uncertainty about 
their skill, expertise and knowledge base as argued by Thompson et al. (2002). They 
act to reduce it in a number of ways concurring with Kitson’s (1999) argument 
regarding the importance of mastering clinical uncertainty. It might be surmised that 
the structure provided by rule-based treatments and research evidence would be a 
primary facilitator in such attempts. This is obviously not the case, suggesting that the 
realities of practice mitigate against those particular structures. Research evidence, 
rather than reducing clinical uncertainty as Gambrill (2005) suggested, may actually 
contribute to it and contradict clinicians’ attempts to reduce that uncertainty. Barrier-
studies on the use of research evidence (e.g. Nail-Chiwetalu & Bernstein-Ratner, 
2007) are awash with findings which identify research-use problems and this may in 
part be explained by the failure of such data to recognise or tackle the problem of 
uncertainty.  
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Instead, preferred decision scaffolds include knowledge of the client group, the use of 
tool-bags, reference to colleague opinion and use of scientific behaviours. The 
unpredictability of practice may explain the high valuing of case-based data in the 
form of colleagues’ experiences, client-group experience and case-based research. 
While being considered less valuable in the EBP paradigm, such sources may be more 
meaningful to clinicians, perhaps because they are more relevant and help to 
moderate uncertainty most. The response to uncertainty is also evident in the 
clinician’s tool bag, that is, the clinicians’ collection of therapies and techniques. The 
tool bag on the surface might suggest practice is more routine than scientific.  
However, these tool bags may function to enable more organised responding and to 
structure approaches to intervention. A clinician’s kit can be said to reduce the weight 
of trial and error in intervention, and thus clinical uncertainty. Furthermore, if 
practice naturally involves tool bags, then the persistent questions in the literature 
revolving around underuse of EBP in clinical practice may at least be in part 
explained. The concept of tools bag may furthermore help to understand why practice 
may be more uncertain in the early years, as the tool bag is emptier at this stage of 
clinical development. Tool bags and case-based knowledge can also be said to 
represent pragmatic shortcuts (Heffernan, 2011) to efficient practice.  
 
Clinicians also manage uncertainty by acting scientifically perhaps best characterised 
by the notion of experimentation, and replicating Logemann’s (2004) contention that 
much of SLT practice is composed of individual clinical trials. Scientific thinking is 
also apparent in the valuing of measurement as a tool even in the context of less-
scientific practices, thus clinicians act to validate information acquired from the 
patient in a reliable fashion as argued by Edwards et al. (2004). Furthermore, 
clinicians also acquire new knowledge which appears to be integrated with critical 
consideration further serving to structure practice decisions. This suggests measured 
behaviour which uses scientific behaviours and information to reduce uncertainty, 
turning unaided decision making into informed decision making.  
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Thus clinical practice is an arena where control is not always possible with clinicians 
identifying the human element and the need to respond to individual patients as 
important in this regard.  The implication from such data is that clinicians do not 
choose to ignore clinical uncertainty but to decrease it in a variety of ways. This 
thought-through approach means that, as Thompson et al. (2002) note, ‘chance and 
all the biases that come with unaided decision making’ reduce their effect on the 
outcome (p.31). Such active and deliberate attempts to reduce uncertainty can be said 
to be evidence of critical practice. 
  
6.2.2. Contradictions 
‘At the heart of clinical medicine is an unresolved conflict between the essentially case-
based nature of clinical practice and the mainly population-based nature of the research 
evidence’ (Firensuoli, 2005, p.7032).  
 
The concept of uncertainty is contributed to by contradictions which participants 
reflect. The main contradiction revolves around the art and science debate, practice 
being both what Lutterman (2011) calls ‘content counselling’ and ‘affect counselling’ 
(p.4). This effectively means clinicians find, at varying times, that they are scientist 
and artist; not scientist but artist; scientist but not artist, and; sometime scientist and 
sometime artist. This appears to represent an on-going dilemma for clinicians with 
participants suggesting that essentially they have not found a satisfactory construct to 
which they can comfortably align themselves. EBP does not meet the needs of 
clinicians in this regard, reflecting a recognition that intervention is about more than 
the therapy and more than the patient. Thus, while individual clinicians may lean 
slightly more in one direction or another based on personal preference or work 
setting, perhaps the badge of a professional discipline is the ability to shift elegantly 
and effectively between and across these dimensions.   
 
There are also indications of contradictions in the use of therapies. Clinicians use 
unvalidated and sometimes questionable interventions such as oral-motor therapy, 
thus suggesting less than scientific behaviour. However, clinicians also engage with 
scientific behaviours such as measurement and outcomes. Therefore, SLTs can be said 
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to sometimes use acts of science to make the unscientific more scientific. This appears 
to represent a considered response to unscientific practice but also a conflict, that is, 
the appearance of valuing both science and non-science. It may be that clinicians are 
being pragmatic. Perhaps they understand the issues regarding the lack of theoretical 
and evidential support for such practices, and therefore impose scientific controls to 
validate their use. This of course assumes that all clinicians using such therapies use 
measures to evaluate their practice. This may not always be the case. Some clinicians, 
particularly those in disability, also reference immeasurable practice. They report 
that some goals cannot be measured, and this constrains their definition of practice as 
scientific. It also epitomises their struggle between thinking like scientists and acting 
in less than scientific ways. However, the very idea that some behaviours may not be 
seen as measurable by clinicians is of concern for a scientific profession with some 
clinicians validating unscientific practice by such thinking.   
 
Contradictions are also manifested in other areas: in the notion that practice is highly 
individualised, but also highly dependent on population-specific knowledge, and; in 
the idea of practice being scaffolded by tool bags but being highly eclectic. These 
opposites may however work in harmony with each other. Instead of being divergent 
operations, such scaffolds perhaps work compatibly to both represent and inform 
practice. Population knowledge and tool bags for example, may the serve needs of 
simpler practice and effectively underpin the more erratic components involved in 
individuating practice and responding to complex patients. Clinicians are above all 
pragmatic and make reasoned decisions about their practices. This can explain other 
discords, including that of doing things the ‘right way’ but acting ‘incorrectly’ by using 
therapies when untrained. Clinicians act in the right way when this is required, for 
example when unsure or concerned with ethical and safety issues. So such apparent 
contradictions appear to be logically and pragmatically founded and explained by 
simple and complex operations. As Higgs & Jones (2008) have stated, ‘clinical 
reasoning is both simple and complex’ (p.4). 
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Clinicians appear somewhat conflicted by the demands of complex practice. They 
tend to dismiss rule-based approaches which are interpreted as incompatible with 
practice. Such rules are represented by Americanised systems, research evidence and 
rigid therapies. However they also express an appeal for structure and dictated 
practice such as packages and machines.  Clinicians don’t use research while at the 
same time they reference it to undermine the worth of pseudoscientific and 
commercial practices. It appears therefore, that clinicians may like the idea of 
structured and rigorous answers but find challenges when translating them to 
practice. Even positive attitudes to research and clinical guidelines do little to ensure 
their uptake as Dowsell, Harrison and Wright (2001) noted. Clinicians do not 
appreciate what they see as external impositions which they report as failing to 
appreciate the nature of practice and which conflict with their autonomous 
operations. If practice is accurately characterised by the uncertainty previously 
discussed, then such contradictions are natural, representing both the character of 
such practice and the attempts of clinicians to adjust to and respond to it. 
 
6.2.3. Dynamism 
‘Clinical practice by its nature, and each clinical interaction, requires constant 
adaptation and dynamism’ (Chapman & Sonneberg, 2000, p.15). 
 
Clinical practice is a dynamic process which while underpinned by a clinician’s 
experience, remains subject to the influence of multiple variables. It appears the best 
way clinicians have found of responding to such diversity is by being both pragmatic 
and reflexive concurring with Kahmi’s (1999) postulations regarding eclecticism. 
Dynamism is reflected continuously in the data perhaps most specifically by 
references to trial and error and experimentation, and by constructs such as ‘dipping 
in’ and ‘just doing it’. These are in essence mostly scientific behaviours which, 
accompanied by values for measurement, suggest that dynamic practice clearly 
contains scientific components.  
   
Not only are clinicians defining practice as dynamic, but they indicate that on the 
whole they are comfortable with this way of working, centring themselves in the 
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shifting sands through notions of experimental practice. As Jones et al. (2006) argue 
the scientific method evaluates one variable at a time across hundreds of subjects, 
whereas in clinical practice hundreds of variables reside within one subject: the 
patient. This can be summarised by one participant’s metaphor concerning lots of 
ingredients but no recipes. Clinicians appear to consistently and flagrantly break the 
rules: they adopt a pick and mix approach to therapies as Hayhow (2010) suggested, 
using therapies for which they have not been formally trained, and; they use their 
colleagues as shortcuts to practice decisions. This inclination towards tailoring of 
therapies and experimentation represents clinicians who are accommodating and 
who are in effect efficiency focused, as indicated by Joffe & Pring (2008). Responsive 
practice may thus form the basis of clinical practice and may explain problems with 
the use of research evidence. Furthermore, such practice requires that the clinician be 
continually mentally-engaged. This suggests that Enderby’s (2004) call for clinicians 
to be reflective practitioners is heeded. 
 
6.2.4. Summary 
Practice is unique, based on individual patients and characterised by dynamism, 
uncertainty and contradictions. Rycroft-Malone et al. (2004b) has described therapy 
as an endlessly creative interpersonal encounter. This leads clinicians to act 
pragmatically, eclectically and autonomously. It suggests an arena which requires 
further definition in order to better understand both the nature of practice and how 
science interacts with, or scaffolds it. There are clear suggestions of scientific 
behaviours supporting such imperfect practice, and this must be interpreted 
positively. Attempts to impose an externally-based rule system onto what is 
essentially an internally pivoted and responsive arena may be doomed to failure and 
explain poor uptake of research evidence.  
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6.3 THE PIVOTAL PATIENT 
 ‘At the heart of clinical medicine is an unresolved conflict between the essentially case-
based nature of clinical practice, and the mainly population based nature of the 
research evidence’ (Firensuoli, 2005, p.7032). 
  
Clinical practice is a different arena to that of research because of the individual 
patient and the resultant treatments sculpted specifically for each patient. This has far 
reaching implications on how practice operates and is defined. 
 
6.3.1. The singular patient 
‘Clinical decision making occurs by the selective application of general rules to 
particular individuals and contexts. The uniqueness of the individual precludes any 
purely rule-based methods for assigning diagnoses and selecting treatments’ 
(Greenhalgh 2002, p.397).  
 
The individual patient is at the cornerstone of decision-making and this is reflected 
throughout all themes. Patients are the reason why practice is imperfect, it being 
highly responsive to individual presentations, and explains why critical practice is 
required. It is reflected in the valuing of case-based research over higher-level 
research as Rappolt (2003) argued, and is further evident in the targeting of 
colleague’s anecdotal and expert experience. The dominance of the patient influence 
results in clinical decisions being under influenced by external scaffolds, effectively 
defining clinical practice as predominantly patient-centred and internally located. 
 
This focus on patient-centeredness results in a functional approach to intervention 
including adapting therapies and being eclectic. It implies, as Gabbay and LeMay 
(2004) have commented, that there are no cookbooks for intervention. Thus, 
clinicians form maximum intervention relevance for their patients by being artistic 
and flexible with rule-based treatments and research evidence. The value for 
functionality supports Kahmi’s (1999) argument that clinicians are bound by 
behaviour change. King et al.’s (1998) interdisciplinary study provides evidence that 
functional goals lead to improvements in children’s functioning, suggesting not just 
practicality but rationality in choosing this path. Functionality also takes into 
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consideration the bigger picture; clinical practice requiring ‘an understanding of the 
person as well as the disease’ (Edwards et al., 2004, p.314), and this is evident in 
clinicians’ comments. Clinicians’ recognition of this, places client considerations 
centrally in the treatment process 
 
The conflict clinicians feel about whether the discipline is scientifically based appears 
to originate from this patient focus. The art in practice partly represent clinicians’ 
acknowledgement of the human element and subsequent resistance to reducing the 
patient to ‘static, linear and simplistic labels’ (Fourie, 2011, p.11). There is support 
that acknowledgement of the human element and extra therapeutic effects are 
important (e.g. Hubble et al., 1999). Certainly there is promising evidence from the 
discipline of neuroimmunolgy (Evans, 2003; Kop & Gottidiener, 2005) to indicate that 
the therapeutic alliance may have real effects on the immune system and the healing 
process. This implies that clinicians are acting logically when considering the artistic 
components of clinical practice. However, this patient focus does not necessarily 
signify the absence of scientific practice, as clinicians construct their patient 
encounters as essentially experimental, or scientifically endeavours. 
 
6.3.2. The client group 
‘Individuals are not populations’ (Chambers, 2008, p.7023). 
 
Chambers (2008) is correct when in stating that individuals and populations are not 
the same proposition. Clinicians clearly agree when they references the ‘dream’ 
populations of research and compare them to the ‘real’ clients in practice. However, 
the singular patient does have a broader population context which is not defined by 
research evidence but by the client group that patient represents, and the clinician’s 
experience with that group. The client group influences treatment selections and 
appears as a dominant consideration motivating choices made by clinicians. 
Treatments are population specific and population exclusionary, meaning specific 
client-group options are to the forefront of a clinician’s decision making. The client-
group effect is also obvious in the use of targeted, population-specific colleague 
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opinion. So client-specific experience whether the clinician’s own or that of a 
colleagues, significantly influences and simplifies the decision making process. This 
population-assisted scaffolding may contribute to our understanding of what clinical 
experience actually entails.  
 
Contrary to notions that practice is therefore highly individualised, is the suggestion 
that it is also broadly based on practical population knowledge. Such knowledge is 
deemed relevant and integral to efficient practice. It also leads to routinised and 
culturally-based interventions. Clinicians suggest that it does not exclude 
individualisation but acts as a further scaffold to support it. The reliance on such 
practically rather than theoretically-based population knowledge, concurs with 
knowledge-based models used in clinical reasoning specifically ‘pattern recognition’ 
(Higgs & Titchens, 2000). This stored knowledge may suggest automatic or instinctual 
practice (Greenhalgh, 2002) and might conceivably be interpreted as part of the art of 
practice. However, it may belie the logical nature of that stored or intuitive knowledge 
being most likely accumulated from problem-solving practices suggested by both the 
models of cognitive reasoning and by the participants themselves.   
 
In this way the making of practice decisions is narrowly defined, being highly client 
relevant, both individually and population centred. This appeal to relevance may 
cement the client-specific tool bag but also constrain ability to adapt between client 
groups. 
 
6.3.3. Pathology not preferences 
‘Clinicians face ill-defined problems’ (Higgs & Jones, 2000, p.4). 
 
Intervention appears not merely defined by patient influences, but limited to specific 
patient influences. While clinicians are concerned with the broader construct of the 
patient and with social models of practice, intervention decisions tend to be clinician 
dependent, and less about patient preferences and values and more about patient 
pathologies. This infers a highly internalised and focused form of decision making and 
implies a medical and restricted model of practice.  
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This emphasis on patient characteristics implies that hypothetico-deductive 
reasoning is operational, supporting Edwards et al.’s (2004) argument that this model 
‘remains the most enduring clinical reasoning model in medicine’ (p.314). In this 
model of reasoning, tentative hypotheses are generated from patient cues on a 
continual basis and this indicates that practice cannot be a passive exercise, as it 
requires the engagement and responsivity from the clinician to patient cues. This 
contrasts with the idea that practice is pivoted on client group but fits with the idea of 
adaptable practice. Intervention is not reduced to an uncomplicated act. Rather, this 
construct of clinical practice which is formulated on individual patient traits can be 
said to heighten the demand on the clinician to be creative, experimental and actively 
involved in the process.  
 
The knowledge that patient values appear to form a substantially minor component of 
decision-making has significant implications for EBP as a model. EBP clearly 
incorporates patient preferences and values as one of its three pillars, and the three 
pillars are intended to be used collectively to guide practice decisions. The clear 
suggestion is that if practice is not inclusive of patient opinion to any significant 
degree then EBP is not fully operational, with perhaps only two of the pillars being 
utilised. While this requires more evidence from research on clinical practice to 
reliably confirm this, it suggests that the attempts to redefine EBP to make it more 
inclusive may have missed the mark. 
 
6.3.4. Summary  
 
The idea of the singular patient as pivotal is at heart a simple notion. Each episode of 
intervention is effectively scaffolded on the unstable basis of each individual patient’s 
characteristics. The implication is therefore that practice cannot be fully scientific as 
conventionally constructed, but is subject to on-going individualised and responsive 
decisions and individual patient experiments.  It suggests a reason why the ‘science 
but’ attitude prevails. 
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6.4 SCIENCE BUT 
‘The science behind the therapeutic measures is not as strong as the faith’ (Basmajian, 
1975, p.608). 
 
The SLT discipline is constructed as a scientific profession. Its origins in scientific 
training and scientific degrees clearly suggest this (Lum, 2002). A leaning towards 
science would be currently most obvious by the embracing of EBP, and specifically 
the use of research evidence. Despite this, there are clear undertones of reluctance in 
pinning the profession under the canopy of science. 
 
6.4.1. Speaking scientifically 
‘Unfortunately, science, truth and logic have little impact on our professional identity as 
speech-language pathologists’ (Kahmi, 2004, p.111). 
 
Basmajian (1975) and Kahmi (2004) contend that those concepts which underpin 
scientific behaviour are not dominant in clinical practice, and participants are 
reluctant to fully commit to defining the profession as scientific. Instead, they 
volunteer the ‘science but’ argument which although articulated in multiple ways, 
always results in the message of science with restrictions. There are clinicians who 
feel more allied to science than others, but even for those clinicians, a full 
commitment to science is not appealing. Furthermore, stances by participants with 
regard to EBP and specifically research evidence further highlight the ‘science but’ 
positioning of clinicians.  
 
‘Science but’ suggests problems with concept of science or what science represents, 
and it is likely it reflects an understanding of the limits of science in practice. There 
may be a reluctance to embrace science due to an apparent science-practice 
incompatibility. Reluctance may also stem from the perceived demands such a 
description would place on clinicians especially if conceived of only as research 
evidence, or arising from a narrow definition relating only to notions of white coats 
and Bunsen burners. This appears supported by the initial attempts of clinicians to 
define scientific practice using traditional concepts of research, assessment and 
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diagnosis. While probing reveals evidence of scientific behaviour, clinicians appear 
not to automatically classify their everyday functioning as ‘scientific’, perhaps 
suggesting a different construction of practice or a restricted understanding of what 
science means. Sherman’s (2009) contention that too often science is presented as a 
‘disembodied collection of facts’ (p.35) may explain this dilemma if science is indeed 
seen as facts without ownership. Indeed, until the question directly relating to science 
was asked, it rarely occurred in the discussions, and neither did EBP. Science does not 
appear to be a term in everyday usage by SLTs despite Herbert’s (2003) contention 
that science in clinical practice would seem obvious and uncontroversial. It is clear 
the definition of science in clinical practice needs attention and explication. 
 
Practice therefore, rather than being purely scientific, appears to involve loose 
constructs of both art and science, although neither of these definitions are clearly 
expressed. There is a clear appeal for artistry in practice, defined mostly as creativity 
even though this too has scientific overtures. However as with science, clinicians do 
not want to fully commit to the idea of practice as art. The notion of the ‘art of science’ 
as articulated by one participant may have most appeal– a scientific underpinning to 
stabilise practice which other skills augment. This would define practice as a 
complimentary arena.  
 
Furthermore, it may also be that a clinician’s scientific leaning may depend on their 
area of practice, with some areas being more traditionally scientific and some less so. 
It is not clear whether clinicians elect to work in areas that fit them or they fit into the 
culture of their work-setting. This cultural effect may also have implication for being 
scientists. There is clearly a culture of looking to the group to check the validity of 
practice, which while positive in that it is a behaviour which suggests attempts to 
check practice, can also result in the rationalisation of poor practices. This may 
explain in part the continued use of culture-based and unvalidated therapies in the 
profession. Clinicians appear to be influenced more by their colleagues in decision 
making than the scientific basis of the interventions, and by their experience than the 
science behind a treatment.  
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The uncertain arena discussed previously is further evidenced in these discussions on 
defining the profession and the place of science within that definition.  While science 
as conventionally constructed appears not to be a useful construct, clinicians do agree 
that they have an active role in contributing to scientific practice through for example 
measurement, experimentation or case-based research.  Additionally, clinicians see 
their profession as unique. This desire or need to differentiate their discipline from 
other disciplines is perhaps not particular to SLTS. It suggests a need to explain 
clinical behaviour and perhaps to validate clinical actions in the knowledge that 
science does not suffice in this regard. This type of thinking also points to a tendency 
towards tenacity in preserving the profession’s self-conception. By defining 
themselves as unique, perhaps SLTS give themselves a licence not to abide by the 
rules. 
 
6.4.2. Behaving scientifically 
‘To be a scientist, is in essence to think critically (or validly) and naturally’ (Lum, 2002, 
p.137). 
 
So given clinicians’ reluctance to fully embrace science, one could ask if scientific 
behaviour is evident. Logemann (2004) as previously stated argues that much of what 
SLTs do is ‘an individual clinical trial’ (p.134). Participants certainly suggest that they 
are acting in ways that are compatible with scientific practice. According to McLean et 
al. (2007), repeated practice which produces the same outcomes is individualised 
experimentation. Such experimentation is evident including attempts to validate 
information acquired from the patient through measurement (Edwards et al., 2004) 
and tracking client progress through data collection (McLean et al., 2007). If science is 
systematised knowledge derived from experimentation (Federspil & Vettor, 2000), or 
a systematic logical process to search for solutions (Apel, 1999), then, depending on 
the degree of systematisation, practice may be said to be scientific. This may not 
always be the case however. The idea of immeasurable practice in particular suggests 
some less than scientific practice. Nevertheless, the predominantly problem solving, 
trial and error approach to intervention means that clinicians can be considered to be 
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acting scientifically at least some of the time, resulting in the reduced effect of chance 
on the outcomes of intervention (Thompson et al., 2002). 
 
Scientific practice therefore appears to revolve around experimentation and problem 
solving, lending further support to a dominant hypothetico-deductive reasoning 
model of clinical practice. However, some of this practice may become automated, 
supporting Greenhalgh’s (2002) contention which proposes that as clinicians move 
towards expertise ‘they no longer rely explicitly on rules and maxim’ (p.396). The 
logical foundation of such automatic practice may not be obvious, merely integrated 
into clinicians’ practice decisions. Furthermore, clinicians do see merit in following 
the rules when appropriate but are free thinkers in that they use their own critical 
thinking to evaluate those rules, and then be creative around the rules attached to, for 
example, individual therapies. Practice cannot therefore be equated with roboticism 
or lack of autonomy which is further emphasised when clinicians report their 
considered use of new knowledge. Clinicians are not resistant to reasoned change and 
alter their behaviour accordingly after engaging with the new knowledge. The seeking 
of other opinion while pragmatically inclined is reflective of open rather than 
dogmatic practice and a search for clarity. This type of responsiveness is clearly 
defined by Adler (1987) as critical behaviour, and lends weight to the argument that 
the acquisition of new skills is a considered exercise. As Kahmi (1999) argues, ‘there 
is no substitute for an informed clinician willing to try different treatment approaches 
and able to critically evaluate the effectiveness of these approaches’ (p.97).  
 
McLean et al. (2007) also identified practice informed and guided by the best 
knowledge regarding efficacious interventions as a scientific behaviour, although 
clearly clinicians cannot be considered to be acting scientifically in this regard. Thus, 
there may be an eclectic approach to the use of science.  However, lack of adherence 
to EBP may have its roots in a broadly applied scepticism, itself a clearly scientific 
cognitive process. Clinicians do not only display some scepticism about EBP but about 
a wide range of issues, including pseudoscientific practices, training programmes, 
Americanised practices and colleague opinion. Critical behaviours which support such 
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scepticism include being critical, not accepting, an insistence on clarity, and lack of 
tolerance of practical inconsistency and vagueness (Adler, 1987). This suggests that 
reluctance to embrace EBP may be more logically founded than previously thought. 
Quite clearly clinicians demonstrate a commitment to critical practice representing a 
scientific attitude. Their affiliation with anecdotal sources, unvalidated approaches 
and immeasurable behaviour, which represent less than scientific behaviour when 
interpreted in isolation, may be less than worrying in the context of such overtly 
critical practice.   
 
Therefore despite their standpoint as reluctant scientists, SLTs position themselves 
by their clinical and articulated behaviours in the scientific realm. This appears to sit 
alongside an understanding of the limits of science in practice and an appreciation of 
the broader nature of practice. It does not however, represent what is seen as best 
practice, that is, the mantle of being evidence-based practitioners.  
 
6.4.3. Translating scientifically 
‘The assumption appears to be that evidence-based practice is the “right” thing to do’ 
(Beecham, 2004, p.131).  
 
Kahmi (1999) argued that clinicians are ‘not naive research consumers’ (p.94) and 
this was apparent in the opinions clinicians articulated regarding research. Clinicians’ 
appreciation of research concurs with multiple previous studies both profession 
specific and cross-disciplinary (e.g. Metcalfe et al., 2001). However, despite this, they 
express concerns with many of the points made echoing previous findings including 
conflicting evidence (e.g. Mullen, 2005) and lack of evidence (e.g. Law et al., 2004) and 
poor generalizability (Metcalfe et al., 2001). These issues imply as Logemann (2004) 
argues, that the profession cannot effectively be evidence based. Clinicians must by 
necessity, use unvalidated interventions in their everyday practice.   
 
Newbold et al. (2008) expressed fears that by not using research evidence, the 
discipline is thus more of a technical occupation than a scientifically-grounded 
profession. However, the opposite argument can also be made, that applying research 
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evidence to clinical practice may itself be a technical operation devoid of an 
understanding of the realities of practice. Clinicians’ overriding concern with 
relevance and practicality means that research evidence may fail to effectively meet 
practice needs, the ideal circumstances of research being ‘rarely realised in the 
practice of speech-language pathology’ (Ylivisaker et al., 2002, p.xxvii) and thus a 
mismatch accruing. Many of the sentiments expressed by participants echo this theme 
suggesting as Dopson et al. (2003) state, that perhaps policy makers and evidence-
based enthusiasts have frequently taken a ‘somewhat simplistic view’ of 
implementation issues (p.311). The outcome of the practice-research mismatch is 
that clinical decisions must be scaffolded by factors other than research evidence, and 
not necessarily even in combination with research evidence as outlined by the EBP 
model. Clinical solutions to practice decisions thus do not appear to include research 
unless it is case-based research which clinicians find to be more meaningful and 
translational. As case data are deemed to be low level evidence, this once again clearly 
indicates an apparent failure in the meeting of minds between what is relevant and 
valued clinically, and what is produced in an attempt to guide such practice. So it can 
be argued that the non-utilisation of research does not originate from a lack of desire 
to be scientific, but from its problems with relevance and generalisability. 
 
SLT experts have suggested a number of other reasons why EBP is not as broadly 
used by SLT as it should be (Reilly, 2004b).  Reilly (2004b) for example, mentions a 
belief that clinical trials are not possible in the discipline; that students are not 
necessarily educated to be evidence-based practitioners, and; that existing clinicians 
do not have the background to use the process. Logemann (2004) suggests additional 
reasons centring on funding and research issues. This type of argumentation may 
miss the point which consistently places the breakdown at the clinical rather than 
philosophical or model level (McCurtin, 2012). It may also misrepresent the true 
nature of clinical practice, an arena where clinicians need to take account of many 
different factors when deciding on treatments, including those represented by the 
individual patient.  
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Clinicians’ awareness of research and their relative valuing of it indicates an open but 
also conflicted attitude. So even though they recognise problems with research, at the 
same time they use it to undermine the worth of questionable practices. They also 
understand that it is a concept open to abuse. SLTs’ thinking about research appears 
both considered and rounded, and essentially clinicians report that research presents 
them with more problems than solutions. Delmar’s (2005) contention that ‘the truth 
is that we have not found a way to use evidence-based practice every day – or better, 
for every patient’ is warranted (p.297).   
 
6.4.4. Summary 
While it can be said that clinicians are not EBP practitioners, there are clear 
indications that clinicians operate in a scientific manner being the appreciators of 
science Bernstein-Ratner (2006) called for. It appears that clinical practice and EBP 
may be different operations, making them incompatible. It is remarkable that after 
nearly twenty years of barrier studies, the mantra of clinicians is relatively 
unchanged. While lauded by those who teach and write, EBP remains problematic for 
those who practice. It would seem that the three pillars of EBP having been 
destabilised by the undermining of the patient scaffold, now appears to have suffered 
damage to the research pillar. This implicates the use of clinical experience as the 
dominant scaffold, governing rather than balancing decision-making. 
 
 
6.5 THE AUTHORITY OF CLINICAL EXPERIENCE 
‘Internalized, collectively reinforced and often tacit guidelines…informed by clinicians’ 
training, by their own and each other’s experience, by their interactions with their role 
sets, by their reading, by the way they have learnt to handle the conflicting demands, by 
their understanding of local circumstances and systems and by a host of other sources’ 
(Gabbay & LeMay, 2010, p.44). 
 
Clinical experience emerges as the primary scaffold being articulated in a variety of 
ways from the broad ‘field evidence’ and ‘practical evidence’ phrases to statements 
such as ‘what works’. 
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6.5.1. Field vs. laboratory evidence 
‘Individual and environmental variables influence nurses' clinical decision-making’ 
 (Bucknall, 2000, p.34). 
 
There is undoubtedly a preference for practical evidence which is articulated across 
all groups. The underlying tone of ‘but’ within discussions of research and science 
were not present for discussions on clinical experience. Given the valuing of 
pragmatism and efficiency this favouring cannot be said to be surprising. Practical 
evidence effectively operates as a system of relevant shortcuts, thus enabling effective 
practice in a dynamic and pressurised environment. Therefore, reliance on clinical 
experience can be said to be functionally and logically based, recognising the 
limitations of services and the need for individuation of interventions. It is far more 
directly relevant and applicable than research evidence, which it can be argued may 
fail to meet many of the above criteria.  
 
The main advantage of research evidence is of course its grounding in rigour and 
replication, and its suggestion of unbiased outcomes. It can be said that clinicians 
have not shown that field evidence or clinical experience is either. Indeed Cicerone 
(2005) points to clinical decision making as ‘fraught with potential biases’ (p.1074), 
although McLean et al. (2007) point to the ‘essence’ of science as the ‘continual effort 
to compensate for confirmation bias, a propensity that afflicts clinical researchers and 
practitioners alike’ (p.84). It can be argued, however, that practice does demonstrate 
scientific components, although perhaps not being as rigorous or replicable as for 
research evidence. The constructs of tool bags and of population-specific experience 
suggests that, replication is an instrument applied in a targeted manner which is 
individualised via a practical response when required. Rigour is suggested through 
the idea of individualised experimentation and measurement although clinicians 
suggest problems with being highly rigorous. This may reflect constraints imposed by 
practice itself. In contrast to research, clinical behaviour appears to be both scientific 
and pragmatic. SLTs are also aware of and attempt to reduce potential bias in a 
variety of ways similar to Copley and Allen’s (2009) clinicians, although it can be 
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assumed that not all decisions are unbiased. The same can be argued with regard to 
the outcomes of research however. There is clear evidence of bias in publications and 
under publication of negative outcomes (Tobler, 2004) and perhaps bias in 
interpretation of outcomes (Westen, 2005). There is even clear evidence of the 
increasing retraction of papers due both to error and fraud (Steen, 2010).  Thus bias 
is not limited to the clinical arena. The under publication of negative evidence is 
interesting in highlighting the disconnects between practice and research. Clinicians 
are bound to carry out interventions which result in neutral or negative outcomes 
(Bouffard & Reid, 2012), and which in turn encourages them to change or adapt their 
interventions. There is clear evidence that a lot of research produces negative 
findings but fails to be accorded the same degree of publication space or value as 
positive findings (Tobler, 2004). Such outcomes reflect clinical practice in that 
negative results are produced; however in research they are not accorded their 
natural place. Thus, bias in what is published sends a message to clinicians that their 
practice may be flawed if they fail to produce positive outcomes. Consequently, even 
in ways that research and practice are similar, the valuing within the published 
literature sends a conflicting message.  
 
Clinicians in effect tend to see more usefulness in the notion of practical evidence 
accumulated by themselves and their colleagues. This means clinical experience 
dominates the three pillars of EBP and may even act as the supreme scaffold.  
 
6.5.2. Defining clinical experience 
‘While clinical experience and the development of clinical instincts are a crucial part of 
becoming a competent physician, information derived from clinical experience and 
intuition must be interpreted cautiously, for it may be misleading’ (Dopson et al, 2003, 
p.313). 
 
It may be that part of the explanation as to why clinical experience is undervalued and 
under defined is because it is less tangible and more abstract than research. Part of 
the appeal of research is the provision of clear and apparently easy answers. Part of 
the problem with grey-zoned clinical experience is its lack of predictability and its 
requirement for flexibility. Accordingly, as McCurtin (2012) has pointed out, if we are 
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to find ways of making EBP work, then we need to make a serious attempt to 
understand the nature of clinical experience.  
 
According to clinicians, clinical experience can be said to be composed of two core 
constructs: that which is accumulated and habitual, and; that which is experimental 
and dynamic. Clinicians then acquire a tool bag which is highly population specific, 
and which effectively acts as a route to efficient practice, thus reducing the weight of 
trial and error and mental effort. This is colloquially known as ‘because it worked’ 
(Kahmi, 1999, p.93) or ‘what’s in your head’, and can be dismissed as illogical. 
However as discussed, the origin of such an accumulated repertoire is primarily 
experimentally derived from the clinicians’ own experience, although it may be 
influenced by other sources such as colleagues and training as also indicated in 
numerous studies (e.g. MacKenzie et al., 2010). Additions to the tool bag appear not to 
be integrated without critical evaluation and trial and error. Thus this repertoire is 
not applied to the individual patient in an inflexible way. 
 
The knowledge-based models of reasoning such as illness scripts (Edwards et al., 
2004), what Andre, Borgquist, Foldevi and Molstad (2002) also call rules of thumb, 
are integral to understanding this repertoire. Essentially, through accumulated 
experience the clinician recognises similar features in cases by accessing stored and 
integrated knowledge. This explains the valuing of population-specific knowledge and 
experience. Furthermore, this specific experience appears central to perceptions of 
expertise and competence. This stored knowledge enables practitioners to perform 
more efficiently, and may be misrepresented as instinctual, routinised or even 
habitual. Alternatively, this might also be interpreted as part of the art in practice, 
although it does not necessarily represent unscientific practice.  Conversely, there is 
also the possibility that dependence on such ways of working whatever its origins, 
may lead to less than individualised and less than scientific ways of working, perhaps 
depending on the individual clinician, the culture and the work context. The second 
component of clinical experience is both scaffolded on, and utilised alongside, this 
tool bag and represents an eclectic and experimental approach to intervention. It is 
best represented by notions of creativity, flexibility and adaptability. This 
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experimental and eclectic approach in itself leads to the repertoire being 
complemented over time by new additions, forming an ever-growing tool bag from 
which intervention decisions are made. So while clinicians acknowledge the need to 
be grounded in many ways e.g. in experience of similar clients, by having a repertoire 
and by use of colleagues, this stored knowledge also forms a basis upon which the 
willing and experimental clinician adds new knowledge. Thompson et al. (2002) have 
argued that experience can provide a false sense of certainty and is of little help when 
faced with a situation the clinician has not previously encountered. This does not 
appear to represent the true nature of practice as the accumulated repertoire 
facilitates engagement with new situations, as does the clinician’s willingness and 
tendency to experiment. Thus, as clinical experience accumulates, and as practice is 
more weighted on this accumulated repertoire, it support the clinician to critically 
engage with more complex patients and thus leads to further experimenting, problem 
solving and theorising. This may and does include mistakes, a consequence of the trial 
and error nature of practice. Lutterman (2011) calls these mistakes ‘nuggets of gold’ 
(p.7) and these are added to the tool bag to inform future practice.  
 
6.5.3. Science absent or science present 
 ‘A shortage of research and a lack of research training have led to a profession that is 
uncritical of its knowledge base and unscientific in some of its practices’ (Pring, 2005, 
p257). 
 
The pervasive sense is that clinical experience is either not scientific or certainly 
considerably less scientific than research evidence. This may be contributed to by the 
substantial influence tool bags play in clinical practice where, because practice has 
become integrated and explicated, it is assumed not to be scientifically based. This 
idea of tool bags fits with the contention that the more experienced a clinician gets, 
the less logical their decision making processes are shown to be (Greenhalgh, 2002).   
This is no different from managing any task which someone does repetitively and 
there is no reason to suggest that clinical practice should function differently to any 
other skill. As Greenhalgh notes (2002), ’we are at our most intuitive when doing our 
regular job and dealing with patients whom we know well’ (p.396).  
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Participants explain that practice does contain clear scientific components. Tool bags 
can be said to represent scientific practice at least in part, increasingly becoming 
scaffolded on this integrated and unexplicated experience more over time. The 
apparent lack of logic said to characterise increased experience may not accurately 
represent its foundations as Greenhalgh (2002) argued, as it may be likely that the 
thinking underpinning rapid and reflexive practice is not readily articulated. Neither 
can experience be inferred to be less reliable than practice guided by research. 
Charman (2010) for example, points to several studies in the field of autism which 
show that for two-year olds, diagnostic reasoning using expert clinical judgment is 
more reliable than the standard diagnostic instruments. Moreover, the clinical context 
is different and the application of research appears less relevant than experience, 
perhaps also being subject to questions regarding reliability.  
 
Furthermore, the second component of clinical experience, that of dynamic practice 
essentially represents scientific behaviour: experimenting, problem solving, using 
trial and error, and valuing measurement. It may not be scientific in the one hundred 
per cent rigorous way that represents constructs of conventional science, but this 
does not mean than scientific bases are absent. Importantly, clinicians consistently 
reference the use of critical faculties especially when acquiring new knowledge. Use of 
a new therapy for example appears contemplated and measured. Training is not 
automatically applied but reflected on. Research articles are evaluated. Colleague 
opinion is weighed in the context of the clinicians’ own experience. This seeking out 
of other opinion, of searching for clarity, of criticism and scepticism, of altering 
behaviour in a reasonable way clearly represents scientific behaviour. Furthermore, 
critical thinking is applied whether the knowledge comes from a discipline specific 
source or a pseudoscientific one. Clinicians understand the potential for bias. While 
participants essentially define practice as a ‘science but’ exercise, this does not mean 
there are no scientific undertones. Science is both integrated into clinical experience 
and functions alongside it.  
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6.5.4. Summary 
Clinical experience emerges as a highly dominant scaffold underpinning decision 
making in clinical practice. This supremacy can be said to reflect and represent the 
nature of clinical practice. The response to such a singular scaffold is that likely to be 
that reliance on such a less than scientific scaffold is bad for the status of the 
profession. This can only be the case if such a scaffold is constructed as fallible, 
ungrounded and biased. There is no reason to suggest that this is, in fact, the case. 
 
 
 
6.6 CHAPTER SUMMARY 
‘It is fair to suggest that we potentially limited our understanding of why EBP has failed 
to gain momentum in practice as opposed to paper, by primarily focusing on clinician 
deficits and practical constraints’ (McCurtin, 2012, p.334). 
 
Practice is dynamic and pivoted on the patient as both a member of a group and as an 
individual. Practice is primarily scaffolded on clinical experience and exists in a 
‘science but’ world, where it is underpinned by scientific behaviours but not 
necessarily defined by EBP. The clinician is sometimes a scientist and sometimes not. 
EBP remains problematic for clinicians and the notion of science and evidence-based 
practice may not be highly useful to practising clinicians. 
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Chapter 7: Integration and conclusion 
 
7.1 INTRODUCTION 
‘Clinicians are science-using, information-sorting interpreters of time-bound 
circumstances’ (Montgomery, 2006, p.174). 
 
The aim of this research was to explore professional knowledge and decision-
making scaffolds in SLT clinical practice. This originated from a concern with 
pseudoscientific practices and an interest in the EBP paradigm, especially in the 
context of repetitive findings from barrier studies that clinicians were not research 
utilisers. It led to questions of whether clinicians were rejecting science in practice 
by their apparent rejection of EBP and their readiness to embrace pseudoscientific 
therapies. In using a mixed-methodology approach, it was hoped to gain an authentic 
understanding of the role of science in practice and thus, a deeper appreciation of 
the nature of SLT practice. This chapter aims to bring together the study findings and 
provide directions for research and practice. 
 
7.2 SYNTHESIS 
In amalgamating the findings from both study phases, there is little evidence of 
discord. In summary, interventions decisions are primarily scaffolded on practical 
and case evidence and conventional scientific scaffolds are less than pivotal in guiding 
clinical decisions. Furthermore, clinicians employ relatively limited clinical reasoning 
as reflected in the weighting in Figure 7.1. 
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Figure 7.1 The bases and weighting of SLTs intervention decisions 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Clinicians have a conceptual problem with the definition of science, as they mainly 
associate scientific practice with conventional concepts such as research evidence as 
opposed to being scientific thinkers. Despite this, they use research evidence to 
undermine questionable practices and furthermore, report using scientific 
behaviours such as problem solving in clinical practice. In essence, practice is 
relatively narrowly defined, being far more influenced by internal and discipline-
specific factors than external factors.  
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7.3 SCIENTIFIC PRATICE 
These findings have implications for scientific practice. The science in practice is 
practical science; intervention episodes being experimental in nature and signalling 
SLTs’ appreciation of other practice components. These components include the 
human element, thus reflecting an understanding of practice perhaps not truly 
evident in models such as EBP.  
 
SLTs on the whole do not use pseudoscientific practices and the non-scientific 
practices they adopt seem to be used in a more rational manner than might be 
previously thought. However, there are indications that those SLTs using 
pseudoscientific and non-scientific therapies are more influenced by non-scientific 
sources, thus suggesting a sub group within the profession. This also implies that the 
vast majority of SLTs can be said to be acting scientifically.  
 
While the primacy of practice knowledge has implications for understanding clinical 
decisions as scientific, clinicians do not just accept knowledge whatever form it takes 
but ‘triangulate it’ (Gabbay & LeMay, 2010, p.200) thus demonstrating scientific 
thinking. There are in effect indications of attitudes or actions supportive to critical 
thinking (Hicks & Southey, 1995) including openness to opposing viewpoints, being 
critical, being serious, autonomous, sceptical and altering behaviour according to new 
knowledge. While there is some evidence of the operation of prior belief (disregard of 
negative evidence), this may reflect the nature of the research base as much as 
indifference to the findings of research.  There is a lack of resistant attitudes (Hicks & 
Southey, 1995) on display including a lack of dogmatism or resistance to reasoned 
change, deference to authority (including EBP), being accepting and a tolerance of 
ambiguity. However, there is also a tendency to tenacity in preserving self-
conception: SLTs in this study consider themselves unique and different from other 
professions although this emphasis on difference may have arisen from clinicians 
being asked to explain the nature of their practice. 
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Practice thus reflects science in different ways to conventional constructs; and 
extends beyond science, reflecting human, uncertain and complex situations. While 
clinicians hesitate to define themselves as scientific, they clearly do not define 
themselves as pseudoscientists. Practice can therefore be said to be based on science 
but not purely scientific, having scientific undertones and behaviours but not limited 
to science.  
 
 
7.4 EVIDENCE-BASED PRACTICE  
EBP can be said to be a model which is on the whole not operated by clinicians. 
Research in particular may be a tool valued by academics or intellectuals rather than 
practitioners.  Clinicians on the other hand highly regard anecdotal knowledge which 
is significantly less esteemed in EBP hierarchies. The consistency of such findings 
across disciplines suggests a pervasive problem with EBP, and implies that EBP as a 
practical rather than theoretical model may be doomed to failure.  
 
If science is viewed solely as evidence from research, it can be interpreted as 
restrictive and reductionist and, incompatible with responsive, pragmatic practice. 
EBP continues to be fundamentally constructed as research evidence which may 
partly explain problems with its uptake. Despite positive changes to the definition, the 
EBP paradigm has failed to accord the less concrete elements of clinician and patient 
contributions the same attention as research. Consequently, there is a failure to define 
clinical experience and develop protocols enabling clinicians to integrate experience 
and values with research evidence.  The implication is that there is a problem with 
either the definition of EBP itself, or that the pillars representing clinician and client 
scaffolds are of lesser significance.  
 
Importantly, EBP itself has produced little evidence to show that its use improves 
outcomes (Rappolt 2003), coaxing Murray et al (2007) to claim that EBP is based on 
‘faith rather than persuasive evidence’ (p.512) and suggesting that EBP itself may 
have pseudoscientific features. Recommendations that it is clinicians who need to 
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change in order to facilitate improved research use appear to miss the point 
(McCurtin, 2012) which is that the complex and individualised nature of practice is 
often ill-suited to the products of research evidence. EBP therefore appears to be a 
model which ignores the realities of practice. 
 
 
7.5 PRACTICAL EVIDENCE  
The findings of most studies, this one included, demonstrate clearly that clinicians are 
pivotally persuaded by practical evidence. Clinical decisions are based on individual 
population-specific repertoires which may in essence define clinical experience. 
While alterations occur throughout the lifespan, the tool bag itself persists as the 
primary reference used by clinicians in making intervention decisions, with clinicians 
eclectically forming modified treatment recipes for each singular patient. It is 
suggested that the tool bag dominates because of the complex and individualised 
nature of practice, and clinicians’ intimacy with, and understanding of the character of 
such practice. 
 
Questions regarding the usability of EBP have led to calls for multiple hierarchies of 
knowledge not single ones (e.g., Nairn 2012). It appears that while clinicians agree 
with this sentiment, they do not acknowledge it should also apply to practical 
evidence. Despite its dominance, practical evidence allows for flexibility of decisions 
which is integral to individualised practice. Practical evidence can be said to be a 
scaffold which is responsive and relevant although concerns arise as clinical 
experience is potentially biased and subjective. Naylor (1995) rightly comments that 
the dependence on clinical experience might be a ‘pooling ignorance as much as 
distilling wisdom’ (p.841). If this is the case, it is a concern for the scientific nature of 
such practice. 
 
The central interest with EBP is ‘what works’ (Bouffard & Reid, 2012). This is also the 
phrase used by clinicians in attempting to define their clinical decisions. So the goals 
of EBP and practitioners is essentially the same, it is just that the ways of getting there 
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may be different. Thus, Tannebaum’s (2005) contention that ‘EBP occupies the moral 
high grounds because its practitioners do ‘what works’ (p.69), can also be said to 
apply to clinical practice. Furthermore, given that clinicians’ practice in an applied 
rather than theoretical arena, then perhaps clinicians’ ideas of ‘what works’ can be 
said to be more realistic. 
 
 
7.6 RECONSTRUCTING PRACTICE 
Despite recent changes to the EBP model to accommodate clinical and patient 
contributions, EBP is still firmly weighted on research evidence. Greenhalgh (2012), 
once a proponent of the model, now calls it ‘a conceptual cul-de-sac’ (p.92). To reflect 
better the complexities of decision making, some authors have argued for 
developments to the model; these appear timely. Tonelli (2006) for example, argues 
for the addition of multiple scaffolds including pathophysiologic rationale, system 
features including resources availability, society and professional values, and legal 
and cultural concerns. Tonelli’s (2006) model suggests no-one factor should take 
precedence, with equal weighting accorded and priority being determined in 
individual situations. Research evidence for example, may guide practice in complex 
situations, whereas clinical experience might inform more routine practice decisions.  
 
Despite calls for broader models, the dominant scaffolds supporting intervention 
decisions in SLT clinical practice are case evidence and practical evidence and 
rethinking the model to extend EBP may not reflect the actualities of practice 
decisions. Rather than reworking an incompatible model, clinical practice itself as 
characterised by clinicians should form the basis of a new paradigm if it is to both 
reflect practice and be embraced by practitioners (see Figure 7.1). 
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7.7 CONCLUSIONS 
‘Medicine is located in the gap between the simplicities of science and the complexities of 
individual lives’ (Gawande, 2002, p.8) 
 
Practice is best defined by clinicians as a ‘science but’ endeavour, scaffolded on 
practical and case evidence and reflecting internal rather than external scientific 
thinking.  This exposes clinical practice as a different construct to that encapsulated 
by the EBP model. Essentially, clinical practice and EBP reflect different paradigms 
and autonomy is the natural home of intervention decisions. The disconnect between 
EBP and clinical practice helps explain problems with research uptake and suggests 
that new or altered models to reflect practice are required. Indeed, revisiting some of 
the seminal works focusing on clinical reasoning (e.g. Higgs & Jones 2008) is 
warranted to facilitate this exercise.  
 
Science in practice reflects that there are simply no scientific answers for a lot of 
clinical problems; what is conceived of as a properly scientific approach is not feasible 
in clinical practice. Scientific thinking is a means of ensuring good practice and this is 
not necessarily a bad thing. While Pring (2004) talks about clinical experience and 
intuition as unpredictable weapons which contribute to inconsistency in intervention 
decisions, it is known that heuristics are often as at least as accurate as complex 
statistics in pointing to the right decisions (Gigerenzer et al., 1999). Clinicians 
however, need to make their knowledge explicit, as by articulating their practice they 
can best reflect their scientific behaviours and allay concerns regarding the fallibility 
of those practice decisions which are not research based.   
 
Effectively, researchers and theoreticians can continue to deny the nature of practice 
and impose translationally challenged models or, they can attempt to better 
understand the challenging arena which is pivoted on human clinicians and patients. 
Clinicians have often been accused of being resistant to EBP. However, it may be that 
proponents of unconditional EBP have been unwilling to understand the nature and 
realities of practice, that is, as Niamh pointed out, that ‘we don’t have recipes really; we 
just have loads of ingredients’.  
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7.8 LIMITATIONS 
Some potential limitations are outlined below: 
 
7.8.1 Constraints on the research process. 
 While a pilot focus group was scheduled, this was cancelled on three occasions by 
the gatekeeper. Planning should have included a back-up pilot group to 
accommodate such circumstances. 
 SLT mangers acted as gatekeepers for the focus groups and as these groups 
targeted SLT departments, managers were included as members in the focus 
groups. This may have constrained group members from presenting honest 
opinions and for this reason managers should have been excluded from the 
groups. Another possible option would have been to target groups of SLTs via 
Special Interest Groups. This was considered at the time but dismissed given the 
infrequency of SIG meetings. Single subject interviews could also have been 
undertaken in place of focus groups to facilitate the explication of unrestrained 
opinion. 
 Use of experts to inform the content of the survey could have been more 
specifically targeted from the outset. Attempts to cover multiple areas of practice 
resulted in the generation of redundant data (although these data are not lost as it 
has been used in other research).  
 Although piloting did not identify this as an issue, it is possible the survey could 
have been shorter in length which may have resulted in higher response rate. This 
may have been facilitated by piloting the volume of therapies and reasons for use 
and non-use on a larger number of respondents, thus identifying core therapies 
and reasons earlier in the process and reducing the options offered to 
respondents in the main survey phase.  This was not attempted due to the 
relatively small potential sample of respondents in the SLT profession in Ireland. 
 
7.8.2 Potential influences on data analysis and interpretation. 
 Explication of scientific or critical thinking might have been more directly targeted 
in other ways for example, case-based reasoning and tests of critical thinking. 
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 The targeting of academic and patient opinion might have been included in the 
study in order to present the perspective of groups other than that of clinicians. 
This may have contributed to a deeper understanding of the issues and findings 
which link more specifically to the three EBP pillars. 
 Other methods such as ethnography might have been utilised to bring even more 
insight to the topic under investigation. 
 Although in this study the quantitative phase preceded the qualitative phase, it is 
also possible the reverse sequence of the qualitative phase followed by the 
quantitative phase might have yielded even more knowledge and understanding 
of the subject matter. 
 
7.8.3 Bias 
 Researcher bias must be considered although multiple strategies were used in 
order to minimise the effect of bias. Examples of this include the use of other 
individuals (experts, supervisory team and colleagues), methods (reliability 
checks, decision matrices and immersion) and techniques (reflective summaries, 
reflective diary).  
 Focus group data may have been influenced by social desirability. It is possible 
that some contributions may have been swayed by attempts to impress or 
collude with either other individuals in the group, or the group as a whole. 
Furthermore, the presence of managers in the groups may have constrained or 
shaped the opinions of group members.  
 
 
7.9 RECOMMENDATIONS 
Implications for practice and research are outlined below:  
 
7.9.1 Research and practice interface 
Acknowledge that practice and research are different arenas and are not best 
represented by the EBP model in its current form. More attention to the nature 
of clinical practice and how this facilitates or prevents the use of research is 
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required. New models which accommodate the realities and uncertainties of 
practice and which consider the research-practice interface need to be 
conceptualised. This should not be done in isolation from those who engage at 
the coalface of practice – the practitioners and the patients. Authors who have 
shown an understanding of this topic should be consulted in this regard, 
including Gabbay & Le May (2010), Greenhalgh (2012) and Miles (2007). 
Furthermore, clinicians need to actively promote practice-driven translational 
research.  
 
7.9.2 Therapies 
Given the ongoing problems with the evidence base, consideration needs to be 
given to defining and understanding treatments in broader contexts than by 
their research evidence alone. Broader considerations may include mechanisms 
of action, theoretical bases, and the parameters for determining candidacy. The 
evidence-based movement may also be better served by looking at evidence-
based principles as recommended by Hayhow (2010), than by evidence based 
therapies. Furthermore, researchers need to more actively engage in researching 
the therapies that are used in practice and which are either under researched or 
ignored in studies of therapy. Clinicians should actively influence research 
agendas in this regard. 
 
7.9.3 Scientific thinking 
The understanding of science in practice should be broadened from limited 
interpretations involving research production and use, to include constructs of 
scientific thinking and scientific behaviours. Research into scientific practice 
should extend beyond considerations of research use to scientific thinking.  
Consideration should also be given to explicit training pre and post qualification 
on areas such as science and pseudoscience, clinical reasoning, clinical decision 
making and critical thinking. This should occur in both the initial training of 
students in SLT qualification courses, and to all post qualification training 
opportunities. Given the current emphasis on continuous professional 
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development by professional bodies and employers, the professional bodies 
should lead on the explicit incorporation of scientific thinking elements into all 
training course and workshops.   
 
7.9.4. Practical evidence 
The use of tacit knowledge and the role of the autonomous clinician should be 
legitimised by acknowledging its importance in clinical practice, and by 
entrenching articulated decision making and argumentation into student 
training and clinical practice. This necessitates that professional qualification 
courses undertake to prioritise debates and training regarding the nature of 
clinical practice which extend beyond discussions about evidence-based practice 
and therapies, and incorporate concepts and constructs including clinician skills, 
patient involvement and extra therapeutic factors. Clinicians also have an 
opportunity to highlight practical evidence by confidently advocating its 
centrality in decision making. 
Furthermore, practical evidence and its transmission systems, specifically 
information sharing between colleagues requires exploration to determine the 
nature and validity of such knowledge. This might be best done by examining the 
nature of knowledge transmission between clinician educators and student 
clinicians. 
 
7.9.5 The culture/ the discipline 
Given the high dependence on shared clinical experience, attention should be 
given to the role that culture plays within the profession in promoting and 
maintaining both valid and invalid practices.  The method of ethnography might 
best serve to elucidate this subject. 
 
7.9.6. Future research 
A number of possibilities for future research stem from this study. They include 
those outlined below.  
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 Research in general needs to link more closely with practice issues. These 
include investigation of the therapies that are being used by clinicians rather 
than those predominantly of interest to researchers and of practice issues 
generally.  
 Further research on scientific and critical thinking in clinical practice is required 
in order to define and substantiate the presence and use of scientific knowledge 
in practice.  
 Conduct research into decision making across the clinical lifespan to solidify or 
negate ideas of such a lifespan. 
 Acknowledge the importance and the influence of culture in informing decisions 
by further exploring its impact and scientific components.  
 Research into ‘collective sense making’ (Gabbay & LeMay 2004) or shared 
clinical knowledge is required. For example, the nature and scientific basis of 
anecdotal information and informal training provided by colleagues deserves 
more attention if the nature of practice is to be truly understood and new models 
are to be developed which more accurately reflect clinical practice. 
 The influences of extra therapeutic factors needs to be more closely examined in 
order to both  understand these variables and how they correlate with clinicians 
and client factors, and to place generic and therapy specific effects in context.  
 The promotion and publication of single subject designs originating from clinical 
practice should be encouraged in order to build practice-based research and 
reflect the individual nature of clinical practice and knowledge. 
 More attention needs to be given within the profession to patient factors broader 
than that of case evidence including patient contributions to outcome and patient 
preferences and values.  
 Given the similarities between disciplines, all research should be cross 
disciplinary rather than unidisciplinary. 
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Appendix 1 Glossary of terms 
ABA:  Applied Behaviour Analysis. 
Approach: ‘A theory driven process or set of procedures defined by its scientific base’ 
(Apel 1999:104). 
ASHA: American Speech Hearing Association 
Clinical decision making: Decision making is a broad term that applies to the process 
of making a choice between options as to a course of action. Clinical decision making 
by health professionals is a more complex process, requiring more of individuals than 
making defined choices between limited options. Health professionals are required to 
make decisions with multiple foci (e.g. diagnosis, intervention, interaction and 
evaluation), in dynamic contexts, using a diverse knowledge base (including an 
increasing body of evidence-based literature) with multiple variables and individuals 
involved (Smith et al 2008:89). 
CAMS: Complementary and alternative medicines. 
Clinical experience: Knowledge or practical wisdom gained from what one has 
observed or encountered. 
Clinical practice: ‘A model of practice that involves those activities with and on behalf 
of clients, especially those activities completed in the client’s presence and with the 
client’s collaboration. These activities are informed by an assessment. These 
intervention and change oriented activities are based on a range of theories with the 
clinician selecting the one most appropriate for the client’s situation’ 
(www.etsu.edu/socialwork/mswprogram/defclinicalpractice.aspx retrieved 9/9/12). 
Clinical reasoning: ‘The thinking and decision-making processes that are used in 
clinical practice’ (Edwards et al 2004: 314). 
Client-specific factors: Refers to factors used to support clinical decisions which relate 
to the client including patient attributes, patient values and patient contributions to 
the therapy process. 
Clinician-specific factors: Refers to factors internal to the clinician which support 
clinical decisions. Includes a range of factors such as epistemological bases such as 
clinical experience and personal beliefs. 
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Critical thinking: ‘Reasonable reflective thinking focused on deciding what to believe or 
do’ (Ennis 1987:9). 
DLT: Derbyshire Language Scheme 
DPNS: Deep pharyngeal neuromuscular stimulation. 
EBP: Evidence-based practice. 
Evidence-based practice: ‘The conscientious, explicit and judicious use of current best 
evidence in making decisions about the care of individual patients’ (Sackett et al 
1996:71). 
EMST: Expiratory muscle strength training. 
Extra-therapeutic /non-therapy specific factors: Refers to factors not directly related 
to the intervention being used which may impact on treatment outcome and include 
placebo, the therapeutic alliance and patient motivation.  
General sources of information: Refers to factors other than profession or health 
specific which are used to support clinical decisions such as the general media. 
Hypothetico-deductive model of reasoning: ‘The clinician attends to initial cues from 
or about the patient, from these cues, tentative hypotheses are generated. This 
generation is followed by on-going analysis of patient information in which further 
data are collected and interpreted. Continued hypothesis creation and evaluation take 
place as examination and management are continued and the various hypotheses are 
confirmed or negated. A person moves from a generalisation (multiple hypotheses) 
towards a specific conclusion’. (Edwards et al 2004:314).  
IASLT: Irish Association of Speech and Language Therapists 
ISL: Irish sign language. 
LSVT: Lee Silverman Voice Therapy. 
NICE: National Institute for Clinical Excellence. 
NSOMEs: Non speech oral motor exercises. 
OMT: Oral motor therapy. 
Other sources of information: Refers to sources of information other than scientific, 
professional or health specific and vernal sources which are used to support clinical 
decisions. 
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Pattern recognition / illness scripts: ‘The clinician recognises certain features of a 
case almost instantly. This recognitions leads to the use of other relevant information, 
including “if-then” rules of production in the clinical stored network. This form of 
reasoning moves towards from a set of specific observations towards a generalisation 
and is known as ‘forward reasoning’ (Higgs & Jones 2000:6). 
PECS: Picture Exchange Communication System. 
Profession-specific factors: Refers to professional factors used to support clinical 
decisions such as professional standards, texts and culture. 
Pseudoscience: A theory, methodology, or practice that is considered to be without 
scientific foundation. 
RCSLT: Royal College of Speech and Language Therapists 
Scaffold: Refers to bases of knowledge and decision making used to support clinical 
decisions. 
Science: ‘Systematized knowledge derived from experimentation, study and observation’ 
(Beyerstein 1995:2). 
Scientific sources of information: Refers to factors supporting clinical decisions which 
emanate from scientific sources include scientific research and scientific thinking. 
Scientific thinking: ‘A set of cognitive and behavioural methods to describe and 
interpret observed phenomena…aimed at building a testable body of knowledge open 
to rejection or confirmation’ (Shermer 2001:98). 
SIT: Sensory integration therapy. 
SLT: Speech and language therapy /therapist. 
TEACCH: Treatment and Education of Autistic and related Communication 
handicapped Children. 
Technique: The strategy or way of implementing a programme or therapy.  
Therapy: Refers to a type of approach such as oral-motor therapy. 
Therapy-specific factors: Refers to factors which are specific to the therapy or 
technique in question range from physical or technological attributes to user-
friendliness. 
Tool: ‘Devices used to perform an activity’ (Apel 1999: 103).  
VFSSB: Videofluroscopic Swallow Study – biofeedback. 
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Appendix 2 Specialist information request 
 
 
Identify the therapies, tools and techniques used by speech & language therapists in your 
specialism.  
Include emerging ones that you are aware of but which may not yet be in use.  
Include ones in use even if you do not agree with their use 
Include ones you think should be used but may not be. 
Include as many as you feel appropriate. 
 
Definitions to guide you 
Therapy: An approach or therapy is “the process or set of procedures …..” (Apel 
1999:103). Therapy refers to a type of programme or one defined by a theoretical position. 
A generic approach example is oral motor therapy. A specific example is FastForword.  
Tools: Tools are simply devices used to perform an activity – a tool is designed to provide 
intervention materials for the approach (Apel 1999). An example of a tool is a bite block or 
videofluroscopy.  
Techniques: These are the strategies or ways of implementing a programme or therapy 
(Turner & Whitfield 1999). An example from dysphagia is the chin tuck.  
Complimentary & Alternative Medicine is defined by the National Center for CAM in the 
states as “a group of diverse medical and health care systems, practices and products that 
are not presently considered to be part of conventional medicine” Haltiwanger & Stein 
2009:3 
 
Area of specialism (Please circle the area of practice which best defines the specialism for which 
you are completing this form) 
Stuttering (dysfluency) Voice (dysphonia) Eating Drinking & Swallowing Disorders 
(dysphagia): Paediatric /disability 
Acquired 
communication 
disorders       
Language delay/disorder   Eating Drinking & Swallowing Disorders 
(dysphagia): Adult /acute 
Developmental speech 
disorders 
Motor speech disorders Craniofacial disorders 
Communication in 
intellectual disability 
Communication in 
physical disability 
Reading & writing (dyslexia) 
Communication in 
autistic spectrum 
disorders  
Communication in mental 
health: paediatric* 
Communication in mental health: adults 
Head & Neck Oncology 
 
Cognitive Impairment 
(dementia) 
Progressive neurological conditions 
Hearing impairment 
 
Communication in adults 
with  
Intellectual disability  
Other (please specify) 
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*Other than ASD 
 
Are you currently working as a (please circle the title which best defines your work): 
Clinical specialist        Specialist clinician* Academic    
* (not employed with title of ‘Clinical Specialist’ but working clinically within area of specialism for at least 5 years    
 
Please identify the therapies, tools, techniques or alternatives medicines for your 
specialist area, which are used by speech & language therapists  
Therapies / approaches   What specifically does this target? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Tools   What specifically does this target? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Techniques   What specifically does this target? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Complimentary & 
alternative practices 
  What specifically does this target? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This research has been approved by ULREC. 
Any questions you have can be emailed to Arlene.mccurtin@ul.ie 
If you have concerns about this study and wish to contact someone independent, you may 
contact: The Chairman of the University of Limerick Research Ethics Committee, c/o Anne 
O ’Dwyer, Graduate School, University of Limerick, Limerick.  
Thank you for your support            
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Appendix 3 Survey master 
Therapies & Techniques used by Speech & Language Therapists 
in Ireland 
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Appendix 4 Therapies rating scale 
 
Scientific intervention 1. Weight of evidence positive 
2. Evidence tends to be high level evidence 
3. Volume of evidence – more than 2  positive studies 
4. High level experts commentary in peer reviewed 
publications positive; and 
5. Sound theoretical basis 
6. Non-singular research sources 
Probably scientifically 
based intervention 
1. At least 1/2 of the criteria for scientific intervention 
demonstrated 
2.  Being tested and open to testing but requires further 
study to corroborate and across populations 
3. Although research source tends to be singular 
4.  Absence of negative commentary 
Neither scientific nor 
unscientific 
Intervention – case 
not proven 
1.Evidence sufficiently  inconsistent /low level to 
prevent determination of weight of evidence  
2.More research required of higher standard to 
supplement low level research findings 
3. Insufficient research being carried out on subject 
4. Expert commentary not decided 
5. Theory may be sound but not proved by research 
6. Evidence from non-singular (biased) source not as 
positive as from invested (biased) source 
Probably unscientific 
intervention 
1. Lack of any/sound theoretical basis 
2. Not being tested 
3. No supporting research evidence 
4. Lack of high level expert commentary in support in 
peer reviewed publications 
5. Therapy or technique ignored in literature 
5. Evidence tends to be anecdotal 
Pseudoscientific 
intervention 
1. Meets pseudoscientific criteria. 
2. If studied, weight of research evidence negative 
3. If studied, level of evidence tends towards low level 
4.Commentary tend to be strongly against intervention 
5. Unsound theoretical basis  - mechanism of action 
unclear and therefore hard to falsify or patently 
inaccurate 
6.  Not testable 
Unknown 1.No evidence 
2.No commentaries found 
3. Unable to make determination 
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Appendix 5 Reasons options for using and not using therapies 
Reasons for using therapies Reasons for not using therapies 
My clinical experience supports its use 
It is employer /department policy 
It motivates patients 
I read about it in text books 
I use it because I am familiar with it 
I use it because I learned it at university 
or on a course 
I use it because there are no other 
options 
It doesn't matter which treatment I use 
so I use this 
It is suitable for my client’s needs 
It makes sense theoretically 
It is adaptable – it can be used with a lot 
of patients 
The specialists /experts in our 
profession recommend it 
I believe it should be used 
It is available in my workplace 
It claims to work 
It is a concrete therapy/technique 
I have not done training for this specific 
therapy/technique 
I am not aware of this treatment 
It is not suitable for my clients 
It doesn’t work 
My department doesn’t use it 
It is too impractical 
It is not an engaging/fun therapy 
The arguments against its use are sound 
It is not a treatment SLTs would use 
It is not easy to use 
It is not scientific 
I have tried it and don’t like it 
My clients don’t like it 
Nobody I know uses it 
The research evidence doesn’t support it 
I don't know enough about this therapy 
to answer 
I don’t know about this therapy 
 
 
  
Deconstructing clinical practice and searching for scientific foundations 
 
 
 
24 
 
 
Appendix 6 Advance contact email (ACE) 
       
ADVANCE NOTICE! 
You will be asked to participate in a survey on therapies & 
techniques used by Speech & Language Therapists in Ireland 
Are you interested in what therapies & techniques our profession uses in clinical practice and why? 
Are you a qualified speech & language therapist who is currently practising? 
Will you consider sharing your opinion and clinical expertise for research purposes?  
What is the research? 
The survey is part of a research project which explores what interventions speech & language 
therapists use, views on those interventions, and the decision making involved in the selection 
and use of therapies & techniques in clinical practice. 
Who is the researcher? 
This survey is being carried out by Arlene McCurtin from the Department of Speech & 
Language Therapy at the University of Limerick. 
Who can participate? 
Any-one who is a practising speech & language therapist 
How are potential participants selected? 
Via your membership of an IASLT Special Interest Group. Via the University of Limerick 
Practice Educator database if you have previously provided a clinical placement to a UL 
student. The survey link will also be placed on the IASLT website. 
Confidentiality 
Please be assured the survey has been arranged so your contribution remains anonymous 
at all stages of the process -your identity is unknown. 
When will I be asked to contribute to this research? 
In one week’s time via a survey link 
What will this information be used for? 
This survey is part of a PhD research project.  
Will the outcomes be disseminated? 
It is the intention of the researcher to present this information at a future IASLT 
conference and/or SIG event where you will be able to see the final results.  
 
 
 
 
 
This survey has received ethical approval from the University of Limerick Research Ethics 
Committee. If you have concerns regarding this study, please contact: Chairman, Education 
and Health Sciences, Research Ethics Committee, EHS Faculty Office, University of Limerick 
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Appendix 7 Data collection email (ACE) 
 
 
A survey of therapies & techniques by speech & language 
therapists in Ireland  
 
Dear speech & language therapist 
Are you interested in what therapies & techniques our profession uses and why? 
Are you a qualified speech & language therapist who is currently practising? 
Will you consider sharing your opinion and clinical expertise for research purposes?  
 
Please consider contributing to this study and be assured your 
contribution will remain anonymous at all stages of the process. 
The survey  
This survey has 4 parts as outlined below. Some clinicians will only need to complete 2 
parts – this depends on your area of practice.  
Some demographic questions  
(this will take about 1-2 minutes) 
Opinions about therapies and techniques 
used with clients with disabilities (this will 
take about 10-12 minutes) 
General statements which can be 
completed by SLTs working in all areas 
of practice (this should take about 10 
minutes 
Opinions about therapies and techniques 
used with clients with dysphagia (this will 
take about 10-12 minutes) 
Directions for use 
You can access the survey by using the survey-link in this email. Simply click on the 
survey-link and start answering the questions. If you prefer to use a hard copy format, 
please contact Arlene.mccurtin@ul.ie for a copy.  
Thank you for participating. Your help is very much appreciated. Any questions about 
this study can be directed to the researcher at the email highlighted above. 
 
This survey has received ethical approval from the University of Limerick Research Ethics Committee. 
If you have concerns regarding this study, please contact: Chairman, Education and Health Sciences, 
Research Ethics Committee, EHS Faculty Office, University of Limerick 
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Appendix 8 Focus group script 
Introduction script: 
Introduction 
Hi everyone, my name is Arlene McCurtin and I am currently carrying out some research 
on decision making in clinical practice. Some of you may already know that I have 
conducted a survey on the therapies & techniques used by clinicians and their reasons 
for using them. Some of the findings of that study will be further explored through this 
group which is called ‘Perspectives on practice’. The aim of this group is to add depth 
and richness to the research findings. To do that, I am running a series of focus groups 
with speech & language therapy departments in different setting, e.g. acute, primary 
care etc. 
The questions will be broad questions in order to elicit your opinion and there is of 
course, no right or wrong answer – I really just want your perspectives… 
 
Forms 
So what happens now? Well first I need you to read these information sheets. Ask me 
any questions about things which you don’t understand or need explaining. You will note 
the information sheet refers to anonymity and confidentiality. Please note all your 
responses and data will be both confidential and anonymous (i.e. the group will not be 
identified in any publications etc., and there will a system in place for ensuring your 
individual responses are not identifiable to you).  
 
Once you have read the information sheet and are happy with that, please read and sign 
the consent form. The consent form enables you to participate and meets ethical 
requirements. This is voluntary. You don’t have to, and if you feel you do not want to 
participate that is your decision and you will need to leave the group. If you change your 
mind about participating during the group, that is also your prerogative and you should 
leave the room. 
 
And finally, the third sheet is for demographic information. This is to enable data you 
provide to be put into perspectives in addition to the broad group we see here. It may or 
may not be used when looking at the data. Please be ensured this data will again be 
confidential and all responses anonymised.  
 
Finally, can I ask you to write your first name clearly in capitals on a label and put it 
on? This will help me when transcribing the data. 
 
Process 
So thanks for that everybody. Now what happens? Well essentially I will put statements 
or questions to the group and ask you to share your thoughts and opinions about them. I 
will act as a facilitator to ensure the questions are answered and everyone gets a 
chance to share their perspectives on practice.  I have also provided you with pens and 
sticky notepads so you can write down any comments you want to make, either as a 
reminder to yourself or to give to me after the session so I can add it to the data from the 
group. 
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I would like to acknowledge the number of people who have attended today - thank you.  
 
You will see that there are two digital recorders in the middle of the table and with 
that I will record the session. The data on that tape will be downloaded to computer for 
analysis of the content, and then deleted from recorder. The recorder is used so that no 
comments are missed.  
 
You might also see me making notes while you have been reading the information 
sheets and signing the consent form. This is to ensure reliable and accurate 
transcription of the data you provide. 
 
Can I ask you to say your name before each comment you make. This also ensures that 
when transcribing and analysing the data, I know that a different person has entered 
the discussion. If you forget, I hope you won’t mind me just saying your name for the 
recording… 
 
Great, then let’s start………. 
 
Data collection groups script. 
Ok. That’s great, thanks. I appreciate your participation today. I will be collating the 
data from today’s session which I will summarise. This summary is intended to be a fair 
and accurate representation of your comments from this session. I would like to send 
this summary to you in about 2-4 weeks. If you have any comments or feedback on the 
summary please do let me know. If you would like a copy of the summary, please jot your 
email on this sheet here. Again confidentiality will be preserved. 
 
Close 
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Appendix 9 Focus group questions and sample potential probes 
Q 1: Concept of ‘Client suitability’ 
Recently, a survey exploring the therapies & techniques speech 
& language therapists use was conducted. In one part of this 
survey, Speech & language therapists gave reasons for both 
using and not using various therapies & techniques. Clients 
either being “suitable” or “not suitable” was an important 
concept that arose when deciding on which treatments to use. 
Please share your ideas on what SLTs were referring to when 
they talked about client “suitability” and “unsuitability”. 
 
Sample probes 
So what exactly are SLTs referring to when they talk about ’client suitability’? 
Specifically what does a therapy being suitable or not suitable for a client mean? 
Why would something be ‘not suitable’? 
Why would a therapy or techniques be ‘client suitable? 
Why would a therapy be suitable for one client/client group and not another? 
How do you know a client is suitable or not for a particular therapy or technique?  
 
Q2: Concept of clinical experience  
‘Clinical experience’ is also a common reason cited by SLTs for 
using therapies & techniques. Can you help me understand what 
exactly do SLTS mean by the term ‘clinical experience’? 
 
Sample probes 
So if you had to define ‘clinical experience’ what would you say? 
Why is clinical experience important in using therapies & techniques? 
Why would you suggest that ‘clinical experience’ is so important in clinical practice? 
What do novice clinicians do when no they have no ‘clinical experience’? 
What do clinicians do when they transfer to a client group with which they have no 
clinical experience? How would their decision making be different? 
If two experienced SLTs saw the same patient and came to different decisions about 
treating that patient, and they both explained their decisions by saying they used 
their clinical experience, what does that say about clinical experience? 
 
Question 3: Concept of training  
Being ‘not trained’ was important to SLTs as a reason for not 
using therapies and techniques. Why do you think training is so 
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important to SLTs in deciding whether or not to use therapies? 
 
Sample probes 
Why is training so strong a reason for not-using therapies? 
If SLTs don’t get trained, how do they decide what to use? 
If SLTs don’t get trained, how do they decide on the therapies value? 
Does that mean that therapists use therapies mainly because they have been trained 
on them?  
Does it mean SLTs are not using therapies they might want to use, because they have 
not received training? 
How do SLTs decide what training to go on?  
How much of what you use (not the clinical skills) is training based? How much not? 
 
Q4: The construction of the profession/practice as scientific 
Lum, in a book on the profession in 2002, stated that speech & 
language therapy is a scientific profession. I'm interested in your 
thoughts about this. 
 
Sample probes 
In a recent survey, very few SLTs proposed scientifically based reasons for either 
using or not using therapies & techniques. Why do you think that science was not 
represented in their answers? 
Is Speech & language therapy more of an art or a science? 
Are there things SLTs do that defines them as scientist practitioners?  
Are there any non-scientific practices in your field that worry you? Why? Why not? 
So would you say science influences your practice?  
If disconfirming evidence for your favourite therapy arose, would you stop using this 
treatment? 
 
General probes 
Why? 
Why not? 
How did you come to hold that point of view?  
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Appendix 10 Focus group recruitment email 
 
 
 
Dear Speech & Language Therapy Manager 
I am writing to invite you and your department to participate in a group 
discussion - ‘Perspectives on Practice’- as part of the following research 
study: 
 
‘Exploring the scientific basis of clinical practice: the use of therapies and 
techniques by speech & language therapists in Ireland’ 
 
o Would you and your staff be interested in sharing your perspectives on clinical practice? 
o Is your department made up of at least 7 members who would be willing to take part in 
a group discussion? 
o Do you have about an hour and a half to offer sometime between May and July 2011? 
 
Please find attached an information sheet for you to distribute to your staff. 
If your department would like to contribute to ‘Perspectives on Practice’, we can 
arrange a date and location of your choosing. Please contact me at 
Arlene.mccurtin@ul.ie or 061-234180 by March 11th 2011. 
Your consideration of this study is very much appreciated. 
 
Many thanks 
Arlene McCurtin 
 
This survey has received ethical approval from the University of Limerick Research Ethics Committee. 
If you have concerns regarding this study, please contact: Chairman, Education and Health Sciences, 
Research Ethics Committee, EHS Faculty Office, University of Limerick  
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Appendix 11 
Sample mind map 
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Appendix 12 Frequency of use of disability therapies 
% Most frequently used 
(Always/Frequently) 
Least frequently used 
(Never/Rarely) 
% 
76.7 Hanen Conductive education 95.8 
75 Lamh Aided language modelling 95 
56.7 Communication boards/books  Cranial sacral therapy 94.3 
53.3 Derbyshire language scheme (DLS) Kidspiration/Inspiration 93.3 
50 Communication passports Speechviewer 92.5 
49.2 Picture exchange communication 
system (PECS) 
Seescape 92.5 
40.0 Objects of reference Toe by toe 91.7 
37.5 Minimal pairs therapy Nutritional therapies 90 
35 Switch toys  Reminiscence therapy 85.8 
31.7 Nuffield dyspraxia programme Listening therapy 85 
30.8 TEACCH Bobath 83.3 
30.0 Articulation therapy Irish sign language 80.8 
27.5 Oral motor therapy More 79.2 
27.5 Voice output communication aids 
(VOCAs) 
Early bird parent training 78.3 
23.3 Talkabout Reciprocal imitation training 76.7 
22.5 Enhanced natural gestures Prelinguistic milieu training 75. 
20.8 Intensive interaction Pyramid approach to education 70.8 
20. Joint attention training Applied behaviour analysis 69.2 
20.8 Social scripts Facilitated communication 69.2 
20.8 Interactive storytelling Visualise verbalise programme 63.3 
20.0 Talking mats Metaphon  62.5 
19.2 Parent-child interaction therapy Social use of language programme 60.0 
17.5 Sensory integration therapy Life books, Life stories and Life maps  59.2 
15 Talktools Talking mats 57.5 
14.2 Visual timetables Socially speaking 55.8 
12.5 Socially speaking Narrative therapy 55 
11.7 Floortime Sensory integration therapy 54.2 
11.7 Early bird parent training Floortime 51.7 
11.7 Life books, Life stories and Life maps  Tactile sensory stimulation 50 
10.8 Tactile sensory stimulation Parent-child interaction therapy  49.2 
10.8 Social use of language programme Intensive Interaction 45.8 
10.8 Facilitated communication Joint attention training 45.8 
9.2 Pyramid approach to education  Enhanced natural gestures 45.0 
9.2 Narrative therapy Social scripts 44.2 
9.2 Visualise verbalise programme Interactive storytelling 44.2 
9.2 Aided language modelling Talktools 44.2 
6.7 Metaphon TEACCH 39.2 
6.7 Applied behaviour analysis Voice output communication aids 36.7 
6.7 Reciprocal imitation training Talkabout 35.0 
5.0 More Oral motor therapy 29.2 
4.2 Bobath Switch toys 29.2 
1.7 Nutritional therapies Minimal pairs therapy 28.3 
1.7 Kidspiration / Inspiration Articulation Therapy 28.3 
1.7 Prelinguistic mileau training Nuffield dyspraxia programme 26.7 
1.7 Irish sign language Communication passports 20.8 
1.7 Reminiscence therapy Derbyshire language scheme  20.0 
1.7 Toe by toe Objects of reference 18.3 
0.8 Listening therapy PECS  16.7 
0.0 Speechviewer Communication boards/books 13.3 
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0.0 Seescape Hanen 13.3 
0.0 Conductive education LAMH 8.3 
0.0 Cranial sacral therapy Visual timetables  0.8 
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Appendix 13 Frequency of use of dysphagia therapies 
% Most frequently used 
(Always/Frequently) 
Least frequently used 
(Never/Rarely) 
% 
80  Texture modification Surface electromyography (SEMG) 92.5 
76.6 Thickening liquids Vitalstim therapy 92.5 
70 Changes in position Homeopathy 92.5 
44.2 Double swallow Deep pharyngeal neuromuscular 
stimulation (DPNS) 
89.2 
42.5 Adapted/modified utensils Intra-oral appliances/prostheses 89.2 
 
41.6 Volume regulation Ora-light system 84.2 
38.3 Verbal cueing technique Head back 84.2 
33.3 Physical support Bobath 80.8 
33.3 Empty spoon technique Deep massage 80.8 
30.8 Videofluroscopic swallow study  Expiratory muscle strength 
training (EMST) 
76.6 
 
29.1 Alternating liquids with solids as 
liquid assist 
Lee Silverman Voice Treatment 
(LSVT) 
75.5 
 
29.2 Range of motion (ROM) exercises 
for the tongue 
Sip from side-spoon technique 74.2 
27.5 Chin tuck Range of motion (ROM) exercises 
in the neck, trunk and shoulder 
joints 
74.2 
26.6 Modifications to food/liquid taste Tapping 72.5 
21.6 Effortful swallow Oro-facial regulation therapy 70.0 
20.8 Clearing cough/throat clear Carbonation 67.5 
20.0 Tube feeding Vibration 66.6 
19.2 Modifications to food/liquid 
temperature 
Stretching exercises 66.6 
17.5 Chewy tube Talk tools 65.0 
15.8 Resistance exercises Thermal-tactile stimulation 64.2 
10.8 Head turn/rotation Supersupraglottic swallow 63.3 
10.8 Masako manoeuvre Mendelsohn manoeuvre 57.5 
10.8 Talk tools Masako manoeuvre 56.6 
10.0 Shaker exercise Shaker exercise 55.8 
7.5 Mendelsohn manoeuvre Chewy tube 53.3 
7.5 Vibration Head turn/rotation 47.5 
5.8 Thermal tactile stimulation Resistance exercises 45.8 
5.8 Bobath Videofluroscopic swallow study 
biofeedback (VFSSB) 
40.0 
5.0 Supersupraglottic swallow Tube feeding 35.8 
5.0 Carbonation Effortful swallow 34.2 
5.0 Deep massage Modifications to food/liquid 
temperature 
30.0 
3.3 Sip from side-spoon technique Range of motion (ROM) exercises 
for the tongue 
29.2 
3.3 Lee Silverman Voice Treatment 
(LSVT) 
Modifications to food/liquid taste 26.6 
2.5 Expiratory muscle strength training 
(EMST) 
Clearing cough/throat clear 24.16 
2.5 Oro-facial regulation therapy Chin tuck 23.3 
2.5 Range of motion (ROM) exercises in 
the neck, trunk and shoulder joints 
Alternating liquids with solids as 
liquid assist 
23.3 
2.5 Stretching exercises Empty spoon technique 20.8 
1.6 Tapping  Physical support 20.0 
Deconstructing clinical practice and searching for scientific foundations 
 
 
 
35 
 
 
0.8 Vitalstim therapy Adapted/modified utensils 12.5 
0.8 Ora-light system Double swallow 11.6 
0.8 Intra-oral appliances/prostheses Verbal cueing before taking bolus 11.6 
0.8 Head back Volume regulation 7.5 
0.0 Deep pharyngeal neuromuscular 
stimulation (DPNS) 
Changes in position 4.2 
0.0 Surface electromyography (SEMG) Thickening liquids 2.5 
0.0 Homeopathy Texture modification 0.0 
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Appendix 14 Identified therapy clusters for dysphagia and disability clients 
Area Clusters Therapies & techniques 
Disability Language cluster 
 
Hanen 
Derbyshire language scheme 
 AAC cluster  
 
Visual timetables 
PECS 
Lamh 
 Adult AAC cluster 
 
Communication boards /books 
Communication passports 
Voice output communication aids 
Objects of reference 
Intensive interaction 
 Speech cluster 1 Nuffield 
 Speech cluster 2 Nuffield 
Articulation 
Minimal pairs 
Metaphon 
Talktools 
Oral-motor therapy 
+ Floortime 
 Lesser-used cluster All other identified therapies 
Dysphagia Bolus modification 
cluster 
 
Thickening liquids 
Texture modification 
Volume regulation 
 Adapting physical cluster Position changes 
Adaptive utensils 
 Swallow cluster 
 
Lee Silverman voice therapy 
Thermal tactile stimulation 
Supersupraglottic swallow 
Head turn 
Masako manoeuvre 
Shaker exercise 
Cough/throat clear 
Effortful swallow 
Double swallow 
Range of motion-tongue 
 Extended swallow cluster 
 
Videofluroscopic swallow study - biofeedback 
Chin tuck 
Alternating liquids 
 Lesser bolus modification 
cluster 
Temperature modification 
Taste modification 
 Lesser-used cluster All other identified therapies 
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Appendix 15 Selected significant findings for experiential demographics and 
disability therapies 
Experiential demographics and use of the disability therapy communication boards 
/books 
Experiential variable for 
communication  boards/books 
Use 
p value 
Years of experience .024 
Years disability experience .012 
Professional qualification .039 
Dedicated time .000 
Self-determined skill .046 
Grade .008 
 
Dedicated time and significant use of disability therapies 
Therapies used more with 
more dedicated time 
Use 
P value 
Choice 
P value 
AAC therapies   
Communication passports <.001 <.001 
Objects of reference <.001 .004 
VOCAs .002  
Talking mats .005  
Switch toys .02  
PECS .001 .001 
Non-AAC therapies   
Social scripts .009  
Lifebooks/Lifestories .013  
Interactive storytelling .018  
Derbyshire Language Scheme .036  
ABA .036  
Intensive interaction .012 .027 
Sensory integration therapy  .022 
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Appendix 16 Selected significant findings for experiential demographics and 
dysphagia therapies 
Experiential demographics and use of the swallow and swallow related techniques 
Swallow /swallow 
related technique 
Use  
P 
value 
Choice  
P value 
Demographic 
Effortful swallow .002 
.002 
<.0001 Most dedicated time 
Middle specialised 
experience 
Masako manoeuvre .004 .002 Most dedicated time 
Mendelsohn 
manoeuvre 
.014 .005 Most dedicated time 
Shaker exercise .006 .006 Most dedicated time 
Double swallow <.0001 
.051 
.048 Most dedicated time 
Most experienced 
Cough/throat clear .036  Most dedicated time 
VFSS Biofeedback <.0001 
.055 
 Most dedicated time 
Seniors 
Thermal tactile 
stimulation 
.008  Most dedicated time 
Alternating liquids .041  Most dedicated time 
Head turn .022  Most dedicated time 
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Appendix 17  
Use of client suitability and clinical experience as a main reason for disability and 
dysphagia therapies 
 
Disability therapy  Client 
suitability  
% 
Disability therapy Clinical 
experience 
% 
AAC 
Irish Sign  Language  
Voice output communication 
aids  
Objects of reference 
Facilitated communication  
Lamh 
Communication boards 
/books  
Communication passports 
Visual timetables  
Picture exchange 
communication system 
Switch toys 
Talking mats  
Other 
Prelinguistic mileau training 
Enhanced natural gestures 
Social scripts 
Reciprocal imitation training 
Lifebooks/Lifestories 
Applied behaviour analysis 
Intensive interaction 
Aided language modelling 
Tactile sensory stimulation 
Parent-child interaction 
therapy 
Floortime 
TEACCH 
Joint attention training 
Nuffield 
Socially speaking 
Articulation 
Social use of language 
programme 
Pyramid approach 
 
80.0 
63.8 
 
63.6 
57.9 
56.2 
55.7 
 
52.2 
50.5 
49.2 
43.8 
41.4 
39.6 
 
71.4 
59.0 
57.1 
55.6 
52.0 
50.0 
47.5 
47.4 
45.2 
41.9 
 
41.7 
40.5 
40.5 
39.6 
39.1 
37.8 
36.0 
 
31.3 
 
 
More 
Talktools 
Oral  motor therapy 
Metaphon 
Toe by toe 
Sensory integration 
therapy 
Hanen 
Derbyshire Language 
Scheme 
Listening therapy 
 
54.5 
44.8 
42.9 
42.1 
40.0 
36.0 
 
34.9 
30.9 
 
30.0 
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Dysphagia therapy  Dysphagia therapy  
Head back 
Tube feeding 
Physical support 
Adapted utensils  
Texture modification  
Positioning  
Thickening liquids  
Intraoral appliances 
Verbal cueing technique 
Taste modification  
Talktools  
Bobath  
Stretching 
Orofacial regulation therapy 
Deep massage  
Chin tuck 
50.0 
47.2 
46.0 
45.2 
44.9 
44.7 
44.4 
40.0 
39.3 
37.3 
35.3 
33.3 
30.8 
30.8 
30.0 
23.5 
Alternating liquids  
Cough/throat clear  
Empty-spoon 
technique 
Chewy tube 
Carbonation 
Temperature 
modification  
Side-spoon technique 
ROM other  
Vibration 
VFSS biofeedback 
Oralight 
Tapping 
Effortful swallow  
ROM tongue  
 
49.0 
46.2 
44.2 
 
43.3 
40.9 
40.0 
 
37.5 
36.4 
35.3 
31.8 
31.3 
28.6 
26.2 
26.0 
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Appendix 18 Significant therapies and experiential demographics for main reasons 
for always-use 
Experience variable Therapies P value 
Years of experience Thickening liquids  
Oral motor therapy 
Thermal tactile stimulation  
VFSSBiofeedback 
Intensive interaction 
Enhanced natural gestures  
Texture modification  
Facilitated communication 
Carbonation  
Lamh 
.000 
.011 
.011 
.011 
.016 
.020 
.020 
.026 
.031 
.042 
Years of specialised 
experience 
Oral motor therapy 
Floortime 
Intensive interaction 
Switch toys 
.002 
.018 
.018 
.035 
Grade Oral motor therapy 
VFSS biofeedback 
Enhance natural gestures 
Voice output communication aids 
Lamh 
.020 
.024 
.027 
.037 
.048 
Skill Floortime 
Parent-child interaction therapy 
Facilitated communication 
Vibration 
Hanen 
Applied behaviour analysis 
More 
.014 
.014 
.017 
.022 
.025 
.027 
.030 
Dedicated-time Joint-attention training 
Side-spoon technique 
Visualise-verbalize 
.013 
.025 
.031 
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Appendix 19 Therapies of significance for work context demographics 
Demographic Therapies P value 
Work setting Visual timetables  
Enhanced natural gestures 
Communication boards /books 
Communication passports 
Narrative therapy 
Social use of language 
programme 
Texture modification 
Intensive interaction 
Side-spoon technique 
Lifebooks/Lifestories 
Derbyshire language scheme 
Nuffield dyspraxia programme 
Lamh  
0.000 
0.001 
0.001 
 
0.002 
0.008 
0.014 
 
0.016 
0.021 
0.025 
0.032 
0.037 
0.041 
0.052 
Region Thermal tactile stimulation 0.029 
Population Enhanced natural gestures 
Metaphon  
Floortime  
Applied behaviour analysis 
Talktools  
Intensive interaction 
 Oral motor therapy 
0.002 
0.014 
0.018 
0.024 
0.024 
0.028 
0.033 
Population age Ora-light 
Deep massage 
0.025 
0.025 
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Appendix 20 Use of main never-use reasons for disability and dysphagia therapies 
Main 
reason for 
never-use  
Disability therapy % Dysphagia therapy % 
Lack of 
suitability  
 
Visual timetables  
Articulation 
Communication 
boards/books  
Minimal pairs  
Lamh 
Voice output 
communication aids  
Nuffield dyspraxia 
programme 
Switch toys 
Communication passports 
Metaphon 
Talkabout 
Picture exchange 
communication system 
Derbyshire language 
programme 
Reminiscence therapy 
Objects of reference 
Visualise verbalise 
Lifebooks /Lifestories 
Narrative therapy 
Social scripts 
Interactive storytelling 
100 
88.9 
88.2 
 
88.2 
81.8 
80.0 
 
68.8 
 
65.6 
63.0 
57.7 
54.1 
47.6 
 
44.4 
 
43.9 
43.5 
41.2 
37.9 
37.3 
30.0 
29.4 
Texture modification 
Effortful swallow   
Double swallow  
Head turn  
Chin tuck  
Cough / throat clear 
Verbal cueing 
Supersupraglottic 
swallow 
Head back 
Thickening liquids  
Masako manoeuvre 
Mendelsohn 
manoeuvre 
Shaker exercise 
Volume regulation 
Alternating liquids 
Resistance 
Chewy tube 
ROM-tongue 
Changes in position 
Physical support 
Thermal tactile 
stimulation 
Stretching 
Intraoral appliances 
ROM-other 
Tube feeding 
100 
89.5 
85.7 
82.4 
80.8 
73.9 
72.7 
72.1 
 
67.5 
66.7 
64.5 
61.9 
 
60.0 
55.6 
55.0 
46.0 
46.0 
42.9 
40.0 
36.8 
32.8 
 
32.8 
31.1 
30.0 
27.0 
Lack of 
training  
Early bird programme 
Sensory integration 
therapy 
Floortime 
Bobath 
Tactile sensory 
stimulation 
TEACCH 
More 
Hanen 
Irish sign language 
Intensive interaction 
Listening therapy 
Parent-child interaction 
72.7 
71.0 
 
70.0 
66.7 
61.5 
 
59.1 
54.4 
52.9 
49.4 
47.2 
46.4 
44.4 
Bobath 
Lee Silverman voice 
training 
Deep pharyngeal 
neuromuscular 
stimulation 
Surface 
electromyography 
Vitalstim 
Expiratory muscle 
strength training 
Orofacial regulation 
therapy 
Ora-light 
74.2 
72.6 
 
55.6 
 
 
55.4 
 
55.4 
48.1 
 
43.2 
 
37.1 
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therapy 
Applied behaviour 
analysis 
Cranial-sacral therapy 
Talking mats 
Pyramid approach 
Nutritional therapies  
Joint attention training 
Enhanced natural gestures 
Socially speaking 
Conductive education 
Facilitated communication 
 
43.6 
 
40.2 
39.7 
38.5 
38.2 
37.3 
34.7 
33.3 
33.3 
28.4 
Deep massage 
Homeopathy 
32.9 
31.0 
Lack of 
awareness 
Kidspiration 
Toe by toe  
Seescape  
Reciprocal imitation 
training 
Prelinguistic mileau 
training 
Speechviewer 
48.6 
47.0 
45.8 
43.0 
 
42.4 
 
31.5 
Side-spoon technique 
Tapping 
Empty-spoon 
technique  
Vibration  
Carbonation 
41.7 
28.6 
26.8 
 
26.1 
26.0 
Don’t 
know 
enough 
Aided language modelling  39.4   
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Appendix 21 Significant therapies in disability and dysphagia by experiential 
demographics 
Experience 
variable 
Therapies  P value 
Years of experience Conductive education 
Ora-light  
Communication passports 
Temperature modification 
Double swallow 
Shaker exercise 
Masako manoeuvre 
Bobath  
More 
Cranial sacral therapy 
Lifebooks /Lifestories 
Seescape 
Switch toys 
.0001 
.007 
.008 
.008 
.014 
.028 
.029 
.031 
.039 
.039 
.039 
.050 
.051 
Specialised 
experience 
Conductive education 
Shaker exercise 
Masako manoeuvre 
Supersupraglottic swallow 
Ora-light  
Lifebooks/ Lifestories 
Double swallow  
Effortful swallow  
Thermal tactile stimulation 
.0001 
.0001 
.0001 
.002 
.003 
.012 
.024 
.037 
.041 
Per-cent time in 
practice 
Head turn 
Enhanced  natural gestures 
Expiratory Muscle Strength Training 
.007 
.021 
.024 
Grade Cranial sacral therapy 
Expiratory Muscle Strength Training 
Switch toys  
Social use of language programme 
Parent child interaction therapy 
Lifebooks / Lifestories 
.002 
.006 
.023 
.029 
.032 
.035 
Skill Conductive Education 
Shaker exercise 
Tube feeding 
Bobath  
More 
Supersupraglottic swallow 
Masako manoeuvre 
Irish sign language 
Carbonation  
Lifebooks 
.001 
.003 
.004 
.014 
.014 
.020 
.026 
.027 
.036 
.040 
Highest Double swallow  .011 
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qualification Stretching 
Lifebooks / Lifestories 
.027 
.029 
Years since highest 
qualification  
 
Conductive education 
TEACCH 
Temperature modification 
Shaker exercise 
Communication passports 
Bobath 
Reciprocal imitation therapy 
PECS 
.001 
.003 
.009 
.010 
.020 
.034 
.040 
.047 
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Appendix 22 Therapies of significance by work-context demographics 
Experience 
variable 
Therapies significant P 
value 
HSE region Switch toys  
Pyramid approach 
.019 
.049 
Work setting Deep Pharyngeal Neuromuscular 
Stimulation  
Range of motion-tongue  
Vibration  
Lee Silverman Voice Training  
Range of motion-other  
Narrative therapy  
<.0001 
 
.001 
.0020 
.036 
.036 
.048 
Population Expiratory muscle strength training  
Deep pharyngeal neuromuscular 
stimulation 
Range of motion-tongue  
Visualise-verbalise  
Ora-light  
Applied behaviour analysis 
Surface electromyography 
Side-spoon techniques 
Enhanced natural gestures 
Talking Mats  
.000 
.005 
 
.005 
.013 
.015 
.022 
.023 
.027 
.032 
.045 
Population age Sensory Integration Therapy  
Kidspiration  
Early bird training 
Aided language modelling 
Floortime 
Parent-child interaction therapy 
Surface electromyography 
Deep pharyngeal neuromuscular 
stimulation 
Prelinguistic milieu training 
Metaphon  
Enhanced natural gestures 
Expiratory muscle strength training  
Homeopathy  
Nuffield dyspraxia programme 
Lifebooks /Life stories 
Hanen   
Intensive interaction  
Derbyshire language scheme 
<.0001 
<.0001 
<.0001 
.001 
.001 
.003 
.008 
.009 
 
.009 
.015 
.018 
.020 
.020 
.027 
.029 
.039 
.042 
.050 
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Appendix 23 Agreement with patient statements  
Patient statement % 
agreement 
Trend P value  
The individual nature of 
each client influences my 
choice of therapy or 
technique 
95.5 -  
I prefer therapies & 
techniques which are 
person-centred 
89.5 Mid-time – dysphagia disagree 
more 
Voluntary setting agree most 
.021 
 
.012 
I focus on the patient’s 
specific deficits and choose 
therapies & techniques 
based on this 
78.5 Early years group most likely to 
agree Later years group most likely 
to disagree 
Adult-acquired most likely to 
agree. Disability least likely to 
agree and most likely to disagree 
Least dedicated time – dysphagia 
Hospital /rehabilitation setting 
agree most 
.028 
 
 
<.0001 
 
 
<0.0001 
.007 
 
A patient’s preferences and 
values influence my choice 
of therapies & techniques 
77.1 Seniors are least likely to agree 
Disability most likely to agree. 
Community paediatrics least likely 
to agree 
Experts disagree most 
Most experienced disagree more 
.039 
 
.038 
 
.014 
.036 
The patient must take 
responsibility for ensuring 
treatment success 
53.2 Early years group most likely to 
agree Later years group most likely 
to disagree 
Basics most likely to agree 
Managers most likely to disagree 
More than professional 
qualification less likely to agree 
and more likely to disagree 
Early years –dysphagia agree most 
Least dedicated time dysphagia 
Community agree most 
Paediatric agree most 
<.0001 
 
 
.036 
 
<.0001 
 
 
.010 
.054 
.045 
.043 
Family preference influences 
my therapy & technique 
choices 
49.2 Mid years group are most likely to 
agree and disagree 
Paediatric agree most 
.047 
 
.007 
What the patient brings to 
therapy is more important 
than the therapy or 
technique 
30.9 Mid years group are most likely to 
agree. Later years group most 
likely to disagree 
More than professional 
qualification less likely to agree 
and more likely to disagree 
Experts less likely to agree 
.033 
 
 
.025 
 
 
.003 
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Appendix 24 Correlation between selected therapies and selected attitude 
statements 
Therapy Did not 
choose 
 
Agreed  
% 
Disagree
d  
% 
Choose 
this  
Agreed  
% 
Disagree
d 
%  
Fishers 
exact p 
value 
Science should decide        
Facilitated 
communication 
n = 97 55.7 9.3 n =6 83.3 16.7 0.259 
Talktools n =82 59.8 11.0 n=21 47.6 4.8 0.279 
Hanen n =23 60.9 13.0 n=80 56.3 8.8 0.689 
I use CAMs in work        
Facilitated 
communication 
n =97  7.1 73.5 n=6 0.0 33.3 0.051 
Talktools n = 83 6 72.3 n =21 9.5 66.7 0.834 
Hanen n =24 16.7 62.5 n =80 3.8 73.8 0.082 
Any treatment will 
work if a therapist 
believes 
       
Facilitated 
communication 
n = 96 5.2 82.3 n = 6 16.7 83.3 0.320 
Talktools n =81 82.7 6.2 n = 21 81.0 4.8 1.000 
Hanen n =23 4.3 82.6 n = 79 6.3 82.3 1.000 
Once research 
attached to a 
treatment more likely 
to believe’ 
       
Thickening liquids n = 15 66.7 13.3 n=86 75.6 7.0 0.785 
Masako manoeuvre n =77 74.0 7.8 n =24 75.0 8.3 1.000 
Thermal tactile 
stimulation 
n =91 72.5 8.8 n =10 90.0 0.0 0.544 
Waste time with 
unvalidated 
treatments 
       
Facilitated 
communication 
n =98 60.2 17.3 n =6 50.0 16.7 0.841 
Listening therapy n=101 59.4 16.8 n =3 66.7 33.3 0.604 
Do harm unvalidated 
treatments 
       
Facilitated 
communication 
n=98 53.1 16.3 n=6 50.0 16.7 1.000 
Listening therapy n=101 53.5 16.8 n =3 33.3 0.0 0.436 
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Appendix 25 Agreement with practical statements 
Practical statements % 
agreement 
Trend p 
value 
I don’t have enough time 
at work to spend reading 
and thinking about 
developing my treatment 
repertoire and therefore 
implement new therapies 
& techniques 
45 Early years agree most. 
Mid and later years 
disagree most 
Basics agree most, 
seniors and managers 
disagree most 
West and Dublin north 
east agree most 
Community agree most 
Community paediatric 
agree most 
.003 
 
 
<.0001 
 
 
.040 
 
.009 
.007 
It is difficult to convert 
research into clinical 
practice 
42 Early years agree most 
and later years disagree 
most 
Emergents agree most 
experts least 
More than professional 
qualification disagree 
most 
Later years-disability 
disagree most 
Later years-dysphagia 
disagree most  
Longest qualified 
disagree most 
.001 
 
.006 
 
<.0001 
 
 
.006 
 
.005 
 
.004 
I am limited in the 
therapies & techniques I 
use by what is available to 
me 
39 Adult-acquired agree 
most, disability least 
Early years – dysphagia 
agree most 
More than professional 
qualification disagree 
most 
Adult clinicians agree 
most 
Disability disagree most 
.019 
 
.034 
 
.053 
 
.012 
 
.012 
Once purchased, or 
learned I will use a 
therapy or technique to 
ensure good value 
24 Community paediatrics 
agree most, disability 
disagree most 
Community agree most 
.004 
 
 
.012 
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Appendix 26 Agreement with statements by areas of practice 
Dysphagia  P value More or less 
likely to agree 
I use alternative or complimentary practices in my work 0.011 less 
Understanding why a treatment works is as important as 
understanding whether it works 
0.044 more 
The patient must take responsibility for ensuring 
treatment success 
0.002 less 
I am limited in the therapies & techniques I use by what is 
available to me 
0.031 more 
Any treatment or technique will work if the therapist 
believes in it 
0.010 less 
I use the therapies & techniques I do because there are no 
other options available 
0.00 more 
Speech & language therapists can do harm by the use of 
un-validated or non-scientific treatments 
0.002 more 
The therapies & techniques I use are the standard of care 
in my workplace 
0.010 more 
Disability   
I believe in my therapy & technique choices even if there 
is no research evidence to support them 
0.048 less 
A patient’s preferences and values influence my choice of 
therapies & techniques 
0.008 more 
Family preference influences my therapy & technique 
choices 
0.003 more 
I focus on the patient’s specific deficits and choose 
therapies & techniques based on this 
0.009 less 
The patient must take responsibility for ensuring 
treatment success 
0.002 less 
Once purchased, or learned I will use a therapy or 
technique to ensure good value 
0.028 less 
The patient therapist relationship is what is important in 
treatment, not the therapy or technique used 
0.001 more 
The therapies & techniques I use are the standard of care 
in my workplace 
0.006 less 
Statement-only group   
 I use alternative or complimentary practices in my work 0.025 more 
I believe in my therapy & technique choices even if there 
is no research evidence to support them 
0.0018 more 
A patient’s preferences and values influence my choice of 
therapies & techniques 
0.033 less 
The patient must take responsibility for ensuring 
treatment success 
0.000 more 
I use the therapies & techniques I do because there are no 
other options available 
0.000 less 
Speech & language therapists can do harm by the use of 
un-validated or non-scientific treatments 
0.001 less 
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Appendix 27 13 dimension output for rotated-solution factor analysis 
Factor  Factor label Factor statements 
1 Uncomplicated 
practice 
S4 Rely on commercial products 
S6 Research doesn’t influence 
S18 Don’t have enough time to develop 
S20 Once purchased will use 
S35 Tend to have a repertoire 
S36 Make efforts to keep up to date (reversed) 
S49 If in use long time must be good 
S51 Easy to implement 
S52 Easier to understand more likely to use 
S54 Variety of fun games and activities 
2 Scientific 
practice 
S1 Goals that can be tested 
S7 Sound theoretical basis 
S9 Clinicians should provide rationales 
S10 Important am able to defend choices 
S30 Read research regularly 
S33 Don’t tend to adopt new techniques (reversed) 
S34 Like exploring new options 
3 Ethical scientific 
practice 
S2 Science should decide 
S5 Believe in (reversed) 
S39 Waste time with unvalidated treatments 
S40 Do harm by unvalidated treatments 
4 Pragmatic 
practice 
S17 Limited by availability 
S19 Difficult to convert research into practice 
S21 The placebo effect 
S32 I am confident (reversed) 
S38 No other options available 
5 External 
influences 
S11 Patient preferences influences 
S16 Patients must take responsibility 
S27 Textbooks 
S43 Watching working with other clinicians 
S45 Specialist/expert valuable resources 
S46 Rely on clinical experts 
6 Clinician-client 
belief dyad 
S15 What patient brings to therapy 
S22 Patient therapist relationship 
S31 Any treatment will work once therapist believes 
7 SLT culture S47 Standard of care in workplace 
S50 Standard of care in SLT 
8 Not so scientific 
sources 
S25 Seen in radio/TV 
S26 Print media 
S28 Older textbooks 
9 Clinical 
experience 
S37 Use because they work 
S41 My clinical experience influences 
S42 Clinical experience best guide 
10 Research belief S29 Once research attached likely to believe 
11 College learning S24 Learned in college 
12 Patient as person S13 Individual nature influences 
S56 Person centred 
13 Specific training S8 Understanding why works important 
S23 Specific training 
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Appendix 28 Significant demographic findings based on extracted factors 
 
Fac Demographics 
differing 
P value Significant statements 
for the demographic 
finding 
Direction of 
difference for 
statement 
P 
value 
1 Mid experience from 
Most experience 
0.05 Don’t have enough time 
to develop 
Most experienced 
disagree most 
0.023 
 Experts from 
Emergents  
Experts from 
experienced 
0.05 
 
0.032 
Long-time use good Experts disagree 
most 
0.025 
 Professional 
qualification from 
more than 
professional 
qualification (PQ+) 
<0.0001 Long-time use good PQ+ less likely to 
agree 
0.004 
   Fun games & activities PQ+ less likely to 
agree 
0.036 
   Rely on commercial 
products 
PQ+ less likely to 
agree 
0.004 
   Use easy to understand 
therapies 
PQ+ less likely to 
agree 
<0.001 
   Use easy to implement 
therapies 
PQ+ less likely to 
agree 
<0.001 
   Research influences PQ+ more likely to 
agree 
0.006 
 Community from 
voluntary 
Community from 
hospital 
/rehabilitation 
0.001 
 
<0.0001 
Use easy to implement 
therapies 
Community least 
likely to agree 
0.049 
   Long-time use good Voluntary most 
likely to disagree 
PCCC most likely 
to agree 
0.025 
   Use once purchased PCCC most likely 
to agree 
0.011 
   Fun games & activities Hospital 
/rehabilitation 
least likely to 
agree 
0.006 
 Community paediatric 
from disability 
Community paediatric 
from adult-acquired 
<0.0001 
 
<0.0001 
Use once purchased Community 
paediatric most 
likely to agree 
0.004 
   Fun games & activities Adult-acquired 
least likely to 
agree 
<0.000
1 
   Research influences 
choices 
Community 
paediatric less 
likely to disagree 
0.024 
 Paediatric from adult 
clinicians 
<0.0001 Long-time use good Paediatric 
clinicians agree 
more 
0.024 
   Fun games & activities Paediatric 
clinicians agree 
<0.000
1 
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more 
   Research influences 
choices 
Paediatric 
clinicians agree 
more 
0.013 
2 Community paediatric 
from disability 
Community paediatric 
from adult-acquired 
<0.001 
 
0.014 
Read research regularly Community 
paediatric less 
likely to agree 
<0.000
1 
 Least recently 
qualified from most 
recently qualified 
Least recently 
qualified from mid 
recently qualified 
0.020 
 
 
0.026 
Read research regularly Longest qualified 
agree more 
Most recently 
qualified agree 
least 
0.003 
 Later years – 
dysphagia from mid 
years 
Later years – 
dysphagia from early 
years 
0.041 
 
0.022 
none   
3 Least experience from 
most experience 
0.028 Do harm by 
unvalidated therapies 
Most experienced 
agree more 
0.042 
 Managers from Basics 
Managers from 
Seniors 
0.0001 
0.024 
none   
 Emergents from 
experienceds 
Emergents from 
Experts 
0.001 
 
0.008 
Do harm by 
unvalidated therapies 
Emergents most 
likely to disagree 
and least likely to 
agree 
0.009 
 Least time –disability 
from mid time 
Least time –disability 
from most time 
0.002 
 
0.008 
   
 Early years – 
dysphagia from mid 
years 
Early years – 
dysphagia from later 
years 
0.013 
 
0.009 
   
 Professional 
qualification from 
more than 
professional 
qualification 
<0.0001    
 Hospital 
/rehabilitation from 
PCCC 
Hospital 
/rehabilitation from 
voluntary 
0.011 
 
0.005 
Do harm by 
unvalidated therapies 
Hospital 
/rehabilitation 
agree most 
<0.000
1 
 Adult-acquired from 
community 
paediatrics 
0.005 none   
 Paediatric from adult <0.0001 Do harm by 
unvalidated therapies 
Adult agree more <0.000
1 
4 Professional <0.0001 Not difficult to convert PQ+ agree more 0.001 
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qualification from 
more than 
professional 
qualification 
research into practice 
   No other options 
available 
PQ+ disagree more 0.013 
   Limited by availability PQ+ disagree more 0.053 
 Adult-acquired from 
disability 
0.040 Limited by availability Adult-acquired 
agree more 
0.019 
   No other options 
available 
Adult-acquired 
agree more 
0.006 
 Paediatric from adult <0.0001 Limited by availability Adult agree more 0.012 
   No other options 
available 
Adult agree more 0.005 
5 Least experienced 
from most 
experienced 
Least experienced 
from mid experienced 
0.001 
 
<0.0001 
Patient responsibility Least experienced 
agree most 
Most experienced 
disagree most 
0.036 
   Rely on clinical experts Least experienced 
agree most 
Mid experienced 
disagree most 
0.011 
 Early years – 
dysphagia from mid 
years 
0.003 none   
 Basics from Seniors 
Basics from Managers 
0.002 
0.003 
Patient preferences 
influence 
Basics agree most 0.037 
   Patients must take 
responsibility 
Basics agree most 0.043 
   Rely on experts Basics agree most 0.005 
 Emergents from 
experienceds 
Emergents from 
Experts 
0.001 
 
0.001 
Patient preferences 
influence 
Emergents agree 
more 
0.014 
   Watching working with 
other clinicians 
Emergents agree 
more 
0.030 
   Rely on experts Emergents agree 
more 
0.007 
 Professional 
qualification from 
more than 
professional 
qualification 
<0.0001 Patients must take 
responsibility 
PQ+ less likely to 
agree 
<0.000
1 
   Watching working with 
other clinicians 
PQ+ less likely to 
agree 
0.005 
 Paediatric from adult <0.0001 Patients must take 
responsibility 
Paediatric agree 
more 
<0.000
1 
6 Professional 
qualification from 
more than 
professional 
qualification 
0.003 What the patient brings 
to therapy 
PQ+ more likely to 
disagree 
Not 
signific
ant 
 Paediatric from adult 0.029 Patient–therapist 
alliance 
Adult disagree 
more 
0.008 
7 Hospital 0.015 Standards in the Hospital 0.065 
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/rehabilitation from 
community 
workplace /rehabilitation 
agree more 
9 Basics from seniors 0.036 Use because they work Seniors agree 
more 
0.046 
   Clinical experience best 
guide 
Managers most 
likely to disagree 
0.032 
10 -  More likely to believe if 
research attached 
Most time –
disability disagree 
most 
0.053 
11 -  Colleague learning 
influences 
Most experienced 
disagree most 
Seniors disagree 
most 
Experts disagree 
most 
Emergents agree 
most 
PQ+ disagree most 
Disability 
clinicians disagree 
most 
0.005 
 
0.034 
 
0.001 
 
0.001 
 
0.030 
0.066 
 
12 Voluntary from 
community 
Voluntary from 
Hospital 
/rehabilitation 
<0.0001 
<0.0001 
Person centeredness Voluntary agree 
more 
0.014 
 Disability from adult-
acquired 
Disability from 
community paediatric 
0.001 
 
<0.0001 
   
13 Most time – 
dysphagia from least 
time 
0.031 none   
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 Appendix 
Significant 
29 
therapies 
 
for 
 extracted factors  
FAC THERAPIES 
SIGNIFICANT 
GROUPS 
DIFFERING 
P VALUE STATEMENTS FOUND TO BE 
SIGNIFICANT 
P 
VALUE 
 1 COMMUNICATION 
BOARDS /BOOKS 
NEVER-USE AND 
ALWAYS-USE 
.001   
 ARTICULATION NEVER-USE AND 
ALWAYS-USE 
<.001 Those not choosing articulation 
therapy less likely to agree they 
rely on commercial products 
.043 
    Those choosing articulation more 
likely to agree they use therapies 
because they are fun 
.065 
    Those always-using articulation 
more likely to agree they don’t 
have enough time to develop 
practice 
.066 
 2 COMMUNICATION 
BOARDS /BOOKS 
NEVER-USE AND 
ALWAYS-USE 
.019 Those who SU communication 
boards least likely to agree and 
NU most likely (100%) with 
provision of rationales 
.020 
    Those who AU and SU 
communication boards agreeing 
far more than NU that they read 
research regularly 
<.0001 
 TEXTURE 
MODIFICATION 
ALWAYS- USE AND 
SOMETIMES USE 
.033 Those who AU texture 
modification more likely to agree 
with provision of rationales 
.002 
    Those who AU texture 
modification agree more that 
they read research regularly 
.005 
    Those who AU texture 
modification more likely to agree 
with sound theoretical basis 
.002 
 THICKENING 
LIQUIDS 
ALWAYS- USE AND 
SOMETIMES USE 
.058 Those who AU thickening liquids 
agree more with those who NU 
disagreeing strongly with 
provision of rationales 
.003 
    Those who AU thickening liquids 
agree more with those who NU 
disagreeing strongly with sound 
theoretical basis 
.001 
    Those who AU thickening liquids 
agree more with those who NU 
disagreeing strongly regarding 
goals that can be tested 
<.0001 
    Those who AU thickening liquids 
agree more with those who NU 
disagreeing strongly that they 
make efforts to keep up-to-date 
.058 
 3 THICKENING 
LIQUIDS 
ALWAYS- USE AND 
SOMETIMES USE 
.037 Those who AU thickening liquids 
most likely to agree more and 
those who NU  most likely to 
disagree that time can be wasted 
by use of  unvalidated treatments 
.005 
    Those who choose thickening 
liquids more likely to agree and 
.033 
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those not choosing more likely to 
disagree that harm can be done 
by unvalidated treatments 
4 TEXTURE 
MODIFICATION 
ALWAYS- USE AND 
SOMETIMES USE 
.015 Those who AU texture 
modification more likely to agree 
they are limited by availability 
.006 
    Those who AU texture 
modification more likely to agree 
that there are no other options 
<.0001 
 5 DOUBLE 
SWALLOW 
ALWAYS- USE AND 
SOMETIMES USE 
.018 Those who AU double swallow 
more likely to disagree that they 
rely on textbooks 
.002 
    Those who AU double swallow 
more likely to agree that they rely 
on clinical expertise 
.030 
 6 THICKENING 
LIQUIDS 
ALWAYS- USE AND 
NEVER-USE 
.051 Those who AU thickening liquids 
less likely to agree that any 
treatment will work if a therapist 
believes in it 
.001 
    Those who choose thickening 
liquids less likely to agree that 
any treatment will work if a 
therapist believes in it 
.045 
    Those who AU texture 
modification more likely to 
disagree that any treatment will 
work if a therapist believes in it 
.016 
    Those who choose texture 
modification more likely to 
disagree and less likely to agree 
that any treatment will work if a 
therapist believes in it 
.035 
 TEXTURE 
MODIFICATION 
ALWAYS- USE AND 
SOMETIMES USE 
0.029 Those who AU texture 
modification more likely to 
disagree that what the patient 
brings influences outcome 
.045 
 8 DERBYSHIRE 
LANGUAGE 
SCHEME 
ALWAYS- USE AND 
SOMETIMES USE 
.011   
 PECS ALWAYS- USE AND 
SOMETIMES USE 
.052   
 ORAL MOTOR 
THERAPY 
ALWAYS- USE AND 
SOMETIMES USE 
.005 Those who do not choose oral 
motor therapy less likely to agree. 
Those who choose most likely to 
agree that they use older 
textbooks 
.063 
    Those who NU and SU oral motor 
therapy less likely to agree. Those 
who AU most likely to agree that 
TV/ radio are sources of influence 
.011 
    Those who do not choose oral 
motor therapy less likely to agree. 
Those who choose most likely to 
agree that TV/ radio are sources 
of influence 
.033 
 TALKTOOLS ALWAYS- USE AND .010 Those who do not choose .008 
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SOMETIMES USE Talktools less likely to agree that 
they use older textbooks 
    Those who do not choose 
Talktools less likely to agree that 
TV/ radio are sources of influence 
.032 
 9 HANEN NEVER- USE AND 
SOMETIMES USE 
.013   
  NEVER- USE AND 
ALWAYS- USE 
.019   
 12 COMMUNICATION 
BOARDS /BOOKS 
NEVER- USE AND 
ALWAYS- USE 
.045   
 13 LAMH NEVER- USE AND 
SOMETIMES USE 
NEVER- USE AND 
ALWAYS- USE 
.024 
 
 
 
.006 
  
 PECS NEVER- USE AND 
ALWAYS- USE 
.045   
 COMMUNICATION 
BOARDS  /BOOKS 
NEVER- USE AND 
ALWAYS- USE 
.045   
 VIDEO 
FLUOROSCOPIC 
SWALLOW STUDY 
BIOFEEDBACK 
ALWAYS- USE AND 
SOMETIMES USE 
.032   
 TUBE FEEDING DID NOT DIFFER .042   
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Appendix 30 Development of coding 
 
First order coding 
 
 Group 1 Group 2 Group 3 Total % of total 
Q1 20 52 105 177 21.6 
Q2 32 39 67 138 16.8 
Q3 40 66 76 182 22.2 
Q4 84 85 155 323 39.4 
Total 175 242 402 820  
% of total 21.3 29.5 49.0   
 
 
First  order re-coding    
 Group 1 Group 2 Group 3 Total % of total 
Q1 63 105 133 301 22.6 
Q2 91 76 87 254 19.1 
Q3 92 105 85 282 21.2 
Q4 194 127 171 492 37.0 
Total 440 413 476 1329  
% of total 33.1 31.0 35.8   
Second  order     
 Group 1 Group 2 Group 3 Total % of total 
Q1 19 32 56 107 13.4 
Q2 55 51 59 165 20.6 
Q3 53 73 41 167 20.9 
Q4 117 93 151 361 45.1 
Total 244 249 307 800  
% of total      
Third  order     
 Group 1 Group 2 Group 3 Total % of total 
Q1 7 8 10 25 23.6 
Q2 7 7 11 25 23.6 
Q3 9 11 9 29 27.4 
Q4 11 7 9 27 25.5 
Total 34 33 39 106  
% of total 32.0 31.1 36.8   
Fourth  order     
 Group 1 Group 2 Group 3 Total % of total 
Q1 3 5 3 11 26.8 
Q2 3 3 4 10 24.4 
Q3 3 4 4 11 26.8 
Q4 3 3 3 9 21.9 
Total 12 15 14 41  
% of total 29.2 36.6 34.1   
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Fifth  order     
 Group 1 Group 2 Group 3 Total % of total 
Q1 2 3 3 8 21.6 
Q2 3 3 4 10 27.0 
Q3 3 3 4 10 27.0 
Q4 3 3 3 9 24.3 
Total 11 12 14 37  
% of total 29.7 32.4 37.8   
Sixth  order     
 Main  themes    
Q1 3     
Q2 4     
Q3 3     
Q4 2     
Total 12     
 Super themes    
All data 3     
 Meta theme    
All data 1     
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Appendix 31 Sample of initial coding – Question 4. 
 
 
Group 1 Group 2 Group 3 
What has worked 
Our own evidence 
Looking at evidence based practice 
Conflicting evidence 
Lack of scientific research 
An amalgamation 
Research is happening 
Went along with it 
Research is interesting 
It’s hard to be scientific 
The client and the relationship 
Science is ambivalent 
There’s the moral issue 
Your knowledge from college 
There’s loads of different variables 
Its problem solving so in that sense yes 
Your personality  
It’s not a hard and fast rule 
We’re tweaking it 
You need to apply it 
Use outcomes 
Pilot it 
Not a hard medical science 
Our complex children 
Throw in a little art 
Learning recording and researching 
Depends on the setting 
The child and the family 
The research environment 
Finite therapy 
Go on instinct as well 
Open to slight changes 
Scientific meaning quantitative research 
The patient’s perspective 
Discuss it with a peer 
That is a dilemma 
You can’t measure that 
Monumental 
Quality of life 
Scientifically we’re huge on diagnosis 
Having an open mind 
Looking for different reasons 
It’s personal opinion now 
Cures 
The only solution 
Practices of concern 
Amazing results 
Clinician internationally or nationally 
How valid is their research 
That’s not ethical 
The qualitative aspect 
If they pay for something 
Maintain professionalism 
You don’t know an awful lot about it 
Perceive it to be superior 
Because it’s a package 
Just causes problems down the line 
Mainly pushed by therapists 
That’s where my concern would be 
Accurate information 
I would go and check it out 
With research 
Might be experience 
You’ve tried it 
SLT is a scientific profession 
It’s a combination 
It’s not just black and white 
A bit inventive 
A bit artistic 
That’s science though 
That’s research 
Experiments 
If its theoretically based 
Why are those 
More than other professions 
Scope to be creative 
Medicine is very strict 
Is this working 
About evaluating 
What the patient wants 
Let’s try something else 
Something like palliative 
To modify what 
What does the family want 
Videofluroscopies all day 
Interpersonal with people 
A lot younger 
As the evidence gets stronger 
Real evidence 
Like America 
We’re very fortunate 
Foundation of something scientific 
Follow those protocols 
Looking at outcomes 
Figure out why 
A different environment 
Kinda the clinical experience 
Just in your head 
Just you know 
More comfortable 
We are clinicians 
Becoming more scientific 
Professions are being pushed 
I wouldn’t use the word scientific 
It’s a different science 
That’s par for the course 
Having funding 
Other reasons 
If there isn’t evidence 
Creating the evidence base 
Part of us being a scientist 
To see that its effective 
Everybody has responsibility 
It wouldn’t put me off 
Wasting patients time 
Could be a different client group 
Lots of different factors 
Your interpretation of it 
Not something we do here but 
Wide different varied practices 
Products designed to be 
Instils a certain confidence 
Yet we provide that service 
For Vitalstim either 
A little machine 
They know exactly 
A more detailed knowledge 
Know exactly what you’re targeting 
It is scientific 
Testing hypotheses 
With a hypothesis 
Isn’t remotely scientific 
That basic bit of it 
Without guidance 
For some it doesn’t 
Works 
Not in an RCT kind of way 
A lot of other aspects 
We don’t document 
About outcome measures 
Your research your experiment 
Prove or disprove 
The hard part for us 
Or art 
Being imaginative 
When the science isn’t directing you 
Both science and creativity together 
And the reflective 
We do assessments 
Our own clinical experience 
Evidence based research 
Other team members or colleagues 
Where there’s human interaction 
Impossible to control 
More science than art 
Define themselves a little more 
White coats 
We’re reluctant 
As something very desirable 
All that concreteness 
That kind of research 
Doesn’t really speak to what we do 
Value of the work 
Very uneasy relationship 
Like to be more scientific 
We need to tighten up things 
Trying to shoehorn 
A bit more confidence 
A bit more frothy 
Creative art we do is valuable 
For adults anyway 
Better realer more real 
Don’t really care about their scores 
Made a difference 
Considered a scientific kind of 
approach 
Measures that reflect that 
We’re probably more the qualitative 
side 
We’ve probably been shoehorned 
We work with humans 
We are scientists but 
The single case studies 
Things aren’t as black and white 
We need to look at the qualitative bits 
Peers who are very scientific 
They expect you to be 
Oh my god it doesn’t work 
Colleagues were saying 
The same sort of evidence 
We need to be upfront 
Worked in a hospital setting 
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I’d be very open 
They’d get suspicious 
It’s a grieving process 
Always be an alternative 
To have clear rationale 
Following professional guidelines 
There’s placebos 
We gave them the tools 
Our professional opinion 
The fact that a parent is engaging 
Where the idea came from 
Just getting anecdotal 
Just sell their product 
I think I certainly would 
Swings and roundabouts 
Why did I stop?  
Everybody did it 
Using bits of it 
Their own experience and knowledge 
It’s all our fault 
Wasn’t just referring about research 
evidence 
Our practical experience 
Fairly recent graduate 
Quite an emphasis now 
As much about fieldwork 
Seeing what works 
Actual scientific basis 
What you’ve tried 
The actual research 
Would be very conscious 
Not be very supportive 
It’s quite neutral 
Whether its effective 
Lack of research 
Evidence base in SLT in general 
An awful long time 
Delighted in the beginning 
A big thing against 
Becoming more scientific 
Read the research 
There’s nothing clear 
Research is there 
It’s interesting 
Can’t be scientific 
And myself 
How can you scientifically evaluate 
Don’t see how that can be scientific 
Affect the outcome 
I try not to let it 
Clients we find difficult 
Scientific issue in the broader sense 
It is a science 
The medical background a little bit 
Of the school 
Factors of the family 
Their diagnosis and all that 
It’s a package then 
To suit the needs 
Hard to compare them 
A particular group 
A very broad group 
If it’s actually appropriate 
The person you’re working with 
Using it as an idea 
Or sociology 
Not exact science 
As a profession 
Learning 
Recording 
A well packaged programme 
Its costly 
Some kind of quack stuff 
Blindly just doing something 
I would be worried 
Done your university training 
Your own clinical judgement 
The reimbursement scheme 
Evaluate that disconfirming evidence 
Start looking harder 
Marry the two 
Working with your patients 
A crap article 
A placebo effect 
Depends how much the therapy is 
Four days a week four weeks a year 
Selling a product 
There’s always going to be evidence 
A little bit sceptical 
Use it cautiously then 
It’s just quackery 
Formula 
Come up with ideas 
Quite creative 
Let’s try it 
Our profession is more 
A broad range of activities 
No real evidence 
That leeway 
Can be measureable 
And research 
How do you define art 
Your adaptiveness 
Undocumented stuff 
Lots and lots of practice 
A bit more quantitative 
Wouldn’t use the word scientific 
I would say there’s no 
There was an assumption 
Prevent you prior 
Evaluating approaches 
Balance it out 
The published literature 
It’s your own 
Not evidence based 
Are packaged products 
Yet we provide that 
With a training course 
Very functional approach 
And know exactly 
About Talktools 
As long as you’re scientifically 
Marketing things 
See how it matched up 
No 
With previous patients maybe 
Thought they were more relaxed 
You’re not going to jump to 
I’ve ten other patients 
Weigh it up 
Lots of evidence 
It’s pretty obvious 
 
Both invaluable aspects 
Gone a little bit wrong 
So frustrating 
We know so little 
Such a vast field 
It should be case studies 
To get to the point where 
There not real people 
Doesn’t actually tell you very much 
Cant transfer it 
Round and round and round 
Research is just kind of stuck 
You read something 
Much  more useful 
You have a real picture 
Apply to a similar client 
That’s not what I do 
I’m not too bad 
Do have scientific knowledge 
Very deeply integrated 
Learned in college 
Read an article 
Using it for five years 
Clinical experience didn’t include 
You know actually a lot of stuff 
Tend to put down 
A pinch of salt 
Or actually unpicking 
People are critically thinking 
Don’t think people would deny 
More reflective practice 
I wouldn’t call it quackery 
Big concerns 
Parents bought into that 
Someone else privately 
This is the programme 
Being sold 
It didn’t achieve anything 
Going to achieve 
Maybe they felt it did 
Sorry that I didn’t 
Maybe some of the listening therapies 
I’m not trained in them 
So I don’t know like 
We don’t know if they work 
Will just fix you 
Probably fairly unrealistic 
Maybe more impairment based 
therapies  
Seen worrying things 
Parents wanted a fix  
A quick fix 
Parents weren’t ready 
As functional as possible 
That isn’t going to happen 
Things that are expensive 
Anything with  huge promises 
Sometimes you have to travel 
One size fits all 
If the child failed 
It was just awful  
Pick up the pieces 
It just sounded awful 
It was big 
Haven’t heard of it recently 
Poor parents 
It didn’t turn out to be the holy grail 
People play on it 
Will do anything 
Kind of cynical 
Deconstructing clinical practice and searching for scientific foundations 
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And researching 
Worked in an acute hospital setting 
Working with say LSVT 
Evaluate that 
Population we work with 
Factors very difficult to control 
Overall emotional wellbeing 
The effectiveness of it 
Not 100% clear 
Might be easier 
Idea of finite therapy 
Lifetime relationship 
We’ve trawled the journals 
Do you not do it 
Be kind of cognisant 
That invalidates then 
Is science not the qualitative research 
Patient can view therapy 
You feel something 
Discuss it with a peer 
Doesn’t necessarily always show up 
Formal assessments 
Some therapies you can fix it 
You’re looking for 
I would have concerns 
Therapies being sold 
As the only solution 
About ABA 
It’s the way to go 
Generalise or whatever 
Provide accurate information 
Unless specifically trained 
Gains just not there 
Feel they are suffering 
A lot against 
Parents are looking 
Didn’t particularly work 
They’d get suspicious 
It’s to understand why 
Always be an alternative 
Holistic medicine and therapy 
Following professional guidelines 
Best for their child 
You’d do anything yourself 
Down to choice 
Or a pushy relative 
Getting anecdotal 
Very positive information 
Need other parents 
Haven’t been qualified all that long 
An instinctual thing 
An experience you know 
Everybody did it 
Still using their own 
If the evidence says wrong 
A bomb went off 
When you thought about it 
Don’t need to be as rigid 
A way that can be better 
Baby out with the bathwater 
Continue to use it 
Clinical effectiveness 
Depend on the research 
If you’re still happy 
Look at it 
You should probably write 
The time 
Looking to other opinion 
I would hope 
Kind of reinforce it 
Sometimes there’s a danger that 
The therapeutic relationship 
Something about the way 
Stopped using it 
Maybe people never loved it 
I never believed it 
When the research came out 
I was delighted 
Changing your practice 
Whole body of evidence 
Doesn’t mean it’s good research 
Shelve it 
There was a paper 
Not be so rigid 
The underlying issue 
Test through therapy 
Then change 
A lot of bubble blowing 
Doing an experiment 
What frustrates us 
Create solutions 
We take notes 
More secure in the medical 
The medical model 
Also measureable 
You take things away from it 
Find it reassuring 
Didn’t explicitly state 
If it’s completely at odds 
Are the findings reliable 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
